ssiMs^liiyS^sife^s 53ia.^^v:: ■< 



;i*, > -'r-^ <" 






COPYRIGHT DEPOSIT 




J^ u .wORTHiNliTON S-- CO. PUBLISHERS. HARTTORD. CONN. 





THE vSTORY OF TWO WARS 
AN ii.iA\sTUAri:i) nis'ioijv 

OUR WAR WITH SPAF.N 

AND 

OUR WAR WITH THE FILIPINOS 

Their Causes, Incidents, and Results 

A RECORD OF CIVIL, MILITARY, AND NAVAL OPERATIONS 
FROM OFFICIAL SOURCES 
WITH 
Full DescripUoHs of the Battles, Engagements, Exploits, and Achievements of our 
Soldiers and Sailors on Land and Sea, and many Thrilling Inci- 
dents and Experiences in Camp, Field, and Hospital 

INCLUDING 

THE LIFE AND CAREER OF ADMIRAL DEWEY 

And other Famous American Naval and Military LEAOERi 

BY 

Hon. HENRY B. RUSSELL 

Author of -Lift of William McKiiUey;' ''International Monetary Conferences," etc., etc. 
WITH AN INTRODUCTION 

BY 

Hon. REDFIELD PROCTOR 

Ex-Secrelunj of War, and United Slalen Senator from Vermont 

^uporMp 5ffu5tratoJ) 

WITII FINE STEEL-I'I,ATK I'OKTKAITS, MANY FULL-PAGE ENGRAVINGS FROM 

ORIGINAL DRAWINGS AND WAR PIIOT()(;UAriIS, AND 

NEW AND ACC'UKATE MAPS 



IIARTFOIU). CONN. 

THE IIAItTFOKD I'UHLISHING COMPANY 

1899 



39466 



Entered, according to Act of Congress, in tlie year 1898 

By A. D. WoETHiNGTON & Company 

In tbe Office of the Librarian of Congress, at Washington, D. C. 



rwo COPIES ;?gci£ivfe&. 



Entered, according to Act of Congress, in the year 1899 

By The Hartford Publishing Compant 

In the Office of the Librarian of Congress, at Washington, D. C. 








PERIODICALLY, in the history of every nation, there comes a crisis, 
questions liaving their small beginnings far back in the past develop 
to a fruition, the natural result of antecedent events, the legitimate 
offspring of all that lias gone to make up a nation's character and relative 
position in the world. These questions must be settled sooner or later, in 
accordance with the demands of progress ; they may be softened for a time 
by diplomacy or obscured by indifference and attention to other affairs, but 
the inevitable settlement is only postponed, the eventual crisis but gathers 
new force, and, in time, it must result in bloodshed or a backward step. 
Placed as Cuba was, belonging to a nation whose star has been for three 
centuries setting, close to the shores of a free people, whose course has for 
more than a century been ever upward, the issue could not be avoided. 
The war came. 

This event, like all in history, being inseparably linked with the past, 
it has seemed to the author that the developing causes were too important 
to a proper understanding of the conflict to remain unnoticed ; and this 
must be the apology, if any is needed, for the opening pages of this history, 
dealing not simply with the Spaniard and the Cuban and the reasons for 
the bitter hatred which grew up between them, but with the part both 
Spain and Cuba have played in the constitutional history of the United 
States. This long story is replete with many dramatic and romantic inci- 
dents, which take on a new color in the light of the war that closed so 
gloriously for American arms, and which give the conflict its true setting 
in the history of the world's progress. 

IJut, while briefly placing the causes before the reader, no space re- 
quired for a full narration of tiie incidents of the war has been sacrificed 
Though brief, the conflict has abounded in deeds of heroism, some of them 
without a parallel in military or naval history, and the character of the 
American people has been revealed in stronger colors not simply to other 
nations of the world, but to the Americans themselves. The last vestige 
of old .sectional feeling disappeared in the inspiring unity with which all, 
North and South, fell in behind the flag ; and, as the war clo.sed, our eyes 
were open to a wider vision, the promi.se of a grander destiny than we 
have been wont to consider in store for us For the war has brought new 
questions and new responsibilities ; in the future are suggestions of new 
experiences, possibly requiring a new policy. The Stars and Stripes now 

(iii) 



IV TREFACE 

float in the Antilles and over rich islands of the Pacific. Whatever comes, 
it has been shown that the people of the United States do not shrink in the 
face of duty to themselves and to humanity. 

The first edition of this work was as complete as it was possible to 
make it at that time. No pains or expense had been spared to provide the 
reader a reliable history of '-Our War with Spain," and it was fittingly 
closed with the Treaty of Peace between the United States and Spain of 
December 10, 1898. 

Later, the war clouds again gathered in the Philippine Islands, and 
the native insurgents, under the ambitious and crafty Aguinaldo, rebelled 
against the administration of any government in Luzon other than their 
own. Tiiey became insolent and assuming, then aggressive. By the 
terms of the Protocol with Spain the Lhiited States were to occupy and 
hold the city, bay, and harbor of Manila, pending the conclusion of the 
Treaty which should determine the control of the Philippines. The insur- 
gents ignored these terms, attacked our troops, and it became necessary to 
extend and maintiiin the military government of the United States, and to 
put down the rebellion with a determined hand. Hence followed our War 
with the Filipinos, the outgrowth of our War with Spain. 

As the demand for the work was great and daily increasing, the pub- 
lishers felt justified in making an entirely new set of plates, thus affording 
opportunity for thorough revision, which, while retaining all that was 
most valuable, made space for many important additions. Official docu- 
ments not given to the public until after the first edition was published, 
later accounts of battles, encounters, and adventures, as described by those 
who took a leading part in them, were available, with the result that the 
work is greatly enriched with matter of interest and value, and that may 
be relied upon as entirely correct New illustrations have been procured, 
many of which are from war photographs not elsewhere reproduced. In 
many cases the photographer risked his life for the sake of liis art, and the 
pictures obtained give a truthful impression of scenes at the front and be- 
fore and after hard-fought battles These furnish, as no written descrip- 
tion can, accurate ideas of the daily life and surroundings of our soldiers 
and sailors in the performance of their patriotic duty in our new possessions. 
Acknowledgments are due to Les'ies Weekly for permission to use some 
of the copyrighted illustrations that have appeared in that paper. Many 
new portraits and maps have been added, and the large colored maps have 
been carefully revised and brought up to date. The work in its new and 
complete form is offered to the public with the confident belief that it is as 
interesting and attractive as it is reliable and valuable. 




^ 




J^rom UDac l^botoflrapbs" anft <©rigtnal ©Cfiigns" ba Eminent Ptrtists, maDe 
fill? for tbifi booh 

¥ ¥ ¥ 

%i^t of ^tcd^lDlatc portraits? 



1. William McKinley, President of the United States and 

Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy Frontispiece 

Engraved from a special photograph approved liy the President. 

2. Portrait of Admiral William T. Sampson . Facing 324 

3. Portrait of Admiral George Dewey . . Facing 354 

4. Portrait of Admiral Wintield S. Schley . . Facing 408 

5. Portrait of Maj.-Gen. William R. Shatter . Facing 524 

6. Portrait of Maj.-Gen. Nelson A. Miles . . Facing 538 

7. Portrait of Maj.-Gen. Wesley Merritt . . Facing 570 

8. Portrait of Maj.-Gen. Elwell S. Otis . . Facing 600 



f ull^pagc pftotograburt o^ngratjings 



1. Eminent Spanish Leaders in Our War with Spain Facing 158 

2. Famous Cuban Leaders in Cuba's War with Spain Facing 1 76 

3. Eminent American Civil Leaders in Our War with Spain 

Facing 200 

(V) 



VI LIST OP ILLUSTRATIONS 

4. Destruction of the United States Battleship " Maine " in 

the Harbor of Havana, February 15, i8g8 Facing 240 

5. Prominent American Naval Officers in Our War with 

Spain Facing } 10 

6. Admiral Dewey's Great Victory. Annihilation of the 

Spanish Fleet in Manila Bay, May 1, I898 Facing 364 

7. Gun Crew of a Battleship Working a Monster 13 -inch 

Gun in Action Facing 388 

8. Start of the American Army of Invasion for Cuba from 

Chickamauga Facing 42S 

9. The Invasion of Cuba. United States Troops Embarking 

on Transports at Tampa, Fla, . . . Facing 432 

10. The First Bloody Engagement of the United States Troops 

in Cuba Facing 450 

11. An Alarm near the Spanish Line at Siboney. Cuban 

Scouts Rallying Around a United States Despatch 
Bearer Facing 4S8 

12. Block House at Siboney where the United States Troops 

First Hoisted the Stars and Stripes— Afterwards made 

a Base of Supplies Facing 464 

13. The Rough Riders Forming to Charge the Spanish Block 

House at Guasimas Facing 472 

14. Creeping up to a Line of Spanish Sharpshooters Facing 482 

15. United States Volunteer Infantry on the Way to the 

Battle of San Juan Facing 492 

16. Members of the Red Cross Society Carrying a Wounded 

Officer to the Rear during the Charge on San Juan 
Hill Facing 49s 

17. Bringing the Wounded to the Field Hospital from the 

Battlefields of San Juan and El Caney . Facing 504 

18. Prominent American Generals in Our War with Spain 

Facing 530 



LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS VU 

Eniilio Aguinaldo, F. Agoncillo, 1 

Leader of l^'iliiiino Insurgents. One of AguinaUio's Cliief Advisers. | _. , 

^9-jA Band of Filipino Insurgents on the Santa Ana [^^^^"^ 550 
[ Road J 

20. An Event of Great Historic Importance — Signing the 

Peace Protocol Facing 576 

21. Outpost of the Nebraska Volunteers, near Manila, where 

the trouble with the Filipinos Began . . Facing 612 

22. Advancing on the Filipinos — United States Volunteers 

Forming to Charge on the Insurgents on the Out- 
skirts of Manila Facing 618 

23. Just before the Battle of Caloocan — Section of the Utah 

Battery Ready to Shell the Filipinos . . Facing 626 

24. On the Firing Line just before the Battle of Caloocan 

Facing 638 

25. After the Battle of Caloocan . . . , Facing 644 

26. Part of the 2d Oregon Volunteers in Action on the Firing 

Line at the Battle of Pasig . . . Facing 660 

27. Part of General Wheaton's Flying Brigade in Action on 

the Firing Line at the Battle of Pasig . . Facing 668 

28. Waiting for the Battle to Open — United States Volun- 

teers in then- Trenches .... Facing 676 

[Dead Insurgents in their Trenches at Cingalon 1 
29.jDead Insurgents in their Trenches on the Battle- 1 Fj67//o C82 
l field of Caloocan J 

30. United States Volunteers Charging on the Defences of 

Malabon Facing 692 

31. United States Volunteers Resting beside their Trenches 

Facing 706 

32. Prominent Generals in Our War with the Filipinos 

Facins: 7\C) 



Vlll 



LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS 



lli^t of 3t^aps 



New Map of Cuba, in colors Facing 46 

Map of the City of Havana, and Havana Harbor, show- 
\\\g the Spot where the " Maine " was Destroyed Facing 46 

Map of the West hidies, in colors . Facing Chapter I 

Map of the Philippine Islands, in colors . Facing last page 

New Map of the Entire World, on Mercator's Projection, 

Last page of boo/i 



m colors 



6. Map of Cuba, showing its Provinces, Population, etc. 

7. Map of Havana, its Harbor and Defences 
Map of the Philippine Islands ...... 

Map of Manila and Surrounding Country 

10. Map of the Bay and Harbor of Manila . 

11. Entrance to Harbor of Guantanamo 

12. Map of Santiago and Vicinity .... 

13. Map showing Approximate Positions of the American 

and Spanish Fleets 

14. Map showing the Approximate Positions of the American 

and Spai.ish Fleets at the Close of the Battle 

15. Map of Eastern Cuba, showing Portion Surrendered to 

the United States at the Fall of Santiago . 

16. Map of the Island of Puerto Rico 

17. Map of the Hawaiian Islands .... 

18. Map showing Routes and Distances between the United 

States, Hawaiian Islands, the Philippine Islands, etc 

19. Map of Manila and the Surrounding Country, showing 

Operations of American Forces 



112 
324 
334 
348 
357 
449 
503 

514 
520 

533 

541 
547 

549 

615 




CHAPTER I 

SPANISH CHARACTER AND HISTORY — DISCOVERY OF CUBA 

— EXTERMINATION OF THE NATIVES — BUILDING OF 
MORRO CASTLE — SPAIN BESET BY ENEMIES. 

Spain's Domaiu in the Eighteenth Century — The Decadence of a Hundred 
Years — Spain's Daring Exi)lorers — Heroism and Fanaticism — Mis- 
taken Policy — Cohnnbus Hears of Cuba — Taking Possession for Spain 

— Extirpating tlie Natives — A Long Story of Rapine, Brutality, and 
Insult — A Bisliop's Testimony — Beginning of African Slave Trade — 
The World Divided — Tiie Resistance of Chief Hat uey -Efforts to 
Christianize Him before Burning Him at the Stake — Maritime Adven- 
turers — Growth of Spanish Settlements — Fortifying Havana — Build- 
ing of Morro Castle — Monopolies and Restrictions — Surrender of 
Havana to the English — Cuba Restored to Spain, ... 49 

CHAPTER II 

SPAIN AT THE FEET OF NAPOLEON— HER DISASTROUS AND 
DISGRACEFUL FAILURES — EARLY RELATIONS BETWEEN 
SPAIN AND THE UNITED STATES. 



Napoleon's Ambition to Make Spain a Subject Kingdom — Ferdinand's 
Intrigues — Joseph Bonaparte on the Throne — Fall of Napoleon 
and Restoration of Ferdinand — Revolt against Sp.iin — Mexico and 
South American Colonies Become Independent — Spain's Weakness 
and Cruelty — Always Failed to Restore Her Flag When Once Torn 
Down — A Policy Culminating in Disa.ster and Disgrace — Spain's 
Possessions in Washington's Time — Owning Over Two-thirds of What 
Now Constitutes the United States — Spain Secretly Cedes Louisiana to 
Napoleon — Jefferson's Diplomacy — Napoleon OlTers to Sell Louisiana 
— The Treaty Signed — Dispute Over Florida Boundaries — End of a 

Long Struggle, 59 

(i\) 



X CONTENTS 

CIIAPTEK III 

"THE EVER-FAITHFUL ISLE" — SPAIN'S SECRET ATTEMPTS 
TO SELL CUBA TO FRANCE — THE HOLY ALLIANCE AND 
THE FAMOUS MONROE DOCTRINE. 

Cuba's Peculiar Position — Importance of Havana — An Early Cause of 
Ill-feeling — Cubans Remain Faithful to Ferdinand — Aponto's Uprising 

— Agitation for the Suppression of the Slave Trade — Favorable Influ- 
ence of English Intervention in Cuba — "A Softer Word for Despot- 
ism" — Help for the Bigoted Ferdinand — Discord in Cuba — Adams's 
Advice to President Monroe — The Famous Monroe Doctrine — Retreat 
of the Holy Alliance — The Captain-General Endowed with Extraordi- 
nary Authority — Powers Misused and Unrest Fostered — The "Black 
Eagle '■ — Discord Among tlie Planters — Inauguration of Spanish 
Venality in Cuba — No Reforms for Poor Cuba — Spanish Treasury 
Depleted — The Queen's Plan to Secretly Sell Cuba to France — Class 
Hatred Grows in Cuba, 67 

CHAPTER IV 

FILIBUSTERING EXPEDITIONS AND THE DEATH OF LOPEZ 

— THE BLACK WARRIOR — Tim FAMOUS OSTEND CON- 
FERENCE—A CUBAN WARNING. 

Buclianan's Efforts to Buy Cuba — Spain Refuses to Sell — Lopez and 
His Uprising — His Filibustering Attempts — Capture of Colonel 
Crittenden and His Men — Lopez Killed by a Spanish Garrote — 
Private Filibustering — Important Letter of Edward Everett — A 
Change in Party Government — Cuba and the Cause of Slavery — 
A Sympathizer with Filibusters — The Blaek WarriorCa.se — Feeling 
against Spain Intensified — Soule Threatens Spain — Conference of 
American Ministers at Ostend — Fixing a Price on Cuba — The Mani 
festo — Effort to Secure Cuba — Buchanan Advises Annexation — 
Arrogance of Spanish Authority — Liberal Sentiment Strengtliened — 
Burdens Only Increased — A Cuban Warning, .... 77 

CHAPTER V 

REVOLUTION IN SPAIN AND INSURRECTION IN CUBA — 
BEGINNING OF THE TEN- YEARS WAR — COURSE OF THE 
STRUGGLE — FORMATION OF THE REPUBLIC— THE PEACE 
OF ZANJON. 

The Revolution at Cadiz — Wretched Condition of Spain — Flight of 
Isabella — Her Vain Appeal to Napoleon — Fires of Discontent 



I 



CONTENTS XI 

Break out in Cuba — Promoters of tlie Insurrection — High Stanfl 
ing of the Jjeailers — Tlie Prochimation at Yara — Jieginning of llie 
Ten- Years War — The Appeal to Arms — Tiie Burden no Longer to 
be Endured — Raiiid Growtii of the Insurrection — (hiban Leaders 
Meet to Form a Government — Diminution of Spanish Forces — Disa- 
greement among the Insurgents — Cisneros Succeeds to the Presi- 
dency—Six Years of Desultory Fighting —The Ilebelliou Nearly at a 
Standstill — Campos sent to the Island — An Armistice — The Treaty 
of Zanjon — Concessions and Privileges, ..... 86 

CHAPTER VI 

SPAIN'S STRAINED RELATIONS WITH TIIE UNITED STATES 
DURING TIIE TEN-Y^EARS WAR — THE TT7?6'AY/r.s' AFFAIR 

— A RACE FOR LIFE —EXECUTION OF CAPTAIN FRY AND 
HIS COMPANIONS. 

Situation Changed after the American Civil War — Spanish Fears — 
President Grant's Pacific Tenders — Significant Reply of Spain — 
Remarkable Decree of the Captain-General of Cuba — To be Shot Like 
Pirates — Methods of Spanish Warfare — The Virginius — Circum- 
stances of Her Departure— Sighted by the Spanish Cruiser Tornado 

— A Lively Chase — Burning Hams to Keep up Steam — Horses and 
Arms Thrown Overboard — A Race on the jMoonlit Caribbean — Cap- 
tured and Taken to Santiago — The First Execution of Prisoners — 
The American Consul's Messages Delayed — He Asks for an Explana- 
tion — An Impudent Note in Reply — Further Executions — Captain 
Fry's Death — Arrival of a British Gunboat, .... 92 

CHAPTER YII 

EFFORTS TO INDUCE SPAIN TO SETTLE —GENERAL SICKLES 
ASKS FOR HIS PASSPORTS AND SPAIN YIELDS — UNITED 
STATES INSISTS ON PACIFICATION OF TIIE ISLAND. 

Mini.ster Sickles Visits Castelar upon Hearing of the Virfjiniits A (fair — 
Curious Break-down of the Cables at a Critical Moment — Some Im- 
polite Replies — General Sickles Demands his Passports — The Span- 
ish Government Quickly Comes to Terms — The People Impatient to 
Recognize the Cubans — Fall of the Spanish Republic — America In- 
sists that the Cuban War Mu.st Cea.se — Intervention Threatened — 
Spain Makes Another Promise — Forbearance at Washington — Campos 
Ends the War by the Agreement at Zanjon — Canovas Refuses to be 
Responsible for tlic Cuban Settlement — Resignation of Canovas — 
Camjios Forms a Ministry — Di.sagreements — A Reform Act Pa.ssed — 
Great Cost of the AVar to Spain — Cuba Still in a Slate of Insurrection, 104 



Xll CONTENTS 

CHAPTER VITI 

CUBA AFTER THE TEN- YEARS WAR — THE CAPTAIN-GEN- 
ERAL AND IIIS EXTRAORDINARY POWERS — A SWARM 
OF SPANISH VAMPIRES— "CUBA IS UNDONE." 

The Government Liberal Only on Paper — The Captain-General and His 
Extraordinary Authority — The Cuban's One Ambition — Cubans Ex- 
cluded from Office — Discriminations in Provincial and Municipal 
Government — Spain's Deceitful and Crafty Policy — Replenishing- the 
Treasury at Home and Enriching the Functionaries — Two-thirds of 
the Island Practically Ruined — Enormous Increase of Taxation — 
Remarkable Growth of Cuba's Del)t — Pledging Cuban Revenues for 
Spanish Interest Payments — Not a Cent of it Spent to Improve Cuba 

— Excessive Import Duties — New Oppressions in New Disguises — 
The Prey of a Swarm of Vampires, . . . . . .111 

CHAPTER IX 

CUBAN EXILES, SECESSIONISTS, AND LEADERS— THE BAN- 
NER RAISED AT LAST— FIRST RESULTS UNPROMISING — 
SPREAD OF THE INSURRECTION. 

Exile of Many of Cuba's Best Citizens — Jose Marti and His Early Life — 
Imprisoned When a Boy — Deported to Spain — He Vows to Free 
Cuba — Becomes the Leader of the Secession Party — His Impassioned 
Address and Eloquence — Many Rebuffs and Disappointments — An 
Influential Friend — His Trusted Friends in Cuba — Fostering the 
Spirit of Revolt — Relaxation of the Vigilance of the Captain-General 

— Marti Starts for Cuba — Stopped by United States Authorities — 
Martial Law Proclaimed — The Outbreak in Matanzas — An Apparent 
Failure — Natural Advantages of Santiago de Cuba — A Forbidding 
Shore— "The Garden of Cuba," 117 

CHAPTER X 

POLITICAL TROUBLES IN SPAIN — GENERAL CAMPOS SENT 
TO CUBA — LANDING OF MACEO AND CROMBET — DEATH 
OF CROMBET AND NARROW ESCAPE OF MACEO. 

Spain Beset Within and Without — Officers Refuse to Volunteer — Sagasta 
Ministry Resigns — Canovas's Ministry — Campos Sent to Cuba — 
Maceo and His Record in the Ten-Years War — The Terror of the 
Spanish — How He Learned to Read — His Exile and Travels — A 
Hostler at West Point — An Ideal Guerrilla Chief — Crombet and 
His Record — An Obstinate Captain — Crombet Blows out the Cap- 
tain's Brains — They Land on a Lonely Shore — Their Sufferings — 
Feasting on a Banana Plantation — Surprised — Crombet Surrounded 



CONTENTS XIU 

and Killed — Maceo Escapes — AVanders Alone in tlic Woods — 
Betrayed by an Indian Guide — A Friendly Negro — In an Insurgent 
Camp — His Presence Works a Marvelous Change, . . . 122 

CHAPTER XI 

GOMEZ AND MACEO PERFECT THEIR PLANS — TRAGIC DEATH 

OF MARTI — MACEO'S BRILLIANT CAMPAIGN — NARROW 
ESCAPE OF CAMPOS. 

Arrival of Marti, President of the Cul)an Republic, and Gomez, Comman- 
der in-Chief — Influence of Gomez in the Central Provinces — Arrival 
of Canvpos — His plan to Confine the Revolution to Santiago de Cuba 

— Plan of Cami)aign Arranged by Gomez and Maceo — Gomez with 
Seven Hundred Cavalrymen Near the Enemy — A Wild Charge — 
The Spaniards Driven Back on their Reserves — Marti's Horse Be 
comes Unmanageable — Carried into the Ranks of the Enemy — They 
Fall upon Him — His Death — Campos Orders a Military Funeral — 
Barbers as Surgeons — ^laceo Plans an Attack — Death of Goulet — 
Maceo Turns the Retreat into a Charge, 134 

CHAPTER XII 

ORGANIZATION OF THE REPUBLIC OF CUBA — PECULIAR- 
ITIES OF CUBAN WARFARE — ONTO HAVANA! — THE 
FAMOUS JUCARO TROCHA. 

Campos Sends for Reinforcements — Landing of Other Cuban Leaders — 
Gomez Enters Puerto Principe — His Order for the Destruction of 
Sugar Plantations — The Reasons for It — Campos Leaves Santiago for 
Santa Clara — Cuban Delegates Meet to Found the Republic — A Govern- 
ment Largely on Paper — Gomez's Great Plan for a Westward March — 
Divisions of the Cuban Army — Gomez's Instructions — Tactics of the 
Insurgents — Their Advantages — The Nature of Alleged Spanish 
Victories — Cubans Constantly Pushing Further Westward — Campos 
Reinforces the Jucaro Trocha — Fifty Miles of Forts and Barbed AVire 

— Gomez's Plan to March 12,000 Men Over It — Maceo Deceives the 
Spaniards — Burning Sugar Plantations in Santa Clara — Insurgents 
Divide into Small Bands — All Cuba Under Martial Law, . . 144 

CTrAl^'KR XITI 

THE ADVENT OF AVEYLER, KNOWN AS "THE SPANISH 
BUTCHER"— HIS CRUELTY AND BARBARITY — THE FA 
MOUS $5,000,000 TliOClIA — DARING EXPLOITS OF MACEO. 

Campos Coldly Received at Havana — Spaniards Clamor for Sterner ^leth- 
ods — Campos Consults the Leaders — His Resignation — AVeyler's 



XIV CONTENTS 

Arrival — His Infamous Reputation — Commissioned Because of It — 
Progress of Gomez and Maceo — Weyler's Immense Forces — Largest 
Military Expedition Ever Transported by Sea — Strength of the Insur- 
gents — Object of Their Campaign — Weyler's Boastful Proclamations 

— Civilized War Abandoned — Weyler's Ineffective Military Opera- 
tions — His Big Fence — Maceo Crosses and Recrosses It Easily — 
Maceo Appears Where Least Expected — Turning Defeat into Victory 

— Death of Maceo's Brother Jose, ...... 158 

CHAPTER XIV 

DIPLOMATIC TROUBLES BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES 
AND SPAIN — THE SANGUILY CASE— CAPTURE OF THE 
COMPETITOix. 

A New Insurrection Proclaimed — Diplomatic Friction — The AlUanca 
Affair — Rights of American Citizens Ignored — Sanguily and Aguirre 
Arrested — A Sharp Interview — Threatening to Shoot American Citi- 
zens — The Consul's Strong Reply — Release of Aguirre — Sanguily 
Sentenced to Imprisonment for Life — His Lawyer Arrested and Placed 
in the same Jail — Spain's Protests and Complaints — American Sym- 
pathy with the Cubans — Palma Appeals for Recognition of the Cuban 
Republic — U. S. Senate Favors Recognition of Belligerency — Indig- 
nation of the Spanish Populace — The Belligerency Question — The 
Capture of the Competitor - Penalty of Death, .... 167 

CHAPTER XV 

WEYLER'S EFFORTS TO CAPURE MACEO — WEYLER PRO- 
POSES TO STRIKE A DECISIVE BLOW — THE NEW 
COMMANDER — DEATH OF THE LAST OF THE MACEOS. 

Maceo the Terror of the Spanish Nation —Weyler's Futile Efforts to 
Capture Him — The Largest Body-Guard Known in the History of 
War — Maceo as Undaunted as Ever — He Leaves Pinar del Rio — 
Was it a Spanish Trap ? — Attack at Punta Brava — How Maceo Fell — 
Gomez's Son Kills Himself at His Side — Cubans Rescue Maceo's Body 

— Rejoicing of the Spanish People — Excursions to the Spot Where 
Maceo Fell — Hopes of Cuban Surrender Disappointed — Weyler's 
Campaign of Destruction — Prefering Death to Captivity, . . 176 

CHAPTER XVI 

THE MURDER OF DR. RUIZ AND THE THREATENED RESIG 
NATION OF CONSUL-GENERAL LEE — RELEASE OF SAN- 
GUILY— ON THE VERGE OF WAR — SPAIN ALARMED. 

Congress Stirred by Stories of the Death of Maceo — The Cameron Resolu 
tion — Spanish People Aroused — Trying to Soothe the United States 



CONTENTS . XV 

— Spain Sooks Europoiin Support — " Iiulopcndencc or Death" — 
Weyler in Disfavor — Tlie MunU'rous Foudcviela — Killing of Dr. 
llni/ — No Notice Given to Consul-Genenil Lee — Lee Not Supported 
at Wasliington in His Defense of American Citizens — Arrest of Scott 

— Lee's Forceful Despatch — He Threatens to Resign — A Dramatic 
Climax — Cuban Sj'mpathizers Classed as Jingoes — Senator Sherman's 
Defense — Its Signilicance — Demand for a Ship-of-War for Havana 

— Sudden Release of Sanguily — Spain xVlarmed, , . . 183 



CHAPTER XVII 

THE CONDITION OF CUBA IN 1897 - IIELPLL3S WOMEN AND 
CHILDREN — AWFUL SCENES OF SUFFERING AND WOE- 
FACING STARVATION AND DEATH. 

Attitude of the ]\IcKinley Aduunistration — Another Decree of Autonomy — 
Wej'ler's War on the Paciflcos — On the Verge of Starvation — Unpar- 
alleled Scenes of Suffering — Weyler's Reasons for Concentrating — A 
Death Warrant to Thousands of the Innocent and Helpless — Driven 
from Burning Homes — Huddled in Swamps — A Plague Spot on Earth 

— A Spanish Account of Misery — The Living and the Dead Together 

— Scenes at the very Gates of Havana — Heaped Pell-mell like Animals 

— The Dead in the Embrace of the Dying — Extermination the Real 
Object — Daily Execution of Captured Peasants — The Massacres of 
Paciticos — The Dead Carts on Their Rounds — Facts Impossible to be 
Exaggerated — Incredulity in the United States, .... 192 



CHAPTER XVIII 

RELIEF OP STARVING AMERICAN CITIZENS IN CUBA — FAIL- 
URE OF WEYLER'S CA:MPAIGN — INCREASING MISERY ON 
THE ISLAND — ASSASSINATION OF CANOVAS. 

Suffering among American Residents in Cuba — The President Asks for 
$50,000 for Their Relief — Spain Watches Us Anxiously — The Mor- 
gan Resolution — Exciting Debate in the Senate — Its Effect in Spain 

— Sagasta Rebels — Canovas R^t^j^ns — Given a New Lease of Life — 
Reasf)ns for His Continuance and for Weyler's Longer Sta}' in Cuba 

— Political Conditions — Don Carlos — Canovas between Two Fires 

— Madrid Opinion — Superior Tactics of Gomez — Return of Com 
missioner Calhoun — Gen. Stewart L. Woodford Aiipointed Jlinister to 
Madrid — His Instructions — Nothing to Humiliate Spain— A Season 
of Waiting — Death of Canovas — Parly Quarrels Cease — Weyler 
Driven into Havana 200 



XVI CONTENTS 

CI I AFTER XTX 

THE STORY OF MISS CISNEIIOS AND HER REMARKABLE ES- 
CAPE—RECALL OF WE YLER — PENALTY OF DEATH TO 
ALL INSURGENTS TREATING WITH SPANIARDS. 

Weyier Retained by the New Premier — The Escape of Evangelina Cisne- 
ros — Her Romantic Story — Following Her Father to Jail — On the 
Isla de Pinos — Attracted by Evangelina's Beauty — Berriz in Close 
Quarters — Guerrillas Ajipear — Her Escape to a Cave — Found by 
the Guerrillas — Sent to Havana — Thrown into a Vile Prison — Sym- 
pathy Aroused in this Country — An Appeal to the Queen — Her 
Escape through a Barred Window — Smuggled on a Steamer in Boy's 
Clothes — Her Enthusiastic Reception in New York — The Queen Tired 
of Cuban Troubles — Her Farewell to Minister Taylor — Sagasta's Min 
istry — Arrival in Havana of Blanco, and Return of Weyier — Weyler's 
Grotesipic Failure — Release of the Competitor Prisoners, . . 210 

CHAPTER XX 

THE PRESIDENT'S MESSAGE — TRAGIC DEATH OF COLONEL 
RUIZ — RIOTS IN HAVANA— ARRIVAL OF THE MAINE 
IN THE HARBOR OF HAVANA. 

The Administration's Cuban Policy Outlined — Possibilities of Interveu 
tion — Opposition to Autonomy — Colonel Ruiz Hopes to Convert the 
Young Cuban Leader, Nestor Aranguren — The Latter's Reply to 
Ruiz's Letter — Aranguren Warns Him — The Meeting — Arangu 
ren's Own Story of What Happened — Ruiz Shot — Organized Relief 
for the Reconcentrados — Military Operations in the East — Disquiet- 
ing Reports — Lee Advises Having Warships in Readiness — A Deli 
cate Situation — Winter Drill of Nortii American Squadron — The 
Storm Breaks in Havana — "Death to Autonomy!" — Lee's Message 
— Blanco's Prompt Action — Death-Blow to Autonomy — Protection 
of American Citizens — The Maine Ordered to Havana — Strange 
Action of the Havana Authorities — Gen. Lee's Misgivings — The 
Maine Arrives Quietly — Demonstrations of Friendship, . . 218 

CHAPTER XXI, 

THE STORY OF THE BATTLESHIP JLIAV^"- THREATS AND 
WARNINGS -A STARTLING MIDNIGHT DISPATCH -THE 
MAINE BLOWN UP. 

The Story of the Maine — The Maine in Havana Harbor — Captain Sigs- 
bee's Precautions — Extraordinary Vigilance — The Hostility of the 



CONTENTS XVn 

S|);iiiisli R;il)I»lo — Warnings lluiidcd to C'aj)taiii Sigsbw; — Ilis Official 
Relations — No CVmiialily from Spanish Military Oflicers — Reporters at 
Hotel luglcterra — Story of a Letter from Weyler — Wcyler's Myste- 
rious Hints at Mines — General Aranguren Betrayed by a Negro 
Captive — Surrounded and Killed — Conditions Worse and Worse — 
Publication of the De Lome Letter — Characteristic Spanish Diplo- 
macy — De Lome Admits His Authorship and Resigns — Spain's Dis- 
avowal — A Better Feeling — A Midnight Dispatch — Startling News 

— "Maine Blown up" — An Awful Catastrophe, . . . 229 

CHAPTER XXII 

THE NIGHT OF FEBRUARY 15, 1898 — A FEARFUL EXPLOSION 
AND SCENES OF HORROR— REMARKABLE ESCAPES — THE 
WORK OF RESCUE — THE NEWS AT WASHINGTON. 

A Quiet Night in Havana Harbor — The Maine Swinging at Her Chain -- 
A Sudden Roar, a Crashing Explosion, and a ]\Iass of Flying ^ lames 
and Debris — The Shrieks of Dying Men — The Silence of Death — 
Captain Sigsbee's Escape — Standing on the Sinking Ship — Lowering 
the Boats — The Officers iu the Mess Room — Frightful Experiences — 
Lieut. Jenkins Groping in the Water — "Which Way?" — Lieut. 
Hood's Graphic Story — The Work of Rescue — A Last Call but no 
Answer from the Burning Wreck — Spanish Delight — Captain Sigsbee 
Leaves the Ship — Visits from Spanish Ollicers — Sigsbee's Dispatches 
to the Department — " Don't Send War Vesels" — E.xeitement at Wash- 
ington — Scenes at the White House — In the Cabinet Room — The 
Ollicial Impression — The General Impression — Sympathy of Spanish 
Orticials — Appointment of the Court of Inquiry 238 

CHAPTER XXIII 

PREPARING FOR WAR — EVIDENCE OF SPANISH TREACHERY 

— MILLIONS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE -A HISTORICAL 
MOMENT — THE DRIFT INTO WAR. 

Ellect of 111 • Maine Incident upon Our Cuban Policy — A Plain, Concrete 
Ciise — The People Remain Patient — The President's Policj' Inter- 
rupted — Reasons for the Accidental Theory — Not Really Believed in 
Official Circles — General Lee Informs the State Department that It 
Looked Like an Outside Explo.sion — Sudden Activity in Official 
Circles — Preparations for War — Orefion Ordered Home — Dewey 
Ordered to Concentrate His Fleet — Arrival and Dei>arture of tlie 
Vizcnya — Our Precautions for Her Safety — Spain's Responsibility for 
the Safety of the Maine — Deeper and Deeper Misery iu Cuba — Red 
2 



XVIU CONTENTS 

Cross "Work — Spain's Request for the Recall of General Lee — Her 
Reasons — Probing for the Weyler Letter — Laine's Arrest and Ex- 
pulsion — Lee Finds a Weyler Telegram — Corroborative Evidence — 
The President Seeks Support in Congress — $50,000,000 for National 
Defense — a Critical Moment in Our National Life, . . . 253 

CHAPTEK XXIV 

ATTITUDE OF EUROPEAN POWERS — INCREASING GRAVITY 
OF THE SITUATION — FINAL DIPLOMATIC EFFORT WITH 
SPAIN — REPORT OF THE COURT OF INQUIRY. 

Sounding European Governments — Friendly Attitude of England — Rea- 
sons for Cherishing an Alliance — Moral Influence of the Attitude of 
(he United States — The Spanish Court of Inquir}' — Marked Impres- 
sion Made by Senator Proctor's Speech — Differing Policies — Renewed 
Activity in War Preparations — Senator Thurston's Speech Enthusias- 
tically Received — Spain's Torpedo Flotilla Departs from the Canary 
Jelands— Hastening Diplomacy — A Critical Situation — Our Demands 
iqion Spain — Report of the Naval Court of Inquiry Submitted — Its 
Conclusions — Significance of the Keel Plates in the Wreck — Evidence 
Entirely Conclusive of Outside Explosion — Efforts to Fix the Respon- 
sibility — Suggestive Phrase from Spanish Report, , . . 263 

CHAPTEII XXV 

NEAPING A CRISIS — "REMEMBER THE J/^1//Yj5J" — SPAIN'S 
FINANCIAL STRAITS — HASTENING OUR NAVAL PREPA- 
RATIONS—SPAIN'S UNSATISFACTORY TACTICS. 

Public Impatience Restrained with Difficulty — The President's Trying 
Position — Radical Resolutions in the Senate — The President's Firm 
Hand — Liberal Victory in Spain — The Cuban Deputies — Arrival of 
the Vizcaya and Almirante Oquendo in Havana — Spaniards in Hostile 
Mood — Spanish Torpedo Flotilla and Its Movements — Spain's Appeal 
to Europe — Suicide of the Dynasty — Desperate Financial Conditions 
— The Church as a Holder of Spanish Bonds — Putting the United 
States Navy in Readiness — The Key West Fleet and the Flying Squad- 
ron — Apparent Concessions — Only for Effect — The Projiosed Armis- 
tice — Congress Becomes Impatient — The President's Reasons for 
Delay — Condition of Some of Our Battleships, .... 272 

CHAPTER XXVI 

THE COALING PROBLEM- SPAIN'S PRETENDED ASSISTANCE 
OF THE STARVING RECONCENTRADOS — AWAITING THE 
PRESIDENT'S MESSAGE. 

The Army Ready to Move — The Importance of the Coaling Problem — 
Spain's Small Supply — Coaling at Neutral Ports — Blanco's Orders to 



CONTENTS XIX 

Help the Reconcentrados — No Charity Except Through Fear of War 

— Spain Appropriates Money for Relief Fund — No Chance for Money 
to Pass the Spanish Olflcials — Appeal of the Autonomist Govern- 
ment — Position of the Self-professed Friends of Peace — The Influence 
of the Commercial Spirit — April 6th an Exciting Day — Waiting for the 
Message — It Fails to Arrive — General Lee's Request for Time to Get 
Out of Cuba — The President's Courageous Act — Bitter Attacks upon 
Ilim in Congress — Other Important Reasons for Delay — The Presi- 
dent's Expectation of War, 283 

CHAPTER XXVII 

THE JOINT NOTE OF THE SIX POWERS — QUEEN CHRISTINA 
ACTS TOO LATE — THE PRESIDENT'S MESSAGE AT LAST 

— "THE WAR IN CUBA MUST STOP." 

A Little Play Behind the Scenes — Attempts of European Powers to Act — 
Austria's Interest in the Spanish Dynasty — The French Investment in 
Spanish Bonds — Plans for a Joint Appeal — An Impressive Moment in 
the White House — The European Note — The President's Reply — 
Humanitarian Considerations — Novel Proceedings hi O'lr Diplomacy — 
Condition on which England and Russia Actc^^ — A Good Opportunity 
for the President — A Similar Request y''.de at Madrid — Spain Replies 
that She has Gone as Far as She Can — The Queen Takes IMatters in 
Her Own Hand and Would Go Further — Too Late — Blanco Ordered 
to Suspend Hostilities — Riots in Madrid — General Lee and Many 
Americans Leave Havana — No further Postponement of Message 
Possible — Useless to Listen to Spain's Insincere Diplomacy — The 
Message Submitted — History of the Troubles Reviewed — Spain's Pro 
posals as to the Maine — The Time for Action at Hand, , . 291 

CHAPTER XXVIII 

RECEPTION OF THE PRESIDENT'S MESSAGE — ARRIVAL OF 
GENERAL LEE AT WASHINGTON -EXCITING DEBATES IN 
THE HOUSE AND SENATE — OUR ULTIMATUM TO SPAIN 

— BREAKING OFF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS. 

How the President's Message was Received — A Plain, Unimpassioned 
Statement — Congress Expected Something More Fiery — General Lee's 
Arrival at Washington — Ovations on tlie Route — A Warm AVelcome 

— Resolutions for Intervention — The Question of Recognizing the 
Independence of Cuba — The Tension of Feeling — Coming Togetiier 
on the Final Vote — Report of the Senate Committee — A Time to 
Drop Party Differences — An Amendment to Recognize the Cuban 
Republic Passed — Disagreeing Action and a Conference — The Final 
Draft — Wisdom of Going to War Without Recognizing Cuba — The 
President Prepares His Uliimaluiu — Signing the Resolutions — Min- 



XX CONTENTS 

ister Polo Demands His Passports — Spanish Ministry Withliold the 
President's Despatch to Woodford — Riots in Madrid and Barcelona 

— Woodford Given His Passports, 398 

CHAPTER XXIX 

OPENING OF THE WAR — THE SPANISH AND AMERICAN 
NAVIES — DEPARTURE OF AN AMERICAN SQUADRON 
FOR CUBAN WATERS — THE FIRST SHOT OF THE WAR — 
THE CALL FOR VOLUNTEERS. 

Beginning Operations — Plans for Offensive and Defensive Action — Com- 
parison of the Spanish and United States Navies — Spain's Armored 
Cruisers — Superiority of Our Guns and Gunners — The Spirit of the 
Navy — Lieutenant Commander Wainwright's Plea for a Chance to 
Fight — Peculiar Positions of Antagonists — Spain's Best Ships neither 
in Cuhan nor Philippine Waters — The C'ape Verde Squadron — Specu 
)'Uions as to Naval Results — Spaniards Suspected of Dark Designs 

— Co'umodore Howell's Auxiliary Fleet — Blockading Cuban Ports 

— Departure oi \dmiral Sampson's Imposing Fleet — Commodore 
Dewey Ordered to Sail for Manila — Caution of the Naval Strategy 
Board — A Spanish Ship ^v.ghted — The First Shot of the War — The 
Spanish Flag Comes Down — Ot'.\?r Prizes Captured — The Call for 
Volunteers — Prompt Response — Reorganizing the Army — A Cause 
of Delay, 307 

CHAPTER XXX 

WAR FORMALLY PROCLAIMED — THE BOMBARDMENT OF 
MATANZAS — EXPERIENCES ON A MODERN AVARSHIP — 
COMMODORE DEWEY SAILS TOWARDS MANILA. 

Enthusiasm and Generosity among the People of the United States — Col 
lege Patriotism — Prompt Action by the Women of the Country — Red 
Cross Nurses — The Dangers of Yellow Fever — Surgeon-General's 
Warning — Rejoicing in Havana — Blanco's Grandiloquent Manifesto 

— Congress Formally Declares War — Spain Talks of Scandalous 
Aggression — Troubles in the Cortes — Importance of Securing a Base 
on Cuban Coast — Havana Ignored — Advancing to Matanzas — The 
Nature of the Bay — Waiting for the Word to Fire — A Shot from 
the Batteries — Engagement Becomes General — A Thrilling Sight — 
Following the Powerful Projectiles to the Target — Clouds of Smoke — 
Three Hundred Shots in Eighteen Minutes — The Piiritaiis Remark 
able Shot — Terrible Destruction — The Concussion of Great Guns — 
General Blanco's Report of Casualties — " A Mule Killed " — The Cape 
Verde Spanish Fleet Sails — Commodore Dewey Points his Fleet to 
wards Manila — Significance of His Orders, .... 320 



C'OXTFA'TS XXI 

("TTAT'I'KK XXX r 

THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS — TIIEIU EXTENT, CHAKACTEK, 
AND NATIVE LIFE — KEIJELLION OF THE FILIPINOS AND 
ITS THRILLING INCIDENTS — TH F TILVCHC DEATH OF DR. 
PIZAL — AGUINALDO AND COM.MODORE DEWEY. 

Magi'llan tlu' Naviiiator Hears of the AVoiidcrl'ul Spice Islands — Persuades 
the Spanish Kinii' that they Miiiht Belong lo Spain — Sailing Westward 
Instead of Eastward — Wonderful Voyage — Discovery of the Philip- 
pines — The Natives — Early Importance of Manila — The Slaughter of 
the Prosperous Chinese — Depressing Results — A Long and Ugly His- 
tory — Character of the Islands — Peculiarities of Spanish Government 

— The Uprising of 1896 — The Katapunan So(;iety — Appealing to the 
Filipinos — A Bloody Conflict — Outrages on Both Sides — A Hundred 
Prisoners Suffocated in a Single Night — Public Executions — Dramatic 
Incidents — The Romantic Story of Dr. Rizal — His Love Affair — Sen- 
tenced to Death — His Death — Aguinaldo's Exile, 331 

CIIAPaER XXXII 

COMMODORE DEWEY AND HIS SQUADRON — INCIDENTS OP 
THE CRUISE TO MANILA — SEARCHING FOR THE ENEMY 

— THRILLING SAIL PAST THE BATTERIES AND OVER 
THE MINES — ADVANCING TO THE BATTLE. 

Commodore Dewey's Scjuadron — Its Guns and Armor — Dewey's Service 
in the Navy — Admiral Porter's Tribute — Proclamation of the Gov- 
ernor-General of the Philippines — Bombastic Encouragement — 
Dewey's Cruise to Manila — Rolling in the China Sea — " Prepare for 
Action " — Practice on the Way — Stripping the Ships — All Unneces- 
sary Articles Thrown Overboard — A Look into Subig Bay — Move- 
ments of the Spanish Adnural — AVhy He Retired to Manila — The 
United Slates Scjuadron Holds a Council of War — Dewey Announces 
His Purpose to Enter ^lanila Harbor that Night — Engines Started 
Again — Men Q;netly Sent to Their Guns — In Sight of the Forts — 
Increa.sing the Speed — Silent and Alert — Discovered at Last — 
Silently Onward — Breakfast af the Guns— Heading for Battle, 343 

CHAPTER XXXIII 

THE NAVAL BATTLE OF MANILA BAY— A TERRIBLE STORM 
OF SHOT AND SHELL — SCENES OF BLOOD AND CARNAGE 

— ANNIHILATION OF THE SPANISH FLEET — COMMODORE 
DEWEY'S (JREAT VICTORY. 

Commodore Dewey's Stiuadron in Battle Array — Advancing Silently 
towards the Enemy — Mines Exi)Ioded in Front of the Olymput — 



XXll CONTENTS 

"Remember the Maine!" — The Time for Action Comes — Torjiedo 
Launclies Veuture an Attack — Rapid Guns — Tlie Ileina CliHstiiui At- 
tacks the Olyinpia — Meets with a Terrible Fire — Destructive Shot of 
the Boston — Retiring for Breakfast — Taking Account of Damages — 
The Fury of the Second Attack — Spaniards Figliting Desperately — 
Defiant Gunners Swallowed Up in the Bloody Water — Escape of the 
Spanish Admiral — A Gruesome Sight — Ships Burnt, Sunk, and De- 
serted — Surrender of the Fort — Care of the Wounded — Experiences 
on the American Ships — Cutting the Cable — Commodore Dewey's 
Modest Despatches, .... .... 854 

CIIAPTEE XXXIV 

AWAITING ADMIRAL CERVERA AND HIS SPANISH FLEET — 
ANXIETY FOR THE BATTLESHIP 0i2^(?0aV— CERVERA'S 
UNEXPECTED ARRIVAL AT MARTINIQUE. 

A Pe--.'od of Uncomfortable Uncertainty — Where would Cervera Appear ? 

— Relative Distances of the Hostile Squadrons — Three Theories as to 
Cervera's Probable Course — Plausibility of the Theory that He might 
Intercept the Oregon — The Oregon at Rio Janeiro — Captain Clark has 
no Fear of Spanish Fleet — Possibility of a Spanish Attack on Coast 
Cities — General Opinion that Cervera would Steer for Puerto Rico — 
Admiral Sampson Starts Out to Meet Him — His Formidable Fleet — 
The Anticipated Battle — Days of Anxious Waiting — Strategists all at 
Sea — Renewed Concern for the Oregon — Strength of the Spanish 
Cruisers — Astonishing Announcement that Cervera had Returned to 
Cadiz — News from London — Spanish Denials Disbelieved — Sudden 
Preparations for Invading Cuba — Cervera Sighted ofE Martinique — 
Sampson Shells the Forts of San Juan, 374 

CHAPTER XXXV 

ADMIRAL SAMPSON'S B0MBARD:\IENT OF SAN JUAN — 
THRILLING SCENES DURING THE ACTION — SKILLFUL 
AMERICAN GUNNERY — SAMPSON'S WITHDRAWAL. 

Admiral Sampson's Cruise to Puerto Rico — The Gallant Sailors Expect a 
Great Fight — Approaching San Juan — Preparations for the Combat 

— San Juan Learns of Sampson's Approach — The Iffioa Becomes the 
Flagship — Peculiarities of San Juan Harbor — Admiral Sampson's 
Plan of Attack — Running up the Stars and Stripes — Speeding into 
the Bay — The Duty of the Wompatiick — Sampson, Finding Cervera 
Absent,' Decides to Shell the Forts — The First Shot — The Music of 
the Projectiles — Spaniards Return the Fire Vigorously — Bravery of a 
Spaniard at an Old Gun — Some Dangerous Guns on the Forts — 
Marksmanship as Worthless as Spanish Promises — "Threaten, Puff, 
Splash ! " — Cruising by the Forts Three Times — Shells Land on the 



CONTENTS XXIU 

New York and loira — Owe jNIan Killed — Not even a Spanisli Gunboat 
in the Harbor, . ... ... 383 

CHAPTER XXXVI 

INCIDENTS ON THE BLOCKADE LINE — FIRST AMERICAN 
BLOODSHED AT CIENFUEGOS -THE BRAVE AND BLOODY 
FIGHT OF THE TORPEDO-BOAT WINSLOW AT CARDE- 
NAS—SWEPT BY SHOT AND SHELL. 

The Blockade in Early May — The Capture of the Z^(/"rtye«e — Recklessness 
of Some of the American Vessels— Work of Cutting the Cables — Eager 
Volunteens for a Dangerous Task — Advancing Close to Shore in 
Launches and Cutters — Fire from the Spanish JMasked liatteries — Men 
Drop at their Oars — Ship's Guns Drive the Spaniards to Slielter — 
Dead Men in the Cutters — Shelling the Lighthouse — First Adventure 
of the Torpedo Boat Winslow — Laying a Trap for the Spaniards — In 
a Nest of Red Buoys — A Spanish Trap — Deadly Fire Pours, in on 
the Winslow — The Hudson to the Rescue — A P^ital Shell — Death of 
Ensign Bagley and his Men — Scattering a Spanish Garrison, . 396 

CHAlxEK XXXVII 

CHASING CERVERA'S FLEET — THE FLYING SQUADRON — 
DAYS OF UNCERTAINTY — SAMPSON AND SCHLEY AT 
KEY WEST AND CERVERA AT SANTIAGO. 

Cervera Raises another Question for the Strategists — Schley Receives Orders 
to Leave ILunpton Roads — Cervera Reported at Curasao — He Seeks 
Coal and Supplies — Sampson a Day's Sail from Santiago — More Days 
of Uncertainty — Cervera and Sampson Both Sailing in the Same 
Direction — Sampson and Schley arrive at Key West and Cervera at 
Santiago — Cervera's Luck as a Dodger — How He Entered Santiago 
while our Scouts were away — Schley Hurries to the South Coast of 
Cuba — Unaware of Cervera's Arrival at Santiago — Schley Prepares to 
Attiick Cervera at Cienfuegos — Finds Cervera is not There and Pushes 
on to Santiago — Doubt as to Whether Cervera is Really There — 
Schley Steams up before Santiago . 406 

niAPTKR XXXVI ri 

IN THE HARBOR OF SANTIAGO — ADMIRAL CERVERA'S AL- 
LEGED STRATEGY — COMMODORE SCHLEY MAKES SURE 
HE HAS THE ENEMY- CERVERA "BOTTLED IP." 

A Beautiful IIar])or — Morro Castle — Background for Many Bloody 
Scenes — The Winding Channel and the Bav — Irrational Movemeuls 



XXIV CONTENTS 

of the Spanish Admiral — Guided Largely by Necessities — Opportunities 
which He Refused to Embrace — Evidence of Cervera's Presence in 
the Harbor — All Doubts llemoved — Schley's Attack on the Forts — 
Cervera's Ships Fire at Random over the Hills — Remarkable Reports 
from Madrid — Too Late for Falsehoods — Cervera "Bottled up" — 
The Government at Once Takes Steps to Send Forces to Santiago — 
Admiral Sampson Arrives at Key West and Prepares to Join Schley 

— The Monitors Left Behind — Remarkable Trip of the Oreffoii — Thir- 
teen-thousand-mile Run and then to Battle — Admiral Sampson Takes 
Command — Organizing the Army — Found Unprepared at the Last 
Moment — The Departure at Last, 420 

CHAPTER XXXIX 

THE BRAVE DEED OF LIEUTENANT HOBSON AND HIS CRE\"v' 

— GOING INTO THE JAWS OF DEATH — FEARFUL EXPE- 
RIENCES AND A WONDERFUL ESCAPE. 

Plans for Destroying or Capturing Cervera's Fleet — Hobson Presents a 
Plan to Prevent His Escape — Admiral Sampson Gives His Consent — 
Preparing the Merrimac for a Dangerous Trip — Asking for Voliu- 
teers — Drawing Lots — Details of i±oi)son's Plans — Preparations 
Made at Last — The Crew as Selected — Hobson Speaks of His Chances 
of Success — Battleships take up Position at Sunset — Hobson Appears 
on the Bridge — Everything Ready — The Merrimac Moves in — 
Watching in Breathless Interest — Disappearing in the Mist of the 
Sliore — A Blaze of Fire — Tlie Search of the Little Launch — Hobson 
Given up for Lost — How He Steamed into the Sheet of Flame — A Mine 
Explodes under the Merviiudc — On the Deck in a Hail of Shot and 
Shell — Slipping Overboard and Clinging to the Catamaran — A Spanish 
Launch Appears — An Offer to Surrender — " It was Admiral Cervera " 

— Prisoners in Morro — Their Fate Made Known, . . . 436 

CHAPTER XL 

LANDING OF MARINES IN GUANTANAMO BAY — SUR- 
ROUNDED BY HIDDEN ENEMIES — SPANIARDS CAUGHT 
AT LAST — SHARP NAVAL FIGHT xlT SAN JUAN. 

Spaniards Strengthen Their Position — Bombarding the Forts at the 
Harbor Mouth — The R'ina Mercedes AY reeked — Looking for a 
Possible Place for the Army to Land — Pluck of the Naval Re- 
serves — Lauding the IMarines — Preparing Camp McCalla — Its 
Peculiar Position — Fatal Search for the; Enemy— No Sleep for the 
Marines — Mauser Bullets Continually Whistling Through the 
Q.,iiip — Bravely Facing the Fot — rntcnable Position of the Camp 

— Spaniards Fire upon a Funeral Cortege — Driving Them Back 
and Resuming the Services — Attacked from a New Quarter— A 



CONTENTS XXV 

Critical Situation — TIic Enemy Caught in a Trap — Slaugliteivd 
without Mt'iry — Tlie Camp Moved to a Less Exposed Position — 
The Blockade of San Juan — Arrival of the St. Paul— The Teiror 
Makes an Attack — Broadside from the tit. Pmd, . . . 447 

CHAPTER XLI 

LANDING OF THE TROOPS AT DAIQUIRI AND SIBONEY — 
THE ADVANCE TIII{OUGII CUBAN THICKETS — A MAG- 
NIFICENT CHARGE AND A DECISIVE VICTORY. 

Arrival of the Transports with General Shafter's Army — Admiral Samp- 
son and General Shafter Consult — Meeting the Cuban Leaders — 
Enthusiastic Cubans — Dai(|uiri Selected as a Landing Place — Plans 
and Preparations —Anticipating an Attempted Escape by Cervera — 
Incidents of a Difficult Landing — Unfurling the Stars and Stripes — 
On the Road to Santiago — Yankee Ingenuity — The Enemy's Retreat 
to Guasimas — General Wheeler Decides to Attack — Moving Ahead 
on Diflicult Trails and under a Burning Siui — The Music of a Mauser 
Bullet — Rough Riders Attacked — A Fierce Battle is On — Deploying 
Through the Thickets — Death in the Ranks — A Relentless Advance 
— Victory and a Well-earned Rest — The Dead and Wounded — 
Camara Leaves Cadiz — His Trip to the Suez Canal, . . 463 



CHAPTER XLII 

CONTINUED ADVANCE OF THE AMP:RICAN TROOPS — GEN- 
ERAL SHAFTER ARRIVES AT THE FRONT - PREPARA- 
TIONS P^OR A GENERAL ATTACK — INGENIOUS SPANISH 
DEFENSES. 

Advancing the American Lines — The Spanish Retreat — Trials of the Trail 

— Soldiers Pusiiing Ahead Faster Thau Supplies Could be Brought 
Up — Impossible to Land Heavy Guns — Cutting a Way Through 
Tropical Jungles — General Shafter Leaves the Ship — Tlie Cuban 
Soldiers — A Remarkable Collection of Warriors — Famished and 
Naked Patriots — No Understanding of Organized War — Their 
Value a.s Scouts and Guides — Their Aversion to Spades and Picks — 
Good Reasons for an Immediate Attack — Dangers of Die Climate- 
Stretching (he Line Northward — Within Rille Range of the Enemy — 
Traps Laid l)y the Spaniards — Disguised Sliarpshooters in the Treetoi)S 

— Ritle Pits Trained on the Oiieriiiigs through Wiiicli our Troops Must 
Advance — Riflemen Placed Like ^lachiiie (Juns — The Block Houses 
and Ma.sked Batteries — Inadequate Hospital Arrangements — The 
Greatest Land Battle of ihr War IT'.t 



XXVI CONTENTS 

CHAPTEE XLTII 

DESPERATE AND BLOODY FIGHTING AT SAN JUAN, EL 
CANEY, AND AGUADORES — INADEQUATE PROVISION 
FOR THE SUFFERING WOUNDED — A DARK OUTLOOK. 

The Morning of July First — Grimes's Battery Opens Fire — The Spanish 
Reply — The Advance in the Center towards San Juan — A Telltale 
Balloon — Critical Position of the Seventy -first New York — Storming 
the Hill — General Hawkins's Brave Charge — Capturing the Spanish 
Position — Roosevelt Leads the Charge up San Juan Hill — Lawton's 
Attack upon El Caney — Desperate Defense of the Spaniards — The 
Dash of the Colored Troops — Storming the Fort — El Caney Falls — 
General Duffield's Attack at Aguadores — Inadequacy of Hospital 
Arrangements — Terrible Suffering but Brave Endurance of the 
Wounded — Provisions Run Short — General Shafter Sick and Dis- 
heartened — A Dark Outlook — Looking to the Fleet for Help — Cer- 
vera Receives Orders to Escape, 490 

CHAPTER XLIV 

ADMIRAL CERVERA'S ATTEMPTED ESCAPE — ANNIHILA- 
TION OF THE SPANISH FLEET — THRILLING INCIDENTS — 
THE RESCUE AND SURRENDER OF CERVERA AND THE 
REMNANT OF HIS CREWS. 

The Waiting American Squadron — Admiral Sampson Departs to Consult 
with General Shafter — Watching Suspicious Smoke Beyond the Ridge 
— The Enemy Appears — Commodore Schley's Prompt Action — The 
Spanish Cruisers Emerge from the Harbor — Pictures of Smoke and 
Fire — Network of Bursting Shells — Cervera's Tactics — Pouring 
Shells upon the Spanish Cruisers — The Chase Begins — Appearance of 
the Pluton and Furor — AViunwright's Handling of the Gloucester — 
His Quick and Fearless Advance — Destruction of the Destroyers — 
Admiral Sampson Turns Back from Siboney — The Infanta Maria 
Teresa and the Almirante Oquendo Run Ashore — Gallant Rescue of 
the Spanish Crews — Chase of the Colon — Working the Spaniard into a 
Trap— The Surrender, 510 

CHAPTER XLV 

THE SURRENDER OF SxVNTIAGO — TRYING POSITION OF 
THE ARMY — RELEASE OF HOBSON AND HIS CREW — 
THE PUERTO RICAN CAMPAIGN. 

General Shafter Calls upon Gen. Toral to Surrender — Refu.sal of the Span- 
ish Commander — Refugees from the City — Fruitless Negotiations — 



CONTENTS XXvii 

The Exchan.i^e of ITobson and His C'rcw— Their Warm Welcome — 
American liines Advanced —yircn-^tlicning the American I'osilion — 
The Truce Ends — r>oml»ardment of the City — Another Demand for 
Surrender — A Council of Ullicers — Arrival of General Miles — Alarm- 
ing Condition of Our Army — Insufficient Provisions — SulTering of 
the Sick and Wounded — Toral Asks for JMore Time — An Agreement 
Reached — Conditions of the Capitulation — The President's Message to 
General Shafter — Occupation of the Citj^ — Looking over the Spanish 
Defenses — "Yellow Jack" Appears — Obstacles "Which Our Army 
Overcame — Shafter and Garcia — The Campaign in Puerto Rico — 
General Miles's Easy and Triumi)hal Advance — Ponce Welcomes 
American Troops — Last of the Fighting 524 

CHAPTER XLVI 

THE SITUATION IN THE PHILIPPINES —PHILIPPINE EXPE- 
DITIONS—ANNEXATION OF THE HAWAIIAN ISLANDS — 
AGUINALDO, THE INSl'KGENT LEADER. 

The Philipijinc Question at Home — Policy of Expansion — A Complicated 
Situation — General Merritt Designated to Lead the Expeditions — 
Apprehension of Trouble with Germany — Dewey's Tactful Manage- 
ment — The Archbishop's Proclamation — Circulating False Reports 
and Sensational Stories — The Insurgents Threaten TrouljU- — The 
First Expedition under Way — Annexation of the Hawaiian Islands 

— General Merritt Takes Possession of the Ladrone Islands — The 
Irene Incident — A Plain Statement from Admiral Dewey — Reports 
and Rumors — Aginnaldo, the Young Insurgent — His Education and 
Character — A Clever and Automatic Campaign, , , . 543 

CirAPTER XLVIT 

AGUINALDO AND THE AGUINALDIANS —EQUIPMENT AND 
ARMS OF HIS MEN — NOT SOLDIERS BUT BUSHWHACKERS 

— CHARACTERISTICS OF THE FILIPINOS. 

The Young Insurgent Chief — Proud of His iSIilitary Ability — A Council 
of Young Men Only — The Tagals his Only Supporters — An Army of 
Boys — White Cotton Uniforms — Taking Turns at ^Military Duty — A 
Mauser in One Hand — A White Flag in the Other — No Artillery or 
Cavalry — Fighting in Trenches — Faith in Talismans — Living on a 
Handful of Rice — Intelligent Filipinos Desire the Support of a Strong 
Nation — Unlit to IManage Their Alfairs Alone — Dread of Aguinaldo's 
Mastery — Mental Characteristics of the Filipinos — Rash and Illog 
ical — Exaggerated Ideas of their Ability as Fighters — ^Mistaking 
American Kindness for Fear — Sealing Their Own Fate, . . 553 



X XVI 11 CONTENTS 

CITAPTEPi XLVTTT 

ARRIVAL OF GENERAL MERRITT AT MANILA— CONDUCT 
OF THE WILY AGLINALDO— FIGHTING BEFORE MANILA- 
THE COMBINED ATTACK UPON THE CITY AND ITS FALL. 

Aguinaldo Proves Troublesome to Geueral Anderson — The Filipino Leader 
Attempts to Dictate to Americans — Arrival of the Second Expedition 

— The Humiliating Situation of the Spaniards — General Anderson's 
Curt Note to Aguinaldo — Obstacles Placed in the Way of the American 
Troops — General Merritt's Narrative of the Situation in which he 
Found Matters — He Holds no Communication with Aguinaldo — 
Working in Fn^nt of the Insurgent Lines — The Night Attack of July 
31st — Planning for a Combined Attack upon the City — The Joint 
Demand for Surrender — Dewey Begins the Bombardment of the City 

— The Position of the Fleet — The Advance of the Army — Entering 
the City — Manila in Possession of United States Troops, . . 561 

CHAPTER XLIX 

SPAIN SUES FOR PEACE — SIGNING OF THE PROTOCOL — 
STORY OF THE PARIS PEACE COMMISSION AND ITS 
LABORS — THE FINAL TREATY OF PEACE. 

Spain's Reluctance to Yield — Her Embarrassed Condition — Don Carlos 
and Weyler — Cortes Dissolved in Disorder — Overtures through the 
French Minister —Reply of the United States — Terms of the Protocol 

— A Swiftly Decisive War — Condition of Our Army in Cuba — 
Commissions for the Evacuation of Cuba and Puerto Rico — Evacua- 
tion of Havana — A Day to be Long Remembered — The Stars and 
Stripes Everywhere — Simple but Imposing Ceremony — The Flag of 
Spain Lowered — Grief of the Captain-General — " We Are no Longer 
Enemies " — Cubans Beside Themselves with Joy — General Brooke 
Becomes Governor of Cuba — The Peace Commission and its Work — 
Dispute as to the Disposition of the Philippines — The Treaty 
Signed, 574 

CHAPTER L 

THE TREATY OF PEACE — SPAIN RELINQUISHES ALL TITLE 
TO CUBA— THE FINAL ACT— END OF OUR AVAR WITH 
SPAIN. 

Articles of the Treaty — Our New and Rich Possessions — Islands in Both 
Eastern and Western Ilemisiiheres — Twenty Million Dollars to be 
Paid to Spain — Spanish Trooi)S to be Sent Home — Prisoners of War 
and Political Prisoners to be Released — Civil Rights to be Determined 



CONTENTS XMX 

l)y Congress — The Treaty Ilatified — Excliange of Dociimeiils at tlic 
White House — Impressive Ceremony — Message of President MeKin 
ley — An Eventful Year — Genuine Heroism of our Soldiers and 
Sailors — What tlie War Brought to this Nation — A Lesson to Spain 
— Patriotie and Prudent Policy of the President — A Rich Legacy for 
the Future, 589 



CHAPTER LI 

TilE SITUATION IN THE PHILIPPINES — MAJOR-GENERAL 
OTIS IN COMMAND AT MANILA — FIRST SKJXS OF HOS- 
TILITY FROM THE FILIPINOS — SAXDICO'S TREACHERY — 
AGUINALDO AND HIS FALSE CLALMS. 

iJriff Skctcli of the Career of our Couunander-in-Chief in the Philippines 

— His Ciiaracteristics — Aguinaldo's Pretended Sympathy — He Dis- 
appears from His IIead([uarters near Manila — Sandico and His Secret 
Clubs — Discover}' of a Regular Army Organization of Treacherous 
Filipinos in Manila — Sandico Hastens Away — Size of Our Army — 
Delay in Issuing President's Proclamation — Terms of the Message to 
the Filipinos — Its Effect on the People — The Rebel Chief Issues two 
Manifestoes — Conference at Manila — Aguinaldo's False Claims — 
Never Promised anj' Assistance — What Admiral Dewey Said — 
AlloAved to Take Arms and Ammunition — Size of the Filipino Army 

— Attitude of Native Press Hostile, 599 



CHAPTER LI I 

FILIPINOS THROW OFF THE MASK AND ATTACK OUR FORCES 
AT MANILA — SIGNAL VICTORY WON BY THE AMERICANS 
— HEAVY LOSSES OF THE INSURGENTS. 

A Sentry's Orders Disobeyed — Signal Gun Fired — Outposts all Along the 
Line Engaged — Americans not Taken Unawares — Rebels Fought 
Bravely but Were Repulsed With Awful Slaughter — Intense Excite- 
ment in the City — Street Cars Stopped and Carriages Vanished — 
Native Troops Well Armed — Driven into the Pasig River — Fight 
Renewed Early Sunday Morning — Several Villages Captured — The 
Ciiarleston and the Callao Shelled — The Monadnock also at Work — 
Rout of the Rebels — Otis Expected the Outbreak — Aguinaldo's Spies 
Deceived — Insurgents Penned in a Cliurch — The Callao a Terror — 
Dewey's Fine Strategy — Rebels Fled to Caloocan — Fight over the 
Apiiroaches to the Reservoir — How Our Troops Were Dis|)osed — 
Sandicos Army Failed — Total Losses — Tiie Ollieial Despalcli — 
Aguinaldo's Proclamation- Our Troops Take the Water Works, Oil 



XXX CONTENTS 

CHAPTER LIII 

THE CAPTURE OF ILOILO— AN EASY VICTORY— THE IN- 
SURGENTS SET FIRE TO THE TOWN — DISPLAYING THE 
WHITE FLAG. 

Second Encounter with the Philipino Rebels — Importance of the Place — 
Its Location and Industries — City Turned Over to the Insurgents by 
the Spaniards — Our Expedition Starts from Manila — Delay in Move- 
ment to Take the Place — Insurgents Try to Obstruct the Channel — 
Gen. Miller's Ultimatum — Threatens to Burn their Villages if they Set 
Fire to Iloilo — Our Warships Get into Position — The Day Appointed 
for the Battle — The Enemy Defies Our Forces and Continues to 
Throw up Entrenchments — The Boston's Signal — Boston and Petrel 
Open Fire — A Shell Dropped into the Filipino Headquarters — Rebel 
General Runs Away — Insurgents Fire the City — Foreign Consulates 
Burned — Filipinos with White Flags Everywhere, . . . 680 

CHAPTER LIV 

MORE VICTORIES FOR THE AMERICAN FORCES — STRAG- 
GLING BANDS OF REBELS DRIVEN INTO THE JUNGLE 
— THE BATTLE OF CALOOCAN. 

Gen. Otis Given a Free Rein — Petty Warfare of the Natives — Small 
Villages Burned — Attempts to Cripple Manila Water Works — Ne- 
braska and Colorado Troops in a Short Engagement — Col. Funston's 
Gallant Sortie — Reconnoissance to Laguua de Bay — Natives with 
Flags of Truce — Insurgent Leaders call on Gen. Otis — No Message 
for Aguinaldo — Dewey Clears out San Roque — Aguinaldo Masses 
his Forces at Caloocan — MacArthur's Division — Warships Begin the 
Attack — Sixth Artillery and Utah Battery at Work — Bravery of 
Western Volunteers — Natives Flee from the Trenches — Flank Move- 
ment Executed by Major Bell — Movement of Filipinos a Rout — 
Fortified Church Abandoned — Deadly Wx)rk of the Shrapnel — 
Warfare Follows Withdrawal of our Troops from Three Places, 635 



CHAPTER LV 

A NIGHT OF TERROR IN MANILA — DISCOVERY OF A FIEND- 
ISH PLOT — GENERAL HUGHES PREVENTS THE EXECU- 
TION OF THE ORDER — INSURGENTS BURN LARGE POR- 
TIONS OF THE CITY. 

Wholesale Assassination Planned by the Filipinos — Discovery of their Plot 
— All Foreigners Were to be Exterminated — Work of Sandico Again 



CONTENTS XXxi 

— "Death to the Tyrants" — General ITuglies Catches Insurgent 
Chiefs in Council — Foreign Hesidents Alarmed — P^verybody Went 
Armed — The Torch Ai)plied — Filipino Ilinises First to be Attacked 
— The Escolta Threatened —Malay Killed wiiile Cutting Hose — Brave 
Sailor from the Olympia — Another District Set on Fire — A Crucial 
Test — Tondo District Infested by Native Militia — Arrival of Rein- 
forcements — Shooting in the Dark — Property Loss Upward of Half 
a Million Dollars — The American Loss — Insurgents Driven out of 
Tondo — Warships Shell the Retreating FiUemy — Americans Find 
it Necessary to Burn out the Secret Militia — Gen. Otis Orders the 
Streets of Manila Cleared after 7 o'clock P. M 647 

CHAPTER LVI 

COMING UNDER AMERICAN RULE — THE SURRENDER OF 
CEBU — THE NATIVES OF NEGROS VOLUNTARILY AN- 
NOUNCE THEIR ALLEGIANCE TO THE UNITED STATES. 

Cebu added to the List of Cities under American Ride — Work of the 
Gunboat Petrel — The People of Negros Decide to come under the 
Sovereignty of the United States — Their Delegates at Manila — No 
Need of a Large Force of Troops — A Tug to Carry Back the News 

— Town Decorated with English and German Flags — Visit from 
British Otflcers — Tribesmen with Spears — Captain Cornwell 3Ieets 
Native Leaders — His Ultimatum — Report of a Plot to Burn the 
Town — Priests Locked up the Coal Oil — Conference of Natives — 
Military Element Opposed to Surrender, but Finally Won Over — 
The Document Submitted to the Petrel's Commander — American 
Flag Hoisted — Captain Cornwell Assumes Charge of the Government 

— First Island to Yield Allegiance Voluntarily — Delegation from 
Negros — Entertained by General Otis, 654 

CHAPTER LVII 

GENERAL WHEATONS FLYING DIVISION — FORWARD MOVE- 
MENT TO LAGUNA DE BAY — TOWN OF PASIG CAPTUIiED 

— ARRIVAL OF REINFORCEMENTS AT MANILA — RETUEAT 
OF THE ENEMY. 

First Offensive Operations in March — General Hale's Brigade Advances 

— Taken in Ambush — Dastard!}' Work under a Flag of Truce — 
Transports Bring Troops — On to Laguiia dc Bay — Guadalouiie Cap- 
tured — Enemy Fled in the Rain — The Attack on Pasig — Firing at 
Long Range — Advance of the Twentieth — Marvelously Accurate 
Fire of Artillery — Over oO.OOO People Vanish — Natives Throw Arms 
into the Water — Another Complete Victory — 36;! Prisoners Taken by 
Our Forces — Loss of Americans Small — Desperate Fight at Caina 



XXXii CONTENTS 

-Outposts in the J uuglc - Charging Across the Rice Fields- An 
Attack by the Rebels Repelled -How they Fled Before Our Army- 
In Command of Laguna de Bay - Operations on the Lake "Our 
Army Reorganized - Generals Lawton and MacArthur Lead the Iwo 
Divisions, . . • 

CHAPTEE LVIII 

STIII ADVANCING UPON THE ENEMY -DAYS OF HARD 

fgh™g_malabon burned and abandoned - 

MALINTA AND OTHER TOWNS CAPTURED- DEATH OF 
COLONEL EGBERT. 

Gen Otis's Curfew Order -Eagerness of the Volunteers to go Forward 
-Good Work of the Regulars- Weak Charges of the F.hpmos- 
Effortto Surround the Enemy -Magnificent Entrenchments Thrown 
up by the Natives-Night before the Encounter-Early S ait by our 
Forces -Gen. Mac Arthur's Advance to the Eastward -FxImmuos Re- 
peat Stubbornly-Three FortiHed Towns Taken - Gem Whea on s 
Onerations- Heavy Fire on the Oregons - German Consul Aston- 
SeT-C ncealed Entrenchments - Galhmt Kansas Fighters -Our 
Losses-Battle Renewed on the Following Day - Malmta Carned by 
a Resistless Assault - Malabon Fired-Col. Egbert Killed -Troops 
Exhausted by the Heat -Prince Ludwig von Lowenstem Killed - 
lf:ZLols ordered Forward -A Volley Fired into the N^.a 
Hut's -Two Days of Hard Fighting and the Results, . . b<^ 

CHAPTER LIX 

T.MTT OF THE REBEL CAPITAL IVIALOLOS - VICTORIOUS 
m\rCHE™0F SlE AMERICANS THROUGH THE JUNGLE 
^ mST^NCES OF THE HEROISM OF OUR SOLDIERS. 

The Insurgents murder the Personal Command of Aguinaldo Routed - 
Notable Feat of the South Dakotas - Retreat toward Malolos - 
fw Manifesto- Getting out of Range of Dewey -D.fbculty of 
Mo'ng F eld Guns-Rebels Beaten by their Officers to Keep tliem m 
nre-Aid of the Railroad -Reinforcements for the nsurgents - 
Blockacie Runner Caught-A Day's Rest-Bocave Captured-A 
Pctu^ of DesolationlMacArthur's Division Moves Forward to 
lllls- Filipinos in I^etreat-Some Little Resistance on tlje^^^ 
-More Fighting in the Jungle -Malolos Entered-The Town lirecl 
-Enemy had Slipped Away -Incidents of American Heroism - 
Wo^mded Sergeant Who Would Return to the ^f^^^^^^^ 
Deliberation under Fire -Scenes at the Hospital -Cheeifulness^ot 
the Wounded -A South Dakota Hero 



CONTENTS XXXUl 

CHAPTER LX 

UNITED STATES COMMISSIONERS ISSUE A PROCLAMATION 
TO THE FILIPINOS — DISCOVERY OF A MYSTERIOUS 
SECRET ORDEli KNOWN AS THE K'ATAIH'NANS. 

Presidoiit jNIcKinley's Pliilippiiie CoiiiinissioiR-rs — Tlieir Fitness for the 
Work — Arrival :il Manila — Proclaination Explaii:ing the Aims and 
Objects of the United States — Our Supremacy Must he Enforced — 
Ample Liberty Promised — Civil Rights Protected — Reforms and 
Good Government Guaranteed — Our Position Grossly Misrepresented 
by Filipino Leaders — Tlie ^lysterious Secret Organization of the 
Natives — Symbols of the " Ku-Klux-Klan " — Deeds of Murder, 
Robbery, and Arson — Wiiole Native Popuhition Awed — All Aide 
Bodied Men Forced to Join — Mystic Symbol Found Everywhere — 
Servants of our Olbcers Enrolled in the Secret Band — How Aguinaldo 
was Enabled to Collect Taxes to Carry on the War, . . 698 

CHAPTER LXI 

FALL OF SANTA CRUZ — LAWTON'S SWEEPING VICTORIES — 
BRILLIANT AND REMARKABLE ACHIEVEMENT OF GEN. 
FUNSTON — DEATH OF COL. STOTZENBERG. 

Brief Respite from Fighting — Pathetic Scenes — An Expedition up 
Laguna de Bay — Gen. Lawton's Fighters — A Picturesque Flotilla — 
Moving on Santa Cruz — Delayed by Shallow Water — Landing in 
Cascoes — Our Men Leap into the Water — Across a Bridge in Face of 
a Galling Fire — Lawton in the Palace — More Towns and Some Boats 
Taken — " Rebels Would not Wait to be Killed " — Marching North- 
ward — Natives Retreat Everywhere — Seven Brave North Dakotans 
Killed — San Antonio Entered without Resistance — Copies of the 
Proclamation Distributed — Lawton Recalled — His Expression of 
Disappointment — Objects of the Expedition Achieved — The Rebels 
Gather at Calumpit — An Armored Car at Work — Funstou and His 
Heroes — Swimming the Stream — Success of the Assault, . 706 



CHAPTEPt LXTT 

THE FILIPINOS SEEK PEACE — ATTEMPTS TO SECURE A 
TRUCE — MORE VICTORIKS — AD.>nRAL DEWEY SAILS FOR 
HOME — THE STORY OF HIS LIFE. 

Failure of Efforts to Surround the Natives — Emissaries Sent by the In- 
surgent Leaders — A Request for a Truce— Gen. Otis Steadily Refuses 



XXXIV CONTENTS 

to Recognize the Insurgent Government — Capture of Baliuag — Lieu- 
tenant Gilmore Captured — The Macabebees Come to the Front — They 
Act in Conjunction with the Americans — Victorious Marcli of Our 
Forces Continued — San Fernando Falls — Insurgents Evidently Badly 
Demoralized — Valuable Supplies Taken by Our Men — Two Divisions 
Clear the Country — Army Gunboats Shelling the River — An Attack 
by Mascardo Repelled — Fresh Troops Off for the Front — Aguinaldo 
Wants all Foreigners to Leave — Admiral Dewey Sails on the Olympia 
for New Vork — The Story of His Life, 722 

CHAPTER LXIII 

PROPOSED FORM OF GOVERNMENT REJECTED BY FILIPINO 
LEADERS— THE INSURGENTS AGAIN ACTIVE — AMERI- 
CAN TROOPS CAPTURE ANTIPOLO AND MORONG. 

Optimistic Views of Admiral Dewe}^ — Proposed Temporary Plan of Gov- 
ernment — A Perplexing Problem — A Genuine Surprise — Commis- 
sioners meet at Manila — Endurance and Patience of our Soldiers — 
Refugees Within American Lines — Captain Tilly Treacherously Mur- 
dered — First Memorial Rites in Manila — Mounds Covered with 
Flowers — Impressive Services — Troops in Motion Again — A Panic 
Among the Insurgents — Arduous March of Gen. Hall's Column 
— Advancing on Autipolo — Americans Take Possession of an 
Abandoned Town — Driving the Insurgents into the Mountains — 
Sawing the Stringers of a Bridge almost in two — Gen. Lawton's 
Bravery — Advancing to the Battle of Zapote, . . . 733 



CHAPTEK LXIV 

THE BATTLE OF LAS PINAS— DESPERATE FIGHTING AT 
ZAPOTE — MANILA THREATENED FROM THE SOUTH — 
ASSASSINATION OF GENERAL LUNA. 

Persistence of the Insurgents — The Rainy Season Their Ally — Americans 
Not to be Daunted — A Fiercely Fought Battle — United States Soldiers 
in a Rain of Bullets — Seven Warships Open Fire — Taking Zapote 
Bridge — Peppered by Filipino Sharpshooters — Brave Leaders of the 
Brave — Insurgents Massing Their Forces — They Intend to Capture 
Manila — General Otis Thwarts Their Plans — The Trenches Carried — 
Rebels Retreat through Imus — The Town surrendered — Telegraph 
Wires Cut — Sharp Skirmish at San Fernando — Dissension Between 
Aguinaldo and Luna — A Statement from Agoncillo — Luna's Death 
Reported — Insulted by a Captain of Aguinaldo's Guard — Ramon 
Endeavors to Defend Luna — Luna and Ramon Assassinated, 743 



^ 






:^J^.A^. >f . 




iHii 



f^\ 



Hon. REDFIELD PROCTOR 

Ey-Sccrciary of War and United States Senator from J'erniont 



CUBA 

Its Condition at the Beginning of 1898 



IT lias 1)0011 siioocstod that I iiiako a ])iiblic statement of 
what I saw during- my visit to Cuba and how the situation 
there impressed me. This I do on account of the public 
iiitorost in all that concerns Cuba, and to correct some inac- 
curacies that have, not unnaturally, apjx'arod in ro])ortod in- 
terviews with me. 

JMy trip was entirely unotHcial and of my own motion; 
not suggested by anyone. Tlie only mention I made of it 
to the J'rosidoiit was to say to him that I oontoiiiplatod such a 
tri]) and to ask him if there was any objection to it; to which 
he re]iliod that ho could see none. Xo one but myself, thoro- 
fore, is rosponsiblo for anything in this statoiiicnt. .Indge 
Day gave me a brief note of intro(biction to General Lee, and 
1 had letters of introduction from business friends at the 
l^orth to l)ankers and other business men at Havana, and they 
in turn gave mo letters to their corrospondoiits in otlior cities, 
'i'liese letters to business men wore very us(d*ul, as one of the 
3 (33) 



34 INTRODUCTION BY SENATOR REDFIELD PROCTOR 

principal purposes of my visit was to ascertain the views of 
practical men of affairs ii])on tlio sitnation. 

Of General Lee I need say but little. His valuable 
services to his country in his trying position are too well 
known to all his countrymen to require mention. Besides his 
ability, high character, and courage, he possesses the impor- 
tant requisites of unfailing tact and courtesy, and, withal, his 
military education and training and his soldierly qualities are 
invaluable adjuncts in the equipment of our re|)resentative in 
a country so completely under military rule as was Cuba. 
General Lee kindly invited us to sit at his table at the hotel 
during our stay in Havana, and this opportunity for frequent 
informal talks with him was of great help to me. 

In addition to the information he voluntarily gave me, it 
furnished a convenient opportunity to ask him the many ques- 
tions that suggested themselves in explanation of things seen 
and heard on our trips through the country. I also met and 
spent considerable time with Consul Brice at Matanzas, and 
with Captain Barker, a staunch ex-Confederate soldier, the 
consul at Sagua la Grande. Xoiie of our representatives 
whom I met in Cuba are of my political faith, but there is a 
broader faith, not bounded by party lines. They are all three 
true Americans, and have done excellent service. 

There are six provinces in Cuba, each, with the exception 
of Matanzas, extending the whole width of the island, and 
having about an equal sea front on the north and south 
borders. Matanzas touches the Caribbean Sea only at its 
southwest corner, Ijeing separated from it elsewhere by a nar- 
row peninsula of Santa Clara Province. The provinces are 
named, beginning at the west, Pinar del Pio, Llavana, Matan- 
zas, Santa Clara, Puerto Principe, and Santiago de Cuba. 
My observations were confined to the four western provinces, 
which constitute about one-half of the island. The two east- 
ern ones were practically in the hainls of the insurgents, ex- 
cept the two fortified towns. These two large provinces were 
spoken of as " Cuba Libre." 



INTRODUCTION BY SENATOR REDPIELD PROCTOR 35 

IliU'ana, tlic great citv and t'a|)ital of the ishiiul, is, in the 
eves of the Spaniards and nianv ( "nhans, all ( 'uha, as niiudi as 
Paris is France. But having visited it in nioi'c peaceful times 
and seen its sights, the tomb of C'ohimbus, tlie forts — Cal^ana 
and ]\rorro (^istle, etc. — I did not care to repeat tliis, pre- 
fci'ring tri|>s in the country. Everything seemed to go on 
much as usual in Havana. (Juiet prevailed, and except for 
the frequent squads of soldiers marching to guard and police 
duty, and their abounding presence in all public places, one 
saw few signs of war. 

Outside Havana all had changed. It was not peace nor 
was it M'ar. It was desolation and distress, misery and starva- 
tion. Every town and village was surrounded by a '^ trocha " 
(triMich), a sort of rifle pit, but constructed on a ])lan new to 
me, the dirt being thrown up on the inside and a barbed-wire 
fence on the outer side of the trench. These trochas had at 
every corner and at frequent intervals along the sides what are 
there called "" forts," but which are really small blockhouses, 
many of them more like large sentry boxes, loopholed for 
musketry, and with a guard of from two to ten soldiers in 
each. 

The purpose of these trochas was to keep the reconcen- 
trados in as well as to keep the insurgents out. From all the 
snrvonnding country the [)co])l(> liad l)een driven into tliese 
fortified towns and held there to subsist as they could. They 
Avere virtually prison yards, and not ludike one in general ap- 
pearance, except that the walls were not so high and strong; 
but they sufficed, where every point was in range of a soldier's 
rifle, to keep in the poor reconcentrado women and children. 

Every railroad station was within one of tliese trochas and 
had an armed guai'd. Every train had an armored freight 
car loopholed for musketry and filled with soldiers, and with, 
as I observed usually, and was informed was always the case, 
a pilot engine a mile or so in advance. Tliere were frequent 
blockhouses inclosed \>\ a trocha and with a gnard along tlie 
railroad track. A\'itli this exception there was no hnman life 



oi) INTRODUCTION BY SENATOR REDFIELD PROCTOR 

or habitation between these fortiiied towns and vilhiges, and 
thronghout the whole of the fonr western provinces, except 
to a verv limited extent among the hills where the Spaniards 
had not been able to go and drive the people to the towns and 
burn their dwellings. I saw no honse or lint in the 400 miles 
of railroad lides from Pinar del Rio Province in the west 
across the fnll \vidth of Havana and Matanzas provinces, and 
to Sagna la Grande on the north shore, and to Cienfnegos on 
the sonth shore of Santa Clara, except within the Spanish 
troebas. 

There were no domestic animals or crops on the rich fields 
and pastnres excejit sneh as were under guard in the imme- 
diate vicinity of the towns. In other words, the S]')aniards 
held in these fonr western provinces just what their army sat 
on. Every man, woman, and child, and every domestic ani- 
mal, wherever their colnmns had reached, was under guard 
and within their so-called fortifications. To describe one 
place is to describe all. To repeat, it was neither peace nor 
war. It was concentration and desolation. This was the 
'" pacified " condition of the four western provinces. 

West of Ila^-ana is mainly the rich tobacco country; east, 
as fai' as I went, a sugar region. Xearly all the sugar mills 
were destroyed between Havana and Sagua. Two or three 
were standing in the vicinity of Sagua, and in part running, 
surrounded, as were the villages, by trochas and forts or pali- 
sades of the royal palm, and 'fully guarded. Toward and near 
(^ienfuegos there were more mills running, but all with the 
same ])rotection. It is said that the owners of these mills near 
Cienfnegos were able to obtain special favors of the Spanish 
go^'ernment in the way of a large force of soldiers, but that 
they also, as well as all the railroads, paid taxes to the Cubans 
for immunity. I had no means of verifying this. It was 
the common talk among those who had better means of knowl- 
edge. 

All the country people in the four western ])rovince», 
about 400,000 in nund)er, remaining outside the fortified 



INTRODUCTION BY SENATOR REDFIELD I'R(KT(>Ft '■\7 

towns when W'cvlcf's ofilci' was iiiailc. wn-r ilri\('ii iiitu these 
towns, and these were tlic reconeentrados. They were the 
peasantry, many (d' them fanners, some landowners, otlicrs 
renting hinds and owning- more or less stock, others working 
on estates and enltivating small patches; and even a small 
patch in that iVuitt'ul clime will sii]t]toi't a fannly. 

Tt is l)nt fair to say that the normal condition of these 
])e<iple was very different from what prevails in this country. 
'J'heir standard (d" comfort an<l ])rosperity, measured by onrs, 
was not high. Ihit accoi'ding to their standards and require- 
ments tludr conditions of life were satisfactory. 

They lived mostly in cahins made of ]ialnis or in wooden 
houses. Some of them had houses of stone, the blackened 
walls of whi(di are all that remain to show the country was 
ever inhabited. 

The first clause of AVeyler's (»rder read as follows: 

I Ordf K AND Command. F.rsl, a]l the inhalitants of the; country or 
outside of the line of fortifications of tlio towns shall, within the period of 
eight daj's, concentrate themselves in the towns occupied by the troops. 
Any individual who, after the expiration of this period, is found in the 
uninhabited parts will be considered a rebel and tried as such. 

'J'lie other three sections forbade the transportation of pro- 
visions from one town to another without permission of the 
military autliority, directed the owners of cattle to bring them 
into the towns, prescribed that the eight days should be 
counted fVom the publication of the ]U'oclamation in the head 
town of the municii)al district, and stated that if news were 
furnished of the enemy which could be made use of, it would 
serve as a " recommendation." 

^lany, doubtless, did not learn of this order. Others 
failed to grasp its terrible meaning. Tts execution was left 
larti-ely to the guerillas to drive in all that had not obeyed, 
and I was infoi-nuMl tliat in many cases the torch was a|)plied 
to their homes with no notice, and the iinnates lied with such 
clothing as they might have on, their stock and other belong- 
ings being appropriateil hy the gnei-illas. When they 
reaclie(l the towns ihev were allowed to builtl huts nf [talm 



38 INTRODUCTION BY SENATOR REDPIELD PROCTOR 

leaves i.n the siiLnvLs and vacant places within the trochas, 
and left to live, if ihev conld. 

Tlieir lints were al)ont ten hy iifteen feet in size, and for 
want of space were nsnally crowded together very closely. 
They had no floor hnt the gronnd, no furniture, and, after a 
year's wear, but little clothing except such stray substitutes as 
they could exteni])orize ; and with large families, or more than 
one, in this little space, the commonest sanitary provisions 
were imjiossible. Conditions were unmentionable in this re- 
spect. Torn from their homes, with foul earth, foul air, foul 
water, and foul food or none, what wonder that one-half had 
died and that one-quarter of the living were so diseased that 
they could not be saved? A form of dropsy was a common 
disorder resulting from these conditions. Little children 
were still walking about with arms and chests terribly ema- 
ciated, eyes swollen, and abdomen bloated to three times the 
natural size. The physicians said these cases were hopeless. 

Death in the streets were not uncommon. I was told by 
one of our consuls that many had been found dead about the 
markets in the morning, where they had crawled, hoping to 
/ get some stray bits of food from the early hucksters, and that 
there had been cases where they had dropped dead inside the 
market, surrounded by food. Before Weyler's order these 
people were independent and self-supporting. They were not 
beggars even then. There were plenty of professional beg- 
gars in every town among the regular residents, but these 
country people, the reconcentrados, had not learned the art. 
Earely was a hand held out to you for alms when going among 
their huts, but the sight of them made an appeal stronger 
than words. 

Of the hospitals I need not speak. Others have described 
their condition far better than I can. It is not within the nar- 
row limits of my vocabulary to portray it. I went to Cuba 
with a strong conviction that the picture had been overdrawn; 
that a few cases of starvation and suffering had inspired and 
stimulated the press correspondents, and that they had given 



INTRODUCTION BY SENATOR REDFIELD PROCTOK o'.) 

free play to a strong, natural, and liiglily ciiltixaUMl iniagina- 
tion. 

Before starting I received tlirougli the mail a leaflet, \vitli 
cuts of some of the sick and starving reconcentrados, and took 
it with me, thiidving these mnst be rare specimens, got up to 
make the worst possible showing. I saw plenty as bad aii<l 
worse; iinmy that shouhl not be photographed and shown. 

I could not believe that out of a population of 1,000,000, 
200,000 had died v ithin these Spanish forts, practically prison 
walls, within a few months past, from actual starvation and 
diseases caused by insufficient and improper food. My in- 
quiries were entirely oTitside of sensational sources. They 
were inade of uuMlical (tllicers, of our consuls, of city alcaldes 
(mayors), of relief committees, of leading merchants and 
bankers, jdiysicians, and lawyers. Several of my informants 
were Spanish born, but every time the answer was that the 
case had not been overstated. AVhat I saw I cannot tell so 
that others can see it. It had to be seen with one's own eyes 
to be realized. 

The Los Pasos Hospital, in Havana, has been recently de- 
scribed by one of my colleagues. Senator Gallinger, and I can- 
not say that his picture was overdrawn, for even his fertile 
pen could not do that. But he visited it after Dr. Lesser, one 
of Miss Barton's very able and ellicient assistants, had reno- 
\at('d it and put in cots. I saw it when 400 women and chil- 
(hx'U were lying on the floors in an indescribable state of 
emaciation and disease, many with the scantiest covering of 
rags — and such rags ! — sick children, naked as they came 
into the world; and the conditions in the other cities ar(> even 
worse. 

Miss Barton needs no indorsement from me. 1 had known 
and esteemed lier for many years, but had not half a]>pre- 
ciated her cajiability and devotion to her work. T specially 
lookeil into her business methods, fearing that tbei'c would be 
the greatest (hinger of mistake, that there might be want ot 
system and waste and extravagance, l>ut found she could teach 



4:0 INTRODUCTION BY SENATOR REDFIELD PROCTOR 

me on these points. I visited the warehouse where the sup- 
plies were received and distributed ; saw the methods of check- 
ing; visited the hospitals established or organized and supplied 
by lier; saw the food distribution in several cities and towns, 
and evervthing seemed to me to be conducted in the best man- 
ner possible. The ample, line warehouse in Havana, owned 
l)y a Cuban firm, was given, with a gang of laborers, free of 
charge to unload and reship supplies. 

The Children's Hospital, in Havana, a very large, fine 
private residence, was hired at a cost of less than $100 per 
month. It was under the admirable management of Mrs. 
Dr. Lesser of New York, a German lady and trained nurse. 
T saw the rapid improvement of the first children taken there. 
All ]\Iiss Barton's assistants seemed excellently fitted for their 
duties. In short, I saw nothing to criticise, but everything 
to commend. The American people may be assured that their 
bounty reached the sufferers with the least possible cost and 
in the best manner in every respect. If our people could have 
seen the small fraction of the need they would have poured 
more " freely from their liberal stores " than ever before for 
any cause. 

General Blanco's order of Xovember 13tli somewhat mod- 
ified the Weyler order, but was of little or no practical benefit. 
Its application was limited to farms " properly defended," and 
the owners were obliged to bnild " centers of defense." Its 
execution was completely in the discretion of the local mili- 
tary authorities, and they knew the terrible military efficiency 
of AVeylcr's orders in stripping the country of all possible shel- 
ter, food, or source of information for an insurgent, and were 
sloAv to surrender this advantage. In fact, though the order 
Avas issued four months before, I saw no beneficent results 
from it worth mentif)ning. 

I wish I might speak of the country — of its surpassing 
richness. I havo never seen one to compare with it. On this 
point I agree with Colnndtns, th,;t this is the ''most rich and 
beautiful that ever Ininian eye beheld," and believe every 



INTRODUCTION BY SENATOR REDFIELD PROCTOR 41 

one between liis time ami mine must he of the same opinion. 
It is indeed a land — 

" WluTe every prospect pleases 
And only man is vile." 

1 had little time to study the race question, and have read 
nothing- on it, so can only give hasty impressions. It is said 
that there were nearly 200,000 Spaniards in (^iba out of a 
total population of 1,600,000. They lived principally in the 
towns and cities. The small shopkeepers in the towns and 
their clerks were mostly Spaniards. JMucli of tlie larger busi- 
ness, too, and of the property in the cities, and in a less degree 
in the country, was in their hands. They had an eye to thrift, 
and as everything possible in the way of trade and legalized 
monopolies, in which the country abounds, was given to them 
by the government, many of them acquired property. I did 
not learn that the Spanish residents of the islands had con- 
tributed largely in blood or treasure to sup})ress the insur- 
rection. 

There were, before the war, about 1,000,000 Cubans on 
the island, 200,000 Spaniards (wdiich means those born in 
Spain), and less than half a million of negroes and mixed 
bloods. The Cuban whites are of pure Spanish blood, and, 
like the Spaniards, dark in comj)lexion, but oftcnier light or 
blonde, so far as I noticed. The jiercentage of colored to 
white has been steadily diminishing for more than fifty years, 
and is not now over twenty-five per cent, of the total. In 
fact, the number of colored people has been actually dimin- 
ishing for nearly that time. Tlie Cuban farmer and laborer 
is by nature peaceal)le, kindly, gay, hospitable, light-hearted, 
and im])rovident. 

There is a proverb among the Cubans that " Spaiii>h bulls 
cannot be bi'cd in Cuba " — that is, the Cubans, though they 
are of S)»anish blood, are less exeitable and of a quieter tem- 
])erament. ^lany Cubans whom T met spoke in strong terms 
against tlir bull tiizlit; that it was a brutal institution, iutro- 
<luce(l and luaiuly pat roiii/.c(l by the Spaiiiai'ils. One thing 



43 INTRODUCTION BY SENATOR REDFIELD PROCTOR 

that was new to me was to learn the snperiority of the well-to- 
do Cuban over the Spaniard in the matter of education. 
Among those in good circumstances there can be no doubt 
that the Cuban is far superior in this respect. And the rea- 
son of it is easy to see. They have been educated in England, 
France, or this country, while the Spaniard has such education 
as his own country furnishes. 

The colored people seem to me by nature quite the equal 
mentally and physically of the race in this country. Cer- 
tainly physically they are l)y far the larger and stronger race 
on the island. There is little or no race prejudice, and this 
has doubtless been greatly to their advantage. Eighty-five 
years ago there were one-half as many free negroes as slaves, 
and this proportion slowly increased until emancipation. 

It was said that there were about G0,000 Spanish soldiers 
in Cuba fit for duty out of the more than 200,000 that had 
been sent there. The rest bad died, had been sent home sick, 
or were in hospitals, and some had been killed, notwithstand- 
ing the official reports. They were conscripts, many of them 
very young, and generally small men. One hundred and 
thirty pounds is a fair estimate of their average weight. They 
were quiet and obedient, and, if well drilled and led, I believe 
would have fought fairly well, but not at all equal to our men. 
Much more would dejiend on the leadership than with us. 
The officer must lead well and l)e one in whom they have con- 
fidence, and this applies to both sides alike. As I saw no drills 
or regular formation, I iiuiuired about them of many persons, 
and was informed that they had never seen a drill. I saw per- 
haps 10,000 Spanish troops, but not a piece of artillery or a 
tent. They lived in barracks in the towns, and were seldom 
out for more than the day, returning to town at night. 

They had little or no equipment for supply trains or for 
a field canqiaign such as we liave. Their cavalry horses were 
scrubby little native ponies, weighing not over 800 pounds, 
tough and liardy, bnt for the most part in wretched condition, 
reminding one of the monnt of Don Quixote. Some of the 



INTRODUCTION BY SENATOR REDFIELD PROCTOR 43 

officers, however, liad <;()od horses, mostly Aiueriean, T think. 
On both sides cavalrv was considered the favorite and tlic dan- 
gerous fighting arm. The tactics of the Spanish, as doscril>ed 
to me by eyewitnesses and j)articij)ants in some of tlieir battles, 
was for the infantry, when tlircatcncd \)\ insnrgent cavalry, to 
form a hollow sqnare and lire away ad libilum, and without 
ceasing until time to march back to town. 

Tt did not seem to have entered the minds of cither side 
that a good infantry force can take care of itself and repulse 
anywhere an equal or greater number of cavalrv, and. there 
were everywhere positions where cavalry would be at a dis- 
advantage. 

Having called on Governor and Captain-General Blanco 
and received his courteous call in return, I could not with pro- 
priety seek communication with insurgents. I had plenty of 
offers of safe conduct to (lomoz's cam]i, and was told that if I 
Avouldwrite him, an answin- would be returned safely within 
ten days at most. 

I saw several who had visited the insurgent camps, and 
was sought out by an insurgent field officer, who gave me the 
best information received as to the insurgent force. His state- 
ments were moderate, and I was credibly informed that he 
was entirely reliable. He claimed that the Cubans had about 
30,000 men then in the field, some in e\'ery province, but 
mostly in the two eastern provinces and eastern Santa Clara, 
and this statement was corroborated from other good sources. 
Thoy have a bd'cc all llic time in Havaiui province itself, or- 
ganized in four small brigades and (i])erating in small 1)ands. 
Ruiz was taken, tried, and shot within about a mile and a half 
of the railroad and about fifteen miles out of Havana, on the 
road to Matanzas, a road more traveled than any other, and 
which T went over four times. 

Aranguren was killed about three miles the other side of 
the road and about the same distance, fifteen or twenty miles, 
from Havami. The Cubans were well armed, but very poorly 
supplied with ammunition. They were not allowed to carry 



-t-t INTRODUCTION BY SENATOR KEDFIELD PROCTOR 

iiuiiiv ('ai'tri(li;('s; soiuetiiiK's not iiioi'c than one or two. The 
infantry, es])ecially, were poorly clad. Two small squads of 
prisoners wliicli I saw, however, one of half a dozen in the 
streets of Havana, and one of three on the cars, wore better 
clothes than the average Spanish soldier. 

Each of these prisoners, thongli surrounded by guards, 
was bound by the arm and wrists by cords, and they were all 
tied together by a cord running along the line, a specimen of 
the amenities of their warfare. About one-third of the Cuban 
army were colored, mostly in the infantry, as the cavalry fur- 
nished their own hoi'ses. 

1'heir field ofllicer, an American from a Southern State, 
spoke in the highest terms of the conduct of these colored sol- 
diers ; that they were as good fighters and had more endurance 
than the whites; could keep up with the cavalry on a long- 
march and come in fresh at night. 

'J'he dividing lines between parties were the straightest 
and clearest cut that have ever come to my knowledge. The 
division in our Avar was by no means so clearly defined. It 
was Cuban against Spaniard. It was practically the entire 
Cuban population on one side and the Spanish army and vSpan- 
ish citizens on the other. 

I do not count the autonomists in this division, as they 
were so far too inconsiderable in numbers to be worth count- 
ing. General Blanco filled the civil offices with men who had 
been autonomists and were still classed as such. But the 
march of events had satisfied most of them that the chance for 
autonomy came too late. 

It fell as talk of compromise would have fallen the last 
year or two of our war. If it succeeded it could only be by 
armed force, by the trium])li of the Spanish army; and the suc- 
cess of Spanish arms would have been easier by Weyler's 
policy and method, for in that the Spanish army and people 
believe. 

There is no doubt that General Blanco acted in entire good 
faith; that he desired to give the Cubans a fair measure of 



INTRODUCTION BY SENATOR REDFIELD PROCTOR 4o 

autoiiomy, as Campos did at the close of the '^('n-^'('al•s Wai-. 
He had, of course, a few personal lollowcrs, ]>\\\ tlic ai-uiy and 
the Spanish citizens did not want genuine autonomy, for that 
meant g-overnment by the Cuban people. And it was not 
strange that the Cubans said it came too late. 

I have never had any communication, direct or indirect, 
Avith the (^iban Junta in this country or any of its members, 
nor did 1 have with any of the juntas which exist in every city 
and large town of Cuba. JSTone of the calls I made were upon 
parties of whose sympathies I had the least knowledge, except 
that I kncAV some of them were classed as autonomists. 

Most of my informants were business men, who had taken 
no sides and rai-ely ex})ressed themselves. I had no moans of 
guessing in ad\ance what their answers would be, and was in 
most cases greatly surprised at their frankness. 

I inquired in regard to autonomy of men of wealth and 
men as prominent in business as anv in the cities of Havana, 
!Matanzas, and Sagua, bankers, merchants, lawyers, and 
autonomist ofHcials, some of them Spanish born but Cuban 
bred, one j)roniinent Englishman, several of them known as 
autonomists, and several of them telling me they were still 
believers in autonomy if ]iracticable, but without exception 
they replied that it was " too late " for that. 

Some favored a Tiiited States protectorate, some annexa- 
tion, some free Cuba; not one has been counted favoring the 
insurrection at first. They were business men and wanted 
peace, but said it was too late for peace under Spanish sov- 
ereignty. They characterized Weyler's order in far stronger 
terms than T can. I could not but conclude that you did not 
have to scratch an autonomist very dee]) to find a (^d)an. 

I have endeavored to state in not intemperate niDdd what 
I saw and heai'd, aiid to make no argument thereon, but leave 
everyone to draw his own con(dusions. To me the strongest 
appeal was not tlie barbarity |ii-act ic(Ml ly AVcyler nor the loss 
<il the Munii\ Icri'ible as wci'c both of tlic-e incidents, Itnt the 
specta(de of a million and a halt" i>{' pcdplc, the entire native 



4G INTRODUCTION BY SENATOR REDFIELD PROCTOR 

population of Cuba, struggling for freedom and deliverance 
from the woi'st misgovernment of which I ever had knowl- 
edge. 

I am not in favor of annexation; not because I would ap- 
prehend any particular troul)le from it, but because it is not 
wise policy to take in any people of foreign tongue and train- 
ing, and without any strong guiding American element. The 
fear that if free the people of Cuba would be revolutionary is 
not so well founded as has been supposed, and the conditions 
for good self-government are far more favorable. The large 
number of educated and patriotic men, the great sacrifices 
they have endured, the peaceable temperament of the people, 
whites and blacks, the wonderful prosperity that would surely 
come with peace and good home rule, the large influx of 
American and English immigration and money, would all be 
strong factors for stable institutions. 





22 2340 41 ^^^ 42 43 44 



THE STORY OF TWO WARS 



OUR WAR WITH SPAIN 



OUR WAR WITH THE FILIPINOS 



CHAPTER I 

SPANISH CHARACTER AND IHSTORY — DISCOVERY OF CUBA 

— EXTERMINATION OF THE NATIVES — BUILDING OF 
MORRO CASTLE — SPAIN BESET BY ENEMIES. 

Spain's Domain in the Eighteenth Century — The Decadence of a Hundred 
Years — Spain's Daring Explorers — Heroism and Fanaticism — Mis- 
taken Pohcy — Columbus Hears of Cuba — Taking Possession for Spain 

— Extirpating the Natives — A Long Story of Rapine, Brutality, and 
Insult — A Bishop's Testimony — Beginning of African Slave Trade — 
The World Divided — The Resistance of Chief Ilatuey — Efforts to 
Christianize Him before Burning Him at the Stake — Maritime Adven- 
turers — Growth of Spanish Settlements — Fortifjnng Havana — Build- 
ing of IMorro Castle — Monopolies and Restrictions — Surrender of 
Havana to the English — Cuba Restored to Spain. 



HE latter part of the eighteenth 
century beheld Spain the proud 
mistress of a domain upon which 
she could boast that the sun never 
set. At the close of the nine- 
teenth hardly a vestige of that 
great empire remained. She 
found a new world and, little by 
little, in a hundred years has lost 
it all. Into the Europe of the 
sixteenth century she poured such 
a stream of golden treasure as had 
never before been seen, the rich 
stores of the Incas and the Monte- 
zumas, but it all slipped from her hands, and she is now practi- 
cally bankrupt, loaded Avith a debt she can never pay. 
Through her was possible tho renaissance of the sixteenth 

(49) 




A. D. Worthingto]! tV Co.'s New TNfap of Puerto Eico. Flail i, Jamaica, and the- Entire Wes^ Indies. 



10 II T.- 12 '3 ,,- II- 15 .» '6 17 ,„ 18 19 ,, 20 21 es 22 2 \ e. 2'^ 25 e; 26 27 ,„ 28 29 




^.°-;;;-,*i 









*2SNi=^<- 



v^/ 



^^^^%ii. , _! ^ 



^,.."- T^ , J s* =1..." .,is»«...t — • 






^ 





■ ■■ - - I'ic^j^i*^ 



'*'' VS'--vf°^' 






""T^J"""' ''' 






Til 



i¥]B§']r i.>jj:cjes, 




\o 




"ssr 








Scalp, op Stai Mi 



\4^:l 



- (U.S.) p \y x|^. 



._ '"^IAT 



7^ 



A R E C I BO 



•:ii% 



jfe,^ 



PUERTO BICO. 



10 II "• 12 13 "" 14 i5 " 16 17 "* 18 19 "" 20 2\ 




■V- 




:^-rT- 






^\ vM 








50 SPAIN'S VANISHED GREATNESS 

century, the great reawakening of niediiioval Europe; but 
Sixain remained medianai. Those very human forces which 
she set in action by the great discoveries of her intrepid mar- 
iners and by the distribution of her newly -found treasures, — 
forces which gave birth to modern history, she strenuously re- 
sisted. Upon that expansion of thought and action, follow- 
ing naturally tlie accomplishments of her daring explorers, 
she set her iron lieel. She strangled her own magnificent crea- 
tions, and set about destroying her colonies by as heedless and 
as cruel a policy as was ever conceived by barbarian of old. 

They who discovered the Gulf of Mexico, the Mississippi, 
the Amazon, and the Pacific — they who first went around 
the world, were Spaniards. Three-fourths of North and South 
America were Spanish before England had acquired a little 
spot of land on the nearest shores of America, and to-day Spain 
has withdrawn from the last foot of land which once consti- 
tuted her gigantic Western domain. 

It would be absurd to say that this has been brought about 
without a reason. Sufficient reason exists, and it must to a 
great extent l)e found in the character of the nation. The 
foundation for the Spanish character, as in the case of other 
peoples, must be largely found i-n the history of the nation, 
which forms no part of the purpose of this book. For a full 
understanding, however, of Spain's relation to Cuba and to 
the United States, a brief glance at the general features of 
Spanish history up to the nineteenth century will be useful. 

Under TJoman sway Spain became, more than any part 
of the empire of the Ca?sars, a Homan province, traces of which 
remain to this day in language, laws, and customs. The 
Italian language preserves less of the qualities of the old Latin 
than the S]ianish, and certainly no more striking trace of 
lingering lioman habit need 1)0 sought than in the Spanish 
bull-fight. In the great amphitheaters erected by the masters 
of the Tvoman world money was lavished and victims were 
slain to gratify the appetite of tlie masses. The proud Koman 
maids and matrons watched with deliffht the fierce gladiators 



THE KEY TO SPANISH CHARACTER 51 

Iiowiiig each othor (.. piece-, an. I in lafor and more dogoncrato 
days looked on with c.iuaJ Inteiv.-t whih- lidph'ss Christians 
were torn hy savage beasts. 

There are other traits than the Eonian in Spanish char- 
acter. As a part of the political debris resnlting from the 
fall (.f the Koman empire, Spain fell to the Visigoths, whose 
history there embraces three centuries of debauchery, intrigue, 
and murder, tainting the blood of the people. In time, guided' 
by the spirit of the age, Spain became a hierarchy, in which the 
influence of the church became all-powerful, the best of the 
Gothic kings, Wamba, who resisted this tendency, falling a 
prey to ecclesiastical treachery. The absorption of the state 
by the church became more and more complete under cen- 
turies of Moorish warfare, and left its indelible stamp upon 
the nation. For, in fighting for his faith, the Spaniard, un- 
like the Crusader, was fighting for his home. He became a 
fierce fanatic, naturally enough, no doubt, and, when Grcna.la 
fell, Spain at last became a nation, but a nation of fanatics. 
It was an age of Spanish heroism, but a heroism which went 
hand in hand with extravagant religious zeal. In the latter 
were the seeds of the ruin of the greatness of her heroism, and 
as soon as the vast Spanish empire was created it began to dis- 
integrate. If it was Ferdinand and Isabella who sent Colum- 
bus forth, it was they also who expelle.l the Jews, and sent two 
hundrc.l thousand Spaniards to death in exile. So blind was 
Spanish fanaticism that it was not enough to light the fires 
under the Jews. The Spaniard who dared to think and to tell 
what he thought also became a victim. The hand of the In- 
quisitor fell npon the pliilnsnpher and inventor wli.. came forth 
with the reawakening of the renaissance, and while other na- 
tions advanced slowly towards uio.leni ideas, Spain proudly 
clung to mediivvalism. 

The economic efi-ects of this bigotry were unmistakable. 
The persecuted Jews were the financiers, and, because of the 
improvidence of rulers and the simplicity of the people in 
financial matters, they possessed all the ready money. The 



53 A NATION OF FANATICS 

hated Moors were traders who brought rich merchandise from 
the east, lu her religious zeal, therefore, Spain exterminated 
her mercantile classes and left none but warriors, priests, and 
peasants. The main wheel was taken out of her economic 
structure. The new wealth from America slipped into the 
hands of those she persecuted, and thus her wars of persecution 
impoverished her at the very time when she might have be- 
come the richest nation in Europe, while her further oppres- 
sion of her thinkers increased her bigotry and sapped her enter- 
prise. When there was no war on hand for the warriors, and 
no more heretics for the priests to burn, there was nothing left 
for them but intrigue. Under her various rulers this policy 
was continued, until, after nearly two centuries, Spain was 
wellnigh exhausted. She had planted her colonies all over 
the new world, but had neither the ability nor the resources to 
develop them, and in the closing years of the eighteenth cen- 
tury her downfall in America began. The peculiar exi- 
gencies of their history had made the Spanish people warriors 
unfitted for war, and colonists unfitted to govern colonies. 

With this brief generalization of Spanish history and 
character, we may enter understandingly upon the story of 
Spain in America, and particularly in the Antilles. In his 
conversations with the friendly natives whom Columbus found 
on the island of San Salvador, where he first set foot in the 
new wojld, he sought with eagerness to learn whence came the 
gold ornaments they wore. They pointed to the south, and 
he made out that in that direction lay a land of great extent 
called Cuba, and, self-deceived as he constantly was by his 
maps and previously-formed ideas, he immediately concluded 
that thi^ Cuba must be the country of the Grand Khan of Asia. 
Accordingly, he set sail, and in three days, or on October 28, 
1492, he touched the Cuban shore not far from the present site 
of T^uevitas. He was dazzled by the beauty of the landscape 
before him and tleclared it to be " the goodliest land he ever 

saw." 

At this time Cuba, Haiti, Jamaica, and Puerto Rico were 



A GENTLE AND TRACTABLE PEOPLE 53 

inhabited by tlie Arawaks, a simple, kindly people, while in 
the lesser islands dwelt the more warlike Caribs. They natur- 
ally looked uj)on Columbus and his followers as superior 
beings, and, when their timidity had been removed, rendered 
their visitors every service in their power, and placed before 
them the best they had; the cotton which they had learned to 
rudely spin, their fruits, and everything they considered of 
value. Yet, in a few years, the Spaniards, with bloody hands, 
had swept these simple, confiding people from the face of the 
Antilles! 

We need not dwell upon the story of the cruelty of the 
early Spanish settlers, or tell of the thousands of defenceless 
people murdered and thousands carried away as slaves. It 
is a long story of rapine, brutality, and insult. The natives 
were exterminated. AVe may judge from the words of a pre- 
late of those days. Bishop of Chiapas, who was brave enough 
to protest against the abuses practiced by the Spanish coloni- 
zers. It throws light upon the real Spanish character. " To 
these quiet lambs," he wrote, " endued with such blessed 
qualities, came the Sj)aniards like most cruel tygres, wolves, 
and lions, enraged with a sharp and tedious hunger; for these 
forty years past, minding nothing else but the slaughter of 
these unfortunate wretches, whom with divers kinds of tor- 
ments, neither seen nor heard of before, they have so cruelly 
and inhumanely butchered, that of three million people which 
Hispaniola [Haiti] itself did contain, there are left remaining 
alive scarce three hundred persons. And for the island of 
Cuba, which contains as much ground in length as from Valla- 
dolid to Rome, it lies wholly desert, nntillM and ruinM." 

Such, then, was the condition of Cuba fifty years after that 
bright day wlien it burst upon the vision of Columbus, " the 
goodliest land " he ever saw. 

In this situation the idea of ini|ioiling slaves from Afriea 
was naturally suggested. It had been noticed that the Afri- 
cans who had been brought to the new colonies continued ro- 
bust imder the blazing sun and in the hard labor of the mines, 



54 THE OWNERSHIP OF THE WORLD 

and thus, from a small beginning, an extensive slave trade 
grew up, much more lucrative than the working of the mines. 
But it was not the Spaniard who prospered most in this enter- 
prise, for soon after the discovery of America the danger that 
the Spanish discoveries might conflict with those of that other 
Catholic people, the Portuguese, Pope Alexander A-^L, while 
confirming the right of the Spanish crown to all the lands dis- 
covered, designated a line to be drawn due north and south a 
hundred leagues west of the Azores from one pole to the other. 
All pagan lands to the east of the line were confirmed to Por- 
tugal and all to the west of the line was to be the exclusive 
property of Spain. Ferdinand and Isabella were commanded 
to appoint upright, God-fearing, skillful, and learned men to 
instruct the inhabitants in the Catholic faith, and all unau- 
thorized persons were forbidden to traffic on or even approach 
the territories, under penalty of incurring "■ the indignation of 
Almighty God and of the Blessed Apostles Peter and Paul." 
According to this offhand arrangement no other power could 
have anything. This simple division of the world, therefore, 
gave Africa to the Portuguese, and, so far as a Papal bull could, 
carried with it the slave trade. But in view of its lucrative 
character, it soon attracted adventurous spirits of other nations, 
who, increasing in number and boldness, found after a few 
years a vast field of enterprise in all sorts of piratical under- 
takings. In time the Spanish islands became a swarming nest 
of adventurers of several nations, and as the native Indian 
disappeared, the black man took his place, a fact which ac- 
counts for the character of the population of the islands, and 
the black republics of Haiti and San Domingo. 

The native population of Haiti had become nearly ex- 
hausted before the settlement of Cuba was attempted, and it 
was because of the unsatisfactory condition of the former 
island that Don Diego Colnmbus, son of the great discoverer, 
d('t(n-niinod, in 1511, to secure a footing in the "Pearl of the 
Antilles." The harmless Indians offered little resistance, 
though one chief, named Ilatuey, who had been in Haiti and 



A DYING CHIEF DEFIES HIS FOES 55 

knew soiiK'tliinj>- nf the Sj)aiiisli practices lliere, attempted 
some opixisition. lie was (piicklv ca|)tMred and his followers 
wei'i' (lis])('rsc(l. As a liii;h cliicr among his people he de- 
served to be treated as an honorable captive, but his death 
may be cited as the first instance of Spanish methods npon the 
island. As the story goes, when Ilatney was tied to the stake 
and the fagots were piled around him, a Franciscan friar stood 
by and besonght liim to adjure the heathen gods of his ances- 
tors and accept the true faith so tliat, as the flames consumed 
his body, his soul might be wafted to that heaven of rest and 
happiness pi-epared fur the faithful. Tie saw that his accept- 
ance of the new faith would not save him from the flames, and 
so he asked if there were any Spaniards in that place of eternal 
bliss. Of course the friar prom})tly answered in the affirma- 
tive. 

" 1 will not go," he said, " to a place where I may meet 
on(> of that accursed race." 

Pai'ties from the new colony puslu'd out and explored the 
island thoroughly, and in ir)14 the towns of Santiago and 
Trinidad on the south coast were formed, largely for the pur- 
pose of facilitating communication Avith the Spanish on the 
island of Jamaica. The next year another settlement was 
made at the spot now known as l>atabano, and it was named, 
after the great discoverer, San Cristobal de la ITabana. Four 
year< later the settlers removed both the town and its name 
to a more attractive place just across the island on the north 
shore, and here, in time, grew up the present capital. 

The waters of the West Indies soon became a rendezvous 
of all the marilime adventurers of that ruffiaidy age. The 
other nations had never acce]ited the Pope's straight-cut 
division of the world whereby Sjiain was generously given the 
whole Westci'ii IIcmis])here, and Knglaud opi^dy disj)Uted it. 
Little was done l>y the governments llicmselves, however, so 
long as they were at peace with Sjiain. but the continued stories 
of treasure shipped from the new lands stirred r.p a Ix^st of in- 
dividual corsairs who cared nothing for papal boundaries. 



56 HAVANA A COMMERCIAL CENTER 

In 1516 the capital of Cuba had been moved from Baracoa 
to Santiago, and Spain began to take precautions against the 
new marauders of the sea, who, however, became more numer- 
ous and bold, as the natives, in their intense hostility to the 
Spaniards, encouraged and even assisted them. It was well 
into the eighteenth century, and after the English, French, 
and Dutch had established themselves in the West Indies, that 
the freebooters were finally driven from the seas. 

In 1551 the capital was transferred to Havana, which had 
been growing in importance because of its commanding situa- 
tion, good harbor, and fertile surroundings. In the wars of 
Charles I. of Spain and his son Philip II., the English under 
Drake again threatened the port, and the Spaniards deter- 
mined to increase the fortifications. This gave rise to the 
famous Morro Castle and the Bateria de la Punta, which for a 
long time made Havana one of tlie best fortified ports in the 
world. 'Ridley were begun the year after the destruction of the 
famous Armada and completed in 1597, and from that time 
Havana was the commercial center of the Spanish dominions, 
being the stopping place for the treasure ships bearing gold 
and silver from ]\rexico and other colonies. 

Notwithstanding the complicated relations of the Euro- 
pean powers during the war of the Spanish Succession with 
which the eighteenth century opened, Cuba was left compara- 
tively free from strife, but it was not long before there came 
the first serious trouble between the Cuban colonists and the 
mother country. By the time of the Treaty of Utrecht, by 
which the Hapsburg rule in Spain was ended, the island had 
become well settled and the agTicultural products of the in- 
terior made a large showung beside the gold and silver of the 
other Spanish-American colonies. In 1717 a new policy was 
inaugurated by which the growing tobacco trade was made a 
government monopoly. Its enforcement was violentl}^ re- 
sisted and resulted in many collisions between the government 
forces and the people; It was but another incident in the re- 
strictive policy of Spain which finally entirely undermined 



MORKO CASTl.E SIKKKNDERS 57 

her power over her colonies. The magnificent harbors of 
Cuba could be entered only by stealth or force except by the 
monopoly vessels. As Spain was in no condition to be a large 
purchaser, the production of the island was strangled and the 
fanners barely more than lived on what they produced. 

The restrictions imposed upon trade with Cuba gave rise 
to systematic smuggling by British tia(U'rs in Jamaica, and 
the constant friction finally resulted in the Anglo-S2>anish 
war of 1739, which ended with a general European war in 
1748. In the decade that followed, the smuggling trade in 
Cuba grew (»ut of all control of the tobacco monopoly, and a 
system of fanning out the revenues to private monopolists 
was substituted. But this only led to further trouble. The 
expansion of British trade in the Indies led to the Bourbon 
compact to put a check to it, and war began in 17C2. An 
English fleet consisting of forty-four men-of-war and 150 
other vessels under Admiral Pocock took Havana in June of 
that year, and an army of about 15,000 men under Lord Albe- 
marle began the siege of the Spanish garrison numbering 27,- 
000 under Governor Porto Carrero. The resistance was stub- 
born, but Morro Castle surrendered on July oOth, and the city 
on August 13th. The treasure wliieli fell to the Knglish was 
enormous. Over three and a half million dollars was divided 
among them. The English continued to hold the city till 
early the following year, when, under the terms of the treaty 
of Paris, the island was restored to Spain in return for the 
cession of Florida to England. 

Dui-ing their occu])ation of Tlavana the Knglish had 
opened tlie port to free commerce, and wlien tlie Spanish again 
took hold of the island they found it impossible to reimjwse 
the old restrictions in all their rigor. Many of the former 
limitations of the commerce of the island with the home 
eoinitrv were removed, and the island made a rapid material 
advance. In 1777 Cuba was given a more ind(^pendent 
colonial gx)vernment under the control of the Captain-den- 
eral, whose power was, however, practically absolute and 



58 REGAINING LOST POSSESSIONS 

fraught with the seeds of the woes of the Cubans in after 
years. 

At the time this change was made England was engaged 
in a struggle with its American colonies, and the Bourbon 
monarchies of France and Spain availed themselves of the op- 
portunity to get even with their old enemy, France joined 
the American colonists and Spain took up a campaign in her 
own behalf, regaining the island of Minorca and several 
smaller West Indian isles which had been wrested from her. 
Other European powers maintained an attitude favorable to 
Spain, and by the treaty of Versailles in 1783 Spain regained 
Florida. England had lost her American colonies, with the 
exception of Canada and some of her West Indian possessions. 



CHAPTER II 

SPAIN AT THE FEET OF NAPOLEON — HER DISASTROUS AND 
DISGRACEFUL FAILURES — ExVRLY RELATIONS BETWEEN 
SPAIN AND THE UNITED STATES. 

Napoleon's Ambition to Malie Sjiain a Subject Kingdom — Ferdinand's 
Intrigues — Joseph Bouapar.e on the Throne — Fall of Napoleon 
and Restoration of Ferdinand — Revolt against Spain — Mexico and 
South American Colonies Become Independent — Spain's Weakness 
and Cruelty — Always Failed to Restore Her Flag When Once Torn 
Down — A Policy Culminating in Disaster and Disgrace — Spain's 
Possessions in Washington's Time — Owning Over Two-thirds of What 
Now Constitutes the United States — Spain Secretly Cedes Louisiana to 
Napoleon — Jefferson's Diplomacy — Napoleon Offers to Sell Louisiana 
— The Treaty Signed — Dispute Over Florida Boundaries — End of a 
Long Struggle. 

THROUGHOUT the eighteenth century Spain and 
France, under Bourbon rulers, had regarded them- 
selves as natural allies, but this alliance in the end 
had much to do with the ruin of Spain. In 179G a war broke 
out with Great Britain which was productive of nothing but 
disaster to the Spaniards. By pressure of France another 
arose in 1804 which was attended with similar ill-success, and 
in the battle of Trafalgar Spain lost a great part of that fleet 
which she needed for the maintenance of her American 
colonies. Napoleon had already conceived the idea of mak- 
ing Spain a subject kingdom with one of his own family on the 
throne, and he had nothing but contempt for its Bourl)on ruler, 
although he pretended to be a faithful ally. IMcanwhile, 
Ferdinand, the presumptive heir to the Sp;inish tlirone, was 
weakly intriguing to displace his fatlier. He became sub- 
servient to Napoleon, who cultivated his intrigues without hav- 
ing the least idea of making him King. Finally, Ferdiuan 1 

(•'59) 



GO napoleon's designs upon the SPANISH THRONE 

who was liked by the people, compelled his father to abdicate, 
but, lured over the border at this critical moment by JSTapo- 
leon's agents, he found himself a prisoner and compelled by 
Napoleon to renounce all claims to the Spanish throne before 
he had had an opportunity to occupy it. The same year 
Joseph Bonaparte was prevailed upon by his brother to take 
the crown, and he was declared King of Spain and the Indies. 
But before he had reached Madrid, the country had arisen, the 
various provinces electing junias or councils to administer 
affairs and resist ISTapoleon's purposes. 

That mighty struggle during which Napoleon overran 
Spain, and which he acknowledged to have been one of the 
main causes of his ultimate downfall, is a thrilling page of his- 
tory, but it concerns this story only as it affected Spain's re- 
lations to her American colonies. Napoleon's fortunes de- 
clined, and, pressed by his enemies, he again negotiated with 
Ferdinand, who still seemed subservient, though the French 
Emperor had so recently and so cruelly deceived him. Na- 
poleon believed that Ferdinand, as King, might be a pliant 
tool, for Joseph had left Spain in disgust. But the imjoerial 
prestige was broken, and early in 1814 Napoleon was com- 
pelled to abdicate. Ferdinand had already returned to Spain, 
where he was welcomed by the people, who hoped that he 
would resume the throne and take up the reins of power under 
the constitution of 1812. But Ferdinand quickly abrogated 
that apparent guarantee of liberal government, together with 
all the acts of the Cortes, the legislative body of Cadiz, and 
proceeded to set up an absolute monarchy on the old lines, 
recalling the Papal nuncio and re-establishing the Inquisition, 
With astonishing ingratitude he broke his most solemn pledges 
and fell under the direction of priests and nobles and of a set 
of vulgar flatterers and favorites. 

These domestic affairs of Spain had an important effect 
upon the American colonies. There were two Spanish vice- 
royalties in South America — that of Lima, which comprised 
the countries now known as Peru, Ecuador, Venezuela, Costa 



SPANISH-AMERICAN REVOLUTIONS Gl 

Ivica, and the Guianas, and that of IJucnos Ayrcs, which in- 
cluded, besides the present Argentine Ivepubiic, Uruguay, 
Chile, Paraguay, Bolivia, and the untraversed wastes of Pata- 
gonia. Mexico, which was known as New S})ain, and coni- 
j)rised a large territory extending to what is now the southern 
limit of Oregon, was also a vice-royalty. The revolts and 
revolutions in each of these provinces had nuui}' features in 
common. It has been said that the history of one is the his- 
tory of all; and it is true that from 1808 to 1821 all were in 
revolt against Spain, their revolutions following each other in 
rapid succession. 

It is not strange that their history had so much in common, 
for all had been the victims of a long oppression of the mother 
country, and the political aspirations of their j)eople were 
simultaneously stirred when Spain lay at the feet of Napoleon, 
and liberal ideas were everywhere noticeable as a result of the 
revolutions in America and France. Ferdinand's restoration 
of absolutism and oppression, therefore, naturally led to their 
revolt. Everywhere the people rose in arms against their 
oppressors. New acts of cruelty but added fuel to the fire of 
revolt, and new heroes took the ])lace of the slain. Mexico, 
richest of Spain's possessions, won its independence, and the 
South American possessions, under the gallant leadership of 
Bolivar and San Martin, conquered the tyrant and constituted 
themselves republics. 

In all these struggles Spain showed her weakness, hor 
cruelty, and her stu])idity. From the time of Philip II. to the 
present day Spanish Heets have taken the sea only to be beaten, 
and Spanish ships have seldom opened fire except to be sunk. 
The overwhelming disaster which overtook the Armada was 
but the beginning; Trafalgar was but an incident in the long 
history of Sj)ain's downfall. AVlien the colonists rose in in- 
surrection, shf tlircw hcv fleets upoii all the seaports in tiu-ii 
— Vera Cruz, Caracas, Buenos Ayres, Val]>araiso, Valdivia, 
Callao. In not a single instance did her squadrons accom- 
plish anything, nor did they retard the progress of the insur- 



G2 ACQUISITION OF NEW TERRITORY 

gents for a single day. By spitefnl bombardments slie occa- 
sionally destroyed some lives and property, but never could she 
restore the Spanish ilag to the forts from whicdi it had once 
been torn, nor could she inspire among the rebels any terror 
of the Spanish name. The whole record of her colonial man- 
agement is an unbroken chronicle of imbecility, cruelty, injus- 
tice, and truculence, culminating in disaster and disgrace. 

We Avill now trace the movements by which the young 
republic of the United States became possessed of the richest 
portion of that great domain which in the sixteenth century 
Spain's daring discoverers had laid at her feet. It marks the 
beginning of those relations between the United States and 
Spain which culminated in the recent war. 

When George AVashington was president more than two- 
thirds of the great domain which now constitutes our Union 
belonged to Spain. Because the government of the United 
States acquired the larger part of this vast territory in a peace- 
ful manner the fact does not occupy a conspicuous place in our 
histories. But in a study of the previous relations of this 
country with Spain, and of the gradual decline of Spain's 
power on this side of the Atlantic, the fact becomes interesting 
and important. 

During the administration of Washington, and also of 
John Adams, the great territory west of the Mississippi from 
its mouth to its headwaters was Spain's. Originally settled 
by France, it fell to Spain through the treaty of 1763, fol- 
lowing the Seven-Years War. England laid some claim to 
that part of it which now comprises the States of Washington 
and Oregon, but it was not deemed valid, and the whole region 
was an unknown wilderness waiting for the nineteenth cen- 
tury to unfold its wonderful resources. In addition to this 
Florida belonged to Spain, together Avith a strip of land ex- 
tending along the gulf coast to the mouth of the Mississippi, 
and known as West Florida. 

During the struggle of the American colonies for their in- 
dependence, Spain held aloof for some time, though largely 



AN IMPORTANT TIIEATV 03 

out of revenge upon the English she rendered lis some ma- 
terial assistance on the Mississippi, allowing us in the first 
stress of the war to obtain powder from her stores at New Or- 
leans. But soon after the war was over Spain became so arro- 
gant over the Florida boundaries and caused so much inter- 
ference with our navigation of the Mississippi that the 
people of the United States clamored for redress in war. 

In October, 1795, or during the second administration of 
AVashington, Thomas Pinckney arranged a treaty with the 
]\radri(l government establishing as boundaries of the United 
States, East and West Florida on the south at 31° North 
latitude, and on the west the middle of the Mississippi River 
above that latitude. What was regarded as the most impor- 
tant and advantageous part of the instrument was a recogni- 
tion bv Spain of the right of the United States to navigate the 
Mississippi, with a privilege of deposit at the port of JSTew Or- 
leans, free of dutv. 

But the conviction that the Mississippi River and 31° 
North latitude were not the natural boundaries of the new re- 
public began to manifest itself soon after peace was restored 
with (Treat Britain, and this feeling was expressed in occa- 
sional propositions for invading Spanish territory. The deca- 
dence of Spain was already well under way. The colonists in 
her territories everywhere were misgoverned and oppressed, 
and dissatisfaction prevailed. In this situation Francisco 
Miranda, a South American revolutionist, secretly worked 
upon the British ministry to promote a joint expedition for a 
movement upon Louisiana, Great Britain to furnish the navy, 
and the United States the army. Our relations with France 
went from bad to worse, and war seemed at hand, and, after the 
failure of our special mission to Paris, Hamilton became com- 
mitted to the schcmo of liberating S))anish America if the 
T^iiiteil States could be tlie i)i-inci|i:il ;ii:-ency and furnish the 
whole land force. Miranda wrote to Hamilton that England 
would co-operate as soon as the United States was prepared. 
" All is ready," he said, " for your President to give the word." 



64 ALLIANCE OF FRANCE AND SPAIN 

But President Adams was not inclined to favor the project, as, 
like Washington, lie disliked forcible conquests or foreign al- 
liances. 

When Thomas Jefferson became President Spain was still 
a faithful ally of France. It was a part of Napoleon's design 
to re-establish French influence in American territory, partly 
for the greater security of the French possessions in the West 
Indies. In October, 1800, in a secret treaty by which he 
promised to secure for Spain the recognition of the King of 
Tuscany by all the powers of Euroj^e, he obtained from her 
the cession of Louisiana, and soon took steps to send an expe- 
dition to take possession of the colony. 

Meanwhile, the United States, being outraged by Spain's 
repeated violations of her treaty as to free navigation of the 
Mississippi, made preparations to attack New Orleans, but 
soon after Jefferson's inauguration information concerning 
Napoleon's secret treaty reached our government through our 
minister at London, and the project was abandoned. The new 
treaty was anything but agreeable to the people of the United 
States. The administration felt that under the control of 
Spain, which was on the road to decay, the United States might 
confidently await the time when the territory could be easily 
secured. But with the French, under a ruler who contem- 
plated universal empire, in control of Louisiana, the case was 
different. The possessor of the mouth of the Mississippi, Jef- 
ferson wrote to Livingston, our minister at Paris, would of 
necessity become the natural and habitual enemy of the United 
States. 

Livingston's instructions in taking the French mission 
were to dissuade France from acquiring Louisiana if possible,, 
and, if not, to procure a cession to the LTnited States of the- 
Floridas and New Orleans. Meanwhile, the King of Spain 
informed the Intcndant of Louisiana of its cession to France,, 
and he was instructed to make arrangements for its delivery 
to the French government. In pursuance of this order, or, 
perhaps, upon some misconception of his duties, he ordered the; 



LOUISIANA SOLD TO THK UNITED STATES 05 

port of New Orleans closed as a place of deposit for merchan- 
dise, a privilege which our treaty with Spain had guaranteed. 
As a result the })ruduct of a large part of the United States 
could find no outlet. The people in the western section of the 
country were greatly stirred by this act, and Hamilton was in 
favor of seizing New Orleans and the Floridas at once and 
negotiating afterwards. But Jefferson was disposed to con- 
tinue his diidonuitic efforts, though they were not succeeding 
well. Livingston strove in vain to gain the favor of Xapoleon, 
who was rapidly fitting out a large expedition to take possession 
of the new territory. Jefferson appointed Monroe a special 
minister to act with Livingston, but by the time he had reached 
France a great change suddenly came over ^N'apoleon. The 
order for the sailing of the expedition was counternuinded, and 
Livingston was surprised to find himself in high favor in the 
court. 

The cause of this was a sudden threatening of a renewal of 
hostilities of France with Great Britain. ISTapoleon had 
charged the Bi'itish with perfidy, and George III. had retorted 
in kind. The English ambassador was openly affronted at 
tlie Tuileries, and both governments prejiared for war. 
Xapoleon saw that if he continued in his scheme for Louisiana, 
the Lhiited States would become an ally of Great Britain, and, 
moreover, he needed money. The result was that he at once 
;nithoi'i/.ed the sale not only of New Orleans but of Louisiana. 
Tn this situation the sale was quickly arranged, and the famous 
treaty was signed ^^fay 2, 1803, the L'nited States ministers 
dining amicably with the Consul, who but a short time before 
would luirdly r('Cogniz(> tlicni. By this trc^aty the Unitcil 
States became a vast empire with immunity from dangerous 
neighbors, securing for about three cents an acre a domain 
whicli has yielded almost incalculable wealth. Thus Spain 
lost her hold on the richest part of the American hemisphere. 

Tn February, 1810, n treaty was signed by Adams and the 
Spanish minister in bclialf of their respective governments, 
whereby Spain ceded to the Ignited States all territory east 



6fi CESSION OF THE FLORIDAS 

of the Mississipiji known as East and West Florida, with ad- 
jacent islands, for five million dollars. West of the Mississippi 
the new boundary began at the mouth of the Sabine Kiver, 
now the eastern boundary line of Texas, running north by that 
river to 32° North latitude, thence north to the Red River, 
thence west along that river to 100° West longitude, thence 
north to the Arkansas River, thence westerly along this river 
through what is now Kansas and Colorado to 106° West 
longitude, thence north to 42° North latitude, and thence 
westerly on the line which is now the northern boundary of 
Utah, Nevada, and California, to the Pacific. All the terri- 
tory left to Sj^ain, including what are now Texas, New Mexico, 
Arizona, Utah, Nevada, and California, with jiarts of Kansas, 
Colorado, and Wyoming, were in open revolt against a country 
whose tyranny was rapidly despoiling her of all the gains of 
the sixteenth century. 

The treaty was at once ratified by the United States gov- 
ernment in anticipation of its speedy ratification by the Cortes, 
but the unreliability of Spanish character again manifested 
itself. In view of the natural sympathy of the people of the 
United States for the rebellious colonists of South and Central 
America, it became difficult for the government of the United 
States to preserve a strict neutrality in these revolutions. 
Ferdinand feared that if he ratified the Florida treaty the 
United States would recognize the belligerents, and so he held 
off, though France, England, and Russia urged him to ap- 
prove. Pressed for a decisive answer, he offered only mysteri- 
ous excuses. Congress was disposed to require the executive 
to take possession of the Floridas at once, but the administra- 
tion still treated Spain with undeserved forbearance. Finally, 
in February, 1821, when Ferdinand's throne was threatened 
by his owm people, and South America had thrown off the 
yoke, the treaty was ratified and the long series of negotiations 
as to Spanish America was brought to a close. 

From this time forward our relations with S^iain chi'^A-y 
concern the history of Cuba. 



CHAPTER III 

"THP: EVER-FAITIIFL'L ISLE ' — SPAIN'S SECRET ATTEMPTS 
TO SELL CUBA TO FRANCE — THE HOLY ALLIANCE AND 
THE FAMOUS MONROE DOCTRINE. 

Cuba's Peculiar Position — Importance of Havana — An Early Cause of 
Ill-feeling — Cubans Remain Faithful to Ferdinand — Aponto's Uprising 
— iVgitation for the Suppression of the Slave Trade — Favorable Influ- 
ence of English Intervention in Cuba — "A Softer Word for Despot- 
ism " — Help for the Bigoted Ferdinand — Discord in Cuba — Adams's 
Advice to President Monroe — The Famous iMonroe Doctrine — Retreat 
of the Holy Alliance — The Captain-General Endowed with Extraordi- 
nar}' Authority — Powers Misused and Unrest Fostered — The "Black 
Eagle" — Discord Among the Planters — Inauguration of Spanish 
Venality in Cuba — No Reforms for Poor Cuba — Spanish Treasury 
Depleted — The Queen's Plan to Secretly Sell Cuba to France — Class 
Hatred Grows in Cuba. 

DUKINCl tlio troublous years of the disastrous reign of 
Ferdinand, the province wliieli, Locansc of the fail- 
tire of all effortvS to plant the seed of liberal govern- 
ment in her soil, obtained the title of '' The Evcr-faithfid 
Isle," maintained a position pecnliarly her own. Pni'ing the 
last years of the eighteenth century Cuba, under the rule of 
a few wise governors, advanced rapidly in material resources, 
and the jjoi'ts of ira\'aiia and Santiago were opened to free com- 
merce, excepting the slave trade, and a few minor productions. 
At the close of the century Havana was the most important city 
in America. Of the governors, none were more wise and 
])rogressive than Luis d(> las Casas, who imparted a new impulse 
to commerce and agriculture, and inaugurated a series of im- 
]X)i'tant ])ubHc woi-ks. lie took nn active interest not only in 
relieving the reiunant of the native ludiau< from slavery, but 
in developing the military defences of the ishuid. 

AVhen Napoleon jdaced his brother on the throne of Spain, 
5 (G7) 



68 CUBA'S LOYALTY TO SPAIN 

and the Spanish, seeing themselves cheated and humiliated, 
roi^e in a sort of helpless frenzy, the condition of affairs in Cuba 
was greatly changed. England, which had long been an 
enemy of Spain, now became her ally. English fleets, instead 
of threatening Cuban waters, now aided in extending its com- 
merce. When the news of the captivity of Ferdiuand 
reached Cuba, the colonists, irrespective of any party divisions, 
refused to recognize Joseph Bonaparte. The divisions be- 
tween the Cubans and the Spaniards were for the moment 
lost sight of, and the people contributed men, money, and 
material to assist the Junta of Seville, which proclaimed equal 
rights for all Spaniards, both at home and in the colonies. 
The hopes of the Cubans rose high, but the Junta proved itself 
too closely bound to the colonial monopolies to allow of a 
liberal consideration of colonial rights, and the Cubans were 
o-reatly disappointed. During the years when Spain was los- 
ino- her colonies in South America, many loyal Spaniards took 
refuge in Cuba, and, while the population was increased, and 
the islands became the most important of Spain's colonies, the 
presence of so many Spaniards naturally contributed to 
strengthen the reaction which followed the restoration of the 
' despotic Ferdinand. 

When, after the capture of Seville, the Spanish con- 
stituent Assembly was called to frame a constitution for the 
Spanish monarchy, the colonies were invited, and Cuba 
was represented by three deputies, the small proportion being 
the cause of considerable discontent. The Constitution of 
If-!12 became only another factor in the discontent, for though 
the pleas of the Cuban planters prevented the adoption of the 
clause for the abolition of slavery in Cuba after ten years, the 
rumors of the failure led to serious uprisings among the slaves, 
led by Jose Aponto, a free negro. But the insurrection was 
quickly put down and the leaders executed as usual. 

In 1817 arose the agitation for the suppression of the slave 
trade in Cul)a. The importation of negroes into slavery had 
been interdicted by Denmark in 1792, by England and the 



THE SLAVE TRADE MADE ILLEGAL 69 

United States in l.'^OT, hv Sweden in isl.",, aiid by Holland 
and I-'raiice in ]S1 1, and as Kii<;laii<l had [lei'tnnned for Spain 
the service of saving her {nm\ A'apoleon, tliat government 
used its influence to bring al)Out the suppression of the slave 
traiU' in the Spanish colonies. The result was the conclusion 
of the treaty at Madrid in 1817, by which the deportation of 
negroes to Spanish colonies was made illegal after 1820, and 
Ferdinand, who was greatly in need of money, received for 
this concession $2,000,000, Portugal being jiaid a million and 
a half for a like concession. 'Jdie change was violently oi> 
posed, not so much by the Cuban planters as by the slave- 
trading interests, and for years after the interdiction ship- 
loads of slaves were either smuggled in or their entrance con- 
nived at by the Spanish authorities. 

To compensate Cuba for the supposed loss of commerce 
from the interdiction, and in the hopes that it might have a 
beneficial effect upon the revolting South American provinces, 
which Sjiain expected then to recover, she consented to have 
Cuban ports opened to unrestricted commerce, and encouraged 
immigration to the islands. In short, owing to the favorable 
influence of English intervention, ('uba made a distinct gain 
at this time. But it was the forerunner of that long and 
troubled period in which the Cubans and the Spaniards stood 
face to face in an attitude of bitter hatred and hostility. 

It was in 1820 that the standard of revolt was raised in 
Spain by Eiego and Quiroga against the cruel absolutism of 
Ferdinand. The movement quickly spread, and in a short 
time the constitution of 1812 was again proclaimed and Ferdi- 
nand w'as compelled to accept it. But the Captain-General 
who had been sent out to Cuba two years before attempted to 
delay its re-establishment in the island. ]le was overborne 
by the garrison of the city, a part of which at once pronounced 
for the liberal order of things, and they were joined by the 
Cubans. A conflict w^as for the time avoided by the yielding 
of the Ca]itain-General. The succeeding governors of the 
island endeavored to restrain the new tendency, and to unite 



70 FORMATION OF THE HOLY ALLIANCE 

the civil and military power in the hands of the Captain-Gen- 
eral in ojiposition to the constitution, and thus a bitter feeling 
was gradually aroused between the Spanish troops under his 
ininicdiate command, and the local militia who supported the 
Cubans. Secret societies began to take root in the island, 
and thus the two elements of the population, those support- 
ing the constitution and mostly native Cubans on the one 
hand, and the adherents of absolutism on the other, gradually 
took sides in opjDosing organizations. But while these forces 
were arraying themselves in Cuba the constitution Avas again 
broken down in Spain, this time by France under the behest 
of the Holy Alliance. 

The great ruling houses of Continental Europe, strong 
upholders of absolute monarchial institutions and the divine 
right of kings, had naturally become alarmed over the sudden 
unfolding of free institutions in the Americas and the develop- 
ing weakness of the Bourbon throne of Spain. In 1815 the 
sovereigns of Russia, Austria, and Prussia had formed the 
Holy Alliance, its avowed jmrpose being to maintain as a 
Christian doctrine that sovereign right of legitimacy which 
Henry Clay in one of his speeches expressed as " a softer word 
for despotism." The Alliance proceeded to put its foot upon 
liberal ideas in government wherever they were found. Nat- 
urally, it turned to help the bigoted Ferdinand, and the 
country was handed over to ten years more of tyranny. 

In 1823 Ferdinand, now more arrogant than ever, set 
about to carry out the plan of the Holy Alliance, which was 
to use Cuba as an arsenal and vantage point for the subjugation 
of the newly-established South American republics. But at 
this point our ministers in Europe became aware that the Holy 
Alliance had a much more ambitious and sweeping project in 
mind than the assistance of Ferdinand. It was, in fact, a 
])lan for the combination of monarchial Europe to throttle 
indopendcnce of spirit in South America. In this situation 
England and the United States drew closer together for the 
time, though the former had not yet recognized the new 



THE GIST OP THE MONROE DOCTRINE 71 

South American republics. John Quincj Adams, then Sec- 
retary of State, strongly advised President Monroe not to join 
with Kng'land in a protest against the projects of the Alliance 
in South America, but to make liis annual message to Con- 
gress a declaration of what would be the position of the United 
States if the Alliance undertook to carry out its plans. Mon- 
roe acted on the advice, though with some reluctance, it is 
said, and inserted those passages which were destined to be- 
conu> famous as " the Monroe doctrine." After referring in 
the first part of his message to certain negotiations then in 
progress between Knssia and this government coneernmg 
rights in the far northwest, he said: 

" Tlie occasion has been judged proper for asserting as a principle in 
wliich the riglits and interests of the United States are involved, that the 
American continents, by the free and independent condition vhich tliey have 
assumed and maintained, are henceforth not to be considered as subjects for 
future colonization by any European pmrer." 

That is the gist of the Monroe doctrine. Monroe continued 
with some forcible words in explanation of this position, and 
[daiidy intimah-d that any attempt on the part of \\\c Euro- 
pean governments to interfere with the independence of the 
new rejjublics would be considered as an unfriendly act, 
dangerous to our peace and safety'. In England, where the 
purpose of the Holy Alliance was understood, the jMonroe 
declaration was applauded as a bold assertion of American 
sj)irit. The Alliance drew back, and its interference with the 
new republics was thus prevented. 

In ^Fay, 1825, Ferdinand endowed Captain-General Vives 
with those extraordinary powers which for years renmined 
the su])reme law of Cuba. Threatened by a revolution of 
the natives, and by attacks fi-om Mexico and Co](^ud>ia, and 
fearing the designs of the United States, he resolved, " for 
the important end of preserving in that precious island his 
legitimate sovereign authority," to give to the Captain-Gen- 
eral all tlie powers whieli by the royal ordinances were granted 
to the governors of besieged cities, lie, therefore, granted 
" the most ample and unbounded power, to send away from 



72 THE "black eagle" 

the island any persons in ofiice, whatever tlieir occupation, 
rank, class, or condition, whose continuance therein " the Cap- 
tain-General might deem injurious, replacing them with per- 
sons faithful to his majesty. He was also granted the ]30wer 
to susjiend the execution of any order whatsoever. From 
that day the Captain-General was, in effect, the absolute ruler 
of the island, the one essential being that he please his king. 
He became a military dictator, and the degree of his despo- 
tism depended only upon his character and disposition. JSTat- 
urally, the sovereign appointed none but those whom he be- 
lieved to be thorough Spaniards, and thus it happened that 
many of the governors misused their enormous powers, widen- 
ing the breach between the islanders and the peninsulars, and 
causing that very unrest which the grant of authority was in- 
tended to repress. 

As under strict military supervision, with a large army 
constantly on hand, uprisings had little chance of success un- 
less operated from outside, Cuban exiles everywhere became 
constant conspirators. In Mexico and Colombia they or- 
ganized, in 1827, a secret society called the '" Black Eagle,'' 
and in a short time its ramifications extended into many Cuban 
cities and towns. The watchful military forces had no diffi- 
culty in finding the main conspirators on the island, and a 
large number of them were condemned to death, the rest to 
exile, though the Captain-General was wise enough, in view of 
the growing discontent, to mitigate these sentences in many 
cases. Vives used his powers with much discretion, but under 
his successor, Mariano Iticafort, venality and corruption be- 
came more and more manifest, large sums of money wrung 
from the Cubans l>y taxation finding their way into the pockets 
of minor officials instead of into public works or into the Span- 
ish treasury. 

Early in the constitutional history of the United States, 
the acquisition of Cuba had been regarded as desirable if only 
as a strategic point. 

" I candidly confess," wrote Jefferson to President Monroe 



OPINIONS OF JEFFERSON AND EVERETT 73 

in 1 823, " thill 1 luivc ever lodkcd iit ( 'iili;i ;i^ t lie iii(»sl iiitorest- 
iiii;- aiKlitidii tli;it (•ouM l)c iikkIc tu <»ur s_\stciii ol States. The 
control which, with Florida roiiit, this ishiiid would give us 
over the (Julf of Mexico and the countries and the isthmus 
bordering it, would fill up the measure of our political well- 
being." This theory grew naturally out of the consideration 
of the geographical position of the island. *' Our safety from 
this danger," that is, the control of the (iulf by a hostile power, 
wrote Alexander Hill P]verett, our Minister to Spain from 
1825 to 1829, in a letter to President Adams, '' has, I believe, 
long been considered as resulting wholly from the feebleness 
and insutb'cicncy of Spain; and it has been viewed by all as a 
settleil point that the American government would not consent 
to any change in the political situation of Cuba other than 
one which would place it under the jurisdiction of the United 
States." He considered it highly important that the United 
States sliould at once endeavor to obtain possession of the 
island in a peaceable way. " If they do not succeed in this," 
he said, " it is morally certain that they will be forced, at no 
very distant period, to effect the same object in a more invidious 
manner and "at the risk of embroiling themselves with some of 
the great powers of Europe." He then asked that he might 
be favored with instructions with a view to negotiations on 
the basis he proposed, which was, in effect, to offer Spain, then 
in desperate straits financially, a considerable loan on con- 
dition of a temporary cession of the island as security. If the 
loan was not repaid within a specified time, the United States 
should assume entire and iindisiiute*! ownersliip of ('ul>a. 

Henry Clay, then Secretary of State, said in a letter to 
Everett that same year, the United States were satisfied w'ith 
the existing condition of ( ^d)a and Puerto Tiico in the hands of 
Sj)ain and with their poi'ts open to free connnerce, but he in- 
timated that if war should continue between Spain and the 
new South American republics, or there should be danger of 
Cuba falling into other hands, the United States would not be 
disinterested spectators. 



74 SPANISH POSSESSIONS IN THE MARKET 

AVhile this was the position of the administration, it was 
not the position of the inhabitants of the Southern States. 
Shivery then dominated the sentiments of the South, and, 
much as it woukl have liked to have the United States acquire 
Cuba as new shive territory, Cuban independence woukl have 
been considered undesirable and unsafe. In writing to Van 
N^ess, minister to Spain in 1829, President Van Buren said 
that " other considerations connected with a certain class of our 
population make it the interest of the Southern sectio^i of the 
Union that no attempt should be made in that island to throw 
off the yoke of Spanish dependence, the first effect of which 
would be the sudden emancipation of a numerous slave popu- 
lation, the result of which could not but be very sensibly felt 
upon the adjacent shores of the United States." Thus it was 
that because of the growing predominance of pro-slavery con- 
trol, even tlien threatening disunion, the government of the 
United States threw its influence in favor of the Spaniards. 
"While boasting of our freedom, our interests in slavery made 
us partisans of Spanish oppression. 

In 1S30, when the Spanish treasury was sadly depleted, 
the Queen conceived the idea of selling Cuba to France, and 
even the Philippines, and she commissioned a Spanish banker 
at Paris to sound Prince Talleyrand upon the subject. The 
Queen then despatched Campuzano to Paris to represent the 
crown in the business, but he was heartily ashamed of his 
mission; an attempt to deprive Spain of nearly all that re- 
mained of her once great American empire. lie undertook 
the oflfice only because he feared that if he declined it, it 
might fall to some of the Queen's favorites, who would seek 
nothing but the personal pecuniary advantage to be derived 
from it. At a meeting with Talleyrand, when the secret 
agreement to be signed l)y the King of France and the Queen 
Pegent of Spain was being read, Campuzano is described by 
Talleyrand's secretary as being deeply affected. The propo- 
sition from the Spanish ruler was so monstrous and l)ase that 
he struck the table a heavv blow with his fist and nuittcred a 



ANGER OF THE C^UEEM's AGENT 75 

curse. Christina proposed for a consideration of 30,000,000 
reals (about $3,500,000) to IihihI Ciilia over to France, and 
for 10,000,000 reals more to i;iv(' up Puerto llico and the 
Philippines. 

The Queen's plan woulil \u[\kc it necessary for France to 
raise a loan. Out of the loan the banker would receive large 
commissions, while the sum of 1,000,000 francs was to be 
offered to Prince Talleyrand, and ;>00,000 francs were to be 
distributed as bribes and commissions to other peoi)le whose 
support might be essential. W'lien, a few days later, the 
parties met in the King's cabinet to sign the contract, Cam- 
puzano could hardly control himself, so disgusted was he with 
the business which seemed to l)e working to a successful con- 
clusion. The article on Cuba hardly provoked any discus- 
sion, but when it came to the Philippines, Louis Philippe 
thought he saw an opportunity for driving a bargain. lie 
remarked that the cession of the Philippines to France would 
be so obnoxious to England that serious complications, if not 
war, might result. He therefore demanded a lower price on 
the Philippines, and pushing the contract acnxss the table to 
Campuzano, exclaimed imperiously : 

" The reduction of price 7nust be accepted. The terms are 
too onerous. Seven million reals is my offer, or else the con- 
tract must be thrown into the fire." 

Talleyrand, who knew how disgusted Campuzano was 
with the whole business, and who fearcnl that the King's move 
might s]K)il the lucrative job, stretched out his hand to pick up 
the paper and was about to speak, when Cami)u/auo, starting 
up quickly, ]eane<l over the table, seized the contract, crum])led 
it in his hand, and looking at the astonished King, said: 

" ^'our majesty is right. The contract is worthless, only 
fit to be thrown into the fire." 

He dung the paper on the blazing logs of the fireplace, 
:ind with the tongs beat it down until nothing remained but 
the blackened fragment.s. And thus ended Spain's only prop- 
osition for the sale of Cubn. 



76 UNHAPPY CONDITION OF THE CUBANS 

Meantime the condition of the Cubans npon the unhappy 
ishmd became worse and worse. The despotic Captain-Gen- 
eral Tacon was surrounded by corrupt and greedy ofldccholders 
from Spain, while the Creoles were under ban, though they 
were the children of Spaniards, many of them well educated 
and wealthy. Their njisfortune consisted solely in having 
been born outside of Spain, and the period was at hand when 
class hatred ^\•as to manifest itself in an antagonism never to 
end till Cuba shouhl l)e free. 

A select commission drew up a report which was accepted 
by the Cortes, by which it was resolved no longer to admit 
deputies from Cuba. The Cuban deputies protested in vain, 
and from that date the political constitution of Cuba became 
established in accordance with the Queen's decree of April 25, 
1837, a decree which stripped the '^ ever-faithful isle " of all 
voice in its own affairs. 

The years which followed this order made bloody pages in 
the history of Cuba. Spain was deaf to the complaints of a 
people devoid of a free press, of the right of assembly, and. of 
the security of the law. The military system gave rise to 
many excesses, and the infamous contraband slave trade was 
carried on and openly tolerated in violation of treaties by 
which, for a money consideration from England, Spain had 
formally forbidden it. The government of Spain had de- 
clared that all negroes brought from Africa subsequent to the 
treaty should be at once set free, and that the ships on which 
they had lieen transported should at once be confiscated, wdiile 
the captains and crews and others concerned should be pun- 
ished with ten years servitude. Yet the statistics show that 
for the twenty-five years following this treaty an average of 
fifteen thousand slaves annually arrived in Cuba from Africa. 
It is asserted that in the four years tliat Tacon was Captain- 
General he made no secret of receiving a doubloon, or seven- 
teen dollars, per head on every slave landed, and the home 
government secretly fostered the trade for the sake of the rev- 
enue which went into the pockets of its members. 



FILIBUSTERING EXPEDITIONS AND THE DEATH OF LOPEZ 
— THE BLACK WAUlilOR — TUV. FAMOUS OSTEND CON- 
FERENCE - A CUBAN WARNING. 

Buchauan'.s Efforts to Buy Cuba — Spain Refuses to Sell — Lopez and 
His Uprising — His Filibustering Attempts — Capture of Colonel 
Crittenden and His Men — Lopez Killed by a Spanish Garrote — 
Private Filibustering — Important Letter of Edward Everett — A 
Change in Party Government — Cuba and the Cause of Slavery — 
A Sympathizer with Filibusters — The Black Warnor Ca.s,e — Feeling 
against Spain Intensitied — Soule Threatens Spain — Conference of 
American Ministers at Oslend — Fixing a Price on Cuba — The Mani- 
festo — ElTort to Secure Cuba — Buchanan Advises Annexation — 
Arrogance of Spanish Authority — Liberal Sentiment Strengthened — 
Burdens Only Increased — A Cuban AVarniug. 

IX the a^-itati<tii wliicli led to the annexation of Texas in 
1845, tlic |)roi)i>siti(»n to acMpiire Cnha Itv pnrcliase or 
otherwise was widely disenssed in the I'nited States, and 
duriui;' the ^lexican war, whicli fixed the l)onndarv of Texas 
and hrong'ht (California into the I'nion as a free state, the 
strenii'tli of the ('uhaii idea incrra-ed I'apidly. 'I'hc shtvc- 
hohlers liad heconic <:r('ally concerned o\-er the anti-slavery 
agitation, and the\- looked to < 'uha as a means (d" e^tahlishing 
the eqiulilii'inni of sectional ^ticniilli. In l'^I>', ther(dore, 
niieluuutn, Secretai'V of State nii<ler President I'olk, jtroposcd 
nei;otiatious for the pnrcdiase of the island to the S]>ani>h g'ov- 
ennnent throiiiih the American ^linister at Madi'id, who was 
instrncted to point onl to Spain that she was in danger of losing 
Cnha i>y revohition, and that it nnght he wiested from her by 
Great Britain if a rnptnre came in theii- relations. The min- 
ister was atithori/.ed |., p;iy :is mndi a- $ 1 co.odo.oiHl. ;ii:d the 
treaty shonld he modeled np^n thai i>f the Loni^iina pnrcdiase. 



78 Lopez's expeditions frustrated 

But the refusal of Spain to entertain tlie proposition put an 
end to the project, and the growth of the anti-slavery sentiment 
led many of the slaveliolders to lend support to violence in the 
shape of filibustering expeditions. 

The Cuban liberals, unable to carry on their revolutionary 
movements at home because of the military vigilance of the 
Spanish authorities, turned to the United States as a place to 
organize their movements. In May, 1847, I^arciso Lopez, who 
had formed a conspiracy for a rising in central CHiba, was de- 
tected and fled to the United States. During the following- 
year he formed an association of Cuban fugitives in l^ew York, 
and in 18-i9, after the failure of Buchanan's negotiations, Lo- 
pez organized a military expedition and induced many promi- 
nent southern citizens to become interested in it. The attempt 
was frustrated by the vigilance of President Taylor, who had 
succeeded Polk, and who issued a warning proclamation. The 
second and third attempts were more serious. In April, 1850, 
Lopez sailed from ISTew Orleans with about three hundred 
men under his command, and, after baffling one of our naval 
vessels which was seut to interce])t the expedition, he landed 
at Cardenas, overcame the Spanish guards, and took posses- 
sion. But the spirit of revolution was not at that moment 
ripe in the cities of Cuba, and Lopez, finding himself unsup- 
ported and unable to reach the rural districts, was soon driven 
from the island l»y the government troops. He took refuge 
in Savannah, wdiere he was arrested for violating our neutral- 
ity laws, but was quickly discharged. 

Lopez was not in the least daunted and he saw that he had 
the sympathy of a large portion of the southern people. En- 
couraged by some revolutionary manifestations in Cuba in 
1851 he hastened to Xew Orleans and organized a new; force 
of al)0ut 450 men, draining as before upon the purses of 
zealous pro-slavery politicians. He sailed away on the steamer 
Pampero intending to land on the southern coast. But learn- 
ing at Key West of a re^'olt at a favorable point on the north 
coast he made for that place, but missed it and disembarked on 



FATE OF LOPEZ AND CRITTENDEN 79 

a lonolv portion of the coast about thirty miles from Havana. 
Colonel Crittenden of Kentucky, second in command, with a 
hundred men, was left in charge of the stores and baggage, 
while Lopez, with the rcniiiiiulci- of his command, advanced 
inland to the town of Pozas, whose inhabitants, instead of lend- 
ing their enthusiastic aid, tied at onc(\ The separated forces 
never reunited. CrittendciTs band iiiially put out to sea in 
small boats to escape the Spanish soldiers, and were soon cap- 
tured by a Spanish war vessel, which took them to Havana, 
where, after a summary trial, they were shot on the 17th of 
August. Lopez had advanced but a short distance into the 
interior, suffering greatly and finding the simple inhabitants 
of that section indifferent to the cause, when he was attacked 
by government forces, and after a severe loss he fled to the 
mountains. But here he was surprised on tlie 24th of August 
by an overwhelming force, and his scattered men, after wan- 
dering about, were finally caught and taken to Havana. 
Lopez was executed at dawn, Se])tcnd)er 1st, by the Spanish 
garrote, an instrument l)y which the victim is clasped fast in 
an iron chair while an iron screw is pierced through a brass 
collar to the spina! nuirrow. The newspapers of the day 
record that this execution was puldicly performed in (he midst 
of an approving crowd. 

President Fillmoi-e had l)y proclamation stigmatized all 
such Imslile adventures from our shores as violations of both 
national and international law, and had warned citizens of the 
United States who aided such projects that they would forfeit 
all claims to the protection of the government. The French 
and Lnglish governments had ;ilso issued orders to their AVest 
Lidian fleets to prevent, by force if need be, such invasions of 
Cid)a. Ijut as a result the Spanish authorities in Cuba be- 
came very suspicious of American designs, especially when the 
South showed sucli iiiHiiist.-ikable signs of irritation nf the 
failure of the filibustering schemes, for a mob at Xew Orleans 
attacked the S])anish residents and tore in pieces a flag on the 
building of the Spanish consulate. Ibit a little diplomacy 



80 AVISE WORDS OF EDWARD EVERETT 

soon secured a better feeJing between Spain and this govern- 
ment, and those w'Jio still dreamed of seenring Cuba vere for 
the time oecnpied with the more serions aspects of the slavery 
qnestion at home. Henceforth the designs of the slave party 
Avere mainly confined to attempts to purchase the island. Still, 
there were some quiet attempts at filibustering. 

Early in 1852 the French and English governments, in- 
fluenced by the efforts of the South to acquii'e Cuba, made a 
joint proposition to the government of the United States for a 
tripartite convention for disclaiming severally and collectively 
all intention of obtaining possession of the island, and binding 
themselves to discountenance all attempts to that effect on the 
part of any power or individuals whatever. In December, 
1852, Edward Everett, Secretary of State, replied to the 
proposition in a letter which is an important landmark in our 
relations with Spain as to Cuba. The French minister had 
stated that France could never see with indifference the pos- 
session of Cuba by any other power than Spain, and explicitly 
declared that she had no wish or intention of appropriating the 
ishind to herself. Lord ]\Ialmesbury made a similar avowal 
on behalf of the English government, but Mr. Everett stated 
that this government could not, for various reasons which he 
proceeded to enumerate, enter into an agreement to pledge 
itself for all time, no matter what the circumstances, not to 
consider the possibility of the acquisition of Cul)a. One of the 
reasons Avas that sucli a convention woidd l)e an entangling 
alliance contrary to the oldest traditions of the government; 
another, that such an agreement, though equal in terms, would 
be very unequal in substance. Cuba lay close to our shores, 
commanded the approach to the Gulf and to the entrance of 
the Mississippi. " If," he said, " an island like Cuba, belong- 
ing to the Spanish crown, guarded the entrance of the Thames 
and the Seine, and the United States should propose a con- 
vention like this to France and England, those powers would 
assuredly feel that the disability assumed by ourselves was far 
less serious than that which we asked them to assume." 



MARCY FORESEES A STKrCflLE 81 

Tims were France and England a liall' ('ciinii-v ago given 
to nnderstand that, Avliile we could not (•(niscnt to any other 
Knropean ])o\ver than Spain occnpviug ( 'iilm, we might under 
certain contingencies feel coinpcllcd to take it to ourselves; 
but not for the aggrandi/cnicut of sla\c power. 

J3ut in the following year the Whig adiiuiii-tratiou, whose 
sentiments Everett had exjn'essed, endeil, niid tlie party whose 
l)olitics were largely donnnate<l hy the defendei's ot" slavery 
came into power. An ardent Southern expansionist, J*ierre 
Soule, a Frenchman by birth, was sent to the .Madrid mission. 
Marcy, the new Secretary of State, sent him instrueti(_)ns 
which went much further than the judicial argument of 
Everett, and which indii*ated how elosely bound up in Cuba 
and its illegitimate shive tra<te was the cause of slavery in this 
country. Marcy M'rote to Soule that, under eei'tain eireuni- 
stances, the Fnited States would be willing to j)urehase, but 
he did not believe that Spain would entertain negotiations, and 
lie felt convinced that S])ain was under obligations to Great 
Britain and France not to transfer the island to the United 
States. " Independent of any end)arrassment of this nature," 
he added significantly, " there are many other reasons for be- 
lieving that Spain will ])ei'tinaeiously hold on to ( 'uba, and 
that the separation, whene\cr it takes place, will be the woi'k 
of violence." 

Soule was an exile fi'om France for being a conspirator 
against the French Iloni'bons, and Napoleon ill. heartilv dis- 
liked him. lie was a sympathizer with the hlibusters, and not 
long before his departure for Spain had made a speech in 
j)ublic jwaising Fopez and his deeds, but he was foi-mally re- 
ceived at ^Madrid, though he ([uickly in\i)l\'e<l himsell" in 
difficulties. 

Sentiment against Sjtain in the T^nited States was greatly 
intensified at this time by the ease of the Jildcl- WdiTior, a 
steamer owned in Xew ^'ork and plying regidarly between 
that port and ^b»bil(\ She was the largest steamer in tln^ 
coasting ti'ade, and possessed accommodations for 200 cabin 



82 SEIZURE OF THE "BLACK WARRIOR" 

passengers. In going and returning, she touched at Havana 
to deliver and receive mail and passengers, but not for the pur- 
pose of discharging or taking on any freight. The custom 
laws at Havana were very strict, and under them she should 
have exhibited each time a manifest of her cargo. This, of 
course, would have been to no purpose as no cargo was to be 
moved, so she usually entered Havana and cleared as " in 
ballast " to save time and trouble. She had so entered and 
cleared thirty-six times in succession, with the full knowledge 
and consent of the Spanish custom officers, and in accordance 
with a written general order given by the authorities seven 
years before. Stopping at Havana as usual in February, 
1854, the steamer was held in the harbor for having an un- 
declared cargo. The cargo was confiscated and taken on 
shore, and a fine of more than twice its value was imposed on 
the captain and his vessel. The cnptain refused to pay, pro- 
testing against the whole proceeding as wrongful. He de- 
clared it a forcible seizure, and, hauling down his colors, left 
his vessel as a Spanish capture and made his way back to the 
United States, where the owners preferred a claim for 
$300,000 indemnity. 

Soule meanwhile had applied every art of menace and 
cajolery to induce Spain to cede Cuba to the United States, 
and in accordance with his instructions from Marcy protested 
against any interference from other European powers in the 
negotiations. Spain ]3roudly spurned all negotiations on the 
subject. The minister declared in the Cortes that such a sale 
would be " the sale of Spanish honor itself." Then came 
from Washington a demand for redress for the Black Warrior 
seizure. 

In order to impress the governments of Europe as well as 
their own, the ministers to England, France, and Spain, 
Buchanan, Mason, and Soule, respectively, all eager to add 
Cuba to our slave territory, at the suggestion of Secretary 
Marcy called a conference of themselves at Ostend in October, 
1854. They conferred three days, and then transferred their 



THE OSTEND MANIFESTO 83 

deliberations to Aix-la-Cluipelle, where they drew up 1he ru- 
])ort wliieh beeauie known :is the OstcMid MMiiife-ti». It was 
proposed that onr government shonld make a bold strike for 
Cuba, and that an innnediate and earnest effort should be 
made to purchase it from Spain at a price not exceeding a cer- 
tain maximum, which was between themselves and the admin- 
istration fixed at $120,000,000. They declared that our pro- 
posal to Spain should be open and frank, so as to challenge the 
approbation of the world, and such a transfer, they urged, 
would be beneficial to Spain and to all the commercial nations 
of Europe. What with her own oppression and the danger of 
insurrectionary troubles, they said, Spain, unless she sold, 
might lose Cuba and the price as well. Finally, supposing a 
price should be refused, the (piestion would remain, they de- 
clared, whether Cuba in the hands of Sj)ain did not endanger 
our internal ]ieace and the existence of our Union; and if so, 
we should be justified by every law, human and divine, in 
wi'esting it from her. 

Ihit this remarkable manifesto did not produce the desired 
effect. President Pierce was too prudent to follow such reck- 
less advice, and the Kansas-Xebraska trouble soon furnished 
him witli enough to attend to, especially as it made the Xortli 
determined to allow of no more territorial acquisitions till the 
slavery cjuestiou was settled. Hie impetuous Soule, observ- 
ing the hesitation of th(» government, threw up his commission 
and returned home in disgust. Thereupon, Spain made com- 
pensation for the BJficlx Warrior, and both nations exhibited a 
more peaceful and amiable disjiosition. 

^^'h(■n Ihichanan became President, lunvever, the slave- 
holders ihought that the policy of " territorial expansion " 
would l)e vigorously ])rosecuted. His message certainly gave 
])ronu*se of such a policy, and ( 'iiba played a conspicuous part 
in it. Ihit by this time the anti-slavery sentiment had become 
strong enough to hold the South in check. Still, Puchanan 
did his best to keep the Cuban project to the front, even aft(>r 
the elections of 1858 showed that the verdict of the people 
6 



84 INCREASE OF CUBAN DISCONTENT 

was against him. AVlieii Congress met in December, he spoke 
much of (Juba, JMexico, and Central America. He held that 
if Spain wonkl not sell, self-defense wonld compel ns to annex 
it by force. Slidell, one of the President's most intimate 
friends, presented in the Senate a bill proposing to place in 
the hands of the Execntive $30,000,000 for negotiating the 
purchase of CHiba, and he made a long report describing in 
glowing language the advantages to be derived, and strongly 
reiterating the threat that if Spain would not listen to negotia- 
tions, the government of the LInitcd States would, by them- 
selves or in assisting the Cubans, drive Spain from the island. 
But Congress woidd do nothing in times of such domestic ex- 
citement, and Buchanan's advice went unheeded. 

During this decade the Cubans bore the ever-increasing 
weight of oppression in a spirit of hopefulness, and every at- 
tempt to throw it off was impotent, so extensive and thorough 
was the military espionage. It is not strange that their valor 
was unequal to the situation when, living in an island smaller 
than the State of New York, they were under the constant 
watch of an army larger than was necessary in the whole of the 
United States. The S])anish government constantly added to 
the burden of taxation, and thus the discontent of the people 
continued to increase. Commerce with the United States was 
almost destroyed by prohibitory restrictions, and that with the 
mother country was subjected to a heavy tax. 

Uncpiestionably, the abolition of slavery in the United 
States as a result of the Civil War and the re-estaldishment of 
the power of the republic on firm grounds strengthened the 
liberal sentiment in Cuba and gave rise to renewed movements 
for its expression. The pleas of the Cubans had so much effect 
even upon the Sjianish government that a liberal ministry 
which happened to be in power in 1865 accepted a project for 
a Commission of Inquiry to consider and devise reforms for 
the Cuban administration. The project was duly set forth in 
a royal decree and the Cubans formed extravagant hopes upon 
the results. 



A PLEA FOR JUSTICE 85 

But instead of a general plan for colojiial reform ])eing- 
considered, the commission, whose dclilu'rations were guided 
I>v ,1 jiresident ai)pointed by tlie goxci'iiniciit, i-estrieted itself 
To the [U'oposal of certain rcuiilal ions for shivc-hil)oi\ The 
('uliaus pleaded for a constitutional system in place of the 
autocracy of the ( 'a})tain-( leneral, fi-eedom of the press, the 
right of ])etition, cessation of the exclusion of ('nhans from 
public othce, unrestricted industrial libei'ty, abolition (»f re- 
strictions on the transfer of landed property, the right of 
assenddy and association, re])resentation in the (/ortes, and 
local self-government. Ihit none of these proi)ositinns would 
the home government consider. Even the moderate demands 
of the Cubans for the abolition of slavery were temporized 
with and nothing was done. The result was tliat the new 
Captain-deneral, bersnndi, tightened the screws on the re- 
fornnsts so that they were worse oil" than before. To cap it 
all, a little later an additional 10 per cent, on the direct taxes 
of the island was im})osed. 

One of the Cuban deputies to the Cortes, in a speech de- 
livered in 18CG, said " I foresee a catastrophe near at hand, 
in case Spain persists in remaining deaf to the just reclamations 
of the (Hdians. Look at the old colonies of the American con- 
tinent. All have cikUmI in concpiering their indei)endence. 
Let Spain not forget the lesson; let tlu^ gov(M-nment be just to 
the colonies that rcMnain. 'I'hus she will consolidate liei' do- 
miinon over ])eo)de who oidy desii'e to be good sons of a 
worthy mother, lait wlio are not willing to live as slaves under 
the scepter of a tyrant." 



CHAPTER V 

REVOLUTION IX SPAIN AND INSURRECTION IN CUBA — 
BEGINNING OF THE TEN-YExVRS WAR — COURSE (JF THE 
STRUGGLE — FORMATION OF THE REPUBLIC— THE PEACE 
OF ZANJON. 

The Revolution at Cadiz — Wretched Condition of Spain — Flight of 
Isabella — Her Vain Appeal to Najjoleon — Fires of Discontent 
Break out in Cuba — Promoters of the Insurrection — High Stand- 
ing of the Leaders — The Proclamation at Yara — Beginning of the 
Ten- Years War^ — The Appeal to Arms — The Burden no Longer to 
be Endured — Rapid Growth of the Insurrection — Cuban Leaders 
Meet to Form a Government — Diminution of Spanish Forces — Disa- 
greement among the Insurgents — Cisneros Succeeds to the Presi- 
dency — Six Years of Desultory Fighting — The Rebellion Nearly at a 
Standstill — Campos sent to the Island — An Armistice — The Treaty 
of Zanjon — Concessions and Privileges. 



M 



EAjS^WHILE, affairs in Spain liad been going from 
bad to worse. TLc trcasnry was well-nigh empty. 
The air wa^^ fnll of intrigne and conspiracy. At last, 
on September lUtli, tlie rcvolntion broke out at Cadiz, and a 
pronunr'iamodo was issued setting forth the causes of dis- 
affection in the mother country. It was a long array of 
charges, all justified. The truth was that the S}>anish rtilers, 
still priest-ridden, were clinging to the customs of the middle 
ages, and the |)eople were at last awakening, but without any 
adequate training for governing themselves. A })rovisional 
government was estaldished, and Isabella fled to France, 
where she pleaded in vain for Xapolcon's help. Napoleon 
was lu^ginning to have troubles of his own, and it was the 
Spanish tlirone which was eventually to form the issue of war 
leading to the Trench collapse at Sedan. 

While these events were being shaped at home, the Cubans 
were planning another outbreak of their own, for, di-app 'inted 

(«6) 



SOME NOTABLE REVOLUTIONISTS 87 

over the failure of the C'ounnissioii of Inqiiirv, and goaded 
ahiiost to a frenzy by the high-lianded methods of C'aptain- 
(leneral Lersnndi, nothing was left them hnt another break 
i'uy lihei'ty. J he movement was fast ri[)ening when the news 
of the (Queen's overthrow reaehed the island, but the change 
in Spain made no diiference with Lersnndi's policy, lie be- 
came even more watchful and oppressive. The plans for insur- 
rection were (juietly matured in the eastern ])rovinces of the 
island by Francisco Aguilera, j\lanuel Aguilera, and Fran- 
cisco Osoi'io at Hayamo, Carlos Cespedes in ^lanzanillo, Beli- 
sarid Alvai'cz in Ilolguin, Vincente (Jarcia at Las 'I'unas, Do- 
nato Marmol in rJiguani, and Manuel Fernandez in Santiago. 
These men were not low-born conspirators. Francisco Agui- 
lera, for example, though born in (^uba, had been highly edu- 
cated both in tlic Fiiited States and Eurojie, and was a mil- 
lionaire when he liberated his slaves and threw himself into 
the cause of the rebellion against Spanish tyranny. Cespedes 
had graduated in law at jMadrid, and was a man of literary at- 
tainments. He had been imprisoned during the conspiracy 
of Lo])ez, but since his release had be(Mi ])racticing his pro- 
fession in Bayamo. It was at his yihuitation nt Yai-a that the 
revdlntidii was proclaimed. 'J'hc Icadci-s had planned to have 
a simultaneous outbreak on October lOtli, but the movement 
having been discovered by the authorities, Cespedes at once 
placed himself at the head of 100 poorly-armed men and 200 
slaves whom he had liberated. Two days hifcr he was joined 
by a1)out 4. <)()() men, and the entire ])rovince rose in sympathy 
witli the movement. Ijv the middle of Xovend^er he had an 
organized army of 12,000 men, who, though poorly e(piip]HMl. 
were united in purpose and of determined will. Thus, in 
brief, began the Ten-"\"ears War. 

Cuba had not failed to a<k for ju<ti('(^ and I'cdi'c^. Tlic 
people, before sliouldcring tlie rillc, pleaded for theii- riglits. 
Far-sighted men had denounced the cancer of slavery, the 
horrors of the traffic in slaves, the corruption of the office- 
holders, the abuses of the government, the discontent of the 



88 BEGINNING OF THE TEN-YEARS' WAR 

people with their forced state of political tutelage. ISTo atten- 
tion Avas given to them, and this bronght on the first armed 
confliets. 

Within a few weeks Cespedes had gathered abont him 
nearly fifteen thousand men, all resolute and eager, but, un- 
fortunately, poorly armed and equipped. The plans of the 
revolutionists having been discovered while still immature, 
war began before arms could be smuggled into the island, and, 
as the Spanish held all the seaports, the insurgents were forced 
to rely almost entirely upon guerrilla methods. Still, for 
the first two years they were victori')US in many engagements, 
and were generally successful, hostilities beiug mainly con- 
fined to the two eastern provinces. 

While the Cubans were gaining ground, a Constituent 
Asseml)ly of ( 'ul)an representatives met at (luaimaro, framed 
a constitution for the Republic of Cuba, and elected (Jespedes 
as President, Francisco Aguilero as Vice-President, and Man- 
uel Questida as military commander. In a short time rights 
of belligerency were accorded them by Chile, Bolivia, Guate- 
mala, ( 'olond)ia, Mexico, and Peru. 

As the war progressed, the people of the United States 
couhl not restrain their iudignation at the Spanish operations 
on the island. In the first place the Cubans continued to win 
victories in the face of obstacles. The yellow fever made 
havoc with the conscripted Spanish soldiers, and they were 
utterly untrained for the guerrilla tactics l)y which, at the end 
of 1870, the Cubans had gradually strengtheued their hold oti 
the eastern ludf of the island. In the second place, the con- 
duct of the Spauish soldiers in the western part of the island, 
where, accord iug to Spanish re]iorts, peace reigned, was suffi- 
cient to rouse the anger even of those friendly to Spain. 

During the cam]iaign of 1871 the insurgents were enabled 
to secure cousiderable stores of auimunitiou and arms, largely 
from the Spanish, and the campaign of 1872 was practically 
a repetition of its predecessor. The insurgents, compelled to 
be very saving of their ammunition, confined their open at- 



DEATH OF CKSPKDES 89 

tacks to siicli small Ixxlics ai Spnniai'ds as lliev could overcome, 
oludiiiii' the larger ones, wliicli were ii(!verthelos8 continually 
liai'i'asscd \i\ ^liar]) attacks and retreats, while e.\])osui'e and 
disease killed more ot the unaccliniate<| than ai'tillery in the 
hands (d" the ndiels coidd have done. 

In 1^7;) the \\;ir I'eally reached it^ climax. I!nt in the 
fall of that year disagreements aroj-e amoiii^' the ( 'uljans them- 
selves. Tlie (^uhaii ( 'ongress met at liijagual in I)(H'end)er, 
and a majorils' being hostile to the policy <d' i'l-esideiit C'es- 
j)edes, he was deposed. lie retire(l to San Loreii/o, where ho 
was surprised hy a detachment (d" S])anish troops, and, though 
he cscajx'd, lu> was mortally wounded, and died on March '2'2, 
1S74. He had given up everything for the cause of Cuba's 
freedom, and at the time of his death was pi'actically homeless 
and deserted. 

Much difficulty was found in selecting his successor, hut 
( 'isiuu'os, a scion <d' the old Spani>h nobility, and a nuui id' high 
social rank and abilities, was j)rovisioiuilly electe(l. Ju join- 
ing the revolution he had renonnced his title, and his estates 
had been confiscated. l>ut the disagreements among the 
('ubau leaders canse(l widespread disaffection, and for a time 
th(» rebellion was nearly at a standstill. It might have ended 
hut for the fact that tiie Sj^aniards themselves were in discord. 

After six years of this de>ultory tighting the end seeme(l 
as far <df as ever. Without a navy there seemed to he no 
jxtssibility of the ('ui)aus ejecting the Spaniards froui the 
i--land, while the Spaniards were able to do no more than drive 
the insui'geiit- from one place to another. Meanwhil(\ it was 
costing Spain an immense amount of money and was well-nigh 
ruining ( 'uba. 

U)) to this time Spain ha<l been i-egularly sending fresh 
levies of S])auish youths to the island, only to fall by disease, 
or in skirmishes with an enemy which came ujxui them sud- 
denly and as snddeidy disajipeared to await another oppor- 
tunity. The \'olnuteers, an undiscipliueil ami ungovernable 
body, sujiposed to be on duty as home gnai'ds, were iu'\"er 



90 THE PEACE OF ZANJON 

brougiit into the field to any extent, being allowed to play the 
bandit in the cities. Bnt when the C'arlist wars came on it 
became im})Ossible for Spain to spare rccrnits, and the con- 
stantly diminishing forces gradnally fell back before the in- 
snrgents. 

In 1870, the Carlist nprising in Spain having l)een sul)- 
dned and Alfonzo XII. placed npon the throne, General Mar- 
tinez de (^am})os, who had won distinction in pntting an end 
to the repnblic and restoring the I>onrl)on dynasty, was sent 
to Cnl)a with 2.5,000 veterans of the (\arlist wars to end the in- 
surrection, lie had had experience in Cuban warfare, yet 
notwithstanding his experience and energy, and that of his 
veterans and recruits, and in spite of the dissensions among 
the insurgents, he made litth^ headway. The latter easily 
elnded the larger forces sent against them, and overpowered 
smaller detachments. The hot season was again coming on. 
and the Spanish troops were weakening under the effects of 
the climate, when Campos determined to undertake negotia- 
tions for peace. Early in 1878, both sides being well-nigh 
exhausted, he succeeded in obtaining an armistice. 

The liead(piarters of the insurgents were then in Cama- 
giiey, and there the insurgent leaders met to consider the over- 
tures. A commission of nine generals, with Garcia, who had 
succeeded Cisneros as president, were appointed to meet Gen- 
eral Campos and a nund;er of his officers at the camp of St. 
Angnstin near Zanjon. This they did on February 10th, and 
there they signed the compact known as the peace of Zanjon, 
by which the Cul)ans gave np their struggle for independence, 
and tlie Spaniards ]n'omised the reforms which it had refused 
to grant in 1867 after the Commission of Inquiry. By the 
articles of this agreement S})ain conceded to the island of Cuba 
the same political privileges, organic and administrative, en- 
joyed by the island of Puerto Eico, and granted com]ilete 
amnesty as regards political offence^. Those remaining under 
trinl or sentence would be given their lil)erty, and a general 
pardon was given to deserters from the Spanish army. 



SPANISH PROMISES 91 

Frt'cdoiu to slaves in the iiisiiri>ent ranks was granted, and 
no insurgent should be compelled to render military service to 
the Spanish governniciit till i)eac'e should haxc heen estab- 
lished, while the government wonld lend aid and protection to 
all desiring to leave the island. Insurgents were publicly to 
lay down their arms, railroad and steamship facilities being 
afforded to all sections of the insurgent army repairing to the 
place appointed for the surrender of their arms. 



I 



CllAPTEll VI 

SPAIN'S STRAINED RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES 
DURING THE TEN-YEARS WAR — THE VIIiGIML,S AFFXIU 

— A RACE FOR LIFE — EXECUTION OF CAPTAIN FRY AND 
HIS COMPANIONS. 

Situation Changed after the American Civil War — Spanish Feans — 
President Grant's Pacilic Tenders — Signiticant Reply of Spain — 
Remarkable Decree of the Cai)taiu-General of Cuba — To be Shot Like 
Pirates — Methods of Spanish Warfare — Tiie Virginius — Circum- 
stances of Her Departure— Sighted by the Spanish Cruiser Tornado 

— A Lively Chase — Burning Hams to Keep up Steam — Horses and 
Arms Thrown Overboard — A Race on the Moonlit Caribbean — Cap- 
tured and Taken to Santiago — The First Execution of Prisoners — • 
The American Consul's Messages Delayed — He Asks for an Explana- 
tion — An Impudent Note in Reply — Further Exc^cutions — Captain 
Fry's Death — His Pathetic Letter to His AVife the Night before His 
Death — Arrival of a British Giuiboat. 

LEAVT]S[G now the (^iibaiis who, siipposin<!; that tliey 
were to receive at hist some measure of that for which 
tliey had been so long pleading and fighting, were 
about to hiy down their anus, it will l)e necessary to return 
to the beginning of the war of 1808 and observe the manner 
in which it alfected the United States and its rehitions with 
both the island and Spain. 'I'he importance of this struggle 
consists not so much in Avhat the Chibans gained, for they really 
gained nothing, as we shall see, nor in what the S]:)aniards 
learned, for they learned nothing, as will also be apparent, but 
it consists in the position which the United States felt obliged 
to assume in the struggle, and which, when understood, will 
make clearer the reasons for intervention in ISOS, twenty 
years after the close of the war. Public and political interest 
in the United States during the struggle was largely confined 
to the question of the recognition of the Cubans and to what is 
known as " the Virginius affair." 

(92) 



FRIENDLY INTERVENTION REJECTED 93 

The Civil War liad well-nigh swept out of the public mind 
the frantic efforts of Buchanan, ^larcy, and others to secure 
Tuba, and the situation was g-reatly altered. Slavery had 

been (K'strovi'd in this counti'V and retained its foolliold in this 
lieiinspliei'e in Cuba alone. Castellar and othei-s had said in 
the ( '<irtes tliat they wished slav(M-v abolished in Cuba. When 
the standai'd of insurreetion was raised at Yara a Spanish minis- 
ter had s]H.keii to onr re|)i'eseiitative at ^la<Ii'id id' " the eoni- 
nion interests shared by the Tnited States and Spain in Cuba," 
and had added, " that whatever retarded the prosju'rity of the 
island was injurious alike to both eonntries; the welfare of 
Cid)a was of more commercial im])ortance to the ITnited States 
than to the mother country." 1 doubtless, the Spanish minister 
was hainited by a fear that the United States mii;ht, iu a 
spirit of revenge whicli woidd have been so iiatni'al to a 
S]>aniard, recognize the belligerency (d' the Cubans before 
hostilities were well begun, as Spain had rec(\i>nized the con- 
federacy eight years before; and it reipiired uneoiiinion assur- 
ance for liini to s])eak of the eoniinereial interests of the United 
States and Spain in Cuba when Spain did everything it could 
by discriminating duties to injure Ctd)an commerce with the 
Ignited States. 

(tcneral Grant, wlio became l'*resident in ^larch, ISlU), 
tendered the good ofliees of tlie Unite(l States for tlie pur]>ose 
of restoring peace in the ishiiid, and (ieneral I'i'ini. as the 
re])resentative of the Spanish goxcrnnient, had replied : '' \\ e 
can better ])roceed in the present sit nation of things without 
even this friendly intervention. A time will come when the 
good offices of the T'nited States will not oidy be usefnl. bnt 
indispensable in the final arrangements between Cuba ami 
Spain." Thit that time did not come, and the struggle had 
not ]U-oceeded far ixd'oi'c it was a])parent thai the United States 
must hecoiiic very sei'i<m<ly int( rcslc<l in the way the S|>anish 
authoi'ities were conducting the war, and In the manner in 
which the rights of American citizens and of American com- 
merce were beiu"' violated. 



04 OPPOSITE VIEWS OP GRANT AND SUMNER 

President (irant, Avitli soiiie members of his cabinet, was 
decidedly in favor of recognizing the belligerency of the 
Cubans. Senator Snmner, chairman of the committee on 
foreign relations, was strongly opposed to it. The one was a 
man of war, the other a student of international relations. 
Crrant looked at it as a practical problem in w^arfare; he, doubt- 
less, reasoned that ^ve w^ere under no moral obligations to Spain 
which, with such undue haste, had recognized the bellioerency 
of the confech'i-ates and still defended that slave power against 
\vhich he had worked out his great campaigns and won such 
magnificent victories. Sumner hoped that Spain would her- 
self abolish slavery and gi-ant self-government to the CUibans, 
and he had the fm-ther reason, which was certaiidy a good 
one, that he did not wish our standing in the case of the 
Alabama claims against England to Ije weakened by a hasty 
recognition of insurgents in Cuba. Tn one of their interviews 
(irant asked Sumner how it would do to issue a proclamation 
with regard to ( Hiba identical with that issued by Spain with 
regard to us ? 

" I advised against it," Avrote Sumner to Motley. " He is 
very confident tliat the Cubans will succeed. On the same 
day I had a call from two Cubans — one of whom was Aldama, 

the richest man of the island and an old friend of mine who 

had come to solicit the concession of ))elligerency, sayino- that 
with it success was certain, and that without it the island would 
become a desert. I gave them no encouragement." 

Hamilton Fish, Secretary of State, was very close to Sum- 
ner, and Snumer's will dominated. But for him, doubtless, 
Grant wonld have done his utmost to concede the right of bel- 
ligerency and the Cubans might have l)een successful. Spain, 
with her own wars and that in the island on hand, could hardly 
have gone to war with us at the time, and belligerent rights 
would have better enabled the Cubans to secure arms, and, 
whereas, we were bound to intercept, if possible, all expeditions 
with supplies and arms fitted out in our ports for Cuba, Spain 
was freely buying both ships and supplies from us. 



AN INSOLENT AND UNJUST DECREE 05 

The manner in which Spain repaid ns for this considera- 
tion of her interests may be seen from the decree of the Cap- 
tain-General of Cuba, a copy of which arrived at the state 
dcpartuient in April, 1869. One portion of this decree was 
as follows : 

"Vessels which may be captured in Spanish waters or on tlie liigli 
seas near to tlie iskiud, having on board men, arms, and uuinitions or 
eirects that can in any manner contribute, promote, or foment the insur- 
rection in this province, whatsoever their derivation or destination, after 
examination of their papers and register shall be de facto considered as 
enemies of the integrity of our territory and treated as pirates, in accord- 
ance with the ordinances of the nav}\ 

" All persons captured in such vessels, without regard to their number, 
will be immediately executed." 

In other words, if an American citizen were canght by 
S])ain near the island with (iiii/lliinfj calculated to contribute 
to the insurrection, he would be shot as a pirdic! 

Our governmcmt at once protested that this was not only 
a violation of its treaty with Spain of 1795, but a violation of 
the laws of nations. 

Almost simultaneously with the receipt of this decree the 
Spanish minister at Washington made a complaint " that pirat- 
ical expeditions are in preparation against the legitimate gov- 
ernment in (^iba," and requested the President to issue a 
])roclamation to restrain the same. The minister furnishe<l no 
evidence of any stich exjx'dirions and none really existed at 
that time. Xo prochiniation was then issne(l. but the regnlar 
officers of the United States were instructi'd to keep a close 
watch for such ex])editions, and, later, several were stoppecl. 
l!ut the objectionable decree of the Captain-Ceneral was 
quickly followed by one which concerned the Fnited States 
(piite as mnch. Idie conrse of trade and social intercourse hatl 
carried many citizens of the Tnited States into ( 'nba. They 
and their ])roperty were snbject to ])rotection by the \ nited 
States. Ihit the commander at Dayamo issued a proclama- 
tion to the effect that: " l'!\crv man, fi'om the age of fifteen 
years upward, found away from his hal>itation, who does not 



96 UNITED STATES CITIZENS IN DANGER 

prove a justified motive therefor, will be sliot; every habitation 
unoccupied will be burned bv the troops; every habitation 
which docs not float a white flag, as a signal that its occupants 
desire peace, will be reduced to ashes; women that are not 
living at their own homes or at the house of their relatives will 
collect in the toM'n of Jiguani or Bayamo, where maintenance 
will be provided. Those who do not present themselves will 
be conducted forcibly." 

Here was Spain, who would not admit that a state of war 
existed in Cuba, for that would have given us ample justifica- 
tion for recognition of the Cubans as belligerents, making de- 
crees in Cu.ba just as if war existed and ordering the confisca- 
tion of goods, the shooting of seamen, and the destruction of 
private property, whether the i)ersons involved were citizens 
of the United States or not. Meanwhile, she was obtaining 
ships and other supplies from us. She was really attempting 
to figlit the poor Cubans under cover of the United States, 
and at the same time decreeing an indiscriminate slaughter, 
which might extend to our citizens and to the destruction of 
their property. 

Under the circumstances, it rtMiuired a great amount of 
self-control on the part of our administration to keep its hands 
off Spain. When Secretary Fish vigorously protested, the 
Spanish minister endeavored to justify the outrageous decrees 
by the code of instruction to our armies in the Civil War, but 
the Secretary jn-omptly reiterated that these instructions were 
issued when the country was in a state of war, which Spain 
would not admit as to Cuba ; but even so, throughout the whole 
Civil War not a prisoner had been shot in cold blood and not a 
political crime, however grave, had been visited by capital 
punishment. There were many instances in which the prop- 
erty and riglit of American citizens who had no connection 
with the insurrection in Cuba were interfered with, and 
although Spain made many promises, restitution was being 
continually postponed on various pretexts, which our govern- 
ment did not consider as evidences of good faith. 



THE CRUISE OF THE "VIRGINIUS" 97 

On tlio Itli (•!' Octolx'i-, 1S70, there sailed from the port of 
?\('\v York the stetinier \'ir(jiiiiu,s, whicli liad been Imilt in 
I'lnj^iand for use as a blockade runner dui-iuii; the Civil War, 
and which, h;ivin«i- been captured, had been bron<;ht to the 
na\v vai'd at Washington. There she had been purchased at 
aucti(»n by one dobn F. Patterson, who had taken her to Xew 
York and made oalb that he was a citizen of the Ignited States, 
and the sole owner of tlu^ vessel. Her custom house bond was 
in I he regnlar form, there was nothing in her manifest or 
{)a])ers or in the circumstances connected with her departure 
from Xew York to attract attention or excite suspicion, and 
she left, liki^ any of the other hundn^d vessels leaving the same 
w(H'k, Avithont attracting the attention of the Spanish consul or 
of the ofHcers of the T'nited vStates. ITer ostensible destina- 
tion was (^iracoa, in the Dutch West Indies, and it appears 
that she went there. For three years, indeed, she cruised 
about the Caribbean Sea, recognized as a vessel of the United 
States at different ports. The watchful Spanish minister, in 
a couniinnicat i<iii to our gn\-('rnnient sevei-al months after the 
\'ii(iiNius had sailed, enumerated several vessels of whicli he 
thought he had cause to complain, but he made no mention of 
the ]' irf/ninis. 

I bit, while it was not known then, it afterwards appeared 
tliiit the A'cssel was in the service of the insurgents. Captain 
|-'i-y was strongly a<lvised by some of his fi'iends not t(^ take th(> 
risk of the venture <>f landing ai'uis on the islnnd, Imt he re- 
l>lied that it was easy enough to i-mi ai'ouiid the Spaniards, 
ami he considered it a righteous thing to work for the patriots. 
" .Vt aiiv i-;ite," he said, '" the wh<de (piestion is one of bread 
for my family." 

On the -J'Ai] of October, 1S7;">, or more than three years 
after she hd't .\ew ^'ork, she regularly cleared from tlu^ port (d* 
Kingston, .liimaiea, tor Puei'to Limoii, Costa Rica. It was 
the intention ..f the e\peditioui-ts on boni-d to sail dii-ect tor 
th(» const of ( 'uba, but a slight damag(> to tlu^ maiddneiw 
obliged the vessel to put in at a port of Haiti. This she shortly 



98 PURSUED AND CAPTURED BY THE " TORNADO " 

left, imd, after toucliing at otlier ports on tlie same island, the 
captain concluded on the 30tli to attempt a landing on CnLa. 

On this day the Spanish consul at Kingston, having heard 
of suspicions against the Virgin ins, advised the governor at 
Santiago that the vessel had recently been seen between 
Jamaica and Cuba. The Spanish cruiser Tornado had that 
very morning arrived at Santiago, and Governor Burriel at 
once communicated his information to the commander, who 
set out to find the alleged filibuster. On the following day 
the Tornado, Avhich was proceeding under sail while w^ork was 
being done on her engines, came in sight of the Tirgintus 
crnising close to the C'ul»an coast. All possible steam was at 
once put on the Tornado, and she was soon running for the 
Virginiiis with fourteen-knot speed, while Captain Fry, dis- 
covering his ]ieril, headed at once for Jamaica. Unfortu- 
nately for him, the supply of coal was short and he was soon 
obliged to burn petroleum, then grease, and fat of any kind; 
even haius had to be thrown in to keep up steam for speed. 

When nigbt closed in, 1)oth vessels were running at their 
best, and were in the same relative position, though the Tor- 
nado seemed to be gaining. It was one of those clear nights 
when the full moon falling on the C^aribbean makes objects 
visible for long distances, and the Yirgiirius was easily kept in 
sight, especially as tlie greasy combustibles which she was 
using caused a thick black smoke to pour continuously from 
her fnnnel. Captain Fry saw that he was falling behind in 
the race and that he might not l)e able to reach neutral waters 
in time, and so, to lighten his vessel, horses, cannon, and cases 
of arms were thrown overboard. It was said afterwards that 
fully two thousand I\emington rifles, a mitrailleuse, and much 
powder was thrown into the sea to facilitate the flight. But 
it did not avail. 

Although the coast of Jamaica was l)ut a few leagues away, 
the Tornado had come within range, and three shots flew over 
the Virgin iiifi, then a shell bnrst near by, In-inging the fugitive 
to. She was boarded by the Spanish officers and crew, who 



EXECUTION OP FOUR PRISONERS 90 

lumlcil (]()\\ii licr Aiiu'riciiii l\i\ix ;iii(l I'nii u[) the Spanii^h cu- 
sigii. 'i'lie ca[)tain showed his [)iipers mid the S[)amanls ap- 
])r()j)i'iated tlieni. At inidiiight they turned al)Out fur San- 
tiago. 

The Tornado and her prize were "welcomed at the port 
Xoveniber 1st by a great crowd of people. The authorities, 
both civil and niilitary, ininiediately visited Governor Burriel 
to felicitate him ii|)()ii the news, and that evening the governor 
gave a brilliant reception; the i)alace was illuminated, the 
vessels were surrounded by boats iilled ^vith bands of music 
and cheering Volunteers, who made coarse jeers at " the 
Yankees." The festivities were continued late into the night. 
The next day a court-martial was held on the Tornado, and all 
but four of the ]n'isoners were sent to jail with an escort fol- 
lowed by a great ra])ble of the people cheering and jeering. 

Tlie Tirginivs had in all 155 persons on board, most of 
them of Spanish extraction, but the names of at least forty-five 
indicated that they were either citizens of the United States 
or of (li'cat ih'itain. The four upon whom sentence was im- 
mediately passed were three Cubans, including General 
Verona and a brothci- of the insurgent leader ( 'espedes, and 
one American named IJyan. Their (execution was fixed for 
tlie 4th, and on tliat day they were marched to a place made 
famous by tlie number of executions there. The whole Span- 
ish pojiulation of Santiago followed and witnessed the act with 
great rejoicing, 'ihe men were shot in the usual manner, 
kneeling close to the slaughter-house wall. Two of them 
were killed at the first shot, liut the other two had not b(>en 
mercifully hit, and a Spanish otlicer walkc'l u\) and ran his 
>-\\drd tlii'<niuh llicir licai'ts. Then the crowd ran in and 
]>icked u]) the bodies, still warm with life, severed the heads, 
])la('(Ml litem u]ion pikes, and mandied about the city. 

Just befoi'c the execution an interesting inci<l(Mit tot»k 
place. There were in Santiago fifteen Spanish ofticers who 
at one time liad been ca]itu7'eil by r,(>iieral Verona, and gen- 
erously released. I hey pleaded with the authorities that this 



100 AN INSOLENT LETTER 

act should entitle him to mercy, bnt no heed was given the ap- 
peal. The Spaniards demanded bloody the}' had had a taste 
and they demanded more. 

As the Vi)'gi»iiis had cleared as an American vessel and 
displayed the American colors, she at least had an apparent 
claim to protection until it should be proven otherwise, and at 
least the American and British citizens on board were entitled 
to the opportunity of acting' with the consuls of their countries 
in the defense of any rights which they might have. Our vice- 
consul at Santiago, Mr. E. G. Schmitt, therefore, had promptly 
demanded access to the ]:)risoners, but the provincial governor 
replied discourteously and to the effect that it was none of the 
American consul's business, as the prisoners were all pirates 
and would be treated as such. Mr. Schmitt was even refused 
the use of the marine cable to communicate with the United 
States consul at Kingston, where the Virginius had cleared. 
Our consul protested, and meanwhile the form of a court- 
martial was gone through with, and the three Cubans and one 
American were shot. On the same day the consul received 
a re])ly from the governor, from which the following extract, 
indicating the character of the Spanish disposition and 
methods, is made : 

"I have received your communications, one dated tlie 2d inst., and 
the remaining two the 3d inst.; the first inquiring if it was true that a 
telegram had been detained by my orders which you had addressed to the 
United States consul in Kingston, Jamaica, asking information as to the 
nationality of the steamer Virginius seized on the high seas as a pirate by 
the Spanish cruiser Tornado. In my desire to correspond duly to the 
exquisite zeal which you show in tliis matter, I would have replied at once 
to your communication, but, as I received it precisely at the moment of 
important and peremptory affairs, to which I had to devote myself exclu- 
sively; and further, as the past two days were holidays, upon which the 
officials do not come to the offices, being engaged as well as everyone 
else in meditation of the divine mysteries of All Saints and the com- 
memoration of All Souls' day, as prescribed by our holy religion; it was 
impossible for me until early this morning to comply to your wishes. . . . 

"Neither could I foresee your desire to repair with such haste to the 
jail where the prisoners were incarcerated; much less that you desired to 
do so, showing an offlciousness so marked, when you had received from 
none of them any remonstrance whatever, which they would have made 



REPLY OF THE UNITED STATES CONSUL 101 

at once tlirouj!;li nij' conduct if tlicir conscience liad perinitled llicin lo even 
suppose that they were innocent and worthy of the protection of your 
vice-consulate, undoubtedly impelled thereto on this occasion l)y unknown 
and suspicious purposes. . . . 

"Such conduct, especially after j'ou were advised by the fiscal that 
Mr. O'Hyan was an Englishman, obliges me to apply to the government 
and propose that jour cxeijuatur to perform the duties of your vice- 
consulate be withdrawn, as an oflicer who addresses protests so slightly 
founded, and who after that attempts to surprise the intention of the 
Spanish authorities, accustomed to act, with the rectitude and loyalty 
known to all, cannot help compromising the honor of the country he 
represents." 

ILivinc: written this rpi)ly, the governor seems to have pro- 
ceeded to the executioii of a few ])risoiiers, and the ])i-etended 
trial of others. Onr consul Ixn-e himself with dii;iiity and 
honor. In his reply he said : 

" I should have been the last person to disturb the important duties 
of your Excellency, and the religious meditations which your Excellency's 
subordinates were indulging in, had it not been that I consider the case a 
pressing one and imagined that, Avliere there was sufficient time to censure 
and detain my telegram, there might have been also time for a few lines 
of explanation, with the additional motive of my second dispatch, that I 
observed that the circumstances wdiich your Excellency enumerates were 
no hindrance to the despatch of other business connected with the 
steamer. ... 

" I shall therefore abstain from saying anything further on this point, 
than that it seems to me, considering that the Virginius was Hying the 
United States flag at the time of her capture, that she claimed to be a 
United States merchant steamer, and her papers as such were surrendered 
by her captain to the boarding oflicer of the steamer Tornado, it would 
have been a delicate attention on the part of your Excellency to have in- 
formed me thereof, and that the use of such flag and papers was an abuse 
of the goodness of the coimtry which 1 represent, in order that I might 
have brought the same to the notice of my government. 

"Finally, I note your Excellency's intention to apply for the revoca- 
tion of my exequatur, and while ignorant of any cause given therefor, I 
can only assure your Excellency that my conscience being perfectly clear 
in the question, and having acted honorably, and as I consider for the 
best, the result of your Excellency's application is to me a matter of 
profound indifference." 

On the (Itli tlici'c were fufthcf couft-maftial ])i'(t('e('(lin<2;s 
and tliirty-seveii more wei'c senteiic('(| ti» he shot the ne.xt 
morning, iiicltiding Captain -loscph I-'ry, the commander of 



102 CAPTAIN fry's letter OF FAREWELL 

the vessel. Of this man's iiKlomital)le coTirago in the face of 
death, and his intense affection for those for whose sakes chieliy 
he had undertaken this hazardous adventure, the pathetic let- 
ter written to his wife the night before his execution bears 
sufficient testimony. 

On Board the Spanish Man-of-War "Toiinado." 

Santiago de Cuba, November 6, '73. 

"Dear, dear Dita — When I left you I had no idea that we sliould 
never meet again in this world; but it seems strange to me that I should 
to-night, and on Anne's birthday, be calmly seated on a beautiful moon- 
light night in a most beautiful bay in Cuba, to take my last leave of you, 
my own dear sweet wife ! And with the thought of your own bitter 
anguish — my only regret at leaving. 

*'I have been tried to-day, and the President of the Court Martial 
asked the favor of embracing me at parting, and clasped me to his heart. 
I have shaken hands with each of my judges, and the secretary of the 
court and the interpreter have promised me as a special favor to attend 
my execution, which will, I am told, be within a few hours after my 
sentence is pronounced. 

"lam told my death will be painless. In short, I have had a very 
cheerful and pleasant chat about my funeral, to which I shall go in a few 
hours from now; how soon I cannot say yet. It is curious to see how I 
made friends. Poor Bambetta* pronounced me a gentleman, and he was 
the brightest and bravest creature I ever saw. 

"The priest who gave me communion onboard this morning put a 
double scapular around mj^ neck, and a medal which he intends to wear 
himself. A young Spanish otlicer brought me a bright new silk badge 
wilh the Blessed Virgin stamped upon it, to wear to my execution for him, 
and a handsome cross in some fair lady's handiwork. They are to be kept 
as relics of me. He embraced me affectionately in his room with tears in 
his eyes. 

"Dear Sweetheart, you will be able to bear it for my sake, for I will 
•be with you if God permits. Although I know my hours are short and 
few, I am not sad. I shall be with you right soon, dear Dita, and you 
will not be afraid of me. Pray for me, and I will pray with you. There 
is to be a fearful sacrifice of life, as I think, from the Virginius, and, as I 
think, a needless one, as the poor people are unconscious of crime, and even 
of their fate up to now. I hope God Avill forgive me if I am to blame 
for it. 

"If you write to President Grant, he will probably order my pay, 
due when I resigned, to be paid to you after my death. People will be 
kinder to you now, dear Dita ; at least, I hope so. Do not dread death 
when it comes to you. It will be God's angel of rest, — remember this. 



J 



* A Cuban rebel general, paBsenger on the Virginius. 



A GALLANT ENGLISHMAN INTERFERE!? 103 

I hope my children Avill forget their father's harshness and remember liis 
love and anxiet}- for them. jVIaj' they practice regularly liieir religi(ju and 

l)niy for him always. Tell the last act of my life will l)e a pul)- 

lic profession of my faith and hope in Him of whom we need not be 
a^;hamed; and it is not honest to withhold that pul)lic acknowledgment from 
any false modesty or timidity. May God bless and .save n> all! Sweet, 
dear, dear Dita, we will soon meet again. Till then, adieu fm- liic last 
lime." Your devoted husband, 

JosEiMi Fry. 

The next inoriiiiiii', with thirty-six others, he was executed. 
The next dav twelve more shared his fate, and probably all the 
remaining 102 would have been shot but for a sudden inter- 
ruption. The interest of the British and French consuls and 
of the authorities in Jamaica had been arousc^d, for some of the 
prisoners were British subjects. The British sloop of war 
Niohe, commanded by Sir Lamb ton Lorraine, left Kingston 
on the Gtli, and on the Stli came flying into Santiago harbor. 
The commander hastened to land, and at once demanded that 
the massacre be stop})ed. 

" But Seilor," protested the commanding Spanish officer, 
" what affair is it of yours ? There are no countrymen of 
yours among them. They are all dogs of Americans." 

" It makes no difference," replied the gallant captain. " I 
forbid you to put another one of these men to death." 

" But, Senor," returned the Spaniard, haughtily, " permit 
me to remark that I take my orders from the Captain-( Jeneral 
and not from you." 

" Permit me also to remark," replied the captain, '' that 
the Nlohc is lying in this harbor, with her guns double-shotted, 
and I am her commander. And, so help me God! if you so 
much as harm a hair on the head of another one of those 
prisoners, I will lay your town in ruins."' And he went back 
to his ship. 

The S])aiiiaril looked at the Xlohe, saw the big black 
muzzles of her guns ti-ained scpiarely ujxMi the city, and — 
there were no more Vi)-(jiiitiis prisoners massacred in Santiago. 



CHAPTER YII 

EFFORTS TO INDUCE SPAIN TO SETTLE — GENERAL SICKLES 
ASKS FOR HIS PASSPORTS AND SPAIN YIELDS — UNITED 
STATES INSISTS ON PACIFICATION OF THE ISLAND. 

Minister Sickles Visits Castelar upon Hearing of the Virginius Affair — 
Curious Breali-down of the Cables at a Critical Moment — Some Im- 
polite Replies — General Sickles Demands his Passports — The Span- 
ish Government Quickly Comes to Terms — The People Impatient to 
Recognize the Cubans — Fall of the Spanish Republic — America In- 
sists that the Cuban War Must Cease — Intervention Threatened — 
Spain Makes Another Promise — Forbearance at Washington — Campos 
Ends the War by the Agreement at Zanjon — Canovas Refuses to be 
Responsible for the Cuban Settlement — Resignation of Canovas — 
Campos Forms a Ministry — Disagreements — A Reform Act Passed — 
Great Cost of the War to Spain — The Emancipation Act — Cuba Still 
in a State of Insurrection. 

THE first intimation of Avliat was taking place reached 
General Daniel E. Sickles, our minister at Madrid, on 
the 6th, or the day before Captain Ery's execution, 
and he hastened to call at the Ministry of State. Spain had 
meanwhile become a republic under President Castelar, 
whom Sickles saw in the evening. Concerning the interview 
he wrote : " President Castelar received these observations 
with his nsnal kindness and told me confidentially that, at 
seven o'clock in the morning, as soon as he read the telegram 
from Cuba, and without reference to any international ques- 
tion, for that, indeed, had not occurred to him, he at once sent 
a message to the Captain-General admonishing him that the 
death penalty must not be imposed upon any non-combatant 
without the previous approval of the Cortes, nor upon any per- 
son taken in arms against the government without the sanction 
of the executive." 

As not infrequently happens in Spanish diplomacy, this 

(104) 



PUBLIC FEELING IN SPAIN 105 

order failed to get further than liavaua, at ivn^i, in time t(j do 
any good. "J'here were two telegraphic lines between Havana 
and SaiiliauH, (Hic ])\ the eoast and one overland. One of them 
had been out of repair for soine time. Siu'iiitieantly enoug'li, 
the other failed to work the day that the \'irginius was 
brouiiht into port, though it suddenly resumed operations in 
perfect working order as soon as the Niobe came into port. 
Public feeling was running high in Spain. The press, violent 
and abusive, advised tlie government to order General Sickles 
out of Spain. One night a mob collected to attack and sack 
the legation, but the authorities interfered. j\[eanwhile the 
S})anisli in Cuba were threatening all Americans, and in 
Havana they gave a great fete and bullfight in honor of Gov- 
ernor Burriel, who had ordered the outrage. 

(Vneral Sickles pres.sed his remonstrances insistently, and 
Garvajal, the Spanish ]\Iinister of State, thereupon began to 
couch his replies in the rather insolent language adopted by 
the governor of Santiago, while Sickles retorted with some 
very sharp but thoroughly dignified communications. He 
had been instructed by the Secretary of State to protest most 
solemnly against the barbarities ])eri)etrated at Santiago, and 
in communicating with the Spanish government adopted as 
near as could be the words of the instructions from Washing- 
ton. To this Carvajal made an exceedingly ill-tempered reply. 
Secretary Fish used strong expressions in his instructions to 
Sickles. Mere condemnation, disavowal, and depreciation 
of the act would not, he said, be acct^pted by the world as 
sufficient to relieve* S])ain from ])ai'ticipation in n just resjion- 
sibility for the outrage. There must be iJunislnncnt (tf those 
concerned. 

Unable to make any headway in bringing the Spanish 
government to some agreement as to the scttlcnu'ut of tlie 
question. Secretary Fish cabled Sickles to make formal de- 
mands. If these were not complied with within twelve days 
he should leave ^ladi-id. General Sickles did so, and. obtain- 
ing no satisfactory response, on the 2Gth of Novend)er he 



lOG DISPOSITION OF THE VliiGINIUti AFFAIR 

asked for his passports. Spanish bravado at once withered. 
Carvajal within a few honrs sent a note, conceding upon some 
conditions the demands of tlie United States that the Vir- 
ginius and the survivors should Le given up, the perpetrators 
of the massacre tried and punished, and the flag of the United 
States saluted. One condition was that a salute of the flag 
should not be deemed essential if the Spanish government 
could bring forward sufficient proofs that the Yirginius had 
no right to fly the American flag. A conference was held at 
Washington between the Secretary of State and the Spanish 
minister,- Don Jose Polo, and the arrangements were com- 
pleted. Meanwhile the antecedents of the Yirginius were 
inquired into and it was proved beyond the shadow of a doul)t 
that she had no right to carry the American flag. Patterson 
was not the legal owner of the vessel, the money for her pur- 
chase having been furnished by a junta of Cuban sympathizers; 
her registry, therefore, had been obtained by jierjury. This 
did away with the necessity of Spain's saluting our flag and 
made it incumbent upon the United States to prosecute the 
proper persons for violation of navigation laws. The Vir- 
ginius and her survivors were surrendered to the authorities 
of the United States on December 15th, and while being con- 
veyed to the appointed port she was lost in a storm off Cape 
Fear. 

Then followed a long correspondence over conflicting 
claims, Spain setting up many counter claims for alleged in- 
jury done to Spain by filil)ustering expeditions. 

AVliile th(»se who considered it wise to refrain from a 
recognition of the belligerency of the Cubans were strongly 
impressed by the conduct of the Spanish government, it may 
be imagined that among the mass of the people, sympathizing 
as they did with the Cul)ans in their hard struggle for freedom, 
the bitterness towards the Spaniards was great and the excite- 
ment caused by the Virginius affair intense. President 
Grant fully anticipated war, and with his thorough knowledge 
of military affairs perfected plans for attacking Spain. But 



BITTEK FEELING Ix\ THE UNITED STATES 1U7 

Sumner's policy prevailed with the aihninistratioii, and it con- 
tinued to tolerate the repeated [)n)niiscs and shifting tactics 
of the Spanish government. Meanwhile, the chiims of Amer- 
ican citizens for spoliation in Cuba continued to accumulate. 
General Sickles was so impatient under the temporizing policy 
of his government that he resigncil, and he was succeeded 
early in 1874 by Caleb Cushing. 

A number of British subjects had been among those exe- 
cuted from the Virginius, and Great Britain, also wearied 
with delay, early in 1874 insisted upon a decisive answer as 
to indemnity, and with her Spain hastened to settle. As the 
claims for executed citizens of the Ignited States rested prac- 
tically upon the same basis, late the same year our govern- 
ment, after much difficulty, reached a settlement. Consider- 
able sums were eventually paid by Spain to the families of the 
American and British citizens, but the governor who ordered 
the executions was never i)unislied. Secretary Fish de- 
manded that that part of the treaty should be carried out, but 
Spain calndy replied that it considered Governor Burriel's 
conduct justified, and he was even promoted from the rank of 
brigadier to major-general. The United States swallowed the 
insult out of love for })eace. 

The war still dragged on, and late in ls7r). when the end 
seemed as far oil' as ever and jn'operty of .Vmerican citizens in 
Cuba was going up in smoke, tlie administration began to feel 
that ]>atience had at last ceased to be a virtue. 

On the .')th of November, 1875, Secretary Fish addressed 
a note to our niiiii-^ter at ^Fadrid, in which he I'eviewed the 
<|uestion and practically stated that the United States had 
come to the conclusion that the state of things in Cuba must 
cease. 

Spain made another promise, a favorite mefhoil in nuM^ting 
such emergencies, and just before our Congi-ess met snbmitt(>d 
to ]\rinister Cushing certain proposals which it was ho|K'd 
might be used as a basis foi- a <ettjeineiit of (litTei'e!u>(^<. These 
proposals had not reached tin- government by the time Presi- 



108 PROTOCOLS AND PROMISES 

dent Grant submitted his annual message, but he reviewed the 
whole question, stated the reasons why he had not deemed it 
wise to accord the Cubans belligerent rights, and explained 
why he believed that the time for intervention had come. 
As Spain was then, however, disturbed by the Carlist wars at 
home, and as proposals had been submitted, he deferred any 
positive recommendation till the situation could be more per- 
fectly understood. Shortly before leaving office General 
Grant proposed to European powers a joint convention, but 
soon other matters began to absorb public attention. As a re- 
sult of the conference between Minister Gushing and Galde- 
ron, the Spanish Minister of State, a protocol, often insisted 
upon during the recent Cuban war and as often violated by 
Spain, was signed. It was intended to guard against any 
repetition of the Virginius affair and secure to American citi- 
zens a civil trial on the charge of sedition or conspiracy, ex- 
cept when taken in arms, and even in that case they were to be 
allowed attorneys and make their defense in public trial. 
Spain agreed to command the strictest observance of the terms 
of this protocol in all her dominions, especially in Cuba. 

Upon the pacification of the island, the rebels having laid 
down their arms according to agreement, General Campos, 
evidently intending that the compact made at Zanjon should 
be kept in good faith, returned to IMadrid and submitted the 
plans for reforms in Cuba before the cabinet of Canovas, who 
at once declared his unwillingness to lay them before the Cortes 
with his recommendation, saying that that body would feel and 
always feel that Spanish honor required the complete sub- 
jection of Cuba. General Campos insisted that he had made 
this agreement with the rebels in good faith, that, trusting in 
it they had Idid down their arms, and that it must be sub- 
mitted to the Cortes. Canovas replied that in that case Cam- 
pos must do it on his own responsil)ility. This and other 
causes led to the resignation of the Canovas ministry, and 
Campos, as the leader of the Liberals, formed a cabinet, but 
his ministers could not be made to ac:ree to the Cuban agree- 



LOSS OF LIFE AND TREASURE 109 

ment, and so Campos quickly resigned. An act was passed, 
however, in January, 1871), whereby Cuba was to have repre- 
seutation in the Cortes. But the Spanish senators practically 
coiitrdlled the elections and more than three-fourths of the 
dej)uties proved to be natives of Spain, so that the Cubans 
really gained no voice even in the small representation tem- 
porarily allowed them. 

The Campos ministry fell in December, 1879, Canovas 
resumed the reins of government, and the promises made con- 
cerning reform in Cuban government were j^ractically ignored. 
Spanish methods in Cuba continued very much as they had for 
years. The bitter hatred between the insulars and jieninsu- 
lars was only intensified. The island of Cul)a had been laid 
waste, thousands of the sons of Spain had found their graves, 
millions of money had been spent, and still S])ain had not 
learned the lesson. The CHiban was still op})ressed and waited 
only for the next opportunity to take up arms. 

The loss of life and treasure in this war was enormous. 
Two years before its close, in a debate on (^iban affairs in the 
Cortes, it was said that Sjiain had up to that time sent 145,000 
men and her best commanders to Cuba. 1'he number in the 
field in the last year of the war was given as 81,700, while 
the records of the Madrid War Office show that over 73,000 
of the land forces had been lost. The minimum total of 
Spanish soldiers who fell in Cuba must have been, therefore, 
nearly 100,000, for of tliose who had gone out not enough ever 
came back to make a full regiment. Adding to this total of 
Spanish forces the Volunteers, about 80,000 in number, the 
Captain-General must have had at his disposal, from the be- 
ginning to the end of flie war, over 230,000 men. Thousands 
fell victims to the guerrilla tactics of the Cubans, but more died 
of fever and other diseases incident to the cliuuite and changetl 
coiKlitidiis (if diet. The young nuMi who werc^ conscripted and 
sent to Cuba were thoroughly unfitted for campaigning in 
such a country, and discipline was so strict in the army that 
many of them deserted to the rebels rather than suffer hard- 



1 10 THE CUBANS AGAIN DECEIVED 

i:li:ps in camp only to bo killed in some Cuban ambuscade. 
The loss of the Cubans has never been known, for no account 
was kept. It was small compared with that of the Spaniards, 
for the army was small and scattered in little bands. The loss 
has been estimated at 50,000 for the ten years, but this is 
probably an exaggeration. 

The cost of the war to Spain was about $300,000,000, and 
certainly not less than that was lost in Cuba from the destruc- 
tion of property and the loss of commerce and trade. 

In the years succeeding the war some reforms were made, 
though the nature of the government did not improve; in- 
deed, as will appear later, tyranny was increased under the 
cloak of concessions. The one stcj:) in advance was the aboli- 
tion of slavery. 

During the sixteen years from the close of the Ten- Years 
War to 1S95, Cuba, if not in a state of insurrection, was sel- 
dom quiet. "When the people saw that they had again been 
deceived, it was difficult for them to restrain their disposition 
to revolt. But a general rising wa:^ out of the question so soon 
after the long struggle, for they had laid down their arms and 
the Spaniards had taken them. 



OHAPTEE VIII 

CUBA AFTER THE TEN-YEARS WAR — THE CAPTAIN-GEN- 
ERAL AND HIS EXTRAORDINARY POWERS — A SWARM 
OF SPANISH VAMPIUES — "CUBA IS UNDONE." 

The Government Libenil Only on P:i[)er — The Captain-Geneml and Ili.^ 
Extraordinaiy Authority — The Cuban's One Ambition — Cubans Ex- 
chided from Office — Discriminations in Provincial and Municipal 
Government — Spain's Deceitful and Crafty Policy — Replenishini; the 
Treasury at Home and Enriching the Functionaries — Two-thirds of 
the Island Practicall}' Ruined — Enormous Increase of Taxation — 
Remarkable Growth of Cuba's Debt — Pledging Cuban Revenues for 
Spanish Interest Payments — Not a Cent of it Spent to Improve Cuba 
— Excessive Import Duties — New Oppressions in New Disguises — 
Taxes on Everything — The Prey of a Swarm of Vampires. 

THE government of Cuba after 1879 showed evidences on 
paper of some liberality, but the evidences were mis- 
leading. The head was still the Captain-General, ap- 
])ointe(l by the crown usually for a term of from three to five 
years, and who was ipso facto the Governor-General. In his 
military capacity, which was not easily distinguished from 
his civil cajiacity, lie had an army tluring peace of from 13,000 
to 20,000 men sent from Spain and maintained out of the 
Cuban budget. lie was assisted by a sub-Inspector-General, 
who was also governor of Havana, but in time of disturbances 
the military divisions were rearranged to suit the emergency. 
Notwithstandmg all the alleged reforms granted after the 
treaty of Zanjon, the Governor-General practically retained 
all the powers granted him in 1S25 by Ferdinand, powers 
which possessed all the al)solntc <|iialitie-s of the Turkish Sul- 
tan without the restrictions imposed by the exigencies of Euro- 
pean politics. 

(Ill) 



113 



MAP OF CUBA 




NOT CONCESSIONS BUT OPPRESSIONS 113 

Bad as the system of govoniiiient and of conuiiorcial polic-y 
was upon paper, it was in its practical a[)plifation that the 
Cuban was oppressed. He bad little understanding of tbo 
\a\vs of government and of trade, but he saw concrete 
results. To him the one trouble was S})anish misrule, and his 
one ambition became " Cuba Libre." lie saw that the 
changes in law were not changes in fact. Concessions had 
really taken the form of new oppressions. Names, not the 
things themselves, were changed. The Captain-General was 
called the "Governor-General." The royal decrees took the 
name of "authorizations.'' The commercial monopoly of 
Spain had been named the " coasting trade." The right of 
banishment had been transformed into the " law of vagrancy." 
IJrutal attacks upon defenseless citizens went under the term 
" compote." The abolition of constitutional guarantees had 
become the " law of public order." Taxation without the 
knowledge or consent of the taxed had been changed into the 
" law of estimates," the budget being voted by the representa- 
tives of peninsular Spain. Instead of inaugurating a redeem- 
ing policy which would have allayed public anxiety, and 
(|uenched the thirst for justice felt by the people, Spain, while 
lavish in promises of reform, continued her old and crafty sys- 
tem, which was to exclude the Cuban from every ofHce that 
could give him any effective inllueuce and intervention in jiub- 
lic affairs. 

For years Spain had been simply a parasite u])on (^d)a, and 
had exjiloited the island tlii'ough a fiscal regime, a commercial 
regime, and a bureaucratic regime. Tier thought from the 
beginning had been to draw from the island all that could be 
squeezed out of it. Nothing was consecrated to the develojv 
ment of the island. Whatever was done was solely to re- 
plenish the exhausted treasury of Spain and to enrich Spanish 
functionaries. Having saddled Cuba with debt, and reached 
that point where inerea-;e<l taxation reduces rather than in- 
creases revenn<'. tlie i-land was of little further value except 
to the Spanish bondholder and the official who came to Cuba 



114 OVERWHELMED WITH NEW BURDENS 

with l)ut one aim — to draw a fortune from resources which 
should have l)een dev.oted to the native population. When he 
had amassed all thie money he could hoj^e to draw from liis 
position, he invested it, not in Cuba but in Europe, returning 
home to enjoy the income he had gained at the expense of the 
Cuban. 

When the Ten-Years War came to an end, two-thirds of 
the island was completely ruined. The other third, the in- 
habitants of wliich had remained peaceful, was abundantly 
productive, but it had to face the great economic change in- 
volved in the impending abolition of slavery. Evidently it 
would have been a wholesome and provident policy on the part 
of Sj)ain to have lightened as much as possible the fiscal bur- 
dens of a country in such a condition. But instead, Spain was 
bent upon making Cuba pay the entire cost of the war. She 
at once overwhelmed the colony with enormous budgets reach- 
ing as high a figure as $40,000,000! And this only to cover 
the obligations of the State, to fill the gulf left by the 
wastefulness and plunder of tlic civil and military administra- 
tion during the years of war, and to meet the expenses of the 
military occupation of the country. For the first two years 
after the war the budget was over $40,000,000; in 1882 it fell 
to $35,000,000, and from then till 1880 it remained at about 
$34,000,000. Then it dropped to $20,000,000, where it re- 
mained until the outl>reak of the recent insurrection. 

The debt of Cuba was created in 1804 by the simple issue 
of $3,000,000; in 1808 it had risen to $25,000,000; in 1891, 
according to a statement made by Perez Castancda in the Span- 
ish Senate, it had increased to the extraordinary sum of $175,- 
000,000, and by the middle of 1895 it stood at $300,000,000! 
Tlm^, by the time of the recent outbreak the debt of the little 
island, considering its population, exceeded that of all the 
other American countries, including the TTuited States. 

This enormous debt, that ground the country down and 
did not permit its people to capitalize their income, or foster 
its improvements, or even to advance its industries, constituted 



KOT ONE CENT FOR CUBA Il5 

one of the most iniquitous forms of the Spanish spoliation. In 
it wore inchulcd a debt of Si)aiu to the L'nitecl States; the ex- 
penses incurred 1>y Spain when she oeeUi)ied San Domingo;, 
those for the invasion of Mexico, and for her hostilities aganist 
Peru; the money advanced to the Spanish treasury during the 
later Carlist wars; and to cover the lavish expenditures of itS' 
administration following 1868. Kot a cent of this enormous- 
sum had been spent in Cuba in the advancement of civiliza- 
tion. It had not contributed to build a single mile of high- 
way or of railroads, to erect a single lighthouse, nor deepen a 
single port; it had not built one asylum nor opened one public 
school. This heavy burden was left to future generations 
without a single compensation or benefit. 

The budget showed that nearly 40 per cent, of the rev- 
enues were expected from duties upon imports. Everything 
that was imported was taxed as heavily as possible, unless it 
came from Spain. Xearly every class of articles paid a much 
heavier duty than was j.aid by the sister isle of Puerto Rico. 
In very many cases the duty on imports was placed at twee 
what they were for Puerto Ilico. ^J'he Cuban producer was 
oppressed with every kind of exaction; the introduction of in- 
dispensable UK.ehinery was heavily taxed, transportation was 
obstructed by taxes on the railroads, a direct tax or industrial 
duty was exacted, and still another, equivalent to an export 
duty, for loading and shipping, while always and everywhere 
were the illegal exactions of corrupt and thieving officials. 

Besieged'by complaints of such destructive discrimination, 
Sjiain ma'ile great ]u-omises of reform. Cuban products were 
to be admitted to the peninsula free of duty, excepting, how- 
ever, tobacco, rum, sugar, cocoa, and coifee, which remained 
" temporarily " burdened. Duties on the importations from 
Spain to (^iba were to be gradually redue...! through a p.'riod 
of ten years, till, in is02, they were to be entirely extin- 
onished'^ P.ut, like other Spanish reforms, this was a new 
oppression in a fresh disguise. The temporary duti.>s. whi<'h 
were upon the principal and almost the only products ot the 
8 



116 PECULATION AND CORRUPTION 

island, were left undisturbed. Spanish products paid no 
duties in Cuba, but Cuban products paid heavy duties in Spain. 
The salaries of the various Spanish officials in Cuba were 
in no way curtailed, while the jicrquisitcs and ^peculations con- 
tinued to grow, and it was one of the most exasperating of all 
the oppressions to which the Cuban was subjected. Falsilica- 
tion of documents, bargains with delinquent debtors, exac- 
tions of higher dues from simple peasants, delays in judicial 
or other bnsiness in order to obtain a gratuity, all combined 
to divert the money of the Cubans into the pockets of the 
functionaries. And while these evils were brought to light 
from time to time, no one was ever punished. Said Rafael 
de Eslava in his Judicio Critico de Cid)a en 1887 : " It seems 
to be self-evident that a curse is pressing upon Cuba, condemn- 
ing her to witness her own disintegration and converting her 
into a prey for the operation of those swarms of vampires that 
are so cruelly devouring us, deaf to the voice of conscience, if 
they have any ; it will not be rash to venture the assertion that 
Cuba is undone j there is no salvation possible.'^ 



CHAPTER IX 

CUBAN EXILES, SECESSIONISTS, AND LEADERS — THE BAN- 
NER RAISED AT LAST-FIRST RESULTS UNPROMISING — 
SPREAD OF THE INSURRECTION. 

Exile of Manj^ of Cuba's Best Citizens — Jose Marti and His Early Life — 
Imprisoned When a Boy — Deported to Spain — He Vows to Free 
Cuba — Becomes the Leader of the Secession Party — His Impassioned 
Address and Eloquence — Many Rebulls and Disappointments— An 
Influential Friend— His Trusted Friends in Cuba — Fostering the 
Spirit of Revolt — Relaxation of the Vigilance of the Captain-General 
— Marti Starts for Cuba— Stopped by United States Authorities — 
Martial Law Proclaimed — The Outbreak in Matanzas — An Apparent 
Failure — Natural Advantages of Santiago de Cuba — A Forbidding 
Shore — " The Garden of Cuba." 

THE vigilance with wliieli Si)anisli officials followed per- 
sons sus])eelo(l of entertaining plans against the Span- 
ish government, and the cold-blooded manner in which 
political prisoners were treated, naturally led to the exile of 
many of the better editcatcd Cid)ans. They were scattered 
through the other West Indian islands, throngh Europe, and 
especially the United States. While as peaceful citizens they 
had many opportunities to prosper in the United States, they 
(lid not and could not forget Cuba where others of their 
nationality were still suffering, and thus there were active 
juntas of Cid)an sympathizers everywhere. Spain was con- 
tinually complaining that they menaced the peace of the 
island, but their exile she alone was responsible for. 

One of these exiles was Jose ^Nfarti, who was living at Xew 
York. Tie was the son of a Spanish colonel, who had learned 
to sympathize with the Cubans, and who, upon Jose's liirtli, 

threw up his commission, saying that no son of his should be 

(117) 



118 YOUTH OF A CUBAN PATRIOT 

brought up a servant of Spain. It is not surprising that with 
such a father Jose, at the age of fourteen, should be attacking 
the Spanish government in an amateur newspaper he had 
established. The little paper was suppressed and the young 
editor sentenced to ten years imprisonment in Havana. 
Afterwards he was condemned to the chain for life, and 
obliged to work with gangs of convicts under conditions which 
killed strong men. The powerful influence of his family 
finally secured a mitigation of his sentence to deportation to 
Spain, where he was confined to the limits of the country. He 
there received a university education and began to show his 
remarkable talents. But while the amnesty gave him his 
freedom, it did not appease his indignant resentment for 
Spain's broken promises and continued oppressions in the 
island of Cuba. He resolved to act. At first he went to Cen- 
tral America, thence to the United States, where he was in 
constant communication with the promoters of the insur- 
rection of ISGS, and it was not long before he became the 
leader of the revolutionary party. 

Marti gave himself to the interests of this party, and there 
was not a moment when he was not devoted to the effort to 
realize his dream of independence for his country. Through 
the United States, San Domingo, everywhere, he traveled, 
preaching his holy war. He was a man of charming and 
captivating personality, yet with audacity and perseverance. 
His impassioned address; his eloquence, at the same time ex- 
alted and simple; his hatred of Spain, from which each day 
he drew some new grievance, and his energetic and magiietic 
oratory gave him the aspect of a modern Peter the Hermit, 
preaching a new crusade. 

Marti gathered here and there a few contributions which 
he sent to trusty agents in Cuba for the purchase of arms 
and ammunition. But his work was often painful for one of 
his nature; he met many rebuffs and disappointments, yet 
when all the world ridiculed and doubted his mission, he re- 
mained confident. He attracted the attention of the late 



HIS CRUSADE IN CURa's BEHALF ll9 

Charles A. Dana, who was an admirer of sincerity and energy, 
and was (|uifk to appreciate talent. Dana believed with .Marti 
that Spanish despotism in Cnba was a wrong that ci'icd to 
heaven, and therefore could not endure; he became a strong 
advocate of Cuban independence, and his influence gradually 
brought the cause to notice and helped to shape events. 

The dreams of Marti in those days seemed so far beyond 
the possibility of reality that even among the people who had 
been won over to his cause by his convincing and impassioned 
words, there were those who looked upon him as the victim 
of hallucinations. He had friends in Cuba who thought with 
him that the hour was fast ripening, but they were few. 
'J'here were not then more than 500 who were ready for the 
word to take up arms, and nearly all of them were young men. 
The old generals had not forgotten the failure of 1878, and 
looked upon another effort then as rash, if not foolish. But 
Marti faithfully corresponded with his few trusted friends, 
and in secret nourished the spirit of revolution, while in 
his hands he held the threads of the developing conspiracy. 
lie knew that if too many Cubans were at once concerned, 
the Spanish would become alarmed and balk his efforts; 
and he Itclicvcd that when the standard of revolt was raised 
thousands would flock to it, while those in exile would soon 
find their way into the insurgent ranks. This being the pur- 
pose in view, February 24, 1895, was fixed as the date for rais- 
ing the cry of " Cuba Libre! " all over the island. 

Three vessels, the Lagonda, the Amadis, and the Baracoa, 
were chartered by Marti, who sailed from Xew York with men 
and WAV materials in Januai'v, 1895. Ari'angements had been 
made for landing the recruits and amis in Santiag;o, Puerto 
Principe, and Santa Clara, but the expedition was stopped at 
Fernandina, Fla., by the United States authorities, and Marti 
left for San Domingo to join ^faximo Gomez, who had been 
a military leader in the former war. Meanwhile, the Cuban 
secessionist* clamoring for the revolution to proceed im- 
mediately, the banner was raised at the appointed time. 



120 APPARENT FAILURE OP THE REVOLT 

The autliorities were aware of the project, and martial 
law was proclaimed througiioiit the island the day before, and 
in the province of Puerto Principe a rigorous search was made 
for arms and ammunition, which were confiscated. For a 
similar reason the revolutionists in Pinar del Rio did not at 
once respond. The rising was confined to Santiago, Santa 
Clara, and Matanzas, and in the two latter provinces the 
leaders and many suspected persons were quickly imprisoned. 

The apparent failure of the uprising and the small number 
of the insurgents seemed to have deceived the Spanish olficials, 
and there was little alarm as Spain had at that time an army 
of over 19,000 regulars in addition to so many of the 50,000 
volunteers as might be called out. 

It was in the province of Santiago de Cuba that from the 
beginning the insurrectionary movement assumed a dangerous 
importance. It was there tliat the revolution of 1868 had been 
strongest, and it was there always that the Cuban hatred of 
the Spanish was most marked. By reason of the mountainous 
configiu'ation of the country it is admirably adapted for resist- 
ance, and much of its coast is difficult to protect from secret 
landings. The shore for mile after mile is characterized by 
long reaches of lonely snow-white beach or rugged brown 
rocks, and is apparently devoid of all human habitations, while 
a little distance back rise twisted hills showing evidence of 
former volcanic upheavals. But beyond these hills, and 
within the watershed of the Bio Canto, are delightful valleys 
where nature can be enjoyed in unstinted measure, though the 
comforts of civilized life are rare. The fruits and vegetables 
render subsistence an easy matter to small guerrilla bands, 
and the temperature is uniformly genial. Boving l)aii(ls can 
camp almost anywhere among the hills or valleys in security; 
the water bubbles forth from springs of crystal purity, and 
camp life is burdened with the least amount of encumbrances. 
It liad been called the " Garden of Cuba," and some of the 
earlier colonists were so delighted with the region that they 
imagined it to be the original garden of Eden. In the moun- 



THE GARDEN OF CUBA 121 

tains along the shores is much mineral wealth, which generally 
remains untouched, while in the valleys are great plantations 
which, in times of peace, are very valuable and tiourishing. 
The principal city is Santiago de Cuba on the south shore, 
ifituated at the head of a landlocked bay, and from it proceeds 
one of the two short railways in the great province, a distance 
of about twenty miles to the town of Euramada. About forty 
miles to the east of Santiago is Guantanamo, connected by a 
dozen miles of railway to a small port on the Bay of Guanta- 
namo. 



CHAPTER X. 

POLITICAL TROUBLES IN SPAIN — GENERAL CAMPOS SENT 
TO CUBA — LANDING OF MACEO AND CROMBET — DEATH 
OF CROMBET AND NARROW ESCAPE OF MACEO. 

Spain Beset Within and Witliout — Officers Refuse to Volunteer — Sagasta 
Ministry Resigns — Canovas's Ministry — Campos Sent to Cuba — 
Maceo and His Record in the Ten-Years War — The Terror of the 
Spanish — How He Learned to Read — His Exile and Travels — A 
Hostler at West Point — An Ideal Guerrilla Chief — Crouibet and 
His Record — An Obstinate Captain — Crombet Blows out the Cap- 
tain's Brains — They Land on a Lonely Shore — Their Sufferings — 
Feasting on a Banana Plantation — Surprised — Crombet Surrounded 
and Killed — Maceo Escapes — Wanders Alone in the Woods — 
Betrayed by an Indian Guide — A Friendly Negro — In an Insurgent 
Camp at Last — His Presence Works a Marvelous Change — Recruit- 
ing His Army — Drilling His Men While Carried in a Hammock. 

DURIXG the weeks immediately following the outbreak 
of the insurrection Spain was beset with troubles 
within as well as withotit. The arrest and summary 
treatment of an American citizen in Havana and the seizure 
of an American vessel had placed the State Department at 
Washington in a position of diplomatic hostility, and it was 
becoming very evident that the authorities in Cuba were not 
suppressing the rebellion with that thoroughness required to 
uphold Spain's supremacy. The home government had 
treated the agitation as a recrudescence of the former so-called 
" brigandage," and, having fostered this impression, the sud- 
den call for volunteers to go to Cuba not only opened the eyes 
.of the incredulous but brought the government into a sharp 
■contest with the militia. While it was apparently easy to re- 
cruit men from the ranks of the army, the officers, according 
to some of the Spanish papers, refused to volunteer to go to 

Cuba, and this forced the government to the unpleasant ex- 

( 122 ) 



EXCITEMENT IN SPAIN 1^3 

l)L'di('iit ot" (Iniwing lot-;. 'I'lic fact ^varf the subject of much 
connnent in the jn-ess, and, in many cases, harsh criticisms of 
the army othcials, with inipiitations of cowardice and venality. 
The officers, furious under this criticism, on jNFarch lOth went 
in a body to the othce of one of the newspapers, invaded the 
composing-rooms, and broke the ))rintiii_u-presses. The police 
contented themselves with a very feeble interference. De- 
mands made by army officers upon the Liberal ministry that 
tliey suppress the newspapers daring to assail the army met 
with a refusal which, on the followinu- dav, caused the resiir- 
nation of the ministry. Great excitement followed this step, 
and it was not till General Campos was made Captain-General 
of Madrid and given full authority that even a semblance of 
order was restored. 

On the 23d of ]\[arch the Conservatives, under Canovas 
del Castillo, took possession of the reins of the government. 
Immediately after his installation the president of the council 
made a very clear statement regarding the conditions prevail- 
ing in Cuba, and the people became aware of the seriousness 
of the insurrection. Public opinion changed, the danger was 
realized, and there arose a clamor for a strong hand to stay the 
insun-ection. AVitli one voice the people called for General 
Campos, and soon his appointment as Governor-General of 
Cuba and Commander-in-Chief was made known. ^lean- 
while, the first expedition, consisting of over 8,500 soldiers, 
had already landed in Havana. 

The news of Campos's appointment was generally wel- 
comed in Cul)a. The insui-gents knew that Spain's most 
famous general was a fair fighter, though severe, Avhile those 
who still hoped for peace, even though they sympathized with 
the Cubans, had great confidence in the sagacity and skill of 
the man who liad liap])ily brought to a close the Ten-Years 
"War. Kveryone agreed that Cam]ios was the most honest 
man in Spain, the Spaniard of all Spaniards who knew Cuba, 
her need's and her aspirations best. "Besides, there was a con- 
viction that as soon as Campos had informed himself of the 



124 YOUTH OF ANTONIO MACEO 

state of the country lie would ask his government to make such 
concessions as would deprive the war of a rational basis. But 
while he was on his way to Cuba with reinforcements events 
were happening on the iusurgent side which had the greatest 
influence upon the future of the war. 

What the insurgent bands lacked at that time was a chief 
vested with the authority that comes of an unquestioned 
record, or that authority which by reason of a strong person- 
ality and magnetic power over men would stand for experience 
and a name. It was the common opinion that if some of the 
exiled generals of the former war could succeed in landing in 
Cuba, they could infuse the necessary strength into the cause. 
In the province of Santiago the j)artisans of the insurrection 
prayed for the coming of Maceo and Flor Crombet. 

They did not know that the old leaders were about to enter 
upon the scene and change in a short time the whole course of 
events. At that moment Maceo and Flor Crombet were in 
San Domingo, and they had but one arm of the sea to cross. 

Antonio ]\laceo was born on July 1-1, 1848. His father 
had a little plantation near Piarajagua, and there were eleven 
sons, of whom Antonio was the eldest. His skin was very 
dark, something between the negro and the mulatto, although 
he seemed much nearer the latter type. At the beginning of 
the Ten-Years War he did not know how to read or write. 
His father kept mules for hire and they were driven along the 
lonely mountain roads by Antonio. In this way the boy made 
trips to Baracoa, to Guantanamo, to Santiago, and even to 
Ilolguin. 

He saw the slaves toiling their lives away in the fields, fet- 
tered and laslied by overseers. He saw the red and yellow 
Spanish flag floating above the fortified towns, and came to 
understand it as an emblem of rapacity, cruelty, and gi-eed. 
One autumn day in 18G8 Antonio returned to his father's 
plantation from Baracoa mth the information that the Cubans 
had rebelled. The father, being a careful man, at once ad- 
vised his family to remain strictly neutral. But they secretly 



THE OATH OF THE MACEOS 125 

exulted over the siieeesses of tlieir conntryiiien, and it may 
have been that the S^mniards obtained an inkling of their sen- 
timents. At any rate, Spanish spies bcg-an to annoy them, 
and more than once tlicy were tlircatciic(l. The i-cvohition 
had been in progress fur some months, and tin' Spaniai-ds were 
wilil over a series of disasters, wlicn tlici-c appeared at tlie 
Maeeo plantation a l)and of S|iaiiis|i niierrillas. Mared and 
his okh'r sons were away with a mnk^ train. 

They retnrned at nightfall. As the i)lantation came into 
view, a hori-ifying sight met the ga/e of Maeeo and his sons. 
Where his home had been thci-e was nnljiing but a smoulder- 
ing heap of ashes and embers, llis barns wert; burned, his 
ero]>s destroyed, his mules, sheep, horses, and eattle driven off. 
Ihit w here were tlie mend)ers of liis family : Out in the jungle 
a woman screamed. Father and sons rushed in tlie dii'eetinn 
of the voice. Six young boys lay on the ground, bound, bleed- 
ing, and senseless. The gray-haired mothei- stood tied to a 
tree, moaning, with a broken arm. 

On the following day the father called his sons about him, 
and exacted from each a promise that they would never lay 
down their arms until the invader was driven out and Cuba 
was free. A few days later i\Iaximo (lomez, lying out in the 
mountains of Santiago Avitli his little following, was con- 
fronted by a gaunt, hagi^ai'd man, behind whom wei'e half a 
dozen awkward boys. Little diil (!onie/. know that in this 
a'atheriu"' of i-aw reei'uits thei-e stood his future lientenant- 
general. Uc a-ked them if they could tight. Idiey smiled 
and said " Peihaps." Soon afterward some Spanisii troops 
were riding leisni-ely along with an ammunition train. 
Around the l)end of the road, in front, swept a iiying body of 
horsemen, with their nuichetes glittering. They were guer- 
rillas of Oomez, and at their head rode the " awkwanl s(piad 
of the l\raceos. 

TJight into the heart of the Spanish troops they drove. ]->ell 
mell. cutting, slashing, and striking right and left. AVheii 
the fight was ended the elder !^^aceo lay dead on the ground. 



120 A BRILLIANT AND DARING LEADER 

Lefore tlio expiration of two months, Manuel, Fermin, and 
Justice Maceo had been killed in battle. 

Raphael was so cut up by wounds that he left the island to 
die as an exile in Costa Rica. For six months after this the 
survivors of the Maceo family seemed to bear charmed lives, 
and they became the foremost fighters under Gomez, 

ICext, Miguel was killed by a bayonet thrust at the cap- 
ture of Une Yitas. Soon after Julio was shot dead at Xuevo 
Mundo. Felipe and Thomas were so badly wounded that they 
became helpless cripples in San Domingo. 

Then, almost at the end of the war, Marcus was killed in a 
gallant machete charge, leaving Antonio, of all the " awkward 
squad " of fighters, still in the field. His brother Jose was 
still too young to join his relatives. During the first twelve 
months of Maceo's service he received sixteen of the twenty- 
one severe wounds that luarked his body at the close of the w^ar. 
"With great taciturnity and apparent gruffness, he combined 
a magnetism that drew men to him. Within a year he had 
been promoted through the various grades of sergeant, lieuten- 
ant, and captain to that of major. 

One of Maceo's notalde achievements in this Ten- Years 
War was in the battle of Zarzai, where 2,500 Spaniards were 
utterly routed. I^ater, at the battle of Santa Maria de Hol- 
guin, he ciharged the Spanish line at the head of his followers, 
and many were cut down before they could fire a shot. It 
was at this time that Maceo first met General AYeyler. The 
latter had been made a brigadier, and at the battle of Guaimaro 
was sent against Maceo. 

Maceo had placed his men across a steep ravine in some 
heavy brush. The Spaniards came tumbling and running up 
to the edge of the ravine, and there they were slaughtered like 
sheep. Y^eyler fled, leaving five hundred dead on the field. 
Tie never stopped to look liack until he w^as safe within the 
Spanish lines at Pnerto Principe. 

For these and other l)rilliant acts Maceo was made major- 
general. It seemed as if this new honor put additional spurs 



THE TERROR OF THE SPANIARDS 127 

to his heels, lie lost no opportunity to harrass the enemy, 
was in ambush and on guard everywhere, ancl he became the 
terror of the Spaniards, lie expei'ted them at all points, even 
when he was far away, and his life seemed beyond the reach 
of Spanish bullets. How to take IMaceo became the one idea 
of the Spanish soldiers, and as he became the terror of the 
Spaniards he became equally the hero of the Cubans. In 
rapid succession he engaged the Spaniards in a series of bril- 
liant and bloody fights. 

While he was in the midst of his iicrj' crusade the Cuban 
and Spanish leaders met at Zanjon and sigiied a treaty of peace. 
The news was brought to ]\laceo by a messenger who was au- 
thorized to procure his signature to the treaty. 

" Tell them," was IMaceo's reply, " that I will never sign 
any compact with Spain otlici- than a compact for the freedom 
of Cuba. I will not submit." 

So Antonio Maceo kept on fighting. It soon became evi- 
dent, however, that the backbone of the war had been broken. 
Ten years of starvation and exposure in all sorts of weather 
had broken the spirit of all but Maceo. Unable to obtain sup- 
plies, he was reduced to complete want. Then the capitula- 
tion came. He wrote Campos a haughty letter, agreeing to 
lay down his arms, disband his forces, and submit to exile on 
the condition that a Spanish man-of-war be placed at his dis- 
posal to convey him and his officers to Jamaica. This offer 
was readily accepted by ('aiiipos, wlio reiili/e(l the impossi- 
bility of catching Maceo in a country where he knew every 
tree and bypath. 

Maceo disbanded his men in the early dawn under a i)ig 
tree near CJuantanamo. There were men among that 500 who 
had fought under Maceo for almost ten years. They were 
ragged and half starved, l)ut they had stood together in the 
brunt of many a hard-fought battle, and it was no wonder that 
tears were in their eyes as they bade their leader goodby. 

For them it was a return to the Idackened sites of their 
burned homes and their ruined planlations. For him it was 



128 THE WEST POINT HOSTLER 

exile forever to a foreign country — and Cuba still in chains. 
No wonder the thought maddened him. Yet he counselled 
patience, industry, and obedience to the laws. " As for me," 
he said, "I will follow the will of fate that leads me blindly 
onward. Will I come again? Qnien sabef ^' Then there 
were handclasps and goodbys, and Antonio Maceo sailed away 
to Jamaica. 

In the few moments of his leisure he had learned to read 
and write. At night, when the fighting was over, by such light 
as his straightened means could compass, he poured over his 
books as industrious and submissive as a child. General Lacret 
was his preceptor, and he suddenly acquired an amazing fond- 
ness for books relating to wars and military tactics, which he 
read early and late. 

Early in 1871) Maceo arrived in Xew York. For a month 
or more he lived alone, without other companionship than that 
of books. In a few months he made his way to West Point, 
where he obtained employment as a hostler. ISTobody in the 
academy dreamed that the broad-shouldered, dark-browed 
man who handled the horses so easily had ever smelled the 
smoke of battle, or heard the song of rifle bullets. Day after 
day, on the parade ground, he watched the evolutions of the 
cadets, listened to the commands of the officers, studied the 
discipline of the place, pored over volumes of military tactics 
that he had managed to borrow, and added to his natural 
genius the knowledge of other great generals. 

At last the hostler, who was regarded as book-mad, gave up 
his positioii and returned to ^e\v ^^ork. From jSTew York he 
went to Costa Rica, taking a hundred or more weighty volumes 
with him. Some wealthy Cubans had settled in Costa Rica 
during the war, and they now offered Maceo a tract of land on 
which to colonize his brave followers. Here for ten years the 
exile worked and studied and dreamed, instructed his veterans 
in the modern theories of war, and gave them practical lessons 
in drilling and in cavalry evolutions. Never for a moment did 
he forget his purpose. 



RETURN OF MACEO AND ("ROMBET 129 

One (l:i_v in Fetbrnarv, 1895, word came that the Cubans 
had risen. A week later Maeeo, his brother Jose, Flor 
Crombet, Cabreco, and sixteen other veterans, sailed from 
Costa Rica for San Dnininpi. At this time ^laeeo was forty- 
seven years ohl. His hair and his beard were beginning' to 
show threads of sih'cr, but his strength and agility were sur- 
prising, lie was a sharpshooter and a horseman of incom- 
parable finish and skill. Cahn, imperious, and inflexible as 
he stood under the rain of bulle^ts, he was the ideal of a guer- 
rilla chief. 1 n the march of events he was to display qualities 
whicli 2)i'(ivcd that he was as true a man and as masterful a 
general as he was keen and skillful in strategy. Springing 
from obscurity, he hewed out of the rugged history of Cuba 
a name that will be remembered while liberty endures. Un- 
known as he was and of a race of slaves, backed only by a 
small band of rebels, he met the soldiers of a European power 
and the head of an imposing army on the ground of man's 
('([iiality, and for a moment the rebel held the safety of the 
royal army in his hands. 

Flor Crond)et was also a guerrilla of unquestioned valor. 
He fought side by side with Macco during the greater part of 
the Ten-Years AVar; wounded many times, he seemed to bear 
a charmed life. lie was a lion in battle, but he lacked Maeeo's 
greatness of soul, and he had neither the noble instinct nor the 
generosity of Maceo. But he was whiter than his compatriot, 
his mother having been a mulatto, while the untainted blood 
of the Caucasian race ran in the veins of his father. 

At San Domingo they chartered a little American boat in 
which to cross to the coast near Baracoa, the nearest port, 
taking with them a few arms and such equipments as they 
considered necessary. They crossed without attracting atten- 
tion. The Spanish cruiser which jiatrolled the coast did not 
a])])("ar. On the morning of Api'il \<\ tlicv sightcl Unracoa, 
and the leaders then asked the captain, who was steering his 
boat towards the jwrt, to land fliem favflur along tlie coast at 
some distance from the city. The captain refused, urging 



130 WANDERINGS AND PRIVATIONS 

that it had been agreed that they should land at Baracoa; he' 
declared that he should land just as he had contracted to, and 
added that he had no wish to run upon the rocks which line 
the coast for the purpose of pleasing his passengers. 

Maceo and Crombet insisted that he should not land in the 
port, and when the captain would not listen to their entreaties 
they told him that to do so would be to thrust them into the 
jaws of death. They told him that they could not approach 
the port without being recognized, and that they would be ar- 
rested and shot. But nothing that they urged had any in- 
fluence upon the captain. He steered steadily towards the 
city, and Crombet, beside himself, seized a rifle and blew out 
the captain's brains. 

They then took the ship, put about, and steered for the 
coast, and shortly afterwards landed in a little bay situated 
some distance from Baracoa. It was a part of the country of 
which they knew very little, and they wandered for some time 
at random, and the few inhabitants whom they met, Indian 
guerrillas in the service of Spain, were hostile to them. Maceo 
and his band kept in hiding in the woods, where they were 
soon called upon to undergo serious privations. After a few 
days of trial and discomfort, however, they arrived at a planta- 
tion of banana trees laden with fruit. Tliey were thankful for 
such a feast after their prolonged fast, but while they were 
busy with this harvest they w'ere surprised by a troop of In- 
dians commanded by Spanish oflicers. Maceo, realizing their 
position, in an instant cried out to his companions: 

" Sauve qui pent! " (Let liim escape who can.) 

All ran, with the exception of Crombet, who was at once 
surrounded. Ho fired and killed several of his adversaries, 
then fell dead with a bullet in his forehead. The Spaniards 
turned to pursue the rest of the band, but they had disap- 
peared. 

Dispersed and wandering separately, their sufferings were 
intense. Maceo lived for days on bitter oranges, the only 
fruit which grows in those Cuban woods. His boots had given 



A NIGHT OF SORROW 131 

out, lie was barefooted, for iu his i>recipitiite fliglit lie had been 
forced to abandon all his supplies. After a time he met an 
Indian and asked liim to show him the way out of the woods. 
The Indian^ who had recognized him, agreed, and they went 
on together for several hours. Evening came on. 

" General," said the Indian, '' beyond this jwint I do not 
know tlie way, an<l 1 think it would be better for you to re- 
main in this grotto to-night. To-morrow T will return with 
one of my friends who knows the country, and he will lead 
you whei-ever you tliiid-c bt^t." 

j\Iaceo thanked him and rewarded him by giving him the 
only money he had left, an American twenty-dollar gold-piece. 
In the shelter pointed out by the guide the wind had heaped 
up a bed of leaves, u])on which the tired fugitive stretched 
himself. But he was too tired and too anxious to sleep, and 
the tliought came to him that it would not be prudent for him 
to rest there. 

" Xo/' he said to himself. "It is not well that anj'one 
should know where I pass the night." 

Then he arose and looked about him. i'lie dew lay heavy 
upon the great leaves of the I'idi undergrowth, and a white, 
malarious veil, hanging above the earth and embracing it, 
trend)led in the dim light of the night. Maceo's heart 
swelled with nunnories of his sorrowful youth, the remem- 
brance of tlie natural and inevitable wrongs of his ])ii-th, and 
the des])erate fight for freedom of his tortured country, lie 
thought of Crombet who had fought by his side and had been 
like a l)rother to him, and of all the brave, determined men 
who had given their lives into ]u< keeping ami followed him 
without a ([uesLion or a doubt. 1 hey too were fugitives, groj)- 
ing about in the fcu'cst. 

Despite his longing for rest, he left his cave and ci-e])t (»ut 
into the woods, where he hid himself among the leafage of the 
great plants at the foot of a tall tree. In that position he 
could watch the cave and signal should his guide return ac- 
cording to his promise. 
9 



133 A TRAITOROUS PLOT DEFEATED 

lie had just settled himself comfortably in his shelter 
when he heard voices in the direction of the grotto, and im- 
mediately afterwards saw a troop of armed Indians advancing. 
They were led by his guide, who had no sooner received his 
money than he had gone to betray him to his enemies, and the 
Indians had come to capture him Avhile he slept. 

Maceo crept further away through the underbrush, that 
luxuriant growth which returns no sound of the cautious 
human footfall. It was not long before he heard the Indians 
clamoring loudly because the perfidious guide had brought 
them to an empty cave. It is evident that the Spanish authori- 
ties, knowing of Maceo's departure from San Domingo, and 
anticipating that he would attempt to land on the island, had 
laid their traps to capture him. The obstinacy of the captain 
whom Grombet had shot was suspicious, and the quickness 
with which armed bands turned up in the thick woods where 
he had been almost lost could hardly have been without de- 
sign. 

Maceo wandered about all that night, expecting at any 
moment to meet an enemy. Reaching at last a small hut 
ainong the rocks, he entered, revolver in hand, and an old 
negro sprang up from the floor. 

"Do you recognize me? " asked Maceo. 

" Yes, General," was the reply. " You are Don Antonio 
Maceo." 

" Very good," said ]\Iaceo. " You will guide me to the 
nearest insurgent station. If you Icnid me into an ambush I 
will blow your brains out." 

The old negro did not reply. Silently he led IMaceo along 
a faintly-marked trail, and after several hours _of marching 
tliey met a little group of Cubans Avho welcomed Maceo with 
joy and gratitude. As for IMaceo, he was utterly exhausted, 
unabh^ to take another step. The dangers whicli lie faced 
after landing near Baracoa afford another proof of the daring 
qualities of the man, and also of the lack of real sympathy 
which the uprising encountered at the beginning. But as 



AGAIN IN THE FIELD 133 

soon as it was known that Maceo had landed, and, in spite of 
the attemjDts to capture him, was at the head of an army, the 
whole aspect of things was changed. One by one, or in little 
groups, the Creoles who were serving in the Spanish ranks 
joined the insurgents; those who had held back doubtfully 
:?liouldcrcd their guns and ciinic inio camp, while the liulians 
who had failed to capture and assassinate Maceo, awed by his 
bravery, soon became some of his best soldiers. 

All those who had landed with Maceo and had escaped 
from the attack at the banana plantation had to pass through 
trying ordeals before they an-ived at insurgent camps, but 
they all came out safe. Maceo, Avho had not been a witness 
of the killing of Crond)et, believed that he was still alive, and 
as soon as it Avas possible he ordered the woods searched in 
every direction. For a long time he looked for him at every 
turn, and in his dreams of Cuba Libre he saw his old friend 
li\ing and t I'iuniphaiil. The Spaniards boasted tliat they ha<l 
carried away his body, but this is doul)tful, as those who saw 
the body which they exhibited as that of Crombet did not 
recognize it. 

Maceo exerted himself at once to gather about him an 
army, and when he had a few hundred armed men he felt that 
his success was assured. AVlien it is considered what he ac- 
complished with these men, one can imagine what he might 
have done, wdth his military talents, could he have commanded 
a large army of trained soldici's. His organization of the 
rough nuitin-ial at his disposal was masterful, though for a 
long time he was hardly able to do nnich work with his troops. 
In his terrible ordeal he had become crippled; his feet were so 
sAvollen that for some time he had to be carried about in a 
hammock. But nothing escaped his keen eye and vigilance. 



CIIAPTEK XI 

GOMEZ AND MxVCEO PERFECT THEIR PLANS — TRAGIC DEATH 
OF MARTI — MACEOS BRILLIANT CAMPAIGN — NARROW 
ESCAPE OF CAMPOS. 

Arrival of iVIarti, President of tlie Cuban Republic, aud Gomez, Comman- 
der-iD-Chief — lutluence of Gomez in the Central Provinces — Arrival 
of Campos — His plan to Coufine the Revolution to Santiago de Cuba 
— Plan of Cami^aign Arranged by Gomez and Maceo — Gomez with 
Seven Hundred Cavalrymen Near the Enemy — A Wild Charge — 
The Spaniards Driven Back on their Reserves — Marti's Horse Be- 
comes Unmanageable — Carried into the Ranks of the Enemy — They 
Fall upon Him — His Death — Campos Orders a Military Funeral — 
Barbers as. Surgeons — Maceo Plans an Attack — Death of Goulet — 
Maceo Turns the Retreat into a Charge — Did Not Know He was 
Attacking Campos. 

GENERAL J\1AOEO had hardly begun his preparations 
A\'lien a detachment was sent to receive Generals 
Maximo (iiomez, Francisco Borrerro, Angel Gnerra, 
and Jose jMarti, under Avhose energetic management the instir- 
rection had been organized. They arrived in C\tba on the 
11th of April, five days before General Campos succeeded 
General Calleja as Commander-in-Chief of the Spanish forces 
in the island. Pending the formal action of the Chilian 
leaders Avlien they should become more firmly established, the 
revolutionary committee appointed Marti President of the 
Pepid)lic of Cuba and Gomez as Commander-in-Chief of the 
army. In two months, therefore, a revolution which had, to 
all appearances, begun so insignificantly was fairly launched, 
and the greatest general in Spain was on his way to measure 
arms with the strongest leaders among the Cubans. If Gomez 
was less than Maceo an idol of the Cuban people in the east, 

he was better known in the central divisions of the island, and 

(134) 



ON THE POINT OP ENCOUNTER l.'Jo 

tlic plan was to take steps at once to extend tlie insurrection 
into that qnarter. Gomez had heen one of the h'adiiii;' spirits 
of the previous war, and hitcr ha<l Ix'cii an ofHcer of higli re- 
pnte in tlie Honduras army. The knowledge. of his presence 
in the island was an inspiring impulse upon the Cubans in tlie 
provinces of I'uciio Principe and Santa Chira, who imnicdi- 
afi'ly prcparccl to join the insnrgents, and, as in that section of 
the island the white race predominated, their sympathy af- 
forded the insurrection a more favorable standing. 

Campos's first plan ot/'am})aign was to confine the revolu- 
tion to the province of Santiago de Cuba, and he was reported 
to have made the statement that he would crush the insur- 
gents, establish peace, and return to Spain the following Xo- 
veml»er. He issneil a pnxdamation promising pardon and 
freedom to such rebellions ( 'nbans as would surrender them- 
selves and their arms, but it was too late for such an exi)edient 
to have the desired eil'ect. ( 'anipos asserted that the province 
of i*uei1o j^iMiicipe Would nexcr I'ise in revolt, and, in or<ler to 
prevent it, he projected a line of railway from Santa Cruz on 
the south coast to the city of Pucn-to l^rincipe, and another 
fi'om ^lanzanillo to Uayanio, ho]»ing thereby to engage the un- 
employed and (|niet the fever of revolt. It became equally 
important for the ( 'nban generals to cross the country into 
]*ucrto Princi|)e so that (Jomez could bring into th(^ ficdd those 
who were waiting for a leadei', hence both the ( 'nbans and the 
Sjianlards awaited the results of this first movement with great 
interest. Campos hastene<l a cord«m of troops, estimated to 
nnndier 10,000 men, near the Ixirder of Pnei'to Princi|)e and 
Santiago to pi-event (!omez from entei-ing. ]Meanwhi1(\ 
INfaceo, wlio could more readily than Gomez recruit in the 
east, organized the ti-oops as best he could. Several chiefs 
brought in little bands which they had gathered together, and 
Goulet with his force, which iiv this time numbere(l near 
1,000 men, liastened to join his old conmiandei-. To the in- 
domitable courage and fierce endnrance .if the ('nbans was 
now added the buovancv and confidence whiidi came from th(^ 



136 FACE TO FACE WITH THE FOE 

knowledge that they were to follow the lead of generals of 
tried capacity, and recrnits came in much faster than the 
equipments could be supplied. 

Gomez, llarti, and Maceo arranged their plan of cam- 
paign and then separated. It was decided that in order to 
facilitate the entrance of Gomez and Marti into the province 
of Puerto Principe, Maceo should attempt a diversion of the 
royal forces in the direction of Guantanamo. Gomez and 
Marti with al^out 700 cavalrymen turned their course west- 
ward. As their main purpose w^as tP work their way into 
Puerto Principe, where Marti counted on the presence of 
Gomez and his own personality and eloquence to influence the 
undecided, it Avas policy for them to avoid, if possible, the 
Spanish troops, leaving them to be drawn away by Maceo with 
liis superior forces. But, unfortunately, when they found 
themselves in the neighborhood of the enemy, the prudence 
of Gomez was overborne by the zeal of Marti. 

On the 18th of May, when camped on the plains of Dos 
Rios, tlicy learned that the first line of the enemy was in the 
neighl)0]-hood, safely protected by a fort. Starting out before 
daybreak the next morning, they soon came upon the Spanish 
outpost. Marti was all excitement. He desired to fight, but 
the prudent Gomez I'eminded Marti that skirmishing was not 
to be the object of the expedition, that they should pass around 
the enemy, if possible, and he thought it would he wiser to 
profit by the heavy fog which enshrouded the plain by firing 
a few shots at the outposts, while they continued on their 
march unnoticed along the flank of the royal army. But the 
firing of the muskets excited Marti more and more. They 
were face to face with the hated Spaniards against whose op- 
pression he had struggled and suffered. The hope of his 
youth and his manhood at last seemed to be realized. He 
had planned the great struggle now at hand; step by step, in 
the face of discouragements and obstacles, had infused it with 
life and made it a working force. Here at last was a chance 
to strike. Why should they avoid this enemy with whom for 



FALL OF THE PATRIOT MARTI 137 

twenty years ho had lunged to measuiie strength 'i lie conld 
not bear to think of drawing back, of slinking away. 

Before the wihl exaltation of Marti, (loiiiez had not the 
heart to insist npon his own })riident tactics. And if, indeed, 
they had had a lai-ge army, instead of a force insigniticant 
in comparison willi the royal troops; lia<l hccii [n-opcrly 
armed and ((inipiicd, a decisive blow might have been strnck 
then and there. The entlinsiasm <d' the yonng recrnits, led 
by an ohl warrior of mark and snch a s])irited champion as 
Marti, wonld liave been hai'(l to withstand, I'or no snch fi'cnzy 
of i)atriotic fervor prevailed among the Spanish yonths, drawn 
into the strnggle against their will. As it was, they ({nailed 
before the charge of those seven hundred cavalrymen, and no 
serious harm might have been done but for the recklessness of 
Marti, who was mounted ui)on a very beautiful and vigorous 
horse. He was told that the aniuud might b(> unnuinageal>lc 
in a skirmish, even if ridden by an experienced horseman, but 
Marti would not listen. 

'■ Viva ( 'uba Libre ! " he cried, waving his sword, and, fol- 
lowed l)y his soldiers, he rushed upon the Spanish lines. Be- 
fore the avalanche the Spanish army retreatecl, but in good 
ordei-, upon its reserves. That was the trap, (lomez sounded 
a rally to the troops, and they stoj)ped, but ^Tarti, carried on 
by the vigor of his horse, whicdi ]\c could not control, was taken 
straight int(» the ranks of the enemy, lie received a bnllet in 
his left eyebrow, another in his throat, and se\-ei'al s\vt)rd 
thrusts in his l)ody. Then the Spaniards fell upon their vic- 
lini. The insurgents charge(l again, bnt in the face of su(di 
superior nund)ers the movement was of no avail. There was 
danger of losing all, and ^larti was dead. 

Marti wore upon his hat a scarf in the colors of ( "nba Libre 
on wlii(di was embroidered his name, 'i'he connnander oi the 
Spanish forces hastened to transmit to Santiago the news of 
this important ca])ture, and the rejoicing was great among the 
Spaniards, ricneral Camjios at once gave orders to despatch 
two persons who knew ]\Iarti to identify him and bring back 



138 A HERO EULOGIZED BY HIS FOES 

official proof of his death. After its identification the corpse 
was to be brought to Santiago, let it cost what it might, lie 
did not propose to neglect the opportnnity of prodncing upon 
pnblic opinion an impression unfavorable to the Cnban cause, 
and, naturally, the news of Marti's death was at first received 
with incredulity by some. Bnt the evidence was conclusive. 
The body of the dead J^-esident A\'as carried to the cemetery, 
where it was exposed to the })u])lic \'ie\v and photographed. 
By the order of General Camjjos, a Spanish general presided 
at the funeral of the illustrious insurgent, and pronounced a 
discourse over the grave, eulogizing the brilliant (pialities of 
the fallen enemy, and mourning because his courage and his 
talents had not been exerted in a better cause. Those who had 
been present at the summary executions of the previous war 
thought that times had changed and military manners with 
them. At that time Marti's corpse would have been dragged 
througli the streets of the city. But Campos knew that such 
brutal treatment would only arouse thousands of Cubans who 
were then in a doubtful attitude. 

Marti's death appeared at first sight to be an irreparable 
loss, but the movement had received such an imjudse that noth- 
ing could then have stopped its onward march. It was ciuickly 
arranged that T. Estrada Palma, one of the leaders of the revo- 
lutionary connnittee, should act as president until such time 
as the Cuban Assembly could meet to definitely organize the 
republic. Marti had already issued the call for this meeting 
and it only awaited the favorable opportunity. 

Experience had taught Marti that Cespedes had failed in 
1878 largely because of lack of arms. Before attempting to 
begin the war, therefore, j\Iarti had organized- a system of col- 
lecting money from exiled Cubans everywhere. lie had but 
a small sum at the beginning, for his system liad only l)egun 
its operations. The Spaniards generally believed that Marti 
controlled millions and jumped at the conclusion that he was 
backed solely by the people of the Ignited States. But it is 
stated as a fact that ]\larti was compelled to start the war with 



CAMPOS BEGINS AN ACTIVE CAMPAIGN 130 

no more than $75,000, wlik-li would be liardly enough for a 
yinglc cxpoJition. l>ut his system was in working order and 
it represented niillions. 

AVhile Comez, mourning the fate of the dasliing Init reck- 
less ]\larti, was adroitly working his way along the flank of the 
enemy towards the iiro\iiu'e of Puerto Principe, Maceo was 
vigorously diverting the S[)anish forces in the eastern part of 
the island. Other bauds of insurgents were having fre<inent 
skirmishes amid the hills of Santiago de Cuba, and occasion- 
ally a ([uite serious engagement. 

It required a stout heart to endure the privations and 
suffering in the Cuban camps. There were no doctors and 
no medicine, and the wounded insurgent had to rely upon 
nature for his cure, though there were a few bai'bei's in the 
ranks who acted as sin-gcons. 

Meanwhile, Genei-al Campos had become impatient be- 
cause his generals displayed so little (Energy; he determined to 
show them that he, the Cai)tain-(jleneral, would meet the in- 
surgents without the support of the entire army. Since his 
arrival in Cuba he had seldom left the ship upon which he had 
established his head(piarters. lie sailed from Havana to San- 
tiago, going wherever he thought he was needed, urging on 
first one and then the other, negotiating in one place and order- 
ing a fight in another. Early in -Tuly he went to Man/anillo 
and lande(l. Xumerous coni])hiints had appeai-ed in the press 
that the Spanish forces at Payamo, an inland city about 
tweiity-iive miles from ^lan/.anillo, were in a deploralde con- 
dition, without food or iio-pitals, and cut off from Manzanillo 
by the insurgents. Campos, a])])arently, conceived the plan 
of relieving Payamo and of crushing the collected forces of 
]\[aceo and Kabi at one blow, and of afterwards pushing west- 
ward to drive Gomez into the Spanish nu'litary line between 
the province of Santa Clara and Puerto Princi])e, thus catch- 
ing the Cubans between two fires. }]c ordered three Spanish 
columns to march against Maceo's force from diiTerent direc- 
tions, while he started from ^Manzanillo on the 12th with a 



140 MACEO ATTACKS THE SPANISH FORCES 

convoy under General Santocildes, wliich was to re-victual 
Bayamo. 

Everything went well until they reached the neighborhood 
of Peralejos, where the road divides. The new highway 
stretches out to^vards the north, while the old road deflects 
slightly towards the south. The guide turned into the new 
road, which is better known and more worn by travel, but 
General Campos ordered him to take the old road. 

Maceo had been warned that a Spanish column was to leave 
Manzanillo -with commissary stores for Bayamo, and he de- 
cided to attack it with as strong a force as he could muster. 
With this end in view he had picked up Goulet's force en- 
camped at St. Georges, and also sent messengers to Rabi and 
the others who were near by to join him. It was not long be- 
fore his army, swelled by these reinforcements, nund^ered 
8,000 men, of whom at least 500 were practically without 
arms. They had proceeded toward Bayamo, and halted near 
the ])arting of the roads. 

Thinking that the Spanish column would follow the new, 
well-beaten road, Maceo distributed his troops among the 
underbrush and placed his equipage and the men who had no 
guns along the side of the old abandoned road. Goulet and 
his band was ]ilaced between the largest bod}^ of the insur- 
gents and the military impedimenta. General Campos was 
moving forward with great caution, when his advance guard 
came fidl ii])on tlie 1)and of unarmed Cubans and fired a volley 
of musketry into their ranks. The result was a wild retreat. 
The panic of the unarmed soldiers was so great that Goulet's 
troops were swept backward. For a moment he seemed ut- 
terly abandoned, but his two aids-de-camp, Palacios and Colas, 
were near him, and the three undaunted soldiers united in a 
desperate effort to stem the flood of retreat. The Spaniards 
advanced, firing volley after volley at the flying fugitives. 
Goulet mounted a rise of ground, to watch the movements of 
the enemy and to give orders to his lieutenants, and as he 
crouched at the foot of a tree half stripped by the Spanish 



A PANIC TURNED TO AN ONSLAUGHT 141 

bullets, -which fell like rain, a hnllct cnteicd his knee, trav- 
ersing the groin, and he fell dead. His two aids hastened to 
carry his body from the field. 

Maceo, who had expected to face the Spaniards on the 
other road, heard the noise of the battle, and, notwithstanding 
the disadvantages of his position, he rallied his troops and faced 
tlie (Mieniy bv a change of front. AVhon it is ronicnibei-ed that 
the nndisciplined and panic-stricken nnarnied band was in full 
retreat, it must be acknowledged that Maceo's change of front 
M'as remarkable, and that it did honor to his generalship. The 
aspect of the combat at once changed ; the Spaniards fell back 
under the unexpected attack and felt that they were defeated. 

At that moment General Campos ordered his officers to 
disinoiint. General Santocildes did not hear the order and re- 
mained upon his horse. Maceo was in front of his lin(\ sur- 
rounded by his staif, all young men of excellent family, used 
to the management of firearms and better marksmen than the 
average soldier. He ordered tliem to fji-o full upon tlic per- 
son who had remained upon his horse, sujiposing liim to be the 
general in command. Santocildes received in his body the 
contents of twenty rifles and fell mortally woundcMl. As he 
tVIl tlic Spanish soldiers rushed foi-ward witli a stn^tclior to 
l)car away his body. uHFaceo ordered his statT to fire upon the 
com])act group which the enemy formed at tliat point. Tliree 
times the Spaniards avoi-c f(^rced to droj-) tlie stretcher upon 
which lay tlie body of llieir geiiei-nl. and each time tliev left 
upon the spot a number of dead and dying. They returned 
after the third repulse and this time they succeeded in carry- 
ing tlie body away with them. 

Gampos, seeing the turn the battle had taken, ordered his 
men to slioot all the horses and mules, and the dead bodies of 
tlie animals Avere ]»iled np as a barricade. ^Faceo, on foot, 
ni'ged tlie s<ddiers on witli all liis accustomed energv an<l conr- 
age. Tt Avas a Avarm and spirited fight. The dead increased 
on the si<le of the royal armv, but they continned to ]M^uv upon 
the insurgents a well-sustained tire. Tlu^ rebels, on the other 



142 A SPIRITED FIGHT 

hand, held their ground firmly. Campos received a ball in 
his boot and another broke his staff. 

As it drew on towards night the rain l)egan to fall in tor- 
rents and the ardor of the insurgents, whose ammunition was 
running low, was somewhat cooled. At this favorable mo- 
ment Campos gave the order to his men to resume their march 
toward Bayamo, and the insurgents followed, harrassing the 
royal army all the way to the gates of the city. The engage- 
ment lasted eleven hours and cost the Spaniards, according to 
their own account, a general and seventy men killed, and 100 
soldiers wounded more or less seriously. The Cul)ans de- 
clared that the Spaniards lost 400 killed and a large number 
wounded, while tlie Cuban loss was Goulet and about 130 
men. Altogether the day had been a hard one, and Campos 
acknowledged in his report that his colnmn had twice been in 
danger. On reaching Bayamo he sent for reinforcements, 
withdrawing a consideralde number from Santa C^lara prov- 
ince, thus tending, as IFaceo purposed, to make Gomez's con- 
temporaneous efforts in that direction easier. 

jMaceo did not learn till the following day that he had been 
fighting with the r^aptain-General. 

" Had [ known that," lie said, " I would have sacrificed 
500 of my men and taken liini dead or alive ! Thus with one 
blow I would have ended the war." 

It is true that had such been the result of the battle the 
conseqnenccs wonld hiwo been incalculable, and even had 
Maceo attacked the Spanish as he expected to, the result might 
have been very different. As it was, IMaceo was compelled to 
rescue his army from a rout. With what skill he faced his 
armed men about, and brought them up past the unarmed 
stragglers who were running for their lives, the results showed. 
That one battle proved that j\faceo was a great general. 

Bnt it was not simply upon the field that he showed his 
great qualities. After the battle IMaceo had the wounded 
picked up and cared for, and then, sitting down in his hinnble 
camp, he wrote the Captain-General the following letter: 



MACEO'S MAGNANIMITY 143 

To Marshal Maktinez Caju'os ; 

Desiriui^ tliat the wounded abandoned by your Iroops upon the ))attlc- 
field shall not perish for want of help, I have onlerccl my men to earry 
them to the houses of the Cuban families liviny near the plaee of the eom- 
bat, where they are to be kept until you send for them. It is understood 
that the soldiers who are sent by you for this purpose shall not be attaekcd 
by those whom I eommand. 

(Si,^^led) Antonio Macko. 

AVo may iiiiai;iiic tlie fccliiiii's witli Avliioli the gTcatcst £2;en- 
ci'al of the })r()ii(l Spanisli mil ion i-cccivt'd this iioto fnnii I he 
imihitto gcnerah JJut ('ani})Os was a wise and generous foe 
and knew how to appreciate Maceo. If the Spaniards had 
always been as niagnaniinons in the treatment of the wounded 
Cubans who fell into tlicir hands there woukl have been less 
cause for a wai- which was destined t(* d(>vastate the fair island 
of Cuba. 

The next nmi-ning ^laceo tiled off with his troops. They 
were ^\•ithin sight of tlie city, and the Spaniards fired after 
them a hannless \'olley of artillery. 

"" Idiat is the way to salute a general," said Maceo with a 
langh. 

A\ hen once his brilliant exploit was aceomi)lished the in- 
stn-gent leader retired, lie had just learned that important 
forces were on their way to Bayamo to reinforce Campos, and 
he feared to be taken between two fires. He sent each band 
to its respective encam])nient to await siudi a time as he might 
think best fitted for a new sortie. 



CHAPTER XII, 

ORGANIZATION OF THE REPUBLIC OF CUBA — PECULIAR- 
ITIES OF CUBAN WARFARE -ON TO HAVANA!— THE 
FAMOUS JUCARO TROCHA. 

Campos Sends for Reinforcements — Landing of Other Cuban Leaders - 
Gomez Enters Puerto Principe — His Order for the Destruction of 
Sugar Plantations — The Reasons for It — Campos Leaves Santiago for 
Santa Clara — Cuban Delegates Meet to Found the Republic — A Govern- 
ment Largely on Paper — Gomez's Great Plan for a Westward March — 
Divisions of the Cuban Army — Gomez's Instructions — Tactics of the 
Insurgents — Their Advantages — The Nature of Alleged Spanish 
Victories — Cubans Constantly Pushing Further WestAvard — Campos 
Reinforces the Jucaro Trocha — Fifty Miles of Forts and Barbed Wire 
— Gomez's Plan to March 12,000 Men Over It — Maceo Deceives the 
Spaniards — Burning Sugar Plantations in Santa Clara — Insurgents 
Divide into Small Bands - - The Battle of Coliseo — Campos Falls 
Back to Havana — All Cuba Under Martial Law. 

FOETUNE certainly favored the insurgents in leading 
the Captain-General into the province of Santiago de 
Cnl>a, for while Campos was unsuccessfully exerting 
himself to crush the rebellion there, he was leaving the way 
open for Gomez to cari-y the banner of Cuba Libre to the west- 
ward. After reaching Bayamo and examining the garrison 
there, Campos immediately sent for reinforcements and a con- 
siderable number of troops came from Santa Clara. That 
province he regarded as thoroughly loyal, and he did not be- 
lieve for a moment that Gomez would be able to push beyond 
the old Jucaro trocha. 

But it happened at about this time that three able Cul)an 
leaders, Generals Roloff, Sanchez, and Rodriguez, landed in 
Santa Clara province with a large amount of war material, 
and before the Spaniards had extricated Campos from his posi- 
tion at Bayamo the army in Santa Clara had been organized 
into the Fourth Army Corps, and operations were at once 

(144) 



GOMEZ STRIKES AT THE REVENUES OF SPAIN 145 

begun. It was not long before the insnrrection had taken a 
vigorous stride there. Skirmishes were of almost daily occur- 
rence and there were some important encounters caused by the 
action of the insurgents who undertook to destroy the rail- 
road and telegraph communication of tlie ])r(>vince. 

(Jonoral CJomoz, after tlio engagement in wliicli ^Tarti lost 
his life, succeeded in eluding tlie forces sent to intercept him 
and entered the southern part of the province of Puerto J^rin- 
ci})e early in June, or before the events just related took place. 
Here he was joined by Salvador (^isneros lietancourt, the most 
influential Cuban in that district, and soon his forces were 
increased by young men from all over the province, thus form- 
ing tlie nucleus of what was later the Third Army Corps. 

When Gomez reached Najasa, about thirty miles from the 
city of Puerto Principe, he issued one of the first of those gen- 
eral orders which had so much effect in the later conduct of the 
island. It was as follows : 

General Heax)Quarters of the Army of Litjeration, 

Kfijam, Camagiiey, July 1, 1S05. 
To the Planters and Owtwrs of Cattle Ranches : 

In accord with the great interests of the revohition for tlie independ- 
ence of the country and for which we are in arms : 

Wliereas all exploitations of any product wliatsoever are aids and re- 
sources to the Government that we are fighting, it is resolved by the Gen- 
eral-in-Chief to issue this general order throughout the island, that the in- 
troduction of articles of commerce, as well as beef and cattle, into the 
towns occupied by the enemy, is absolutely prohibited. The sugar ]ilan- 
tations will stop their laJ)ors, and whosoever shall attempt to grind the 
crop, notwithstanding this order, will have their cane burned and their 
buildings demolished. The person who," disobeying this order, will try 
to protit from the present situation of affairs, will show by his conduct lit- 
tle respect for the rights of the revolution of redemption, and therefore 
shall be considered as an enemy, treated as a traitor, and tried as such in 
case of his capture. Maximo Gomkz, 

The General in-Chi'if. 

The reasons for this order were the same as those which 
led to the destruction of cotton in the South dnring the Ameri- 
can civil conilict. TIic siionr ci'o)> was :i ]:\v<yo som-ce of rev- 
enue to the Spanish govcniniciil, \u,\]\ dirccllv ;iii(l iii(h'rcc(lv. 



146 PUSHING THE CAMPAIGN WESTWARD 

He who follows the developments of this rebellion mnst al- 
ways remember that while the Cubans were in no position to 
drive from their strongholds the Spaniards who held the ports 
and garrisoned the large towns, they could practically hold and 
control the rural districts. It was equally true that the 
Spaniards could not subjugate, except by vastly superior num- 
bers, tlie numerous battalions of Cubans who were scattered 
about in the country, where the people generally sympathized 
with the insurrection. But while the Cubans could subsist 
easily upon the country itself, the Spaniards always required 
money. 

Having issued this order and another to the insurgent 
troops to destroy all railroad and telegraph lines possible, 
Gomez proceeded to ride over the country surrounding the 
city of Puerto Principe. AVlienever he found his position 
inferior or met a force too great for him to attack with safety, 
he contented himself with an ambush and a rapid retreat, 
which the Spanish news headquarters at once construed into a 
rebel rout, although the unmistakable fact was that the insur- 
gents were constantly growing in numbers and were pushing 
their campaign further and further westward. By summer 
the insurrection had taken sha])o in the three great provinces 
of the east, and the time had come for the supreme effort to 
be made by the insurgent leaders. 

Campos had meantime left Santiago de Cuba, where the 
uprising had become general, and was being vigorously pushed 
by IMaceo and other insurgent leaders, and hurried back to 
Santa Clara province to prevent Gomez from passing beyond 
the Jucaro trocha, which strctclies for fifty miles across the 
western portion of Puerto Principe. The forces he had relied 
upon to prevent the westward march of Gomez had proved en- 
tirely inadequate for the sharp tactics of the veteran Cuban, 
and, besides, daring bands of insurgents were by this time 
roving over the districts of Santa Clara. 

It was at this point that Gomez announced his intention of 
marching through Santa Clara into Matanzas and on to 



ORGANIZATION OF THE REPUBLIC 147 

ITavaiui. 'lliis innvciiu'iit must be regankMl as the most re- 
markable of any during the war. 

By the beginning- of tlie dry season Gomez had practically 
perfected all his ]ilans and had ordered JVlaceo, with about 
4,000 men, mostly infantry, to follow up and join him near the 
trocha. Fni'llici' westward, (ienerals Uololf, Sanchez, Perez, 
and L:!('rct were waiting under orders for the advance of the 
( '(ininiandi'i'-in-( liief. (!onie/ estal)lished liis liead(inai-ters at 
.limagnaya, in tlu^ ])rovince of Puerto Principe. Near tlie 
town is an immense prairie or savanna, difficult of approach, 
and it was upon this plan that it was decided to accomplish the 
formal organization of the rc^public and the concentration of 
its military forces. The call for a meeting of re})resentatives 
of the Cnban people to form a permanent civil government 
had been issued by jMarti as soon as he read km 1 the island, but 
his death and the exigencies of the campaign had rendered it 
inadvisable to comply with the call till this time. 

Seldom has a republic been set up under more j)ictures(iue 
circumstances than attended the establishment of the Repub- 
lic of Cuba on the l-'5th of Septendier, 1805. On that broad 
savanna gathered the men who w(>re to stand in the same rela- 
tion to the young re])ublic as the fathers of the Constitution of 
the United States stood to onr people. 

On the 18th the assembly proceeded to tlie election of the 
officers of the government council, eatdi i-epveseiitative de]iosit- 
ing his ballot in an nin ]ihiee(l on the chaii'inan's tabh'. The 
voting resulted in the election of the foHowing: 

Prcsifhnf. — Salvador Cisneros Betancourf, wlio liad lulil tlio same 
position iu the foniur rcvolutionarj' irovcriinient. 

Vice-Preiddent. — Bartolome Maso, a pioniinent citizen of ^tanzanillo. 

Secretary of State for Foreign Ajf'airs. — Raiiliael Portnondo y Tain- 
ayo, a member of a wealtliy and distinirnislied family of tlie province of 
Santiago dc Cuba. 

Secretary of War. — Carlo.s liololT of Santa Clara, a native of Poland, 
who had borne a consjueuous i>art in tlie former revolution. 

Secretary of the Treasury. — Severo Pino, of an old and wealthy family 
of St. Spiritus. 

Secretary of till Tntirior. — Dr. Santiago Garcia Cani/ares 
10 



148 A MASTER OF STRATEGY 

Civil formalities having been completed and the govern- 
ment having eonclnded a grand review of the forces which 
were to march to Havana, Gomez proceeded with his plans for 
marching to Havana. Maceo was bringing his forces np from 
the east with little difhcnlty, thongh he was compelled to tight 
some of the way. In point of strategy there have been few 
events in recent warfare to eqnal the remarkable character of 
the undertaking Gomez had in mind. For it is to Gomez 
alone, it has been said, that the honor of devising the move- 
ment is due. In carrying it ont he accomplished feats worthy 
of the most conspicnons of the w^orld's reno\vned generals, and 
he exhibited (jnalities placing him among the first of Ameri- 
can commanders. That part of the Spanish army which was 
between Havana and Gomez must have nnmbered at least 
50,000 w^ell-armed men. It was against this defending force, 
vastly superior in numbers and equipment, that the insurgents 
were about to measure their strength. 

From the outset, Gomez divided his troops into three 
columns, one commanded by Antonio Maceo, about 8,000 
strong; another under the command of Suarez and Lacret, 
numbering 2,000 men, and the principal corps, numbering 
about 0,000 men, under his own personal direction. A column 
of 1,000 men under the command of Francisco Perez formed 
the advance guard. In all, therefore, there were 12,000 men. 
Fhis was the effective army with which Gomez began his 
march upon Havana, but it should be borne in mind that it 
was only the nucleus, for as the insurgents marched along they 
were joined by all the Cubans who daily embraced the cause, 
of liberty. 

After Gomez had unfolded his plan and explained to his 
lieutenants all that he hoped, he told them that all their efforts 
were to be directed towards one object, to reach Havana. He 
insisted that it was not a question of killing Spanish soldiers, 
but of arriving before Havana. He expected them by a 
march — strategic if need be — and as rapid as possible, to 
succeed in reaching the goal, and they were to foil the enemy 



ON TO HAVANA ! 14'J 

as often as possible, and in any way, whether by a false attack 
or by an absolute avoidance of a meeting. His final instruc- 
tions were : " In the event of a forced battle, overthrow 
them; pass over them — and on to Havana ! " 

However inferior the Spaniards of the royal army may 
have been in point of enthusiasm, there could have been no 
doubt lliat they were capal)l(' of dcf"c;itini^' in open battle the 
undisciplined ai'niy of insurgents who were homogeneous in 
nothing but their love for Cuba and tlunr luitred of Spain. 
1 hit there was no reason to fear that the army of Gomez would 
be forced into battle, for in order to bring about such a result 
it would have been necessary to surround the insurgent army 
to bring it to a halt and then attempt to destroy it in a close 
conflict. 

AVliile the Spaniards marched in columns relatively large, 
from 1,000 to 1,500 men, who could move but slowly, bur- 
dened as they were with a certain amount of luggage and the 
usual military impedimenta, the Cubans had divided their 
army eoi'i>s into detachments of from 200 to 300 soldiers, well- 
e(piij)ped and carrying an adequate supply of ammunition, 
soldiers familiar Avith the country, with no useless baggage to 
transport, and accustomed to such nourisliment as they could 
gather from the trees, the plants, and other products of the 
ground over which they inarched. Tliesc small detachments 
of natives, thoroughly hal)ituate<l to a climate which is barely 
sup[)orta])]e to others, slipped between the meslies of the net 
whicli Camjios essayed in vain to stretch out, and as tliey 
marclied with a very small convoy they cared very little if they 
left behind them an enemy who with his best efforts could not 
liave hindered them from returning to their point of departure 
should such a movement become necessary. 

It may be ihouglit tliat it would have l>cen a rati<uial way 
of circumventing the Cubans for the S]>aniards to have fol- 
lowed the tactics of Gomez and divided their columns into 
small bodies calculated to compete with the rebel troops in 
rapidity of mobilization, Imt the Spanish officers had a distinct 



150 SOME ADVANTAGES OF THE CUBANS 

disinclination to attack the Cubans except with a very superior 
force. Moreover, the Spanish soldiers were much embar- 
rassed by the natural difhculties of tlie country, and their lack 
of familiarity with these difficulties, and with the country 
itself. They dared not leave their positions without the guid- 
ance of some one born in the country, and the recruiting of 
these guides became a serious problem. Each day it became 
more difficult, for the natives feared the insurgents and were 
haunted by visions of the reprisals which they feared miglit 
follow any great victory obtained by Gomez, as the insurgents 
had declared that any Cul)an fonnd l>y them serving in the 
ranks of the Spanish army should be hanged. 

There existed another reason why tlie movement of the 
Cuban army was easier and less influenced by nervous dread. 
Every movement of the Culjans was calculated, and they 
began their march with a distinct end in A'iew, while the ob- 
ject of the Spanish movement was much more vague. To 
chase after the fleet-footed Cubans was far from easy. On 
the rare occasions when an insurgent column was engaged in a 
skirmish M'ith the Spaniards, the insurgents sent forth a few 
flying volleys and disappeared as if the earth had swallowed 
them. It seemed to be of no importance to them which direc- 
tion they took; they faced about in the v(>ry midst of a combat 
and fled in any direction, apparently without a plan. The 
Spaniard stood alone upon his ground and cried ^' Victory ! " 
This is the ex])lanation of the Spanish despatches to the jour- 
nals of that day. It was always the same story, reading some- 
thing like this : " After an insignificant discharge of mus- 
ketry, the Cnbans ran away." 

And yet the Cubans were every day marching nearer and 
nearer to Havana. While the Spaniards were winning their 
alleged victories, the Cubans were bringing the whole island 
into insurrection and making it well-nigh impossible for loyal 
planters to harvest a sugar crop. Some of the war correspond- 
ents, who had never seen a war before, complained that there 
was only a handful of insurgents here and there, and that 



SUBSISTING ON SUGAR CANE 151 

Gomez would not light. Tliey missed entirely the stratagem 
which he was carrying out with the most consummate skill. 

AVhether these tactics are called Cuban retreats or Spanish 
victories, it cannot be denied that they gave to the insurgents 
an advantage far exceeding victories which fall on more im- 
portant cond)ats. At times the royal troops endeavored to 
(Mpial their adversaries in rapidity of uiovement, but it was like 
a race between day and night. As one observer expressed it : 
" The ]iassage of the rebels resembled the trail of liop o' my 
Thumb, ('xc(']>f that in the place of crund)s and pebbles the 
Cuban Hop o' my Thumbs left along their trail the bodies of 
their foundered horses, the chewed remains of sugar cane and 
bananas, and the empty cans of preserves which had been de- 
\<iui'('d as soon as ])i1f('i'c(l, for the insurgents lunched as they 
tied. There were whole days togetlun- when their only food 
was sugar cane; and this simple nourishment sufhced to sus- 
tain the strength of these robust men who were inured to all 
suffering, who went into a skirmish as children go to play, and 
whose chief advantage was that there was no climatic danger 
for them in an atmosphere that is fatal to their enemies." 
Under such circumstances the march from Gomez's point of 
concentration was made. The 8])aniards were incapable of 
parallel efforts and such a mode of living, and they lost more 
than an hour each day in making the soup for their meals. 

Two weeks iifter (loiiiez liegan his luarcli lie was before 
the Jucaro ti-ocha on which ('amj)os was relying to keep the 
enemy within the eastern provinces. This military defense, 
which had b(>en constructed during the former war, he had, in 
anticipation of the movement, strengthened and reinforced 
along its entire length. Those who have not seen these lines 
of defense have an inadequate idea of what they consist, and 
as similar lines wovo built Inter in the western section of the 
island, a descrijition of the Jucaro trocha will serve for all. Tt 
stretched froui Jucaro on the south const of the province of 
Puerto Priiiciiio to ^Foron on the north, a distance of about 
fiftv miles. The conntrv on each side of it was covered bv a 



152 THE FIFTY-MILE TROCHA 

thick jungle of woods. The troeha consisted primarily of a 
cleared space tlirough this jungle from 100 to 200 yards wide, 
and the trees, cut down to clear a way, were piled up on each 
side, thus forming a sort of barrier of tree trunks and their 
branches, averaging perhaps six feet high and fifty feet wide. 
These alone would seem to an observer sufficient to prevent the 
passage of any army, especially if the barricades were guarded, 
but the Spanish found that such a device would not even pre- 
vent the passing of Cuban cavalry. The space between the 
lines of fallen trees ^\'as given np to a military road and forts 
and a maze of barbed wire. 1'he wire was strung back and 
forth from three rows of poles, about five feet high, 450 yards 
of wire being used to every twelve yards of posts. At inter- 
vals of every half mile along this roadway were the larger forts 
made of stone and adobe and painted white. Midway between 
the larger forts were placed blockhouses of two stories, the 
upper being of wood. Between each of the larger forts and 
the blockhonses, or within the short distance of a quarter of a 
mile, were placed three small forts of mud and planks sur- 
rounded by a ditch. They were capable of holding five men 
and were within hailing distance of each other, or about 150 
yards. 

Maceo had not yet brought up his division, and while wait- 
ing for him Gomez thought he would ascertain what he conld 
do with the troeha, and, if possible, discover the condition of 
things on the other side. So, leaving the main body of his 
army, with a few hundred men he began to manoeuvre before 
the troeha and finally succeeded in working a small force 
through on the southern end. He immediately fell upon the 
little town of Pelayo, and ca]itured the forts which guarded it, 
together with the entire garrison and a large amount of arms 
and anununition. He then moved cautiously northward 
through the woods into the district of Remedios, then suddenly 
westward toward the troeha. The Spaniards appear to have 
been closely watching the southern end, believing that Go- 
mez's remaining force would try to eifect a passage there. In 



CLEVER RUSE OF MACEO AND ClOMEZ 153 

consequence, Gomez found the northern part weakly defended, 
or at least he succeeded in re-crossing it, and was soon joined 
by Maceo, who by this time had brought up his army, having 
marched across the whole of Puerto rriiici|)c (iroviiicc, chiding 
four Spanish coluiuns \vl:icli had been sent against him. 
Maceo's forces were therefore in front of the ti-oclia some little 
distance to the north of where Gomez's main division was wait- 
ing to cross. Tt might seem that when ihey were in this posi- 
tion it would have been easy for the S[)aniards whom Maceo 
had left in the rear to have closed in and caught the Cubans 
between the trocha and themselves, but the country is a diffi- 
cult one for the moving of disciplined troops, and, moreover, 
the Spanish officers were never quite sure where the enemy 
was and seemed to content themselves with trusting in luck to 
come upon him in a favorable location. Gome/ understood 
tlieir position |)erfectly. 

He ordered ]\Iaceo to make a feint of attack u[)()n the 
nortliern ]ioi'tion of the trocha. Maceo accordingly sent a few 
soldiers to the front of the entrenchment of the royal army, 
and the Spaniards, thinking that the advance guard of the 
(^ubans had opened an attack and proposed to cross the trocha 
to the north, passed the word down the ti^xdia, and innnedi- 
ately the Spanish rushed en nia.s.se toward the nmlh, h'aving 
the southern ]K)rtion, before which (bmiez was conceak'd, un- 
protected. This was exactly what (ionic/, had counted ii])()n, 
and lie foi-tliwith ci'ussr'd the barricade without striking a blow, 
except to clear away trees and Dthcr obstatdes. His i)assage 
seems to have hocu unsusiiecte(j by the Spaiiisli engaged in 
lidldinii' b;i(d\ Maceo, who hail iio inteiitiou id" crossing there 
or then. Finally, when he had lieard that Gomez was safely 
over, Maceo beat a retreat, the Spaniards thinking they had 
won a victory. 

^laceo li;id a]t|tarently dis;i|i|ieare(l towards the north, and 
the enemy naturally kept their attention turned in that direc- 
tion; but as soon !is the shrewd ( ulian leader was out of sight 
he faced southward and hurried his men to the point where 



154 PLAYING HIDE-AND-SEEK WITH CAMPOS 

Gomez had jnst taken his men through, followed in his tracks 
without ditticult}', and before the Spaniards realized what had 
happened the entire Cuban army were marching into Santa 
Clara province. 

Campos at Santa Clara saw that he had been outflanked 
by the clever ruse of the Cubans before the trocha and that he 
was now in a measure surrounded. So when he heard that 
Gomez Avas threatening C*ienfuegos he made a precipitate 
march to that place, intrenching himself and assuming direct 
command of his troops. He also dispatched a large number 
of troops to form a line between Cienfuegos and Las Cruces 
to imi)ede the westward n^iarch of the (hd)ans. Meanwhile, 
Gomez had not forgotten one of the main ])urposes of his cam- 
paign, which was to prevent the grinding of sugar cane so that 
Spain would lose her revenue and the Cuban w(irkiiien, left 
with nothing better to do, would take up arms. Shortly after 
crossing the trocha, therefore, he issuetl a peremptory order 
for the destruction of sugar plantations and railroad communi- 
cation. 

I'he insurgents continued their evasive movements with 
great skill. They advanced until in their devious ways tluy 
reached the boundary of Matanzas. (^an)})os Avas again out- 
flanked; he drcAV back and established his hcadipiarters at 
Colon, twenty miles over the border of ]\Iatanzas. Here, 
while Campos was planning to concentrate his forces, surround 
Gomez and force him into open l>attle with a vastly superior 
Spanish force, Gomez foiled him by radiating his troops. By 
the time Campos was ready to concentrate his forces, therefore, 
there was nothing except one of these various " will-o'-the- 
wisp " divisions to concentrate upon. 

He liad hopes that the Spanish forces in Gomez's rear 
would be able to co-operate with him, Imt every means of com- 
munication by railroad, telegraph, or telephone had been com- 
pletely destroyed by the insurgents in their progress. Under 
other circumstances it is doubtful if the complicated strategy 
he contemplated would have been practicable owing to the 



APPPYING THE TORCH 155 

iiatiiriil eoiulitions of the country, for sucli a move, even in 
European countries, -would liave reiiuired the co-operation of 
officers -who were familiar with the ground over which they 
were to deploy, and the ofhccrs u[)on whom Campos depended 
were unaccustomed to Cuba. Campos, however, agreed with 
his generals — Garcia, Xavarro, and Valdes — on the point 
of conccnitration, where they were to meet on a day appointed 
and were to drive the enemy before them. At that place and 
at that appointed time the great battle should be fought. To 
draw the insurgents into his proposed trap, Campos ordered his 
pickets to return the fire of the insurgents in a feeble manner, 
while ^faceu, wlio, like Cami)os, was h()})ing to deceive the 
enemy so as to leave the divisions to the north and south un- 
obstructed, had given a like order to his men. This engage- 
ment, therefore, amounted to but little. Suddenly the cane- 
brake which surrounded the Spanish camj) burst into flames 
and towards the west there appeared a great blazing plain. 
Campos understood at once that he had been foiled. It was 
not long before the llaiiies threatened to lick the feet of his 
frenzied horses, lie gave the orders to break the camp at 
once and looked about for his lieutenants. They were not to 
be found ; they had l)een unable to concentrate. Campos alone 
had come to the rendezvous! 

Such, in brief, was the battle of C^oliseo in December, 
1895, which was so construed by the press censors as to occa- 
sion nuK-li rejoicing at Havana, for they thought the rebels 
had been iiid ;mi(I cheeked. In reality, however, a few insur- 
gents had phiycd their games with (leneral Campos; a detach- 
ment of ( 'nban cavalry, conunanded by ^Nfaceo, had made an 
exasperating charge on the S]»anisli jtickets, a fire had hi-oken 
out in the cane-brakes, and the Cubans had marched into 
]\ratanzas province. 

Campos drcM' back to Jovellanos, towards which C.omez 
advanced, bni-ning the sngar ])lantalions on the way. AVith 
calls for the protection of the sugar plantations in both Santa 
Clara and ;\ratanzas to attend to, the cities of Santa Clara, 



156 ALL CUBA IN A STATE OF SIEGE 

Cienfuegos, Colon, and Cardenas threatened, Campos drew 
back to Limonar, and Gomez advanced to Jovellanos, which 
commanded the raih-oad lines of Cardenas, Matanzas, and 
Havana. These lines he destroyed, while the smoke of the 
sugar plantations never ceased to darken the sky. AVith all 
communication with the east, except by water, cut off, Campos 
moved back to Matanzas and hurriedly sent orders for the con- 
centration of as many troops as possible, sending even to the 
province of Santiago de C^iba for as many troops as could be 
spared from there. Then he fell back to Havana and the in- 
surgents, without serious obstacle, continued their destructive 
march towards the west, while Campos waited for rein- 
forcements and set about actively to fortify the land ap- 
proaches of the capital city. He also hurried as many troops 
as he could spare to the neighborhood of Batabano, directly 
across the island from Havana, withdrawing even a large num- 
ber of marines from the fleets for shore duty, for by this time 
the insurgents were threatening to break the line and penetrate 
into Pinar del Tiio. So grave was the situation that martial 
law was declared in both the provinces of Havana and Pinar 
del Pio. Thus by the end of 1895 the whole island from 
Point Maysi to Cape Antonio was declared to be in a state of 
siege. 

As ah-eady explained, it was not the intention of General 
Gomez in carrying out this winter campaign to lay siege to 
Havana. That Avould have done little good, even supposing 
his troops could have held their place before tlie gates, for, 
while the bay w^as open, supplies or reinforcements could liave 
been easily brought in. Gomez's two great objects were to 
prevent the griuding and export oi sugar and the consequent 
flow of treasure into the Spanish coffers, and to infuse the 
Cubans everywhere with courage to take the field, with the 
belief that he could control the provinces and enforce his 
orders. While the westward march of the main body of the 
troops was being carried on, the forces of the other Cuban 
army corps succeeded in carrying out the orders concerning 



THE WINTER CAMPAIGN 157 

sugar cane and tlic dostruction of Spniiisli lines of coninnmica- 
tion. Sonic artillery had boon introduoed into the ('id)an 
army, and with thiri small garrisons were more easily attaeked. 
Moreover, the insurgents, in spite of the Spanish patrol of the 
coast, managed to preserve communication between the in- 
terior and certain points on the coast, where, from time to time, 
supplies were received and carried iidand. 

The insurgents in the east were under the command of 
General Jose jMaceo, Antonio's brother, and they were passing 
their lives in comparative quiet in their various camps. 
Nearly all martial ctTorts \ver(» confined to the surroundings of 
Havana, when^ (lomez was in charge, and the insurgents of 
Santiago de Cuba were rarely troubled with the unimportant 
sorties of the Spaniards. They pitched their camps wherever 
they could find a comfortable place, the officers usually taking 
possession of some old building or shed, while the men brought 
in palm leaves and constructed primitive shelters. They 
usually ])osted pickets on all the roads, and made themselves 
comfortable. Frequently, camps were placed near some 
planter, who deemed it wise to show his sympathy for the in- 
surgents whether he really wished to or not. 



CHAPTER XIII 

THE ADVENT OF WEYLER, KNOWN AS "THE SPANISH 
BUTCHER" — HIS CRUELTY AND BARBARITY — THE FA- 
MOUS 1-5,000,000 TROCIIA — DARING EXPLOITS OF MACEO. 

Campos Co'clly Received at Havana — Spaniards Clamor for Sterner Metli- 
ods — Campos Consults the Leaders — His Resignation — Weyler's 
Arrival — His Infamous Reputation — Commissioned Because of It — 
Progress of Gomez and Maceo — Weyler's Immense Forces — Largest 
Military Expedition Ever Transported by Sea — Strength of the Insur- 
gents — Object of Their Campaign — Wejder's Boastful Proclamations 
— Civilized War Abandoned — Weyler's Ineffective Military Opera- 
tions — His Big Fence — Maceo Crosses and Recrosses It Easily — 
Cuba "Pacified" — Maceo Appears Where Least Expected — Maceo 
Surprised — Turning Defeat into Victory — Battles and Skirmishes — 
Death of Maceo's Brother Jose. 

WPIEX General Carnpos, having fallen back from one 
stronghold to another, finally made his stand in 
Havana, he was very coldly received h\ the people, 
who considered him gnilty of cnlpable negligence and care- 
lessness. It was one of the absnrditics of the sitnation that 
Spain was continnally characterizing the rebellion as only the 
ontbreak of a lot of ignorant negroes, and insisting that a state 
of war did not actnally exist npon the island. Spanish pride 
bled at the thonght that at any moment a horde of rebels might 
pour trinmphantly into the streets of Havana. Pnblic emo- 
tion ran high. Since the battle of Coliseo hnndreds of fami- 
lies had taken refnge within the walls of the capital, deserting 
the rural districts and even the villages. The highways and 
byways were cnmbered with people distracted with fear and 
bringing in whatever they conld carry or transport of tlieir 
nsefnl and precions possessions. Household goods and ob- 
jects of valne were piled together in confnsion. 

(158) 




l:..\U.Ni..N 1 .-^I'A.M.^ll Ll',AUl',K.1 1 A IJLK W A Iv. Willi Sl'AlX. 

Admiral Cervera. Prime Minister Sagasta. 

General Weyler. General Blanco. 



CAMPOS RESIGNS HIS COMMAND 161 

The Spaniards of Havana were luuiglity and unrelenting, 
and from the beginning of the insurreetion had chunored for 
re\-enge witliont mercy. Their aim was to restore the system 
of rc|)ris;ils which had pilcMl up hccatonilis of helpless Cubans 
during the former war; s^ueh a system of revenge as had dis- 
tinguished with an unenviable eelebrity some of the Captain- 
(Jeuerals of the preeecliug insurrection, like Halniaeeda and 
such subordinate ofhcers as Weyler. These fanatics, furious 
and trembling with fear, demanded of the marshal some cogent 
reason for his repeated defeats. They made serious threats, 
but the welbkiiown energy of (*ani])os held tluMU in check; 
they darnl not make any open attack on his })erson. 

('uuf'runted by the disfavor of the po[)idace, Campos met 
the leaders of the three parties in an interview having for its 
object tlie adjustment of the existing conditions. He asked 
what measures they could ])ropose and what they would advise. 
The Conservatives clamored for vigorous reprisals; the Re- 
formists dared not ex[)ress an oj)inion. The Autonomists 
timidly assured their leader of their snj)port. In the face of 
such divergence of opinion, practically deprived of the assist- 
ance of the governmental parties, Campos thought it but right 
that he should resign his command. 

Campos sailed for Spain on the 17th of January, 189G, his 
office being temj)orarily left in the hands of General Sabas 
^larin, who, on the 10th of February, was succeeded by Gen- 
eral Valeriano Weyler y Xicolau, Marquis of Teneriffe, bet- 
ter known and hated by the world at large as " Weyler." 
This general arrived preceded by a reputation for excessive 
severity and cruelty, lie Avas accused of having committed 
the most atrocious crimes during the former war. The insur- 
gent leaders were inclined to welcome his appointment, for 
they knew his disposition and counted njion the probability 
that his acts would quickly arouse sympathy for th(> strugoling 
Cubans in the T'^nited States and elsewhere, and eventually 
secure for them ihat recognitiou which they so much desired, 
and which their representatives in the United States were so 



162 ARRIVAL OF THE BLOOD-THIRSTY WEYLER 

industriously seeking. Moreover, tliey said that his military 
talents were not brilliant, in ability not to be compared with 
Campos, and his appointment to the office at such a crisis in 
Cuba could be but for one purpose, of returning to a system of 
severe reprisals. Undoul:>tedly, the Spanish government had 
been moved by a certain stress of public opinion to appoint 
him, for the impression then was that the failures of General 
Campos were due to a too lenient treatment, not simply of 
Cubans in the field but of CUibans apparently peaceful. 
Chiefly l^ecause of his reputation for severity in the former 
war, the Conservatives in Havana demanded him. He secured 
the important mission, indeed, mainly because as a man he 
lacked the high qualities possessed by Campos. It was pre- 
tended, however, that he had been especially instructed to 
moderate his ardor, a pretence doubtless suggested by the fear 
of possible complications with the United States. 

The Cuban question had already been taken up by the 
United States Senate, and considerable excitement prevailed 
in IvTew York as well as elsewhere in the country when the 
news of \\"eyler's appointment was received. The fear that 
the United States might recognize the belligerency of the 
Cubans hung like the sword of Damocles over the head of the 
Spanish Ministry, and while it was compelled to heed the 
clamors of the Conservatives in Havana and Madrid, it osten- 
tatiously used every means calculated to avoid a declaration by 
this country which might double the force of the revolution. 

Meanwhile, Gomez and Maeeo had pushed through Mad- 
ruga, ]S[euva-Paz, and Giiines. "When they reached the im- 
portant railway line which unites Batabano to Havana, they 
destroyed it at several points, as also the telegraph lines. 
Having done this, the two chiefs separated; Gomez to go 
towards Havana, and jMaceo to continue his march westward 
to bring the province of Pinar del Tiio into the insurrection. 

General Weyler brought over with him large reinforce- 
ments, and he must have begun his work for the pacification 
of the island with a force of about 140,000 men. According 



weyler's immense military force 103 

to the ofHc'ial ligiircs given out at Madrid, there liad l)een at 
the outbreak of the insurrection 20,000 men for fiehl work in 
the island. From that time to tlie 10th of March, 1890, there 
were sent over nine successive bodies of reinforcements aggre- 
gating a little more than 120,000 men. 

It has been said tliat this made the largest militarv force 
ever transj-jorted by sea, and if it is added to the original per- 
manent force, not counting the Volnnteers in city garrisons, 
it makes ;iii nriiiy of over 1 lO.OOO, of which Weyler took com- 
mand in an island no largei' than Pennsylvania, ^'ct the 
Spanish government maintained that this was not a war! 

The insurgents starting in February as only a handful of 
men ill tlie |)rovince of Santiago de (\d)a, in December con- 
sisted of about 50,000 men, not over half of whom were fully 
armed and e(pii])ped; the rest carried miscellaneous weapons. 
This army was divided into five corps, two in Santiago, one in 
Puerto Principe, and two in Matanzas and Santa C^lara. 
Tlu^se corps were subdivided into brigades and divisions, scat- 
tered here and there all over the island. 

'idiis was the force that (leneral AVeyler with about four 
times as many armed men at his conunand was to crush. So 
far as the insurgents were concerned, their great object had 
been nearly accomplished; they liad spread the insurrection all 
over (^d)a, aii<l all tliat veiiiaiiie<l for tliem was t<) Imld the 
island till Spain went into bankruptcy or some one should in- 
terfere, riiere was no more thought of taking Havana than 
there was of taking Madrid. Their work was simi)ly to 
harass the Spanish at every opportunity and at every point, to 
ca]Uure their anus and to cut off all su])]dies autl all revenue 
from the island. 

Fpou liis arrival at ITaxaua, CJeueral "Weyler, much to the 
delight of the uncompromising Spaniards, issued several boast- 
ful ])rof'lamations announcing that the war should be con- 
ducted in the shar]>est manner. One of his proclamations 
comiuaiidcMl tlie dilTereut iiiuiiicipal guveruuieuts to send him 
lists of all jiersons in any way ideiitilieil wiih the insurrection, 



164 THE BUTCHER BEGINS HIS AWFUL WORK 

and announcing that all wlio did not surrender would be 
severely punished. It Avas generally understood that no quar- 
ter would be given. The first results of his efforts to find those 
likely to be identified with the insurgents was to bring under 
suspicion many people who had taken no part in the uprising, 
many mothers who perhaps had sons in the insurgent ranks, or 
])eaceful (hibans v.-ho were known to have taken part in the 
Ten-Years War. No leniency was to be shown to Cuban 
prisoners of war. Chiban hosi)itals were to l»e ruthlessly de- 
stroyed and all found in them put to death. It was no longer 
to be civilized war. The brutality of the tierce Si^anish gueril- 
leros was not to be restrained by any humanitarian considera- 
tions so foreign to their nature. The shooting in cold blood of 
luckless young (^ubans became a regular early morning scene 
about the Spanish garrisons, and many were the examples of 
Cuban heroism all unknown to the world except to the soldiers 
who delighted in this wanton cruelty. 

AVeyler's military achievements were chiefly conspicuous 
for their ineffectiveness. AVith Gomez and Maceo both in 
the regions of Havana when he ])oastfully took command, in- 
stead of throwing his vastly superior forces upon the insur- 
gents, he ado])ted the expedient, always popular with Spanish 
commanders in Cuba, of building a fence. Ilis idea was to 
prevent ]\raceo from getting into Pinar del I\io, or, if he should 
get in, to keep him there while he sent his columns against 
him. 'The boundary line between the provinces of Havana 
and Pinar del Pio lies close to the narrowest part of the island. 
At this narrowest ]^art, l»etween Artemisa and the Pay of 
IMajara, Weyler, therefore, constructed another trocha about 
twenty-five miles lone:, t^nd lying about forty miles west of 
Havana. This pretentious device was constructed in a ccnni- 
try quite thickly settled, and therefore (piite dissimilar from 
the jungle through which the Jucaro trocha was built. It 
differed also in character. A road wide enough to ]>ermit 
the cavalry to pass couif(n-tably was b(»r(lered on each side by a 
ditch, three yards wide and three yards deep, in the lower 



A FIVE MILLION DOLLAR FENCE 1 65 

places filled with water. Aloiio- tliesc trenches was stretched 
barbed wire — imported from the United States, of course. 
As the island was not admitted to be in a state of war, nothing 
was contraband so far as tlie Spanish were concerned, but 
everything was so far as the Cubans A\'ere concerned. Beyond 
the ditches and the wire fence, which it was supposed would 
offer some obstacles to cavalry, were due; ritic ])its twenty feet 
apart, and at intervals of about 100 yards were l)uilt "' forts," 
so calh^d, whose walls were formed by partitions of thick 
planks, a yard apart, the intervening space being filled with 
sand. At night this inrtiticd line was lighted by electi'icity and 
the forts were connected by telephone wires. Twelve thou- 
sand men were concentrated on this elaborate highway, making 
it a permanent post, and 0,000 were placed toward Pinar del 
Eio and G,000 more towards Havana to hold themselves in 
readiness to reinforce the troops on guard in case of an attack. 
This great military work is supposed to have cost nearly 
$5,000,000. It was to aid in pacifying " a few 1)andits." 

But in spite of General AVeyler's precautions, in the latter 
part of February !Maceo led his forces across the incompleted 
troclia, and then recrossed to assist Gomez to carry the 
wounded out of reach of danger. Then he went on an ex- 
pedition t(^wards Matanzas, and Weyler aiuiounced in one of 
his glib ])rochnnations that the provinces of Havana and Binar 
del Kio were inicitied and free from any large body of insur- 
gents, whom lie classed as outlaws to be dealt with by the 
mounted police. Both Maceo and Gomez were represented 
as fleeing towards the east before the victorious Spaniards. 
Ihit Maceo escaped easily fi'oni the combinntion which had 
been planned 1)V AVtnder, and at the hea<l of a large force, 
by (pu'ck marches through the swamps skirting the southern 
coast, once more apjtearetl wheiv he was len^t expecteil, de- 
terniiiied to Innnble Weyler an<l I'eturn iigain to Binar del 
Bio. On the llth of Miirch he suddenly atta<d<ed the city 
of I>;it;di;ino, jiiilae'ed it, ;im<1 Imnicd a part of it. On the 
1-llh he ci'osse<l the troclia ag;iin. and two days later fought 
11 



166 THE LAST OP THE MACEOS 

a fierce battle with the Spaniards in which he captured arms 
and ammunition, hut the resistance was so spirited that 
Maceo's force was for a time divided. 

Typical skirmishes and battles were taking place all over 
Cuba during the whole of the year 1890. Their description 
would be tedious and unnecessary, for they were much alike. 
They were nearly always reported as Spanish victories, though 
the insurgents roamed at Avill over every part of the island. 
Gomez had but one purpose — to wear out the Spanish. In 
July, General Jose Maceo was killed in a hard engagement in 
which his small army beat off the Spanish. Of the Maceo 
family none were left but Antonio. All had been sacrificed 
to Cuba Libre. 



CHAPTEE XIV 

DIPLOMATIC TROUBLES BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES 
AND 8PAIN — THE SANGUILY CASE — CAPTURE OF THE 
COMPETITOR. 

A Now Insiinuction Proclaimed — Diplomatic Friction — The Allianca 
AlTair — Rights of Aniericau Citizens Ignored — Sanguily and Aguirre 
Arrested — A Sharp Interview — Tin-eateniug to Shoot American Citi- 
zens— The Consul's Strong Reply — Release of Aguirre — Sanguily 
Sentenced to Imprisonment for Life — His Lawyer Arrested and Placed 
in the same Jail — Spain's Protests and Complaints — American Sym- 
pathy with the Cubans — Palma Appeals for Recognition of the Cuban 
Republic — U. S. Senate Favors Recoguiti(m of Belligerency — Indig- 
nation of the Spanish Populace — The Belligerency Question — Op- 
posed by the Administration — The Capture of the Competitor — Penalty 
of Death — Cares Transferred to the Madrid Court. 

IF the })co|)le of the Thiited States had felt upon the point 
of interfering in Cuban affairs during the Ten- Years 
War, the lovers of peace had abundant reasons for mis- 
givings when the Cubans proclaimed a ncAV insurrection in 
Febnuiry, 1895. Cuba had become more closely identified 
witli this country commerciall}'; Americans controlU'tl large 
jiropcrty interests there and thousands of Cubans had mean- 
while become citizens of the United States. While the far- 
sighted deemed it inevitable that this govenuneut woidd in 
time be brought into the conflict, there were few manifesta- 
tions of concern at first, and conservative opinion all over tbe 
country was strongly set against any ste|>s which should give 
Spain offense. But with a diplomacy such as Spain prac- 
ticed, and methods of warfare such as she adhered to, it was 
absolutely impossible for a self-respecting nation to remain 
thoroughly cordial, and the diplomatic friction began almost 
immediately after the standard of revolt was raised. 

(167) 



168 AN AMERICAN STEAMER FIRED UPON 

The revolution was hardly two weeks old when a Spanish 
gunboat off Cape ]\raysi fired upon and chased an American 
steamer, the AUianca, which was engaged in regular traffic 
between New York and Colon. This act at once raised a 
flurry in the United States, whose people knew how prone 
Spain had been in the former war to interfere with American 
vessels, and it was feared that something like a Virginius af- 
fair might result. The government of the United States at 
once demanded an explanation of the conduct of the captain 
of the gunboat aud an apology. It should be remembered 
that no state of war existed affording any excuse for firing on 
American vessels. Spain at that time, engaged in putting 
down the outbreak of army officers in Madrid, knew well 
enough that if an outrage were committed on American com- 
merce tlie United States might step in and grant belligerent 
rights to the Cubans, and her ministers very quickly disavowed 
the act with full expressions of regret and assurance of a non- 
recurrence of such an event, while the offending officer was re- 
lieved of his command. 

But the State Department of the United States soon found 
that it had much more serious business on liand in protecting 
the rights of American citizens in Cuba. As already related, 
one of the first acts of the Captain-General at the outbreak of 
the rebellion was to place the western provinces under martial 
law, and on the day of the outbreak many arrests were made 
in the provinces of Havana and ]\tatanzas, the revolution in 
that quarter being for tlie time suppressed. Two of the per- 
sons arrested in Havana were Julio Sanguily and Jose 
Aguirre, both American citizens. The former had been a 
brave and efficient officer in tlie Ten-Years War, had been 
wounded seven times, and, whether the Spanish authorities had 
any evidence against him or not, they naturally assumed that 
his sympathies were with the insurgents, though since the war 
he had become an American citizen. On the morning of the 
24th of February, Sanguily Avas arrested at his house while 
taking a bath, a circmnstance which furnished no positive 



IMPRISONMENT OF SANGUILY AND AGUIRRE 1G9 

proof of his connection with the uprising of that clay. lie 
was thrown with others into Cabana fortress, and subjected 
at once to trial by court-martial in direct violation of the treaty 
between the United States and Spain of -lanuarv 12, 1877, 
which i)r()vidod that American citizens arrested without arms 
in hand should not be tried by any excoj^tional tribunal but 
by those of ordinary or civil jurisdiction. 

Our consul-general at Havana, Kamon O. AVilliams, went 
on the morning of the 2r)th to Captain-General Calleja and 
inform(>d him that both Sanguily and Aguirre were natural- 
ized citizens of the United States, and as such were (Inly in- 
scribed in the register of foreigners kept in the office of the 
'^btvernor-Ceneral. lie remonstrated against the commit- 
ment to court-martial and asked for their immediate transfer 
to the civil jurisdiction. The (\iptain-Ciencral pretended to 
be sur})rised that they were American citizens and instantly 
answered the consul in an outburst of most violent language 
and gesture, saying that it was a disgrace to the American flag 
for the goveniment of the Ignited States to protect these men, 
who, it was notoriously known, were conspirators against the 
government of Spain; and, growing more violent, he ex- 
claimed that iiKiiiy citizens of the United States were conspir- 
ing in Cuba against Spain, and that he would shoot every one 
of them caught in arms regardless of the consequences. 

"But, (Jeneral," intei-jiosed the consul calmly, " in carry- 
ing out such measures you will sui-ely obser\-e in all its parts 
the agreement between the two governments? " 

" Yes, in observance of the agreement," he said, somewhat 
more moderately. 

"Well, Oeneral, that i-^ all T have come to ask for, but 
these American citizens, instead of having been couimitted be- 
fore a civil court in observance of the agreement have been 
subjected to a trial by court-martial conti-ai-y to the agreement; 
for neither of them has been captured with arms in hand 
against the government, but both were arrested by the munici- 
pal police while peacefully deporting themselves in the city." 



170 TREAfY OBLIGATIONS EVaDED 

Calleja merely observed tliat the law governing tlie resi- 
dence of foreigners in the island was paramount to the treaty 
between the United States and Spain. The consul firmly re- 
plied that his government would not admit such a construction 
of it. Calleja said the prisoners might apply to his judge- 
advocate, who woidd see whether they were entitled to rights 
under the treat3^ As the judge-advocate was a creature of 
the Captain-General, he doubtless would have decided tliat 
the prisoners had no rights. Our consul firmly maintained 
that in deciding such a question no Spanish judge-advocate 
should supersede the diplomatic representative of the Uuited 
States, and that he should at once take steps to formally re- 
monstrate. Calleja again became excited. 

" Your defense of these men is a disgrace to the American 
flag! " he exclaimed. 

"General," replied the consul, "I am acting lentirely 
within the confines of my ofiicial duty and in accordance with 
tlie instructions of the Secretary of State of the United States, 
and in strict conformity with the agreement of the 12th of 
Jauimry, 1S77 "; and he then bade Calleja good morning and 
withdrew. The incident, which is thus related in the diplo- 
matic correspondence, serves to illustrate how lightly Spanish 
officials regarded treaty obligations, and shows also their feel- 
ing towards the United States. About a month later Sanguily 
was transferred to the civil jurisdiction, but he was almost im- 
mediately arrested upon another and a ridiculous charge, an(i 
submitted to a court-martial on that without any information 
being officially conveyed to the consul, who learned of it only 
through Sanguily's attorney in the other case. Another pro- 
test was made, and the Captain-General protondc^d to comply 
with the demand, but Sanguily was ke]it in military prison, 
and apparently it was to keep him there that the second charge 
was trumped up. 

Four months later the consul wrote to the State Depart- 
ment that the cases of both Sanguily and Aguirre presented 
the anomaly that, while arrested at the very outbreak of the re- 



LANGUISHING IN PRISON 171 

liclHon, tliey Lad not been broiiglit to trial, tliougli others ar- 
rested solely on suspicion were subjected to extreme arbi- 
trary measures. " They are discriminated against on account 
uf their ([uality of being American citizens," wrote the consul 
to the Secretary of State. In September, in vicnv of the delay, 
the State l)e])artment demanded the instant release of Saii- 
iiuily ami Agiiirre, and the latter was released, a promise being 
iii\ (11 that Sanguily would be tried soon. As a matter of fact, 
the authorities had no case against him. The courts in Decem- 
ber took up his ease, and, although the evidence adduced 
against him was of the llinisiest character, he was sentenced to 
iniprisuiiment for life. An appeal was taken to the Suj)reme 
Court of Justice at Madrid, which ordered a new trial. In the 
last days of December, 1S9G, nearly two years after his arrest, 
he was again tried and sentenced to [xTpetual iiiiprisoiuiieiit. 
IMcanwhile, his health had become broken in ])rison and he 
begged to be allowed to leave the island with his family. An- 
other ap})eal was taken and still he langnislied in prison. 
Meanwhile, the lawyer who defended him in the first trial, and 
who made a magnificent defense, was arrested and looked from 
the bars of a cell adjoining Sanguily's in Cabana fort, and the 
lawyer who managed his first appeal before the Madrid court 
was made to suffer so much in consecpuMice that it was difficult 
to find any one who would undertake his scn-ond a})peal there. 
As in the Ten-^'ears AVar, Spain was constantly making 
strong protests and bitter complaints against the alleged aid 
that the Cubans were receiving from sympathizers in the 
Fnited States. Our government did all it could. Proclama- 
tions were issued warning citizens, and instructing officials to 
renew their vigilance, and a largo expense, over $2,000,000, 
was incurred in keeping a fleet of cutters in southern waters to 
iiitei'cept expeditions, many times to the annoyance of those 
engaged in legitimate business. The Cuban expeditionists 
wore so sjmrp that they frequently escaped without being sus- 
]iected by the Siianish s]>ies or caught by the authorities. No 
government could lune done more to live up to its obligations. 



172 SYMPATHY FOR THE CUBANS 

Meantime, it was inevitable that the successes of a people strug- 
gling for their freedom from oppression should be welcome 
to the people of this country. When Oampos was driven into 
Bayamo, the adherents of the j)olicj of recognition gained evi- 
dent strength and Congress manifested a decided disposition to 
act. Public meetings were held in many cities and towns ex- 
pressing sympathy with the Cubans. These expressions were 
not dictated out of any hatred to Spain as a nation, but out of a 
natural dislike of her methods in Cuba. But the Spaniard 
could not bring himself to comprehend how the people of the 
United States coidd be actuated by a desire to see an op- 
prcsscd people free. To the S})anisli character such a senti- 
ment would be entirely inexplicable. They could hnd no 
other motive for our interest in Cuba except in a desire to pos- 
sess her by fair means or foul. They had not learned that the 
Civil War had greatly changed the sentiment of this country 
towards Culja. 

In the latter part of 18U5 the Senate Committee on Foreign 
Kelations took uj) the question of our attitude towards the new 
Cuban Ivepublic. Palma, the Cuban representative at Wash- 
ington, had made a strong appeal for recognition, and the 
claims of the Cubans were set forth in detail. By that time 
Gomez and Macco had made their remarkable march of in- 
vasion and were the masters of the rural districts and were 
overrnnniug TIavana province. Campos Avas about to be suc- 
ceeded by Weyler, whose unpleasant reputation gave addi- 
tional strength to the Cuban cause in this country. Even 
under Campos the people had been shocked by authentic ac- 
counts of the treatment of insurgent prisoners by the Sjian- 
iards, while the insurgents themselves treated the Sjianish 
prisoners in a manner approved by civilized warfare. Early 
in February the Senate committee reported a concurrent reso- 
lution to the effect that the war had reached a magnitude which 
concerned all civilized nations, and if it were to continue it 
should be conducted on both sides on principles acknowledged 
to be obligatory upon civilized nations, and that the President, 



CUBAN I!Ki.m(;erency recognized 173 

if he concurred in this opinion, sliould in u friendly spirit use 
the good ofKces of the oovernnient in requesting- Spain to ac- 
cord to the armies with which she was engaged the rights of 
belligerents. Ihit President Cleveland was evidently opi)Osed 
to interfering in Cuban affaii's, and it was said to be at the ad- 
ministration's instance that the resolution was made concur- 
rent instead of joint, the custom being not to send resolutions 
of the former haracter to the President. 

After a long debate the Senate passed by a vote of G4 to G 
a resolution favoring the recognition of Cuban belligerency, 
and inttrposing our friendly offices in behalf of Cuban in- 
de])end(mce. The House passed resolutions essentially the 
same by a vote of 263 to 16. This undoubtedly w'as a fair 
expression of the sentiment of the {x'ople of the United States. 
From this time f<u"th, therefore, only the delicate requirements 
of international law could prevent interference by this nation, 
and it became a question of time when diplomacy should give 
way to sentiment and action. 

The Spanish ]io])ulace was much wrought up over this ex- 
pression of o})inion; our legation at ]\[adrid had to be placed 
under guard, and at Barcelona our consular headquarters were 
attacked and the Stars and Stripes contemptuously treated. 
Spain hastened, however, to apologize and to offer reparation 
for those acts. She was frightened. But as these resolutions 
had no effect in shaping our active policy towards S]>aiu, we 
continued to live up to the requirements of international law 
and to seize vessels and cargoes susj^ected to be intended for 
Cubans. 

Notwithstanding the violent feelings which tlie S|iani--h 
in Sj)ain and Havana were nuinifesting towards the United 
States, the S])anish government showed its desire to conciliate 
this country. General Weyler receive(l our new consul-gen- 
eral, Lee, at Havana with marked cordiality. General Lee's 
military experience and professional training made him un- 
usually com})etent to ascertain the exact state of affairs in 
Cuba, and he was not a nuin to be hoodwinked or cajoled when 



174 THE CASE OF THE "COMPETITOR" 

the interests of the United States were in danger. Meanwhile, 
in the summer of 1896, the presidential campaign diverted 
jiublic interest in a great degree from the struggle going on in 
the oppressed island. It had become evident that it would re- 
main for the next administration to determine what should be 
our policy towards the Cubans, against whose armies General 
Wcyler was making poor headway, though he was beginning 
to treat the innocent and the helpless with a disregard for 
human instincts which excited the horror of the civilized 
world. 

On the last day of April, 1896, the American schooner 
Competitor from Key West, with part of her crew, was cap- 
tured near San Cayetano while engaged, as the Spanish al- 
leged, in landing arms for the insurgents. She was towed to 
Havana, and our consul at once demanded that the protocol of 
1877 be adhered to in the trial of any Americans who might be 
among the crew. The minister to Spain was urged also to re- 
quest that the C\\ptain-General be instructed to a strict ob- 
servance of that treaty. The Spanish admiral chumed, how- 
ever, that these men did not come within the treaty inasmuch 
as they were not " citizens of the United States residing in 
Spanish dominions," one clause of the treaty. We claimed 
that in the part of the treaty covering such cases there was 
nothing making residence of American citizens within Spanish 
dominions a condition necessary to entitle them to all its guar- 
antees. The Spanish government promptly sent orders to 
Cuba for the suspension of all executive action till an examina- 
tion had been made as to the standing of the Americans cap- 
tured. But three days later the Spanish admiral officially in- 
formed our consul that the treaty did not aj^ply to the Amer- 
ican prisoners and that they would be tried by court-martial. 

The S]ianish prosecuting officer asked for penalty of death 
for all on the ground that the local law for foreigners took pre- 
cedence in such a case over any treaty, and the obedient court 
quickly pronounced a death sentence. Secretary Olney at 
once urged upon the Spanish minister at Washington that exe- 



DELAY AND Strt'FERlNQ l'J'5 

eiitions should not take place till this g'overnment had hoen 
permitted to cxainiiie the ])ro('eediii<;-s of the court, and as a re- 
sult the Si)anisli ^ovci'iiiuciit, imidi to Weyler's indi<»natii)n, 
ordered the eases transferred to the Madrid eonrt. This meant 
indefinite d(day. 

The Slimmer months passed by, the prisoners complained 
of insutliciciit food, wei'o afflicted with prison fever, and some 
of them were transferred to the military hospital. On Sep- 
tember 3d Secretary Olney cabled the minister at i\radrid 
that tli(i delay in (h'ciding the CompelHor and other eases 
which had meanwhile arisen was " absolutely unreasonable. 
Call for prompt action and reasons justifyinG^ past delay or 
additional delay, if such is asked for." Thereupon the min- 
ister was informed that the authorities of the Madrid court 
had ordered a new trial before an ordinary tribunal, and 
that the decision would be made public " soon." But the t imc 
passed on, and late in November the consul at Havana acci- 
dentally heard that the marine court-martial was aj^ain tryino- 
the prisoners. Tie asked for an authorization to protest, but 
the State Department upon investigation was informed that it 
was oidy a preliminary proceeding. 

Congress soon afterwards called for the correspondence 
and took the matter in hand, but Spain continued to hold the 
men in prison, and it was long before their fate was de- 
termined. 



CHAPTER XV. 

WEYLEirS EFFORTS TO CAPURE MACEO — WEYLER PRO- 
POSES TO STRIKE A DECISIVE BLOW — THE NEW 
COMMANDER - DEATH OF THE LAST OF THE MACEOS. 

Maceo the Terror of the Spanish Nation — Weyler's Futile Efforts to Cap- 
ture Him — Tlie Largest Body-Guard Known in J the History of 
War — Maceo as Undaiuited as Ever — He Leaves Pinar del Rio — 
Was it a Spanish Trap? — Attack at Punta Bra va — How Maceo Fell — 
Gomez's Son Kills Himself at His Side — Cubans Rescue Maceo's Body 

— Rejoicing of the Spanish People — Excursions to the Spot Where 
Maceo Fell — Hopes of Cuban Surrender Disajipointed — Maceo's 
Successor, Rivera — Insurgent Successes — Weyler Criticised at 
Madrid — Weyler's Inaccurate Reports — Weyler's Campaign of 
Destruction — A Gallant Fighter — Prefering Death to Captivity — 

— General Garcia takes Command. 

THE terror of tlic prond Spanish nation was the dnsky 
Maeeo. Weylor liad constrnetod a tive-niil lion-dollar 
trocha and garrisoned it with about twenty thonsand 
men to prevent Maceo from cscapiiii;' from Pinar del Uio, bnt 
it soon appeared that the dashing Cuban had no partienlar de- 
sire to escape. With a force at his command of less than 
4,000 armed men, he moved abont the province of the west at 
will, captnring and destroying the garrison towns and so ter- 
rorizing tlie Spanish soldiers that they dared not move except 
in large colnmns, and these, moving slowly abont in a hilly 
conntry, were at the constant mercy of the cleverly-handled 
insnrgents. It was evident that nnless jMaceo conld be snb- 
dned, Weyler's boasted trocha wonld be set down as a failure. 
Hence, Weyler's chief object was the captnre of the Cuban 
general. 

More reinforcements came from Spain, and at the end of 
the wet season AVeyler took the field in person and with much 

(176) 




KAM(irS CrUAX LKADKRS IN Cfl'.AS WAR WIIH SI'AIX. 
General Maximo ("lOiiiez. Ciciieral l"ali.\la (iaicia. 

General Antonio Maceo. General Don Julio Sanguilly. 



weylek's wily falsehoods 179 

h'lat, but despite his reports of successful eugagements with 
Maceo's army a continuous stream of wounded Spanish soldiers 
found their Avay back to Havana. 

Soon Weyler returned and announced that the province 
was " paciiied." But shortly came reiwrts, which the censor 
was unable wholly to smother, that Maceo was capturing gar- 
risons, and driving into fatal ambush the Spanish detachments 
sent against him. Again Weyler took the field. Three times 
he did this with the same results. In November he wont 
forth with the largest body-guard ever known in the history 
of war, a cordon of 6,000 men, whose duty it was to care for 
his personal safety in a '' pacified " province. At his com- 
mand were over (50,000 troops to capture an army but one- 
fifteenth as large. Yet, as undaunted as ever in the gloomy 
gorges of the hills, within sight of the troclia, was the man 
against whom AVevler had made his showy marches. 

^faceo was as strong in that province as ever, in spite of 
the columns which Weyler had sent against him. There he 
might have remained and possibly might have lived till Cuba 
was free. l>ut he had other plans. Just why Maceo at this 
time left his army to another gifted guerrilla cliief, Iluis 
Rivera, has never been satisfactorily explained. That he left 
it because it was in sore distress, as the Spanish averred, and 
because he wished to learn why he was not reinforced, is ab- 
surd. His army was not in distress and Maceo had no fear of 
death. Fur years, time after time, he had nishcd into the 
thickest of the battle laughing at the S])anish bullets in the 
belief that they would not hit him unless fate willed it so. 
The most plausible explanation of his move is that he ])ro- 
posed to leave the Pinar del Rio forces to Rivera to i-arry on 
the war there while he joined the forces operating in Havana 
province, thereby accomplishing the double piirimse of mak- 
ing an aggressive movement under the nose of the boasting 
Weyler, and diverting his attention from the western jjrovince, 
which Rivera could then easily hold. At the same lime that 
Maceo started eastward, CJomez started westward. With a 



180 THE LAST OF THE MACEOS FALLS 

guard of about a dozen of his staff Maceo suddenly crossed the 
trocha at the north and appeared in the province of Havana 
where he was apparently exj^ected by the CubanSj and where 
ho was least expected by the Spaniards, unless it is true that 
he was enticed over the trocha by a plot and drawn into a 
S]3anish trap. He quickly gathered about him a small force of 
Cubans operating in the western part of Havana province, and 
on December 7th was suddenly attacked by a superior Spanish 
force under Colonel Cirujeda at Punta Brava. While Maceo 
was in the center of his staff, a heavy volley was fired directly 
at them and Maceo was shot in the neck and fell from his horse 
mortally wounded. Several of his staff also fell, while one 
of them galloi^ed back to secure aid to carry away Maceo's 
body. Gomez's son, also on Maceo's staff, remained by the 
body and, when he could no longer defend it, seems to have 
killed himself and fallen at Maceo's side. The Spaniards 
rifled Maceo's body of his jewels, but probably without know- 
ing whose they were, for the body was left on the field and 
afterwards buried l)y the Cubans in a spot which remained a 
secret to all except a few. 

Great was tlie Spanish rejoicing. Royal flag's were hoisted 
everywhere in Madrid, and bells were rung, while the (^ueen 
sent a gift to the wife of the Spanish officer whose men killed 
Maceo. As soon as the news reached Havana, a grand torch- 
light procession was organized, and after a long march through 
the illuminated streets, it proceeded to the palace where a great 
crowd was assembled. General Weyler was received amid 
cries of "Long live Spain! " " Long live the King! " and in 
response he said that he would now speedily pacify the island. 
A few days later, there was a great excursion from Havana to 
Punta Brava, and a fete on the spot where Maceo fell. On 
the arrival of the excursionists they were received by the 
officers, and there were speeches and much jubilation. 

But General Weyler's expectations of a speedy breaking 
up of the rebellion were disappointed. He fully believed that 
the Cubans in Pinar del Rio would rush in and lay down their 



CAMPAIGNS OF DESTRUCTION 181 

arms. But no one suiTondcrcd except Dr. Zcrtnclia, a man 
denounced by the Cubans as a traitor, while every night the 
volleys of the insurgent skirmishers could be heard in the 
suburbs of Havana, 

General liivera, Maceo's successor in Piuar del Rio, took 
up a position in one of Alaceo's old strongholds. In a few days 
(Jcncral Wcyh'r went again, in jxTson, and with a strong force, 
to the province which he had declared pacified. The insur- 
gents wore more active than ever, and the discouraging effect 
of the l)nlk't which had gladdened Spanish hearts by killing 
]\Iacco was only temporary. After AVeyler had marched his 
men al)out the hills till they were tired out, and had won no 
sigiuil advantage over the insurgents, he made his way back 
again towards Havana, and the Madrid papers were so vehe- 
ment in their criticisms that the government seized them and 
began action against their proprietors. 

As Weyler's position became more insecure at Madrid, 
h(^ bccnnie more reckless in fixing the character of report-s. 
AVithout a word of truth (jlomez was represented as desirous 
to treat with him for peace, though Gomez at the very mo- 
ment was aggressively attacking Spanish forces in Santa Clara. 
Piiiar (h'l Rio was again dechircd as pacified, and witliin a few 
honrs reports came to Havana that a Sjianish division had been 
com|)h'tely rontcd by lviv(>ra, who had drawn the S])anish 
ti-oo])s into a tight phico in tlic hills, and tlnm charged with 
terril)le effect; nearly three hundred Spaniards were killed, 
and as many more wounded, while the Cuban loss was small. 
This report was sn|i]iressed by the censors, and tln^ government 
circnhited a report that Tiivera had been kille<l. It was a des- 
perate game and could not be expected to last long. 

I'nable to drive the rhd)ans ont of Havana province with 
his greatly sn])ei'i(>r nrniy, Weyler ordered the destruction of 
all ]>laiitati((n- and Imildings in the pi-(>\ince wliicli ciMild be 
likely in any way to prov<> nsefnl to the insurgents, lie diil 
not seem to recognize the fact that he was doing exactly what 
the insurgents had been doing for two years in order to de- 



182 THE NEW COMMANDER 

prive the Spaniards of revenue. He was helping the insur- 
gents carry on their campaign. Thus the whole island, ex- 
cept in the east, w'here the insurgents were in full control, 
where they collected taxes and where some industries were 
proceeding under their protection, was made a desert. About 
Havana and Matanzas the Spaniards destroyed everytliing 
within their reach, and the insurgents did the same. If the 
Cubans came to a patch of potatoes they took what they wanted 
and destroyed the rest so that the Spaniards could not have 
them. If the Spaniards arrived at the patch first they did 
the same thing. 

(Jomez had started westward at about the same time Maceo 
began his fatal journey eastward. The plan of his campaign 
was to move westward slowly, augmenting his force with the 
various brigades scattered along the route, and also by the 
army of Genea-al Garcia from the east. Meanwhile he de- 
tached two divisions, which made their way westward, and 
were soon operating in Wcylcr's rear. 

General Calixto Garcia, who arrived in the island some- 
what later than the other Cuban leaders, was one of the best- 
known fighters for Cuban freedom. He had fought with 
great ardor during the Ten-Years War, and shortly afterwards 
when he found that Spain did not intend to keep her promises 
made at Zanjon, he took up arms again. But his small force 
was surrounded by the vigilant Spaniards, and, rather than be 
captured, he deliberately shot himself. The bullet passed 
from his chin through his tongue and came out between his 
eyebrows, and to the end of his life the opening remained from 
the roof of his mouth to his forehead. He always kept a bit 
of cotton in the hole in his forehead, a peculiarity which can 
be distinguished in his photographs. 

Having lieen captured when thus wonndcd, he finally es- 
caped from prison and wandered about the world till the new 
war began. Then he remained in the United States for a time, 
fitting out expeditions for Cnl^a. At last he arrived there and 
took command of the army of the East. 



OJIAPTEK XVI 

THE MURDER OF Dll. lU IZ AM) THE THREATENED RESIG- 
NATION OF CONSUL-GENERAL LEE - RELEASE OF SAN- 
GUILY— ON THE VERGE OF WAR — SPAIN ALARMED. 

Cunirress Stinvd by Stories of the Death of Macoo — The Caiiioron Resolu- 
tion — Spanish People Aroused — Trying to Soothe the United States 

— Spain Seeks European Sui)port — "Independence or Death" — 
Weyler in Disfavor — The Murderous Fondeviehi — Killing of Dr. 
Ruiz — No Notice Given to Consul-General Lee — Lee Not Supported 
at Washington in His Defense of American Citizens — Arrest of Scott 

— Lee's Forceful Despatcli — lie Tiu'eatens to Resign — A Dramatic 
Climax — Cul)an Sympathizers C'iassed as Jingoes — Senator Slierman's 
Defense — Its Significance — Demand for a Sinii-of-War for Havana 

— Sudden Rtdease of Sanguil}- — Si)ain Alarmed. 

FOK some weok.s prior to the rcassemblino- of Congress in 
December, ISUO, it was apparent that the people of the 
United States woiil<l not permit the Cnban sitnation to 
drag along indefinitely. In behalf of the Cubans, l»ntli parties 
had inserted a strong plank in their platform, and the hopes of 
the Cnban sympathizers, which had been dashed i>y President 
Clevelaiurs inaction, eagerly awaited the coming administra- 
tion of William McKinley. That our interference wonld 
be tolerated, if, indeed, it werc^ not welcomed by Th-itish inter- 
ests, was evident ffom editorials in leading English jiapers. 
'1 lie cliaotie coiidit idii of industry and coiiimoree in (^d)a eonld 
iH:)t be longer endured with complacency, when there was no 
evidence that the Spaniards coidd pacify the island, and when 
Spanish atrocities seemed to warrant interference on the 
'!,ronnds of humanity alone. Indignation jneetinii's were held 
all over the United States, and were often addressed by leading 

and infinential men. There was little interest in President 
12 (183) 



184 ACTION OF COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS 

Cleveland's message -his last annual state paper -except 
in liis references to Cuba. He reviewed the struggle and saw 
no prospects of its early termination, and he suggested that it 
Spain should offer to Cuba a full measure of home rule Cuba 
remaining subject to the Spanish sovereignty, such a solution 
n,io.ht be satisfactory on both sides, and the United States 
nnght well consent to give guarantees for the carrying out ol 
the arrangement. For the present he recommended our gov- 
ernment to pursue our usual course. But hardly had the mes- 
sage been printed when the people were aroused by the stories 

of the fate of Maeeo. 

The Senate Committee on Foreign Relations proceeded to 
action at once, and, notwithstanding the fact that Secretary 
Olney departed from custom and appeared before the com- 
mittee and advised against any action by Congress, it unani- 
mously passed a joint resolution, introduced and championed 
by Senator Cameron of Pennsylvania, acknowledging the in- 
dependence of the Republic of Cuba. It was evident that 
the time was drawing near when something would be done, 
.„,d but for the fact that a new administration was about to 
take up the responsibilities of office. Congress would have 
done its best to force the Executive to take action 

The Spanish people were again greatly aroused by the ac- 
tion of the committee. Popular feeling was evidently in favor 
of boldly defying the United States and of notifying tiis gov- 
ernment that Cuba would be retained if it took Spa^n s last dol- 
1,, an.l her last man to uphold her sovereignty. Put the gov- 
ernment of Spain, in spite of the clamors of the people main- 
tained a dignified attitude, relying on the influence of Pi evi- 
dent Cleveland to oppose interference for the tune, and again 
,,,V it known thnt it would soon, or as soon as the conditmn 
of the island permitted, institute a system of autonomy similar 
to that in Puerto Rico and would liberalize the commercial 
tnlations. Spanish statesmen seemed always to consider 
that the mere announcement of reform purposes would effec- 
tually soothe the feelings of American people. 



SPAIN SEEKS SUPPORT FROM EUROPEAN POWERS 1M5 

On December 21st the Senate Connnittec on Foreign Re- 
lations made a long rej^ort citing for the right of intervention 
a lung line of European precedents, and showing that Europe 
has invariably asserted and practiced the right to interfere, 
separately and collectively, amicably and forcibly, when ques- 
tions of independence were involved. The situation in Cuba 
■dud the duty of the United States as the committee saw it 
were stated, and it was claimed that there could be no rational 
interference except on the basis of independence. Congress 
then adjourned over for the holidays. 

Meanwhih', Spanish ])oli('y was directed towards securing 
support fi"oni other European powers. She labored desper- 
ately to show the jwwers that lier troubles with this country 
wei-e also theirs, and it was evident she expected aid in defy- 
ing " the Yankee." The attitude of France and Austria ap- 
peared to be favorable; they sympathized with Spain but were 
non-committal. The Vatican was of course distinctly favor- 
able to Spain's cause. England offered little encouragement. 
President Cisneros of the Cuban Republic allowed it to be dis- 
tinctly understood that it would treat with Spain only on the 
basis of the absolute independence of Cuba, and the Spanish 
journals announced that, whik; the death of Maceo implied the 
stujx'faction of the insurgents, only the destruction of a large 
insui'gcnt force or the comj)lete pacification of a province could 
be sufficient for tlie establishment of the contemplated reforms. 
They looked to see General Weyler follow up the advantage 
which accident had thrown in his hands, but as the days 
elapsed, and the fruitlessness of Weyler's cam])aigns became 
apparent, they gave way to a spirit of ci-iticism of the man who 
was so continually boasting of what he would do but never 
did it. 

As soon as Congress reassend)led after the holidays it ap- 
peared that there was little chance of the passage of the Cam- 
eron resolutions, ^vhich were successfully side-tracked. As 
the last days of the administration approached it was apparent 
that Spain had (nily coiitcnqit for President Cleveland's policy 



186 WAITING FOR A NEW ADMINISTRATION 

of friendly mediation, had never seriously considered it, was 
proposing reforms only for effect upon the coming administra- 
tion, that the Cubans would take no notice of it, and that the 
people of the United States rejected such a policy with scorn 
and were simply waiting for McKinley. This attitude was 
reflected in Congress and nothing was attempted with the reso- 
lutions of recognition. Fearing that the coming administra- 
tion might not be so easily trifled with, the Spanish journals, 
which, in treating of the United States, had long been insolent, 
pretentious, and bombastic, became for the time very con- 
ciliatory. 

While Weyler was in the field in Santa Clara, and at that 
moment when it was expected that he would engage Gomez 
and either fall or conquer, the murderous Fondeviela in his 
bloody operations at Guanabacoa became so reckless as to make 
American citizens his victims. Several Americans were 
already under arrest and lodged in various prisons at points 
held by the Spaniards, and the State Department had been 
diplomatically busy in looking out for their interests. It was 
difficult for General Lee to obtain any satisfactory reasons why 
these persons were arrested and thrown into vile prison holes, 
and all protests and demands were met by that evasive shifting 
policy which had always characterized Spain's dealings with 
American interests. 

Among those arrested about the middle of February at 
Fondeviela's orders was Dr. Richard Ruiz, a naturalized 
American citizen who had studied and practiced dentistry in 
Philadelphia for many years before going to Cuba. He was 
charc-ed with havino; assisted in the derailment of a train, when 
some Spanish officers were captured by the insurgent General 
Aranguren, and magnanimously released. The charge was 
of the flimsiest character, as the doctor had the reputation 
among all of attending strictly to business and of not meddling 
in any way with revolutionary movements. He was thrown 
into the Guanabacoa jail, no communication with him being 
allowed, and on the afternoon of February 17th he was found 



GENERAL LEE IS AROUSED 187 

dead in a coll, there being little doubt that he had been beaten 
to death by the jailers at Foiideviela's orders. The Spanish 
authorities, as usual, had failed to give oiu- consul any olHcial 
notice of the arrest, and Consul-General Lee heard of it only 
unofficially. He was fully aroused. 

General Lee had experienced some difficnlty in having his 
efforts in behalf of arrested American citizens satisfactorily 
supjxirted at Washing-ton, where the adniinisti'atioii was aj)- 
parently clinging to a hope that something might re«sult from 
Spain's abundant promises. Spain had given a semi-official 
assurance that Sanguily would be released, but the release 
did not come, and, meanwhile, other American citizens were 
pining away in jail, and others were being arrested and disjx)sed 
of in utter disregard of their rights as Anun'ican citizens. It 
was stated in the papers that General Lee had kept the wires 
busy informing the State Department as to the death of Ruiz, 
and the arrest of other Americans, but had received no reply. 
Ten days l>efore he had sent a despatch, saying that Charles 
Scott, an American citizen, had been arrested at Regla, charges 
unknown, as usual. Scott had been eleven days incommuni- 
cado, and it was reported to the consul that he had been several 
times under severe torture. 

It was reported in the newspapers that Lee had made a 
demand for warships for a protcn-tion, had been refused, and 
had sent in his resignation. The feelings of the people were 
greatly aroused; Congress became nu)re bitter against the ad- 
ministration, and immediately calle<l for the corresjwndence 
and reports of the consul-general at Havana relating to all 
American citizens in prison, wliose cases ha<l not been before 
reported on. It was not suliniittcd till three days before the 
Cleveland administration went out of ofhce. From this report 
it appears that General Lee sent the following telegram to the 
State Department on February 20th: 

" riiark's Scoff, a ritizcn of llic riiitcil Statos. arrt'sfcd Rc-rla : no 
charsre jrivcn. Been witliouf cnniniMiiication. jail. Havana, fwf) luindrotl 
and sixty-four hours. Cannot stand anollicr Hui/ niurdi-r and liave de- 



18S THE SCOTT CASE 

manded his release. How many war vessels Key West or within reach 
and will they be ordered here at once if necessary to sustain demand ? " 

Whatever the reply to this telegram, the State Department 
did not submit it to the Senate committee, not being compat- 
ible with public interests. Its nature may be judged from 
Gen. Lee's next despatch to Secretary Olney, which appears 
in the document: 

"Havana, February 23, 1897. 
"Situation simple; experience at Guanabacoa made it my duly to 
demand, before too late, that another Ameiican who had been incommu- 
nicado two hundred and sixty-four hours, be released from said inconunu- 
nicado, and did so in courteous terms. If you support it, and Scott is so 
released, the troul)le will terminate. If you do not, I must depart. All 
others arrested with Scott have been put in communication. Why should 
only American in lot not be ? lie has been incommunicado now three 
hundred and thirty-eight hours. Lee." 

That day the Spanish authorities complied with Lee's de- 
mand, as is seen from the following dispatch: 

" Havana, February 23, 1897. 
"Scott released from incommimicado to-day, on demand, after four, 
teen days' solitary confinement in cell five feet by eleven ; damp ; water 
on bottom cell. Not allowed anything to sleep on, or chair ; discharges 
of tlie body removed once in five days. Was charged with having Cuban 
postage stamps in liouse. Scott says went always twelve hours without 
water, once two days. He is employe American Gas Company. 

Lee." 

Rather grapliic, if concise, were these two dispatches of 
a single day, but they serve to illustrate the treatment re- 
ceived by Americans in Spanish hands on more than one oc- 
casion, indeed, almost continually during the war. In 
Santiago those alleging American citizenship were arrested 
early in the war, and their fate remnined a mystery. There 
were known to be at this time about forty Americans in Span- 
ish prisons in Cuba, against whom charges had long been pend- 
ing and never tried, or against whom no charges whatever had 
been preferred. 

From the day of the arrest of Dr. Ruiz to the day of his 
death the Spanish authorities, though having his papers in their 



METHODS OF THE INQUISITION REVIVED 189 

possession, never took the trouble to inform General Lee that 
he had been arrested, and he was only kept informed ot" the 
course of events from unofficial sources. This alone consti- 
tuted a grave breach of international law. Yet, the case of 
Iluiz was one of daily occurrence in Cuba then, with this dif- 
ference that the victim was u;^ually a CHiban. It was the cus- 
tom of Spanish officials to torture and, perhaps, murder their 
defenseless prisoners in their attempts to wring from them a 
desired confession incriminating them, as well as others, in 
some imaginary offense. 

In investigating the case of Ruiz, Consul-General Lee de- 
manded that the body be turned over to him, and that an au- 
topsy be performed by two physicians, one an American, to be 
designated by himself. The acting Captain-General in Wey- 
ler's absence, Ahumada, saw that Lee was aroused and com- 
plied. The consul and physician proceeded to (Juanabacoa, 
where Fondevichi tried to delay them, but they insisted and 
went to the jail to find that the body had been placed in a cart 
and was about to be taken away. A little delay would have 
prevented an investigation, which showed that Ruiz had met a 
h<in-i1)le death, in a cell which would in a short time have 
[)roved the deatli of any man; that he had been arrested on a 
trumped-up charge, and that he had been ke])t incommunicado, 
like so many others, though, under our treaty witli Spain, no 
American citizen could be held in close confinement for more 
than seventy-two hours. 

For months General Lee had placed overwhelming proofs 
before the State Dejiai'tmeut that \u>t a single ]>rovision of the 
treaty rights secured to us by Cusliing and Pinckney was being 
observed by the Spanish authorities in Cuba, but Lee's friends 
claimed that his representations had not only been kept from 
the public, but liad ilrawu no reply fi-om tlie (^xecutiv(> de])art- 
ment. Lee had submitted in silence to a position so little to 
his liking and proba1)]y would have done so till the end of the 
administi-ation, wliich was so near, but for the murder of Ruiz, 
of whose imprisonment he had notified the State Department 



190 TORTURED FOR HAVING A CUBAN STAMP 

and of whose fate he had warned it. He had taken the same 
course in the case of Scott, whose wife went to Lee in tears and 
said that he was being tortured, and, she feared, killed, though 
arrested only because he had a Cuban stamp in his stamp col- 
lection. 

The threatened resignation of Lee, unless upheld in his ef- 
forts to protect American citizens, precipitated a dramatic 
climax to the administration's conciliatory Cuban policy, and 
stirred Congress, with but a few hours longer to exist, into one 
of its most heated debates of Cuban affairs. The Cameron 
resolution for the recognition of the Cubans had already been 
set aside, and everyone had accepted as a fact that the delicate 
problems involved would be left to the new administration 
with our Spanish relations still cordial, when Lee's practical 
request for warships came like a bombshell in a quiet camp. 
Secretary Olney had evidently endeavored to ward off an 
open rupture with Spain at any cost, while the Spaniards of 
Cuba, thinking, apparently, that Americans could be attacked 
with impunity, began to vent their natural hatred. Congress 
had nourished a feeling of contempt for our diplomatic for- 
bearance with Spain, but, like others, had given up attempts 
at action. The conservative element which feared war and the 
burdens it might involve even with a power so weak as Spain, 
had found it easy to avoid sympathy for a few American citi- 
zens, most of whom were of Cuban birth, and the conservative 
press immediately branded any one who demanded that the 
government should compel Spain to live up to its treaty obli- 
gations as a " jingo." 

But when the TJuiz incident and Lee's position became 
known, strong resolutions for insisting upon the protection of 
American citizens were introduced in the Senate and passed 
without division, and a resolution demanding the immediate re- 
lease of Sanguily was also passed after a strong argument by 
Senator Slierman, who, in four days, was to take Olney's place 
at the head of the State department. "T trust the time will 
never come," he said, "when an American citizen can be 



SANGUILY RELEASED I!»l 

wronged or persecuted by any power, great or small. I am 
in favor of protecting tliid American citizen, though he is a 
naturalized citizen. I am opposed to wrong and tyranny and 
violence wherever it is exercised, and when it is exercised 
against an American I will stand up tor him even if I am 
alone." '' If I had my way," exclaimed Senator Frye of 
Elaine, "a ship of war would start forthwith for Havana." 

Spain was alarnuMl. At noon the next day a telegram 
reached Havaiui from .Madrid for the immediate release of 
Sanguily. ]n two hours he walked feebly out of a prison 
where he had been kept, without a shadow of evidence to 
justify it, for over two years. Spain saw that it was no time 
to trifle with the United States. If she had not acted speedily 
the McKiidey administration would have begun with a "vvar. 
It is probably also true that had not the strained relations be- 
tween General Lee and the State ])cpartment leaked out 
through Havana, Sanguily would have remained in jail. Sec- 
retary Olney had made public nothing concerning the condi- 
tion of affairs, and the attention of Congress would not then 
have been calle(l to them but for the newspaper reports. By 
Sanguily's release the tension at Washington relaxed, and the 
public mind was absorbed by the inauguration of a new ad- 
ministration. 



CHAPTER XVII 

THE CONDITION OF CUBA IN 1897 — HELPLESS WOMEN AND 
CHILDREN — AWFUL SCENES OF SUFFERING AND WOE — 
FACING STARVATION AND DEATH. 

Atthmlc of tlie jMcKinlcy Administration — Anotlior Decree of Autonomy — 
Weyler's War on the Pacificos — On the Veige of Starvation — Unpar- 
alleled Scenes of Suffering — Weyler's Reasons for Concentrating — A 
Death AVarrant to Thousands of the Innocent and Ileljiless — -Driven 
from Burning Homes — Huddled in Swamps — A Plague Spot on Earth 

— A Spanish Account of Misery — The Living and the Dead Together 

— Scenes at the very Gates of Havana — Heaped Pell-mell like Animals 

— The Dead in the Embrace of the Dying — Exterminaticu the Real 
. Object — Daily Execution of Captured Peasants — The Massacres of 

Pacificos — The Dead Carts on Their Rounds — Facts Impossible to be 
Exaggerated — Incredulity in the United States. 

FI\0]\r the first, the McKinley adraiiiisti-atioii in courteous 
and diplomatic language gave Sj)ain to understand that 
neither the peojde nor the government of the United 
States could regard with complacency an indefinite continua- 
tion of the existing condition of things in Ctiba, and, as before, 
the friendly services of the United States were placed at the 
disposal of Spain in any way that might conduce to peace in 
the island and the institution of genuine reforms. But the 
two nations regarded Cuba from utterly irreconcilable stand- 
points. 

Spain's ministry recognized in the attitude of the new ad- 
ministration a determination not to be so easily trifled with as 
before, and it therefore proceeded to release more American 
prisoners, and to make in its diplomacy as well as in the public 
prints great pretensions concerning a new scheme of autonomy 
which it was proposed to introduce, luit in which lurked the in- 
sincerity characterizing all the plans of refomi which Spain 

(192) 



SPAIN TRIES TO HOODWINK THE UNITED STATES 103 

had from time to time been " meditating " for forty years. 
The (^ueeu liegent signed the decree for these reforms on 
April 29th, and one of the humors of the act was that it was 
done upon the assurance of General Weyler that the four 
western provinces were at last completely pacified. That the 
reforms were intended to hoodwink the United States was 
evident from many cii'cumstances, and the Havana papers 
quietly laughed at the cry of " Weyler and Reform." 

The administration was not deceived by Weyler's assur- 
ances, and while hoping for the best from the alleged reforms, 
it proposed to examine into Cuba itself. President AlcKinley 
appointed William J. Calhoun of Illinois a s[)ecial commis- 
sioner for the purpose of acting with General Lee in an in- 
vestigation of the lluiz case. 

Meanwhile, the enormous expenses of Weyler's manage- 
ment of affairs had produced something like a financial crisis 
at Havana. The debt had risen to $425,000,000, and the rev- 
enue the Spanish could collect in the first two years of the war 
amounted to only $25,000,000. 

It will now be necessary to examine briefly a feature of 
General Weyler's methods in Cuba to which full justice could 
hardly be done in a whole volume — his war on the pacificos. 
There is no parallel for it in history. If a true and adequate 
history of it is ever written, it will be the largest and darkest 
picture (if man's iiiliuiiianity e\'ci" drawn. Xothing in real 
life has quite so closely ai>proached the tortures of the damned 
in the jioetic dreams of Dante as the punishment deliberately 
inq)Osed upon the innocent and the helpless, old men and old 
women, motlicrs with babes in tlieii- arms, ( "ulmu iiinidens ;ind 
Cuban boys. And the remarkable thing about it is that it 
was taking place at the end of the nineteenth century within a 
hundred miles of the shores of the United St^ates while many 
of its citizens were crying "Peace!" "It is none of our 
business! " " Do not interfere! " 

In October, ISOG, while Weyler, who had shown no mili- 
tary talents in the field, was vainly throwing his forces into 



194 THE FIENDISH PLAN OP CONCENTRATION 

Pinar del Rio, be conceived the idea that the quickest way to 
pacify the insurgents was to make war against the peaceful 
Cubans. Seeing that the movements of his columns were al- 
ways made known to the Cuban leaders, thus giving them 
the opportunity of making ambushes, disastrous to Spanish 
columns, he thought that if the pacificos were driven from 
the country to the fortified towns, their houses and crops 
destroyed and their property confiscated, they could no longer 
aid the insurgents with information, shelter, or food. Hav- 
ing obtained permission from Madrid, therefore, he issued 
a decree on October 21st that all the inhabitants of the coun- 
try districts or those who resided outside the lines of fortifi- 
cations of the towns should within eight days enter the towns, 
and any individual found outside the lines in the country 
at the expiration of that period should be considered a rebel 
and should be " dealt with as such " — which in guerrilla 
Spanish meant that he should be shot or hacked to death with 
machetes. The decree further stated that the transportation 
of food from one place to another without the permission of the 
military authorities at the place of departure was absolutely 
forbidden. The owners of cattle were ordered to drive their 
herds to the towns. 

Most of these men and women were of the guajiro class, 
respectable, hard-working farmers oii a small scale. On throe 
or four acres of land they raised all the necessities of their 
simple lives, and even the luxuries, including coffee and to- 
bacco. But they were naturally improvident in a land which 
was ever productive, and thus they had few resources to fall 
back upon in such unfortunate circumstances as Weyler's order 
suddenly forced upon them. 

This death warrant of hundreds of thousands of innocent 
people, particularly women and children, was sent to the gov- 
ernors of the western provinces — it could not, of course, be 
carried out in the two eastern provinces which the Cubans con- 
trolled — and the governors made it known to the leaders of 
the Spanish guerrillas, who were intrusted with the task of in- 



DRIVING IN THE PACIFICOS 1 !J5 

foniiiiii;' llie ruinitrj j^'oplc lliat tlicv iimst leave t.lieii- Ikhiic- 
steads and belonging's and i'cimonc In the a]>ii(Hiit((l i^lace.s uf 
concentration. As these gueiTillas, composed exclusively of 
Spanish jail-birds, were notorious for their inhuiuauity and 
outrages upon defenseless C\ibans, Ivrutalily bciiii; a iiart of 
their trade, it may be imag'iiied liow ilic oi'tlcr was carried out. 
The ]>eople were not allowed to take away with them any [>rop- 
erty but what they could cany on their backs, and, as they 
filed away t^ the stations where they were destined to die of 
stai'N'ation and ejiidemic diseases, they saw their honu>s go up 
in smoke, their crops burned down, and their cattle and oxen 
confiscated to feed the hateil Spanish troops. Wlunvver the 
peasants resisted tluy were driven in at the poiut of the gun, 
or shot down to avoid further trouble. 

This order showed Welder's absolute iiicouipetcncy as a 
general as well as his inhumanity, for the able-bodied men 
of each family wdio had remained neutral, if uiyt loyal, so long- 
as they were permitted to live on their few acres, at once joined 
the insurgent ranks when ordered to concentrate, and thus it 
was almost entirely the old, the intii'm, the women and the 
children who were driven into the towns. The order failed 
also to embarrass the insurgents by the destruction of the 
plantations, for they were accustomed to finding their living 
in the woods, and they always regarded su(di destruction as an 
injury mainly to the Spanish. As a war measure, therefore, 
it was successful only as a boomerang. 

The helpless people were allotted ground m-ar the towns, 
almost invariably in low-lying, swampy, and malarious places. 
The Spanish residents would not be burdened with them and 
generally cared not how soon they died. They were concen- 
trated in greatest nnmbers where tlie accommodations were 
least ade(}uate, as if extermination was the main object. 
There was nothing for them to do and there was less and less 
for them to eat, and finally they stretcdu'd out upon the damp 
ground, gazing vacantly before tlicm as the weary days 
dragged by. ">rothers lay listless with dead babies in their 



196 A PLAGUE-SPOT ON THE EARTH 

arms. The quick and the dead hiy side by side till the latter 
were taken and thrown in the dead carts, and carried oii' 
into the country where lay the half-buried bodies of hun- 
dreds of victims of this system of warfare. The huts of 
these people were jammed together in rows with but a few 
inches of space between, and the ground was covered with 
hltli. Diseases of malignant types claimed their victims every- 
Avhere and every day. There was no medical attendance; it 
Avas fortunate if there were half rations. In the different 
stations of concentration there were estimated to be over 
400,000 of these hel])less people, and by the summer of 1897 
the death rate had become terrible. The beautiful island was 
a jilague sjiot upon earth. 

The reconcentrados, it should be understood, were at the 
very gates of the city of Havana. xVs Oeneral Lee said in 
one of his communications, there were fewer here tlian in 
most other places, and in general their condition was l)ctter 
than elsewhere. Yet their condition could hardly be exag- 
gerated by the use of any words which the English lauguage 
can comnumd. In a ri^poii; which was submitted to (leneral 
Lee by one who visited these reconcentrados, and whom Lee 
vouches for as " a nuin of integTity and character," one of the 
sights was " 460 women and children thrown on the ground, 
heaped pellmell as animals, some in a dying condition, others 
sick, and others dead, without the slightest cleanliness, nor 
the least help, not even to give water to the thirsty, with 
neither religious or social help, dying wherever chance laid 
them, and for this limited number of reconcentrados the deaths 
averaged between forty and fifty daily, giving relatively ten 
days of life for each person. Among the deaths we witnessed 
there w^ns one impossible to forget," continued Lee's informant. 
" We found a girl of eighteen seemingly lifeless on the 
ground; on her right side was the body of a young mother, 
cold and rigid, but with her young child still alive clinging to 
lier dead breast; on her left hand side was also the corpse of a 
dead woman lK»lding her son in a rigid emlirace; a little farther 



INIQUITOUS CRUELTY — INDESCRIBABLE SUFFERING 19? 

on a poor dying woman Laving in lior arms a daughter of fonr- 
teen, crazy with pain, who after five or six days also died in 
spite of the care she received. In one corner a poor woman 
was dying, surrounded by her children, who contemplated her 
in silence, without a lament or shedding a tear, they themselves 
being real specters of Inmgcn-, emaciated in a horrible manner." 
As the dead were taken away new victims were driven in, and, 
says this informant for whom Lee vouches; " If any young 
gii-1 came in any way nice looking, she was infallibly con- 
d(Mnned to the most abominable of traffic." In time some- 
thing was done through the (Micrgy of jjriv^ate persons for the 
help of these people, but it was estimated that the usual death 
rate among them was about 77 per cent. 

Keports of the massacre of pacificos were of daily occur- 
rence and many of them were shown to be authentic. Late 
in July, one was reported from Sancti Spiritus ])eculiarly ap- 
[)alling in its details. The pacificos, who had been starving for 
several days, crowded around the forts and asked in vain of 
the commander to be allowed to seek food. A woman whose 
four children were dying of hunger resolved to brave the anger 
of the soldiei's to save her boys from misery. In the night she 
sb]>p('d unnoticed between two sentinels and reached the 
woods. On returning in the morning with vegetables, she was 
caught and recognized. At once the rumor was spread among 
the soldiers that the pacificos had an understanding with the 
insurgents and that the woman had gone out to inform them 
of the Spanish defenses. AVith a shout of " treason " the 
troops began the slaughter, the helpless pacificos were mowed 
down like sheep, and the commander reported the occurrence 
to Generiil AVcylcr as a victory of his troops over the insur- 
gents, wlio bad many killed. Such news was, of criurse, re- 
ceived at ]\radrid with demonstrations of dcliglit. 

'I'lic ninniing liulit bi'nkc witb little good cheer to any one 
in western Cuba, uidess to the Spanish guerrillas and butrhers. 
The first rays of the sun fell upon a land, once glowing in all 
the emerald brightness of exuberant tropical veget^ition, now 



198 GATHERING IN THE HARVEST OF MARTYRS 

resembling- nothing so nuicli as a great ash heap. Where 
once stood the humble dwellings of the pacificos, snrromided 
by their rich garden patches and waving fields, were now heaps 
of ruins, the marks of fire, of death, and of desolation, and 
hovering always in the sulti'y air were the greedy vultures. 
Here and there were half-made graves from which protruded 
the festering flesh, sometimes the ghastly countenances of the 
victims of Spanish " military regulations." 

Each town awoke each morning to face a fresh installment 
of the dead. Out to the esphinada, in full sight of the town, 
filed the usual morning procession, the band, playing a jaunty 
air, the priests, the soldiers, and their officers, and there were 
shot in the back young boys who had been captured in various 
ways and charged with the stereotyped crime of rebellion, and 
found guilty after a court-martial in which the victims had 
nothing to say. As a matter of fact, very few of these victims 
were ever in the insurgent ranks; the great majority were sim- 
ply peasants who had not heeded the proclamation of recon- 
centration, or who, starving, had attempted to escape through 
the Spanish lines to find a few roots, but had fallen in with the 
Spanish bushwhackers lying in wait day and night about the 
roads and byways leading from the town to the country dis- 
tricts. As a rule, those who were caught were shot down in 
cold blood in their tracks, and, possibly, covered wnth a sprink- 
ling of earth, while the case was reported as another Spanish 
victory in a skirmish. Some, however, were brought to town 
when captured and fiendishly tortured for a time in the hope 
of securing from them useful information; then in the gray 
dawn they were led out and shot. 

As the sun rose higher over the desolate and bloody scene, 
it shone upon the dead carts filing away. In the camp of the 
starving pacificos the dead had been assorted from the living, 
the harvest of another night, while those in whom the breath 
of life feebly lingered lay listless, speechless, dazed by the very 
enormity of their own suffering and of the suffering about 
them. 






A STORY THAT COTLD NOT BE EXAGGEKATED lUO 

Those are but glimpses of the panorama of death which 
it is distressing and revolting to follow. Of such was the 
whole. It has never been exaggerated; it never will be. 
Here fiction fell before reality. It was one of the unfortunate 
facts of the situation that the people of the United States did 
not really believe the stories of misery, of suffering, of outrage 
upon the island, partly doubtless because it seemed too ter- 
rible for the nineteenth century, and on American shores, and 
partly because of the poor character for truth which had been 
given some stories of military operations there. These stories 
of the reconcentrados were considered by many as examples 
of rather graphic writing by newspaper correspondents, 
whereas these plucky and gifted writers had actually en- 
countered a subject for which their capacity for exaggeration 
proved entirely inadequate to the demands of reality. 



18 



CHAPTER XVIIT 

RELIEF OF STARVING A:\IERICAN CITIZENS IN CUBA — FAIL- 
URE OF WEYLER'S CAMPAIGN — INCREASING jVIISERY ON 
THE ISLAND — ASSASSINATION OF CANOVAS. 

Suffering among American Residents in Cuba — The President Asks for 
$50,000 for Their Relief— Spain Watches Us Anxiously — The Mor- 
gan Resolution — Exciting Debate in the Senate — Its Effect in Spain 

— Sagasta Rebels — Canovas Resigns — Given a New Lease of Life — 
Reasons for His Continuance and for Weyler's Longer Stay in Cuba 

— Political Conditions — Don Carlos — Canovas between Two Fires 

— Madrid Opinion — Superior Tactics of Gomez — Return of Com- 
missioner Calhoun — Gen. Stewart L. Woodford Appointed Minister to 
Madrid — His Instructions — Nothing to Humiliate Spain — A Season 
of Waiting — Death of Canovas — Party Quarrels Cease — Weyler 
Driven into Havana. 



OFFICIAL information from onr consnls in Cnba estab- 
lished the fact in the spring of 181)7 that a large 
nnml)er of American citizens in (Hiha were in a state 
of destitntion, snfFering for want of food and medicine as a re- 
sult of Weyler's order for concentrating the conntry people in 
the towns. Early in May, C^onsul-General Lee reported that 
from six to eight luindred Americans were withont mea^ns of 
support. The local authorities, even if kindly disposed, were 
nnable to relieve -the needs of their own people. President 
]\rcT\inley assured General Lee that provision woidd be made 
to relieve the American citizens, and to that end on the iTth of 
]\fay he sent a message to Congress recommending an a]ipro- 
priation of $50,000 to be immediately available for nse nnder 
the direction of the Secretary of State; and it was desirable 
that a part of the snm might be left for jiroviding transporta- 
tion for snch American citizens as desired to return to the 

United States but had no means to do so. 

(200) 




KMINEXT AVIKKICAX Cl\ll. I.i: ADICRS IN Ol'R WAR WITH SPAIN. 
Hon. William R. Day, Secretary of Stale-. Hon. Russell .\. .\lger, Sei-retarv of War. 

Hon. John D. Lonji, Secretary of the Navy. Cieti. FitzluiK'i 1-ee, Consul-Generul to Cuba. 



DEBATE ON THE MORGAN RESOLUTION 203 

Public opinion in tlio United States was again strongly 
aroused. At a large mass meeting held at Washington, pre- 
sided over Ity Seiiafor Gallinger, strong pleas for intervention 
and sharp criticism of the mild policy of the previous admin- 
istration were made. 

Sj)ain watched these developments in the United States 
very anxiously, and the conservative Spanish joiii'iials advised 
the government to make no more concessions, and especially 
to forbid us to interfere in (^dian affairs. But the govern- 
ment was aware that such a policy would at once strengthen 
the warlike feeling in this country, and so it was ofHcially an- 
nounced that Spain would place no obstacle in the way of re- 
lieving the American reconceutrados. 

1'he message was followed by three days of long and ex- 
citing debate in the Senate over the Morgan resolution for ac- 
cording belligerent rights to the Cubans, which passed by a 
vote of 41 to 14, most of the minority being Itei)ublicans who 
did not wish to interfcn-e with the policy of the administration, 
which at that time was summed up in the words, " a peaceful 
intervention to secure the independence of Cuba." This was 
substantially the demand in the ])latform on which the Presi- 
dent had been elected, but he evidently did not propose to be 
swerved from a judicious course, though he recognized that 
the people were becoming impatient. Independence through 
l)ui'cliase was regarded as one of the possibilities, but in any 
event it was seen that it must be independence. Spanish rule 
over the island was recognized as no longer possible or desir- 
able. It was not unreasonable to suppose that some of the 
sujtport (d" tlie lielligereucy resolution lia<l come from ]iolitical 
enemies who wisli('(l to force the administration into precipi- 
tatr" action, and the l*resident did not propose to be forced. 
In his position he was upheld by the House. 

The effect of this new excitement in the United States 
upon the Spanish government was pronounced. Sagasta, the 
Lib(>ral leader, had allowed Canovas to pursue his policy for a 
long time without criticism, though believing that the attempt 



y04 SPAIN'S GLOOMY OUTLOOK 

to uphold the Weyler regime was driviug the United States 
into warlike expressions. When the action of the United 
States Senate became known, Sagasta announced that the 
truce whereby he had supported Canovas in his Cuban policy 
was at an end. In a debate in the Cortes he said : " We 
have 200,000 troops in CHiba, but we are not masters of the 
territory trodden by oiu- soldiers. Carlism is organizing itself 
in the peninsula and menaces us with a new war, thanks to the 
immunity it enjoys. The picture could not be gloomier. We 
have a war in Cuba and a war in the Philippines. We wish to 
know what has become of the sixteen millions of the former 
loan, as eight millions are still due the army. In Cuba no im- 
portant problem has been solved, and th»re has only been an 
exaggeration of long-existing evils." 

The feeling between the Liberals and Conservatives be- 
came very bitter. In a dispute in the lobby of the Cortes over 
the Morgan resolution between Comas, a Liberal senator, 
professor in the Madrid University, and the Duke of Tetuan, 
Minister of Foreign Affairs, the latter boxed the senator's 
ears, and the excitement became so great that the sitting was 
suspended. ^Fbe Duke resigned his office, but the bitter feel- 
ing continued, though a duel was averted. The Liberals 
dex'lared their intention of absenting themselves from the 
Cortes till reparation was made. Canovas appealed to the 
absentees, saying that \oxe of country in the presence of grave 
internatiouai troubles should lead them to resume their duties, 
but they obstinalcdy remained absent, and on the 2d of June 
Canovas tendered his resignation to the Queen. She sum- 
moned General Campos to Madrid, and after a considtation 
with the party leaders the Canovas ministry was given a new 
lease of life. Faith still lingered in the reports of Weyler as 
to the speedy pacification of Cuba; in fact he had held and 
continued to hold this position of the greatest pecuniary profit 
to himself largely by continually repeating what was not true 
as to the condition of the islanil. 

The Cuban revolutionary party had always sought from 



THE SITUATION COMPREHENDED AT MADRID 205 

the l)('<;iiniing to weaken Spain, to wear her ont so that in 
despair and to save herself she wonld drop Cnba and leave it 
to the (Albans. And when Spain was really bronght to ihe 
]»(iint of seeing that Cuba could be of no further use to hei-, her 
j>ride aud domestic politics left her no other course but war 
with the United States. " War," said a Madrid journal, " is 
the oidv solntiou that will pi'oloug the days of the doomed 
monarchy. AVoe to the throne if it avert it. To fall in ( 'uba 
is to fall with all the ignominy of Sedan; to fall in the Ifuited 
States is to fall with all the glory of Waterloo." 

It was (piite evident that ^ladrid could not be deceived by 
the claims of pacification. " We have for some time purposely 
refrained," said El Imparcial, "from all comment and criti- 
cism concerning the Cuban question in order not to be prose- 
cuted and not to give rise to press scandals. If we now break 
silence it is to express our astonishment upon learning that 
provinces have been declared pacified where fighting is an 
every-day occurrence and where the rebellion's most famous 
leaders continue at the head of their followers." 

Cieneral Garcia, operating in the province of Santiago de 
Cuba with a well-Ciiuipped army, had driven the Spaniards 
into tlie more important towns after several victorious engage- 
ments. In their effort to hold Bayanio the S[)aniards had 
several times undertaken to transport sup]di(N from !Mau- 
zanillo, but each time the rebels had fallen upon them and cap- 
tui-ed a large jtorticni of the arms and ])rovisions. Once they 
had blown u]) a boat laden with men an<l supplies on the Canto 
liiver. It cost the Spaniards a large amount of money and 
l)loo(l to keej) a garrison at llayamo, aud it was of no impor- 
tance to them from a military standjioint, for the country was 
filled with insurgents and the Spaniards did not venture to at- 
tack. But Weyler knew tlmt the fall of Bayamo M'ould result 
in the fall of the niinistrv and ])ossibly in a Spanish ujirising. 

After passing around Weyler's troops aud entering ]\ratan- 
zas, Gomez returned to Santa Clara, where "Weyler again en- 
deavored or pretended to surround him. The result was that 



206 A TYPICAL SPANISH ''VICTORY" 

General Weyler met General Gomez for the first time in a 
pitched battle. There is a cattle ranch at La Reforma, in 
the eastern part of Santa Clara province, consisting of about 
10,000 acres, and it was always a favorite camping-ground for 
Gomez, as his son, who fell by Maceo's side, was born there. 
At this time he camped on this ranch as usual. 

It seems incredible that 1,500 men should stand and fight 
20,000, but the Spaniards generally march in columns of 
1,000. They came into La Eeforma from twenty different 
directions. The trap was apparently well laid, but Gomez, 
wlio was cognizant of it for two weeks, simply waited. His 
tactics here were typical of his tactics elsewhere. He sent a 
hundred men to fight one column and fifty to fight another 
cohnnn; a hundred against another, and seventy-five to meet 
still another, and so on. Ten Cubans have often been known 
to hold a Spanish colunm of 1,000 men until General Gomez 
could get together his impedimenta and get away — hold them 
at a complete standstill. The Spaniards were always in deadly 
fear of an ambuscade, and they would not run into it. 

The Cubans on tliis occasion not only held the Spanish 
columns in check, but several times small divisions charged, 
and on the last time Weyler's left flank was routed. His horse 
was wounded three times, although he did not come to the 
front. The battle wound up by Weyler's withdrawing his 
troops and Gomez came in and camped on the field. It was 
reported in Havana as a Spanish victory. The Cuban loss 
was twenty-six and the Spanish loss 185 and about 300 
wonudcd. 

Tho net result of Weyler's Santa Clara campaigns, from 
which sucli great results were expected, Avas the complete de- 
vastation of another ]U'ovince and a consequent reduction of 
th(^ f(.(.(l snp])lv u]ion which the Spanish troops Avere more de- 
pendent than the Cnbans. Tn the country which the insur- 
gents conunanded, which was at least fonr-fifths of the island, 
and into which the S]ianisli tv(»o]is did not venture except in a 
lar«e force, the Cubans found food on every bush and in every 



MII.ITAKV SKILT. AND JUDGMENT OF GOMEZ 207 

root. I'licy licld liill-luckcd vallcvs where their eattlo grazed 
ill sateiN' and where they even phiiited <iiii('k crops like sweet 
|ti>tateis, which ripen live or six times a year in Cuba. Gomez 
ami his h'a(h'is axaih'd themselves to the fullest extent of the 
advantages afforded hy the nature of the country, fought only 
when ihey wanted to, and chose fa\'oral)le niovenients for at- 
tack with I'are disceriunent and judgment, lie showed hini- 
scdf to he not only a nuiii born to comnmnd, but one skilled to 
a higli decree in military science so far as it could be applied 
to the peculiar warfare in which the Cubans were engaged, 
iris nuisterly circular movements by which he brought his 
forces to AVeyler's rear when that general fancied he had the 
wily ( 'nhan hemmed in was Imt a single example of the numy 
cases in wlii(di he never failed to puzzle the Spanish, who, worn 
out by the chase, could never succeed in cornering him, and 
who lived in constant dread that he would fall upon them sud- 
denly from some favorable and)usli. 

On his return from Cuba, Mr. Calhoun, the special com- 
missioner ap])ointed by the United States, made a confidential 
report to tlu^ President upon the Kuiz case and as to the situa- 
tion on the island as he saw it, and a few days later Stewart L. 
Woodford of New York was appointed to the Madrid ministry, 
with instructions to secure an indemnity of $75,000 in the 
Kuiz case, and to impress upon the Spanish government the 
sincere wish of the United States to lend its aid towards the 
ending of the war in Cid)a by the reaching of peaceful and 
lasting results, just aiul honorable alike to Spain and to the 
Cuban people. These instructions recited the character and 
diu-ation of the contest, the widespread losses it entailed, the 
burdens and restraints it imposed u]ion us, with constant dis- 
tni'bance n( national intei'csts and the injury resulting from 
an iiuh^finite continuance of this state of things. 

Tt Avas stated that at this juncture onr government was con- 
strained to seriously inquire if the tinu^ was not ripe when 
Spain of her own volition, moved by her own interests and 
every sentiment of humanity, should put a stop to this destruc- 



208 ASSASSINATION OF CANOVAS 

five war and make proposals of settlement honorable to herself 
and just to her C'liban colonies. It was nrged that as a neigh- 
I)oring nation with large interests in Cuba we could be re- 
quired to wait only a reasonal)le time for the mother country 
to establish its authority and restore peace and order within the 
l)orders of the island; that we could not contemplate an in- 
definite period for the accomplishment of this result. 

During the interval of time required for the newly-ap- 
pointed American minister to present his credentials to the 
Spanish court, both the governments of the United States and 
of Spain maintained a waiting attitude as to Cuban affairs, 
though in the latter country domestic politics were much dis- 
turbed. It was held as an assured fact that the Canovas min- 
istry would in a short time l)e re(|uired to resign, and it was 
expected that the event would take place very soon after the 
American minister presented his credentials and made his de- 
mands, an event which could hardly occur until October, when 
the Queen returned to Madrid from San Sebastian. Mean- 
while, the Cortes had been dissolved, and Cano\as, whose 
health had become somewhat impaired, had gone to Santa 
Agneda, a watering place not far from San Sebastian, where 
lie was taking a course of baths and attending to affairs of state. 

On the Sth of August, while Canovas was standing in the 
gallery of the bathing establishment waiting for his wife, a 
young Italian anarchist named Golli fired three shots at the 
minister, all taking effect, and he died in a few minutes. For 
years Canovas had been one of Spain's leading statesmen, a 
strong u])holder of the monarchy and a defender of the integ- 
rity of the kingdom, and. though Spain's relations were in a 
very trying state, he was still hopeful of a settlement which 
would preserve to the kingdom peace at home and continued 
dominion over Cuba Avith little surrender of royal preroga- 
tive. This assassination had the effeot of stopping the politi- 
cal quarrel; Sagasta and other Liberals at once placed them- 
selves at the orders of the government, but General Azcar- 
raga, the minister of war, was made the premier provisionally. 



STARVATION, MISERY, AND DEATH 209 

It was the goiioral opinion in this conntry tliat the death of 
CanoN'as would iireatly (*han<z,(! the Cuban situation, for by his 
ability and strength as a statesman he had braved as no other 
man could the public; opinion of those who more and more 
called for the removal of Weyler. That general was at this 
time engaged in an effort to beat back the advancing insur- 
gents in ]\Iatanzas, but he was gradually being forced back 
towards Havana. The day after the tragedy in Spain his 
forces suffered a severe defeat at Aguacate in Havana prov- 
ince, and, leaving many Spanish dead on the field, he hurried 
back into t he city with insurgents tiring on his rear guard. He 
had been utterly unable to check the invasion Avliich Gomez 
had planned. Death had l)een on all sides, in the open ground 
of battle, in the hidden and)ush, in burning buildings, in fever- 
infected swamps, and in disease-breeding hospitals — yet the 
rebellion remained a living, active, aggressive force. The 
Spanish soldiers were in a bad way; they had not received their 
j)ay for months; they were weak from illness and i)oor rations; 
they were badly clothed and sometimes shoeless; their credit 
was exhausted, and they were in no condition to take the 
offensive. The only feature of Weyler's campaign which was 
working successfully was his war on the jiacificos. They were 
dying by the hundreds in the center's of concentration every 
day. In Pinar del Ivio whole towns were starving. There 
were no vegetables; people were feeding on emaciated dogs. 
Pacificos were driven into the city of ^Matanzas from some of 
the outside fortifications which the Spanish could not hold, 
and as the poor famished wretches came straggling along, 
cruelly beaten by the soldiers to make them go on, many 
dropped and died. Evei-ywhere was misery and death. 



CIIAPTEK XIX 

THE STORY OF MISS CISNEROS AND HER REMARKABLE ES- 
CAPE-RECALL OF WEYLER- PENALTY OF DEATH TO 
ALL INSURGENTS TREATING WITH SPANIARDS. 

Weyler Retained by the New Premier — The Escape of Evaogelina Cisne- 
ros— Her Romantic Story — Following Her Father to Jail — On the 
Isla de Pinos — Attracted by Evangelina's Beauty — Berriz in Close 
Quarters — Guerrillas Appear— Her Escape to a Cave — Found by 
the Guerrillas— Sent to Havana — Thrown into a Vile Prison — Sym- 
pathy Aroused in this Country — An Appeal to the Queen — Her 
Escape through a Barred Window — Smuggled on a Steamer in Boy's 
Clothes — Her Enthusiastic Reception in New York — The Queen Tired 
of Cuban Troubles — Her Farewell to ]\[iuister Taylor — Sagasta's Min- 
istry—Arrival in Havana of Blanco, and Return of Weyler — Weyler's 
Grotesque Failure — Blanco Announces a More Liberal Policy — A 
Stroke of Spanish Diplomacy — Release of the Competitor Prisoners — 
Their Wretched Lot. 

THE provisional premier, General Azcarraga, announced 
that General Weyler wonld be retained in Cuba and 
be supported by the government, which would strictly 
adhere to the late minister's policy. In writing to one of his 
political supporters he said : " General Woodford will be re- 
ceived and even welcomed as our mourned Don Antonio 
(Cano^'as) wished to welcome him. If he brings only claims 
of American citizens harmed in Cuba, attention will be paid 
to these claims so far as they are just. In a friendly manner 
he will be notified also of Spain's right to claim other damages, 
and instructions will be given for the purpose to our minister 
at Washington. But it will be a great mistake if he intends to 
suggest anv other kind of American interference in Cuba." 
He said that America would be told very plainly to keep her 
hands off or take the consequences. But the Conservative 
forces were badly divided, and as the success of the ministry 
depended upon the carrying on of that policy which had nearly 



THE STORY OF EVANGELINE CISNEROS 211 

been disastrous even umlcr the stroiit;- liaiid of ( 'aiiovas, it was 
evident that it could not h)ng endure. Nothing but a con- 
spicuous success by AVeyler in Cuba could give it strength. 

Though the Spanish continued to report victories daily it 
was, nevertheless, a notable fact that the insurgents were still 
as active as ever in all the provinces. All the rural districts 
were in their hands. They reigned as absolute masters, and 
in the eastern end of the island had reorganized the i)rovinces. 
The royal troops were cantoned in the cities, from which they 
sallied forth now and then, but with small results. They 
would start out in the morning to crush a rebel force, fire a 
few volleys at them and return in time for their evening meal. 
In these engagements the Sjianish loss was generally greater 
than the Cuban, though the Spanish reports were always to the 
contrary. 

In the fall of 1897 public interest in the United States was 
greatly aroused in the remarkable escape of Evangelina Cis- 
neros, a young Cuban girl of good family, whose story reads 
like a romance. At the outbreak of the revolution she lived 
with her father and three sisters at a pleasant little place in 
Puerto Principe. Her father decided to enter the Cuban 
army, but before he could go he was arrested, and in time was 
sent to Isla de Pinos with other prisoners. Evangelina faith- 
fully and dutifidly followed his footsteps to share his punish- 
ment and comfort him in his sorrow. She was eighteen years 
of age, cultured, talented, and beautiful. Through her ef- 
forts and the mediation of some friends, the governor of the 
penal settlement gave Cisneros permission to withdraw from 
the common criminals, and to live with his daughter, and there 
everything went well till a new governor came to the island, 
Coloncd Perriz, a nejihew of the Spanish mim'stcr of war and 
a favorite adjutant of AVeyler. Struck by the girl's beauty, 
he endeaviire<l to attract her to him, but failing, adopted 
harsher measures. Her father was arrested and taken to an 
unknown place. Late that night, when the girl was alone ai^i 
wondering where her father was. Colonel Berriz came to her 



212 PETITIONS TN HEll "BEHAl.F 

house, forced himself into her presence, sought to force her to 
submit to him by making her father's liberty contingent upon 
her compliance, and when this failed he would have over- 
powered her had she not slipped [iway from him, opened the 
door, and screamed for help, Avhich came, at once. Berriz 
was in close quarters for a moment, but succeeded in calling a 
few guerrillas who were near. As her friends were unarmed 
they could make no resistance; they tried to escape as best 
they could, and several were shot in cold blood. She man- 
aged to escape and hid in a cave till the next morning, when 
she was discovered by guerrillas, locked up, and later, with 
others, was sent to Havana, where she was placed in the Casa 
de Recojidas, the prison for disreputable women. In order to 
save the reputation of the villain, Colonel Berriz, the Spanish 
had invented an accusation against her character. Her ex- 
periences in that prison were horrible. 

At intervals the story of this innocent girl's wrongs ran 
through the Cuban news in this country, and many people be- 
came interested. Her trial came on in August, and she was 
sentenced to twenty years' imprisonment in an African penal 
settlement upon the testimony of tJie perjurers who were try- 
ing to save the reputation of the nephew of the man who had 
become the Premier of Spain. Mrs. Jefferson Davis, Julia 
Ward Howe, Mrs. John A. Logan, and others petitioned the 
Queen for her release. The Pope, who had been appealed to, 
urged clemency, while Weyler, incensed at the efforts in the 
girl's behalf, publicly reiterated the falsehood as to her char- 
acter. The Queen did not act. 

MeauAvhile, a New York newspaper commissioned one of 
its reporters to go to Havana and see if he could bring about 
lier escape. The rescue was carefully planned and success- 
fully executed. It was a desperate game, but it succeeded, 
and one night, having succeeded in drugging the wretched 
women in the prison pen with her, lest they should betray her, 
she was helped through a window, one of the bars of which had 
been filed and bent by her accomplices. She was at first taken 



I 



HER RESCUE AND ESCAPE TO NEW YORK 5il3 

to a house of a friend in Havana and carefully concealed. In 
a few days, dressed in boy's clothes, she was smuggled on a 
steamer bound for Xcw York, while the Spanish guards were 
searching in every nook and corner of Havana for her. She 
became the heroine of the hour in New York, where a recep- 
tion was arranged for her, and where her beauty and cultured 
ways won admiration and the story of her trials thrilled every 
heart. 

"While it is possible that few cases possessed so many dra- 
matic features as that of Miss (^isncros, it was well known that 
there were hundreds of other victims, innocent of any charge 
except sympathy for the Cubans. Had it not been for the 
daring rescue of Miss Cisneros, she, like others, might have 
gone to wear away her life in an African penal settlement. 
For could the Queen pardon a mere girl when her punishment 
was necessary to save the reputation of the nephew of her 
Prime ]\Iinister ? That she was moved by the appeals and the 
story of Miss Cisneros's sufferings there can be little doubt. 
She was tired and sick of the condition of things in Cuba. To 
pardon this girl might mean a cabinet crisis, and how much 
the case had to do with the fall of (General Azcarraga can only 
be surmised. It was on September 28th that the Queen talked 
so plainly to Azcarraga that he resigned, but before the new 
ministry was fairly at work Miss Cisneros had slipped through 
her barred window and was on her way to New York. 

On September 13th, when taking leave of ^Ir. Tnylor, the 
departing minister of the United States, the (^ueen said : 

" Do, pray, be a friend to Spain when you return to 
America." 

^' Madam, E will, so far as my conscience will permit," 
was his reply. 

The (^ueen receivcMl Minister Woodford graciously and 
conversed with liim in an informal manner withont any refer- 
ence to the sul)ject upon which both countries were intensely 
interested. His instructions were such as to give Spain no 
intinuition of just what the United States would do as a last 



214 RECALL OP GENERAL WEYLER 

resort to end the trouble in Cuba, and his first duty was to 
sound Spain as to our friendly intervention to bring about a 
settlement between the Cubans and the Spaniards. If Spain 
rejected this plan, the minister was to inform this government 
and receive new instruction. 

Meanwhile, General Azcarraga was engaged in a desperate 
attcm})t to bring into a cabinet all the dissenting Conserva- 
tive forces, but the larger Aviug of these under the leadership 
of Silvela refused to become a party to the government un- 
less Weyler was recalled. To this Azcarraga would not con- 
sent. 1'he (^ueen, who had become disgusted with Con- 
servative quarrels, and horrors in Cuba, returned to Madrid 
September 2Sth, when she stated her sentiments so forcibly 
that the impending crisis was precipitated and the ministry 
tendered their resignations. Sagasta was summoned to form 
a new cabinet. Hope of peace in Cuba was stimulated by 
the announcement that AVeyler would be recalled if he did 
not resign, and General Blanco, considered as the most 
Inunane general in Spain, would take his place to carry out 
a comprehensive scheme of autonomy. But Weyler was not 
disposed to resign his lucrative position, and the hopeful 
feeling in the ITnited States was offset by the rage with which 
the bloodthirsty element of Havana received the news of 
AVeyler's fall. The Volunteers, at the instigation of one of 
AYeyler's factotums, paraded the streets shouting " Death to 
the United States! " '' Long live General Weyler! " and the 
whole city was for a short time in a state of terror. 

General Blanco arrived at Havana on October 30th, and 
General Weyler departed, having bought a bill of exchange,, 
it is reported, for $000,000. His salary during his occupancy 
of the islaud would have amounted to about $80,000. The 
expenses of the war had nearly doubled; millions had been 
spent for supplies, and yet the Spanish troops were poorly fed 
and poorly clothed. Medicine had been purchased in large 
quantities, but was always scarce, and the names of legions of 
dead Spaniards were kept on the pay-roll. Never had been 



A CARNIVAL OF lU.OODSIIED AND FRAl'l) 215 

more strikingly ilhistratcd tlie saying that tliongh a Spaniard 
will fight for his country, he also does not hesitate to rob it. 
The frands of the connnissariat were enormons, and Weyler 
was only one of the [)i-iiici]>al l)onefiters. 

To snstain Weyler in pacifying a country which he was 
continually reporting to he troubled with a few bands of scat- 
tering bandits, Spain had poured out her young blood with a 
lavish hand — i;>0,000 men and officers in addition to the 
120,000 which had been previously sent. Thus from the out- 
break of the war she had sent to the island over 250,000 men, 
fully armed, and the mystery of the military world was what 
Weyler could do with them in an island so small that an army 
of 30,000 insurgents could practically hold the whole coun- 
try and even raid the suburbs of Havana. History aifords no 
parallel in the way of gi'otesque failures. With such an 
army and over 50,000 Volunteers at his back, Weyler had 
done nothing but complete the devastation of the f(n-tile island 
and starve and kill tliousniids of ]nieincos, driven like sheep 
from their burning homes. His guerrillas had swe])t the 
country for hiding innocents, and butchered in cold blood 
wounded (Hibans in their hospitals, not sparing the nurses. 
IJniidi'cds had been thi'owu into filthy jails upon the flimsiest 
charges or none at all, their fate often remaining a mystery. 
He had met the generosity of the (Adians, who regulai-ly set at 
liberty the Spaniards they captured, by killing Cuban ))ris- 
oners upon nearly every occasion, and all this cruelty and 
wantonness had ])ut added fuel to the llame of Cuba's hatred 
toward the mother country, which now, in the hope of saving 
her de\astate(l island, grudgingly pro]>osed to otler an auton- 
omy which, if more liberal than heretofore, was still restricted. 

Sagasta, whether Ixdieving that autonomy would be ac- 
cepted or not, knew that it would gain time and tend to 
diminish the aggressive s])irit in the United States. He had 
been given to understand that if something were not done it 
would be impossil)le to silence the demands of Congress when 
it met in December. Moreover, the tiuie had come when the 



216 BLIND AND UNGOVERNABLE PRIDE 

island was of no further financial use to Spain. She had 
mortgaged Cuba's revenues for more than they were worth by 
the issue of bonds. To hold her longer would mean only an 
cxliausting expense to Spain, and it was only that ungovern- 
able pride which had been her ruin that prevented her from 
withdrawing from the devastated island. In this situation a 
war with the United States seemed to afford an avenue of 
escape with the possibility — the probability — as the Spanish 
statesman thought, that the other powers of Europe would 
step in and not only help her humble the United States but 
even give her back Cuba and preserve the dynasty. From 
this time forth Spain used what resources she could command, 
not to push tlie war in Cuba, but to strengthen herself for a 
contest with the United States, while doing everything to post- 
pone the break by an ostentatious reversal of Weylcr's policy 
as to the reconcentrados, and an attempt to infuse the forlorn 
hope of autonomy with enough life to keep the United States 
in a waiting attitude. 

A reply to Minister Woodford's note was received by our 
governnient on October 23d. Stripped of its diplomatic 
phraseology, Spain's answer to the United States was substan- 
tially this : 

" All the armed expeditions intended to benefit the Chd)an 
rebels are organized in the United States and sail from United 
States ports. Some of these expeditions have been prevented 
from going to Cuba, but most of them have succeeded in leav- 
ing America. If there were no aid from United States citi- 
zens there would be no insurrection. The United States can 
best extend its friendly offices by suppressing these expedi- 
tions." 

The wisest men saw that war was inevitable unless Spain 
surrendered her sovereignty in Cuba on some terms. From 
this time on diplomacy was used largely in an effort to arrange 
the terms, and in Spain it was used to provoke the Eurojicau 
powers into an attitude of hostility towards us. The adminis- 
tration wisely began the work of putting the defences and the 



RELEASE OF THE "COMPETITOR" PRISONERS 217 

armament of the nation, so lono- noglccicd, into Ix'ttcr sli;i])o. 
In ("nba the Spani.-li coiitiiiiKM] to hnni ('nl,;!!! lio<])it;ils, kill 
the inmates and hel[)less women and children, while the in- 
snrg-ents continued tlieir successes. According to the reports 
of tlie Spanish hcaltli Imreans, a thousand rcconcciiti-ados were 
dying every day. Jt was too late to amend matters by annull- 
ing the decree of concentration, for the hai)less peo])le were 
now destitute, they had no homes t(j return to, and their tields 
had been destroyed. 

At this time, by order from Madrid, the Coiiipetilor pris- 
oners were released (iTth of Xovemljei-j, and the act Avas 
naturally regarded not so mm h as a concession as an effort on 
the part of 8j)ain to deprive^ the friends of intervention in the 
Congress of a rational basis for action. It was in exact keep- 
ing with previous Spanish diplomacy to appease sentiment in 
this country at certain intoi'vals l)y the release of American 
citizens kept a long time in ])rison without evidence of their 
guilt. 

Broken in hcaltli by their long confinement and the treat- 
ment accorded tliem, and clad only in the rags which they had 
worn since their capture a year and a half before, they pre- 
sented a pitiful spectacle as they landed in Xew York and fell 
into the arms of their friends. The story they t<»ld of their 
sufferings was heartrending. Sentenced to death Avithout any 
chanr-e to defend themselves, and saved only because the exe- 
cution was postponed from ^Madrid, for eighteen months they 
had lain in jail and been frequently subjected to torture by 
their cruel jailers. Yet some of the newspapers of the coun- 
try hailed the tardy release of these men as a triumph of 
American citi/.cnsliip and a disarmament of ''jingoism." 
They pretended to regai-d it just as Spain in her crafty insin- 
cerity trusted they would, and of course they reflected the 
(>l>iniou of many people desirous of peace at any price. 



14 



CHAPTER XX 

THE PRESIDENT'S MESSAGE — TRAGIC DEATH OF COLONEL 
RUIZ — RIOTS IN HAVANA — ARRIVAL OF THE MAINE 
IN THE HARBOR OF HAVANA. 

The Adrainistratiou's Cuban Policy Outlined — Possilnlities of Interven- 
tion — Opposition to Autonomy — Colonel Ruiz Hopes to Convert the 
Young Cuhan Leader, Nestor Aranguren — The Latter's Reply to 
Ruiz's Letter — Aranguren Warns Him — The Meeting — Arangu 
ren's Own Story of What Happened — Ruiz Shot — Organized Relief 
for the Reconcentrados — Military Operations in the East — Disquiet- 
ing Reports — Lee Advises Having Warships in Readiness — A Deli- 
cate Situation — Winter Drill of North American Squadron — The 
Storm Breaks in Havana — "Death to Autonomy!" — Lee's Message 
— Blanco's Prompt Action — Death-Blow to Autonomy — Protection 
of American Citizens — The Maine Ordered to Havana — Strange 
Action of the Havana Authorities — Gen. Lee's Misgivings — The 
Maine Arrives Quietly — Demonstrations of Eternal Friendship. 

THE assembling of Congress in December and the mes- 
sage of President MeKinley were awaited with the 
keenest interest in the United States, in Spain, and in 
Cuba. Conkl the crisis in Cnban afPairs be longer postponed? 
The President recognized the problem as the most important 
with which the government had to deal. His message told 
the story of the previons rebellions, and the relation of onr 
government to them and to the existing rebellion in which de- 
struction had been carried to every part of the island. He de- 
nounced the " crnel policy of reconcentration," which had ut- 
terly failed and which " was not civilized warfare, but extermi- 
nation." Against this abuse he had repeatedly protested. 
After reviewing the more recent diplomatic negotiations, he 
said that three untried measures remained — the recognition 
of belligerency, the recognition of independence, and neutral 
intervention to end the war by imposing a rational compro- 
mise. 

(218) 



AN ATTEMPT TO PERVERT ARANGUREN :219 

Although the apparent hopefulness of the message was 
not shared by the majority of the members of Congress, they 
could not but be impressed with the strength of the reasons 
for waiting and watching results. But it soon became evident 
that, however good the disposition of Captain-General ]>lanco, 
it could have little effect upon an island so conditioned as 
Cuba. A large proportion of the Spanish subjects having 
commercial and business interests there Avuuld not accept 
autonomy, and the openly hostile attitude of the always 
troublesome Yolunteers caused the government much anxiety. 
Blanco did all he could to bring the insurgents around to a 
more favorable attitude, going so far as to liberate General 
Rivera, Maceo's successor, who had been captured in March 
and had been in Cabaiia fortress ever since. The Captain- 
General endeavored to have him use his influence with the 
insurgents to accept autonomy, but he refused. A decree was 
published, offering amnesty to all exiles ordered from the 
island by Weyler, except common criminals, but how deter- 
mined the insurgents were in the position they had taken is 
shown by one of the tragic incidents of this period. 

The fearless young insurgent leader, iSTestor Aranguren, 
whose daring raids upon the Spanish forces about Havana had 
given him the sobriquet of " the Cuban Sheridan," was a per- 
sonal friend of Colonel Ruiz, Blanco's aide-de-camp. Ruiz 
had informed Blanco that he believed he could convince Aran- 
guren of the advantage of surrcmdering and accepting au- 
tonomy. '' I know his good heart," said Ruiz, " and I can in- 
duce him to abandon his folly and come back to Havana with 
me." Nothing could have been more pleasing to Blanco than 
to make a convert of this dashing young ( 'uban. Ruiz opened 
correspondence with him to this end, and Aranguren answered 
in amicable terms, but energetically refused to betray the 
Cuban cause. " AVe are suffering all the hardships of the life 
we are leading," said Aranguren, " only to makc^ our counti'v 
free. We do not hate the Spaniards ])ersonally, but we do not 
like their government in any form. As a gentleman I appre- 



220 KUIZ MEETS THE FATE OF A SPY 

ciate you and admire your talents, but in our intercourse let 
us drop political questions." 

This letter encouraged Ruiz to answer that he was sure 
that " personally " Aranguren would not refuse to see him, 
and he asked for a meeting on December 9tli two miles from 
Campo Florida. Aranguren sent the letter to General Rod- 
riguez, commander of the insurgent forces in the province of 
Havana, and awaited orders. Receiving no reply on the day 
Ruiz had appointed, he did not go, so Ruiz returned to Campo 
Florida and wrote again to Aranguren. On the 11th the lat- 
ter received from General Rodriguez the message, " Do as you 
please, but if he offers autonomy do your duty." Aranguren 
sent a copy of this order to Ruiz with these words: 

" If you desire to talk about the independence of Cuba or 
as a friend I will see you to-morrow. If not, for God's sake 
do not come." 

Ruiz well understood the nature of the order which Gomez 
had given to his army. Anyone appearing to offer autonomy 
would be treated as a spy, but Ruiz still had faith in his 
powers to persuade Aranguren, so when he received the reply 
on the 13th he at once started for the rendezvous. What fol- 
lowed was thus related afterwards by Aranguren himself: 

" The following day (it was 10 o'clock in the morning) Ruiz, in the 
full uniform of a Spanish colonel, and accompanied by two practieos, pre- 
sented himself at one of the outposts. From the very start I felt nervous 
and would gladlj^ have avoided the encounter, but it was not in my power 
to do so. I met Ruiz at the entrance to my camp. He was very pale and 
acted in a nervous, hesitating manner. He rode forward and attempted 
to grasp my hand, which I refused to let him have. 

"'How fine you are looking," he said, not appearing to notice my 
action. ' This life evidently agrees with you. You are a fortunate boy ; 
no man among you all has the future that you have. Autonomy has been 
granted, and you, my dear friend, have been selected as the first one to be 
pardoned. ' 

" In vain did I hold up my hand and motion him to stop talking. 

" 'I have come,' he continued, 'to offer the pardon of a generous 
Government and such a position as you raaj desire. Ask what you will 
and you will have it. It all lies with you. Ask.' 

" Ruiz had condennied himself, and I ordered my men to arrest him. 
He was at once tried, found guilty, and shot. He met his death like a 



THE RED CROSS IN CUBA 221 

brave man, fearless to the end. This is a true account of liow ail tiiis sad 
affair occurn-d, and when my friends in the north read tiiis, I liope they 
will reason as I did, liiat a sdldicr's duly to his country comes lirst of all." 

It was said that the iiisufo-cnts found upon liniz's body an 
autliorization from (iencral JJlanco offering to give Aranguren 
$100,000 and to extend official favors in the autonomous gov- 
ernment. This act was industriously heralded as an evidence 
of the barbarity of the Cubans by the Si)aiiisli ministry and by 
" the peace at any price '' men in tlu^ United States, and more 
ado was made over it than over the hundreds of cases in which 
Cuban officers had bcnm ruthlessly shiiu in cold blood, a fate 
that was still reserved for Aranguren himself. Ruiz did not 
go under a flag of truce; lie went in the face of a warning. 
Aranguren was soldier enougli to carry out the orders of his 
(•(imman(ler-in-(diief. The injustice of classing this with the 
outrages daily practiced l)y the Spaniards was so flagrant that 
it only stirred the deeper the spirit of Cuban sympathizers. 

In view of the continued and indeed increasing sufi'ering 
of the reconcentrados, and the widely-expressed desire through- 
out the United States to assist the helpless and starving, the 
government, after some difficulties, arranged in December 
with the Spaiu'sh minister so that charitable contribiiticuis in 
money or kind could be sent to the island b}' the benevolently 
disposed people of the country. Articles so intended could 
be consigned to the consul-general, who had arranged to co- 
operate with the local authorities in certain places. At first 
the relief was confined to Havana, but in a short time proper 
organizations were formed in the surrounding sections. The 
work was systematized uiuhr the snpci-vision of Miss Clara 
Barton, president of the Red Cross Society of the T'nitcd 
States, and her active and experienced assistants. Much 
suffering was prevented, though when the number of poor and 
destitute was so large it was almost impossible to relieve more 
than a few of the worst cases in each locality. 

The decree of General Rlanco announcing the establish- 
ment of autonomy on January 1st had a bombastic introdue- 



223 DISQUIETING INFORMATION 

tion about tlie blessing to be expected from the new regime. 
The plain truth was that outside the army of oftice-seekers, 
who were the natural result of the general poverty of the 
country, and a few Spaniards whose jn-ivate interests led them 
to support Sagasta's government, there were no honest be- 
lievers in autonomy. The Cubans were well aware that the 
decree was a sham, promulgated merely to endeavor to de- 
ceive the patriots. 

The determination not to give offices in the government 
to the uncompromising Spaniards had greatly enraged some 
of them. The advantage given to them by General Blanco 
of ten votes out of sixteen in the electoral junta, which prac- 
tically enabled them to gain a majority in the Assembly, did 
not mollify them. The mutterings of discontent threatened 
to break out into violence upon slight provocation, and hardly 
had President McKinley's message been I'ead in Congress be- 
fore the State Department was receiving disquieting informa- 
tion from our consuls. 

There were rnmors, as General Lee telegraphed, of an ex- 
tensive conspiracy in Matanzas directed against Americans. 
General Blanco promised to deal at once with the alleged con- 
spirators, and in his note of December 3d General Lee said 
that he had the assurance that American life and property 
would be protected by the government at a moment's notice. 
'" I have declined to make an application for the presence of 
one or more warships in this harbor, and have advised those of 
our people who have wives and children here not to send them 
away, at least for the present, because such proceedings would 
not in my opinion be justifiable at this time from the stand- 
])oint of i^ersonal security. I still think that two wai*shi]is at 
least should be at Key West, prepared to move here at short no- 
tice, and that more of them should be sent to Dry Tortugas, 
and a coal station be established there." 

The situation was one of extreme delicacy. The adminis- 
tration did not fail to perceive that the lives of American citi- 
zens were in some danger and that they should really have the 



ANTI-REFORM RIOTS IN HAVANA 223 

iiioi'iil siipjjort to lie derived from tlic presence of a man-of- 
war; on the otlier hand, there was the danger that the appear- 
ance of a Uiuted States warship in ( 'nhan ports \v<iuld cause a 
demonstration by tlie ah-eady inthimed enemies of autonomy 
and of the United States. There was a suiz'gestion in Gen- 
eral Jx'c's corres]ioii(h'iiee that a hii'ge and iutluential portion 
of the Spanish people in the Cuban cities were really desirous 
of a war with the United States, and that this feeling lay to 
some extent underneath the manifestations of disorder. Gen- 
eral Lee was inclined to think that the arrival of a United 
States warship won hi so excite the ]^eople as to preci[)itate a 
crisis at once, and so, from time to time, he advised delay, 
lie had, however, come to the conclusion that it was essential 
to hax'c a naval foi-cc in readiness to act, and the administra- 
tion strongly seconded him in this belief. But it saw the 
necessity of proceeding cautiously, for Spain w^as regarding 
our naval plans with cNpressions of disapprobation. 

The North xVtlantic squadron had orders to rendezvous 
about Key West, not, it was stated, because of conditions at 
Havana, though the plan for winter drill in those waters un- 
doubtedly had in it a measure of precaution. The Maine was 
coaletl and ready for sea at short notice and was undoubt(Hlly 
held in readiness in case of emergency. 

On the 12th of Januai'v the anti-reform storm broke forth 
in serious riots in Havana, taking the shape of attacks upon the 
antonomistic papers. A mob headed by several army ofRcei'S 
and made up of hundreds of the conservative Spaniards 
wrecked toui- news]);ipei" olHces, the immediate cause being 
General Blanco's refusal to sui)press these journals, which 
Avere sujjporting him. The next day General Lee telegraphed 
to "Washington : " Soldiers sent to protect them fraternized 
with the mob. Two attacks were attempted t<i-day. I am 
told that troops massed inside the palace to j)rotect Governor- 
General shout 'Death to Autonomy!' ' I")eath to Blanco!' 
T^ncertainty exists whether l)laneo enn eontntl situation. 
If demonstrated he cannot maintain order, preserve life, and 



224 SPAIN MUST YIELD 

keep the peace, or if Americans and their interests are in dan- 
ger, ships must be sent, and to that end shoukl be prepared to 
move promptly. Excitement and uncertainty predominates 
everywhere." Bhmco acted jjromptly and courageously. 
Artillery forces and cavalry detachments were placed at all 
strategic points in the city. He issued orders also to the au- 
tonomic papers to j)ublish nothing more which would inflame 
the rioters. This was really a confession of weakness. The 
rioters thus gained their point. A death blow had been given 
to autonomy! 

Thousands of troops were brought in from the fiekl and 
massed in the cit}' under ofiicers whom Blanco thought he 
could depend upon, and gradually quiet was restored, though 
. there was much suppressed excitement. 

The administration was fully aware of the dangers of the 
situation, and quietly began to make preparations to act if 
necessary, though maintaining tlie most friendly attitude 
toward Sjiain. It Avas evident that autonomy was dead. The 
insurgents were dri\-ing the Spanish troops from their gar- 
risons, the reconcentrados were starving notwithstanding 
measures of relief; there could be but one outcome, but one 
policy. Spain must yield her sovereignty in the island or face 
war. The President, aware that any accident might precipi- 
tate trouble and endanger every American on the island, de- 
termined to use his diplomacy to induce Spain to 2>eacefully 
3'ield her sovereignty in Cuba, and at the same time prepare to 
j^rotect American rights. 

In taking the necessary steps the administration desired to 
avoid any affront to Spain, and also the dangers of arousing 
the excitable Spaniards in Cuba and Spain. To have sent a 
battleship into Havana harbor while Blanco was offering as- 
surances that the rights of all foreigners Avould bo protected 
would in all probability have added new fuel to the riots. In 
two or three days quiet had been restored and a few days later 
the Spanish minister at AVashington was informed that the 
United States desired to " resume " friendlv naval calls in 



RESUMPTION OF FRIENDLY NAVAL RELATIONS 225 

Cuban ports. The minister was inclined to demur, but con- 
sidering' the sj^irit in which the proposal was made there could 
luinllv he reason for anv diploniatir (ilijcction, and any S})an- 
ish ahirni niig'ht be })i'event(Ml if a S[)aiiish warsjiip made a 
similar call at some American port. 

On January 24th, Assistant Secretary Day sent the follow- 
ing despatch to General Lee: 

" It is the puriiose of this Government to resume friendly naval visits 
at Cuban ports. In that view, the Maine will call at the port of Havana 
in a day or two. Please arrange for a friendly interchange of calls witli 
authorities." 

Secretary Day made a statement to the public in which he 
said: '' Sending the Maine to Havana means simply the re- 
sumption of friendly iia\al relations with Spain. It is cus- 
tomary for naval vessels of friendly nations to pass in and otit 
of the harbors of other countries with which they are at peace, 
and British and (Jerman warships have recently visited 
Havana. This is no new move. 'J'he President has inteudcHl 
to do it for some time, but heretofore something has happened 
to postpone it. The orders for the ]\faine mean nothing more 
than 1 have saitl, and there is nothing alai'ming or unfriendly 
in them. The Spanish minister here is fully informed of what 
is going on, and so far as I know has not made the slightest ob- 
jection to it." In a public statement the Spanish minister at 
AVasliiiigtoii said: "It is perfectly in accord with usage for 
warshij)s of two fi-iendly powers to enter and leave each other's 
ports; the warships of Spain have visited American ports (m 
complimentary missions three times in as many years, and if 
tlicrc lias not been an Aiiicricaii warsliip in Haviiiia in the 
same length of time it is merely because the United States 
government has not seen fit to order one there." Unques- 
tionably, it was a purely friendly act from a dii>lomatic point 
of view, and it was so published by the Spanish government, 
but tlie Si);mish people were inclined to think otherwise. Ex- 
citable Spaniards in Madrid professed to think the United 
States had tdterior motives, and General Lee reported that the 



m 
^ 



226 OBJECTIONS TO THE VISIT OF THE " MAINE " 

Havana authorities were fearful lest it sliould excite the people 
of the city and cause a demonstration. But the Spanish gov- 
ernment, to show the ai)preciation of the courtesy of the 
United States — so smooth are the words of diplomacy — 
announced that the cruiser Vizcaya would soon pay a visit to 
an American port. 

As soon as General Lee received Secretary Day's despatch 
he cabled back, advising a postponement of the visit of the 
Maine for six or seven days until the recent excitement was 
allayed, but he said he would consult the authorities. Cap- 
tain-General Blanco had just gone on a trip to the eastern part 
of the island in the hopes of converting the insurgent leaders. 
Lee received a reply at once that the Maine had been ordered 
and would be at Havana the next day. " Keep us advised by 
frequent telegrams." The next day Lee telegraphed: "At 
an interview authorities profess to think United States has 
ulterior purpose in sending ship. Say it will obstruct au- 
tonomy, i^roduoe excitement, and most probably a demonstra- 
tion. Ask that it is not done until they can get instructions 
from Madrid, and say that if for friendly motives, as claimed, 
delay is unimportant." 

As the Spanish minister at Washington had been fully in- 
fonned of the purpose of this government, the ignorance of the 
Havana authorities must have been assumed or the authorities 
at Madrid had not advised Havana. The former was probably 
true, and the objections at Havana were doubtless made to pro- 
vide an excuse for the inevitable failure of autonomy. They 
saw a chance to cast the responsibility upon the LTnited States 
and use it as an argument with the European powers. Madrid 
had doubtless advised Havana how to receive the suggestion. 

That General Lee had misgivings, not for the Maine, but 
of a hostile demonstration on the part of the Volunteers, is 
evident from the despatch wliicli he sent on the 25th : " Ship 
quietly arrived at 11a. m. to-day. N^o demonstration so far." 
The Maine steamed into the harbor with no more disturbance 
than attends the arrival of the Key West mail steamer. When 



THE **MAINL ARRIVES IN HAVANA HARBOR 227 

sho came alongside Morro Castle she sainted the Spanish flag 
with twenty-one gnns, the response being given by the guns of 
(Cabana. The Maine ran np the Spanish royal ensign and 
saluted the Spanish flagship with thirteen guns. The Alfonso 
AIL ran np the Stars and Stripes and returned the salute gun 
for gun. The Maine dropped her anclior where the harbor 
master directed, and the oflicial calls and other demonstrations 
of eternal friendship followed. But in spite of them it was 
impossible to overlook the strong undercurrent of feeling in 
the city, the excited talking of groups alxjut the cafes, and the 
expressed opinion of radical Spaniards that the cause of Spain 
had been betrayed by ^he government, and that the nation had 
been humiliated by the first step in Yankee intervention. 
The arrival of the battleship was considered a joyful event 
among the Americans, for tlu'V had Ik'cu in suspense and now 
felt that they were safe. This alone was enough to anger 
some of the Sj)aniards of the city. 

In reality, the appearance of the ]\Iai)\c in Havana harbor 
was a necessary and justifiable move for the proper protection 
of American citizens. In view of recent outbreaks in the city 
our citizens could not feel secure without such protection, and 
anotlici' outl>i'cak might occur at any time and be less easily 
put down. 'J'he State Department had waited until it thought 
a reasonable time had elapsed after the outbreak to permit of 
the visit of the Maine being classed as a friendly act, a " re- 
sumj)tion " of naval cordiality, and a free use of diplomatic 
ficti<»ns was doid)tlcss wise for its efi'ects not simply upon Sj^ain 
but upon the inflammable Spaniards in Havana and the im- 
patient peojile of this country. 

It was plain that Congress was watching with impatience 
and ill-concealed excitement the next step in the President's 
])olicy. The belief was strong that when it was made jier- 
fectly clear to the world that autonomy had failed, the Presi- 
dent would feel called upon to act in accordance with the 
declarations of his message. It did not soem possible that a 
crisis could long be delayed, for if it did not come through tho 



228 A CRISIS NEAR AT HAND 

vigorous action of the President, there would evidently be an 
uj^rising in the Congress which would force the issue upon the 
country. The Congressional situation was strained to the last 
degree, for it was known that the half had not been told re- 
garding the horrors of starvation and there was no appreciable 
amelioration of the dreadful situation. Only because of the 
profound respect for the President's judgment, the thorough 
confidence in his devotion to the national honor, the entire 
belief that he would act when tlie moment was ripe, restrained 
the impetuous of his own party, while some of his opponents 
were striving to force the question for political effect. 



CIIAPTEE XXI. 

THE STORY OF BATTLESHIP MAINE — THREATS AND 
AVARXIXGS— :MINISTEK De LOME'S ABUSIVE LETTER — A 
STARTLING MIDNIGHT DISPATCH — THE .V.l/A7s' BLOWN 
UP. 

The Story of the Maine — T\\c Mninc m Iluvana Harbor — Captain Sigs- 
bee's Precautions — Extraordinary Vigilance — The Hostility of the 
Spanish Rabble — Warnings Handed to Captain Sig.sbee — His Official 
Relations — No Cordiality from Spanish Military Officers — Reporters at 
Hotel Tngleterra — Story of a Letter from Weyler — Weyler's Myste- 
rious Hints at Mines — General Aranguren Betrayed by a Negro 
Captive — Surrounded and Killed — Conditions Worse and Worse — 
Publication of the De Lome Letter — Characteristic Spanish Diplo- 
macy — De Lome Admits His Author.sliip and Resigns — Spain's Dis- 
avowal — A Better Feeling — A Midnight Dispatch — Startling News 
— "Maine Blown up" — An Awful Catastrophe. 

THE 2faine, wliich was ofHcially rated as a second-class 
battleship, was launched at the Brooklyn Xavy Yard 
Xovember 18, 1890. An act of Congress in 1886 
anthorized hei- construction at a cost not to exceed $2,- 
500,000, and it is said that her exact cost was $2,484,503. 
Her dimensions were : Extreme length 324 feet, beam 57 
feet, draught 211 feet; her (lis[)hic('uieiit was (^(i.-tO tons. 
She could carry enough coal to steam 7,000 miles at ten 
knots an hour; .'^he had twin screws, and the indicated horse 
power of her vertical triple-expansion engines was 9,290. 
Her armor in the water line helt and the barbettes was twelve 
inches thick, and on the turrets ten inches thick. A pro- 
tective steel deck, two inches in thickness on the crowm and 
four inches on the slopes, protccttMl the iM.ilcis and cnuines. 
Her armament consisted of a main battery of fniir lO-inch 
guns, mounted in pairs in two turrets, and six (l-inch guns, 

two each in the bow and stern, and two on the main deck 

(229) 



230 THE "MAINE" AT ANCHOR 

superstnictiire, amidships. The other armament consisted of 
eight 7-poiinders and four machine guns; there were also 
seven torpedo tubes and two 3 0-foot torpedo boats, each 
weighing seven tons. She could hurl a broadside of 1,323 
pounds, not including her small-arms fire, and she could fire 
1,224 pounds ahead from her two turrets and forward guns, 
besides the smaller fire. Her crew consisted of 328 sailors 
and twenty-six officers. 

The berth given the Maine wdien she arrived in the harbor 
of Havana was in the man-of-war anchorage off the Machina, 
or " the Shears," and was one of the regular mooring l)uoys 
of the harbor. The Havana pilot who conducted her in said 
it was buoy Ko. 4. It was, in fact, buoy No. 5, as shown on 
Chart 307 of the United States Hydrographic Office, but it 
was known at Havana as Xo. 4. It was stated that the vessel 
last anchored there before the arrival of the Maine was the 
Legazpi, a Spanish dispatch boat which had been used by 
General Weyler in his tours about the waters of the island. 
She had run out and anchored there two days before the 
Maine arrived, and afterwards had taken a different position. 
It was noticed that in the series of social formalities following 
the arrival of the Maine the captain of the Legazpi never 
called upon Captain Sigsbee, who regarded the fact with 
some suspicion, but did not consider it of serious moment. 

Fully aware of the state of feeling among the radical 
Spaniards and Volunteers in Havana, Captain Sigsbee took 
extraordinary precautions. He had sentries on the fore- 
castle and poop, quartermaster and signal boy on the bridge, 
signal boy on the poop, the corporal of the guard especially 
instructed to look out for the port gangway, the officer of the 
deck and the quartermaster particularly directed to look out 
for the starboard gangway; a quarter watch was kept on deck 
all night; sentries' cartridge boxes were filled, and their arms 
kept loaded; a number of rounds of rapid-firing ammunition 
were kept in the ])ilot house and in the captain's spare pantry, 
under the after superstructure; additional charges of shell 



SPECIAL PRECAUTIONS FOR THE SHIP'S SAFETY 231 

were close at hand for the secondary battery; steam was kept 
lip in two boilers instead of one; special instrnctions were 
given to watch carefully all the hydraulic gear and report 
defects, and the officer of the deck was charged to make de- 
tailed reports to Captain Sigsbee, even of minor matters. 

He also instructed the master-at-arms and the orderly ser- 
geant to keep a watchful eye on everybody that came on 
board. When the ^•isitors went below they were to go with 
them, and afterwards were to carefully inspect the routes that 
these persons had taken lest packages of high explosives 
should have Veen left somewhere. The whole purport of the 
various orders was that the vessel was in a position requiring 
extreme vigilance. 

The reasons for this wcro not founded upon any distrust 
of the high authorities of llavaiui, but upon the possibilities 
of danger from attempts of irresponsible parties. It was 
hardly conceived as possible that the Maine stood in any 
danger of mines or torpedoes, for they would have required 
some kind of official connivance. But the hostility of the 
Spanish rabl)le was very api)areut. On the first Sunday after 
the arrival, when a ferryboat crowded with people, both civil 
and military, returning from a bull fight in Regla, passed the 
]\faine she was greeted with yells, whistles, and derisive calls 
from a number of the passengers. When Captain Sigsbee 
and other officers were in the city thev wniild occasionally be 
li;ni(lc(l slips of paper wai'uiiig them to look out for their ship, 
hut the captain thought little of these. General Lee was 
constantly reeeiviug warnings and threats of assassination, 
about wliicli lie gave himself no coneeru. One day Captain 
Sigsbee received in liis mail a circulai' pi'otesting in vehement 
language atiaiust the .]f(ii)ic's visit, and closing with, " Death 
to the Americans! Death to autonouiy ! Long live Spain! 
Long li\-e Weylcr ! " 

Yet his relations with the officials were outwardly cordial. 
Lieutenant-Commander AVainwriglit, second in connuaml, 
was very ])articular concerning the occasional visitors, who 



232 WEYLER WRITES A "PATRIOTIC" LETTER 

were chiefly Cubans of the highest social standing. Captain 
Sigsbee invited Spanish officers to the ship, in fact, made con- 
siderable effort to get them on board socially, in order to show 
good will according to the spirit of the Maine's visit, but they 
did not come except to pay the customary official calls. The 
members of the autonomistic council made a formal visit, and 
afterward a social visit, accompanied by their friends. 

The correspondents of the United States papers and the 
reporters of the Havana journals were in the habit of meeting 
at the Hotel Ingleterra at night to talk and exchange news. 
One of these was Honore Francois Laine, the correspondent 
of the !Kew York Sun, who was on rather friendly terms with 
Francisco Diaz, a reporter for the Union Constitutionel, a 
Weylerite paper. One night in January, according to 
Laine's story, they met at the hotel, and Diaz said that he had 
reliable information that General Weyler intended to become 
a candidate for the Cortes from the district of Havana. 
Asked how he knew, he said that he had a copy of a letter 
which Weyler had written to Santos Guzman, a lawyer and 
the head of tlie conservative party in Havana. Guzman had 
turned the letter over to the editor of the ultra-Spaniard 
Union (^onstihdionel, in order that at the proper time Wey- 
ler's candidacy might be announced and commented on. 
Diaz had succeeded in getting a copy of it, and Laine made 
a copy of which the following is a translation : 



Madrid, January 8, 1898. 
His Excellency Don Francisco de los Santos Guzman, 

Havana. 

My Distinriuislied Personal and Political Friend : — Since the lastevents, 
I have changed my views about the attitude wliicli our political party in 
Cuba ought to assume. I have thought before that it was more dignified for 
us to abstain from the electoral contest : I believe now that it is a patriotic 
duty for us to go to the polls. Our success can not be doubted ; neither 
can be our majority of voters, nor that, with a program of defense of 
national honor, we will have side by side with us all those lukewarm politi- 
cians who, though Spaniards by heart are deceived by the inside combina- 



SUGGESTIVE PARAGRAniS 233 

tioiis of Morel aud Sugastu and take as scientilu; .solutions of our colonial 
l)roblenis what are really dishonorable huuiiliatious of our country before 
llie United States. 

Write on your Hag, the Hag of Spain : "Defense of National Honor," 
and I otler you my name as your candidate. After having commandeil 
during two years 200,000 Spanish heroes in Cuba, the title I shall be more 
proud of is that of Deputy from Havana at the Cortes of Spain. 

Bi, the tcay, I have read thene days that the Americans are thinking abo^it 
sending one of their warships to that city. During my command in Cuba they 
did not even dare to dream about it. They kneio the terrible ■punishment that 
awaited them. I have Havana harbor well jirepared for such an emergency. 
I rapidly finished the work that Martinez Campos carelessly (dianduned. 

If the insult is made, I hope that there will be a Spanish hand to punish 
it as terribly as it deserves. 

Romero is in better health than his friends could have expected, and 
notwithstanding how morally sick I feel breathing this humiliating atmos- 
phere, is well, also, your affectionate friend and servant, 

Valeuiano Weyi-eu. 

V>y the titne this letter reached iravaiia the riots had taken 
phacc, autonomy iiad revealed its weakness, and it had become 
a c|uestion whether any elections wonld be held. The Con- 
servatives had announced that they would not by voting be- 
come ])arties to such a i)hni, and the information that Weyler 
had chaiiiiccl his uiiud and counselled [)articipati()ii in the elec- 
tions and electing him as deputy in the face of the autono- 
mous plait was naturally regarded as an important ])iece of 
news. But as the Maine had not I hen reached Ilavaiui, and 
little or nothing was known outside of official circles of her 
intended visit, the reporters took no notice of the latter part 
of AVeyler's note, regarding it as a species of that braggadocio 
to which tlicy bad become accustomed when he was Captain- 
General. Laine threw the copy of the letter into his desk, 
and two days later the Maine anchored in the harbor. 

Fortunately, the attention of Havana people was some- 
what diverted at just this time by events in the field. General 
Blanco had gone on "a trip to the eastern end of the island, 
where the Sjianish forces had suffered several defeats at the 
hands of (iarcia and Kabi, aud ou Januai'v -JTtli there was 
great joy among the Spaniards when the deail boily of the 
15 



234 ARANGUREN BETRAYED AND SHOT 

young Cuban general, Aranguren, who for months had ter- 
rorized Havana by his daring raids, was brought to the city 
and exhibited. He had been one of the picturesque figures 
of the rebellion, second only to Maceo in the dread he inspired 
in tlie Spaniards, and after he executed Colonel Ruiz, who 
tried to induce him to accept autonomy, the great object of 
the Spanish officers was to capture Aranguren dead or alive. 
But he was not captured in battle. Through a Cuban pris- 
oner, the Spaniards learned that the daring insurgent was in 
the habit of quietly paying visits to a family in the suburbs 
of Havana. Offered a bribe of $500 if he would lead them 
to the place, the negro accepted, and one morning the Spanish 
cavalry burst upon it from all directions. Aranguren and 
his orderly were shot at the first volley, and the younger mem- 
bers of the family fell wounded into the arms of the father 
and mother, who were made prisoners. 

General Blanco's mission to the east was a complete fail- 
ure. He had gone with tlie expectation of winning the in- 
surgent leaders over to autonomy, but their only response had 
been to press harder upon the Spanish forces in the east, 
which were in a sad condition of neglect, poorly fed, and not 
paid at all. The pretence of autonomy was sinking into con- 
tempt; the new cabinet was like a hornets' nest; deeper and 
deeper became the misery of the starving reconcentrados. 
From an American point of view the situation had become 
well-nigh intolerable. American citizens Avere held as vir- 
tual prisoners away from their plantations; the American 
consuls required constant military and police protection, yet 
in response to the appeal for contributions they were doing 
everything possible to relieve the condition of the starving- 
people, while the Spanish guerrillas were doing everything 
possible to exterminate them. 

In a diplomatic note S])ain pleaded for a longer trial of 
autonomy and said that the United States could not expect 
the war to close within an indefinite period unless filibustering 
expeditions were prevented. The whole responsibility for 



THE DE LOME LETTER 235 

tlic success of these expeditions she placed upon ns, though 
hor naval vessels were supposed to command the whole coast 
of Cuba. This intimation was resented by the Ignited States 
in a strong note, detailing' our efforts to prevent lilil)nstcriiig. 
When aifairs were in this delicate situation, the ( 'uban 
Junta in ISIew York made public the following astounding 
letter purporting to have been written by the Spanish minis- 
ter at AVashington, Senor De Lome, to the editor of El 
Ilcraldo at Madrid, who had recently been on a visit to Cuba: 

Legation De Espana, Wasuington. 
ExiMO Senor Don Jose Canalejas: 

My Distinguished and Dear Friend: — You need not apologize for not 
having written to me ; I also ouglit to have written to you, but have not 
done so on account of being weighed down witli work, and nous sommes 
quittes. 

Tlie situation here continues unclianged. Everytliing (lei)eiid.s upon tlie 
political and military success in Cuba. The prologue of this second method 
of warfare will end the day that the Colonial Cabinet shall be appointed, 
and it relieves us in the eyes of this country of a part of the responsibility of 
what may happen there, and they must cast the responsibility upon the 
Cubans whom they believe to be so immaculate. 

Until then we will not be able to see clearly and I consider it to be a 
loss of time and an advance by the wrong road — the sending of emissaries 
to the rebel field, the negotiating with the autonomists not yet declared 
to be legally constituted and the discovery of the intentions and purpose of 
this government. The exiles will return one by one, and, when they return 
will come walking into the sbcepfokl, and the chiefs will gradually return. 
Neither of these had the courage to leave en masse, and they will not have 
the courage thus to return. 

The message has undeceived the insurgents who expected something 
else, and has paralyzed the action of Congress, but I consider it bad. 

Besides the natural and inevitable coarseness (groseria) with which he 
repeats all that the i)ress and i)ublic opinion of Spain has .said of "Weyler, it 
shows once more what 3IcKinl(y is — weak and catering to the ral)ble, and, 
besides, a low politician, who desires to leave a door open to me and to 
stiind well with tlie jingoes of his party. 

Nevertheless, as a matter of fact, it will only depend on ourselves 
wliether he will jjrove bad and adverse to us. I agree entirely with you ; 
witiiout a military success nothing will be accomi)lished there, and without 
military and political success there is here always danger that the insurgents 
will be encouraged, if not by the government, at least by part of the iniblic 
opinion. 

I do not believe you pay enough attention to the role of England. 



236 DE LOME RESIGNS HIS OFFICE 

Nearly all that newspaper canaille which swarm in jour hotel are English, 
and at the same time that they are correspondents of the Journal they are 
also correspondents of the best newspapers and reviews in London. Thus 
it has been since the beginning. To my mind the only object of England is 
that the Americans should occupy themselves with us and leave her in 
peace, and if there is a war so much the better ; that would further remove 
what is threatening her — although that will never happen. 

It would Ite most important that you should agitate the question oi 
connnercial relations even though it would be only for effect, and that you 
should send here a man of importance in order that I may use him to make 
a propaganda among the Senators and others in opposition to the Junta and 
to win over exiles. 

There goes Amblard. I believe he comes too deeply taken up with 
little political matters and there must be something very great or we shall 
lose. 

Adela returns your salutation and we wish you in the new j-ear to be a 
messenger of peace and take this New Year's present to poor Spain. 

Always your attentive friend and servant, who kisses your hands. 

Enrique Duptjy De Lome. 

How this letter found its way into the hands of the Cuban 
Junta was a mystery, and, indeed, has practically remained 
so, but it made little difference, as the Spanish minister at 
once declined to deny its authenticity, and afterwards ad- 
mitted it. Following its publication events moved rapidly. 
Anticipating the inevitable, De Lome cabled his resignation 
to Sagasta. However much the President might be iuclined 
to overlook the attack upon himself, he was aware of the 
serious aspect of the letter as affecting our relations with 
Spain. The State Department, which on the following day 
came into possession of the original letter, secured from De 
Lome a frank affirmation that he had written it, and Minister 
AVoodford was requested to demand De Lome's immediate 
recall. The Sagasta ministry accepted the resignation in 
time to prevent this government from handing De Lome his 
passports, but the incident was not regarded as closed unless 
Spain made some disavowal of the intimations that her agita- 
tion of the (piestion of commercial relations was for nothing 
more than effect, and that she proposed to institute a lobby 
in the ITuitcd States Senate. 

It was apparent enough to all who were watching develop- 



A STARTLING MESSAGE 237 

monts that all of Spain's diplomacy was for effect and for the 
sake of throwing obstacles in the way of active intervention 
hy tliis country in Ciihan affairs, and of creating syni])athy in 
Europe. But until this diplomatic veneer had been fi-ankly 
exposed in the T)e Lome letter no notice was taken of it. 

On the 14th of February, Spain sent a disavowal of the 
sentiments of the letter, and naiiie(l Don Luis Polo y Barnabe 
to take De Lome's place, and the President authorized the 
statement that the incident was closed. Lhe tension in the 
relations between the two nations appeared to be relaxed; a 
resolution for the belligerency of the Cubans was the same 
day reported adversely; De Lome had gone to New York, 
where he was waiting for the departure of a steamer, and the 
Si)aiiish cruiser Mzcoija was on her way to the port of New 
York to reciprocate the friendly visit of the Maine. Such 
was the situation when the following message flashed over the 
cables to the State Department : 

Havana, Februiiry W, 1898. — 12.30 a.m. 
Maine blown up and destroyed to-night at 9.40 p. M. Explosion 
occurred well forward under (iiiarters of crew; consecpiencc many were lost. 
It is believed all officers saved, but Jenkins and Merrit not yet accounted 
for. Cause of ex])losion yet to be investigated. Captain-General and Span- 
ish army and navy officers have rendered every assistance. Sigsbee and 
most of his officers on Ward steamer City of WnsJiiiu/ton. Others on 
Spanish man-of-war and in city. Am with Sigsbee now, who has tele- 
graphed Navy Department. 

Lee. 



CHAPTER XXII 

THE NIGHT OF FEBRUARY 15, 1898 — A FEARFUL EXPLOSION 
AND SCENES OF HORROR — REMARKABLE ESCAPES — THE 
WORK OF RESCUE — THE NEWS AT WASHINGTON. 

A Quiet Night in Havana Harbor — The Maine Swinging at Her Chain — 
A Sudden Roar, a Crashing Explosion, and a Mass of Flying Flames 
and Debris — The Shrieks of Dying Men— Tlie Silence of Death — 
Captain Sigsbee's Escape — Standing on the Sinking Ship — Lowering 
the Boats — The Officers in the Mess Room — Frightful Experiences — 
Lieut. Jenkins Groping in the Water — "Which Way?" — Lieut. 
Hood's Graphic Story — The Work of Rescue — A Last Call but no 
Answer from the Burning Wreck — Spanish Delight — Captain Sigsbee 
Leaves the Ship — Visits from Spanish Officers — Sigsbee's Dispatches 
to the Department — " Don't Send War Vessels " — Excitement at Wash- 
ington — Scenes at the White House — In the Cabinet Room — The 
Official Impression — The General Impression — Sympathy of Spanish 
Officials at Havana — Appointment of the Court of Inquiry. 

IT was a dark and sultry night in the harbor of Havana — 
the night of February 15, 1898. The great United 
States battleship Maine lay quietly at her anchorage 
pointing nearly northwest. About 250 yards ahead of her 
and midway between her anchorage and the Machina wharf 
was moored the Spanish man-of-war, the Alfonso XII. The 
Spanish despatch boat, Legazpi, which had come out two days 
before, lay at a berth a little further to the north. The 
steamer City of Waslii7}gton of the Ward line, which had just 
arrived, was lying a short distance astern of the Maine, and 
other vessels were quietly at anchor at distances somewhat 
more remote. 

Across the gently undulating waters of the harbor 
vibrated the lights of the city. So quiet was the night and 
the surroundings that the echoes of the bugle sounding from 
the deck of the Maine at "taps" were singularly sweet and 

distinct, and they fell pleasantly upon the ear. 

(238) 



THE CALM BEFORE THE AWFUL SHOCK *^ 239 

Tlio usual inspection of maG;azines had been completed; 
every ])iirt of the shij), every room, every passageway had 
been entci'cd and (•xaniiiuMl : llic keys had licen given to Cap- 
tain Sigsbee, who was seated at his port cabin table, writing a 
letter to his fannly. Other officers were in their rooms aft, 
reading or writing, or conversing in little groups in other 
parts of the ship. Swinging in tlicir hanmiocks and lying 
abont the ship forward, some ash'cp and some spinning yarns, 
were the gallant yonng sailors an.d marines off dnty. Others 
were on their watch on deck, and the sentries were at their 
posts. The reports had been matle to the oHicer of the watch. 
Half-past nin(> — All was well. 

Passengers fnnn the United States on the City of Wash- 
ington had come np to the stern of the ship to watch the 
Maine. 

" We are nndi'r the guns of the United States," said one. 
" We are well protected, and we can sit here." 

As they looked there came a roar of immense volume, 
then a succession of heavy, crashing reports, a burst of flame 
hic'h in the air, and a great rising mass of smoke, streaked 
with burning or l>lack Hying ol)j('cts. The bow (d' the Mdinr 
rose out of the water, and then, before the light of the explo- 
sion faded, the ship settled back and down — deeper and 
Jeepei- — while round the bow surged a foaming semicircle 
of water, of debris, and gr<Kiiiing men, the cries for liel]) fall- 
ing to a low nnn-mur as the how setth'd lu'low the foam. 

Such was the frightful spectacle in that awful moment — 
at 9.40 on the night of February l.'>tli. 

Death sealed tlu' lips of 253 of her gallant men. All that 
was known of tlieir experience was told in that appealing cry 
for help as it mingled with the hissing and the roaring of the 
fearful maelstrom of tire and water in which ihcy wen^ strug- 
o-linji- — a cry which dic(l away into a moan an<l then into 
the silence of death. 

Captain Sigsbee was just finishing his letter when he felt 
the first crash of the explosion, tlu; trembling and bnvidng 



240 A NIGHT OF TERROR 

motion of the vessel and the subsidence. The electric lights 
went out and there was intense darkness and heavy smoke. 
He felt at once that the Maine had been blown up and was 
sinking. Thinking it might be necessary for him to make 
an exit by the cabin port holes on the starboard he rushed in 
that direction, but found that he could get out by the passage 
leading to the superstructure. He, therefore, took the latter 
route, feeling his way along and steadying himself by the 
bulkheads. At the quarter deck he found some of his officers 
who had escaped, asked a few questions hurriedly, and then 
clind)ed up on the side-rail, holding to the main rigging in 
order to see over the poop awning, which was covered with 
debris, ])ut he could make little out of the black mass ahead 
of him. He ordered Lieutenant-Commander AVainwright to 
post sentries all around the ship, but in a moment they saw 
that there were no marines to post and no place forward to 
post them. By this time the surviving officers had worked 
tlicir way out and were standing by his side. All were quiet 
and self-contained, overawed l)y the magnitude of the dis- 
aster. The cn]itain directed that the forward magazines be 
flooded, but soon saw that they Avere already under water, and 
those who were coming up from the ward room told him that 
the water was i-ushing in over everything. Al)Out this time 
fire broke out in the mass forward and he could see the white 
floating bodies in the water and hear their faint cries. That 
gave him a better knowledge of the situation than any thing- 
else, and he immediately ordered the boats to be lowered, but 
only throe boats were available. These were lowered and 
manned and left tlio ship to save the wounded, jointly with 
other boats, which by this time had arrived on the scene from 
the Alfonso XII. and the City of Washington. 

While Captain Sigsbee, with a few of his officers, was 
standing tliere the boats returned and reported that they had 
gathered in from the wreck all the wounded that could be 
found. The Maine was settling very fast, and by this time 
the deck where the officers stood was level with the gig's gun- 



STRU(i(il.lN(J UUT OF THE RUINS 343 

wale afloat in the -water aloiigsido. Tho tiro amidships was 
Imrniiig more fiercely and the spai'e aninninititin in the pilot- 

honso was ex])loding. 

All the otlicers were acconntcd i'nr except Lieutenant Jen- 
kins and F>ni;ineer Merritt. At the time of the exiilu.-ioii 
Lieiilenants dun^eii, llelnian, and Jenkins, and ( 'hief En- 
gineer lldwell were in the otHcei's' niessi-ooin, when there 
came \\\v duU, (h'at'enin^- roar, followed \>y the friii'htful 
crash, and it seemed to them as if the whoh' shi[) was falling 
to pieces. 

" AVe have been tor])edoed!" shouted Ilolman, jnmping 
up. " F(dlow me." 

Thev had hardly reatdied the opposite door when the 
lights went ont and left them in total darkness. Jnngen sup- 
posed tluit both Ilolman and -lenkins were ahead of him, but 
he could hear neither, and stretching ont his hands he fol- 
lowed along till he reached the ladder, which he ascended to 
the passageway of the after superstructure, turning to the 
left, intending to go forward. But he at once encountered a 
mass of debris, lie tried to reach the ladder leading to the 
])oop, but could not. His only escape was to raise himself by 
a door on the supersti'ucture. At his first effort lie failed and 
fell back; straining every mnscde f(n' the second effort, he 
swung himself up, caught a chain and raisecl himself to the 
poop, where he fonml the Captain and Lientenant-(\nu- 
mander AVainwright. Ilolman and Howell worked them- 
selves out in mncdi the same manner. 

The mess attendant, John 11. 'rnr]»in, had bo(>n in the 
wai'droom pantry when the ex})losion occni'red, and the offi- 
cers in the messroom had started to find tlieir way out. Be- 
fore he rea(dieil the messroom th(> lights wei-e all extinguished. 
He heard -Jenkins shout to him, "' AVhicdi way? " 

" I don't know whicdi way," cried Turjiin. 

The water was rushing in rapidly, and as they groped 
about came nearly to tlieii- waists. 

"Which wav ^ " shouteil Jeid<ins ai^ain. 



244 turpin's escape 

" I don't know, sir, wliieli wiiy," replied Tnrpin again, as 
be felt his way along a wall. The water rose to his breast and 
Jenkins shonted again, and again Turpin replied that he conld 
not make ont bis direction. Suddenly the whole compart- 
ment lit np by the light of an explosion — one of the after- 
explosions in the magazines — and Jenkins started forward, 
threw np both his hands, and fell by the steerage pantry. 
Tnrpin got his direction, and groped his way aft to the cap- 
tain's ladder, which he found carried away. The water was 
np to his chin, and rushing in Avith frightful rapidity. He 
was just giving up when he felt a rope, and clind)ing on this 
hand over band, he reached the deck, from which he soon 
jumped overboard. As he swam out a Spanish gig passed 
him, but be dove under water, thinking that the ship had been 
attacked and that he would be captured. When he came up 
he swam towards the Maine^s barge and was pulled in. By 
this time many small boats were about the wreck, picking up 
the drowning men, and many were the thrilling, the fearful 
experiences of those who succeeded in extricating themselves 
from the awful wreck. 

Lieutenant Hood's graphic story, as told to the Naval 
Board of Inquiry, gives a graphic picture of the horrors fol- 
lowing the explosion. He said : " I was sitting on the port 
side of the deck, with my feet on the rail, and I both heard 
and felt — felt more than I heard — a big explosion that 
sounded and felt like an under-water explosion. I was under 
the impression that it came from forward, starboard, at the 
time. I instantly tnrnetl my head and that instant there was 
a second explosion. I saw the whole starboard side of the 
deck and everything above it as far aft as the after end of the 
superstructure spring up in the air with all kinds of objects in 
it — a regular crater-like performance with flames and every- 
thing else coming up. 1 immediately sprang behind the edge 
of the superstructure for shelter, as there were a number of 
objects flying in my direction. I ran very quickly aft, as 
fast as I could, along the after end of the superstructure, and 



EXPERIENCE OF HOOD AND THOMPSON 245 

cliiiiLed lip on a kind of step. I went under the bar^c, aii<l 
by this time the explosion liad passed. The "l^iocts had 
stopped flying- around. Then 1 saw on the starboard side an 
immense amount of foaming water and wreckage and groan- 
ing men out there. It was scattered around in a circle, 1 
should say about a huiKh'cd yards in diameter, oil" on the star- 
board side. T immediately j)roceeded to lower the gig, with 
the help of another num. After I got that in the water, sev- 
eral officers jumped in it and one or two men (having been 
ordered to pick up the wounded.) Tn the meantime some- 
body else was lowering the other boat on the port side. I 
heard some groans forward and ran forward on the quarter- 
deck down the poop ladder, and I immediately brought up on 
an immense pile of wreckage. I saw one man there who had 
been thrown from somewhere, pinned down by a ventilator. 
We got him u}) just in time, just before the water rose over 
him." 

Corporal Thompson was lying in his hammock on the port 
gangway about twenty feet f i-oni the turret, when he was sud- 
denly thrown through the port awning as high as the super- 
structure. ITe fell back on the deck stunned. As soon as he 
realized his position, he regained his feet and hung to the ridge 
rope till the water came nearly up to his neck. Just then a 
rope was thrown liim from one of tlie l)oats; he let go of the 
ridge rope, sank, came up and managed to catch the line and 
was pulled into the boat. 

Everv few minutes, as the Mn'nic l)unie(l tiei-cely, a shell 
would burst, scattering the thiming debris all about, but still 
the men in the boats worked bravely to find the injured. Xo 
more cries could be heard, though they knew tliat over 200 
sailors had been on board. Then an officer of one of the 
il/aZ/ip'.s boats approached the ship, and, with a voice that 
could be heard far away in the stillness of the night called 
out: " Tf any one is alive on board, for God's sake say so!" 
All waited for an answer, but none came, save the echo from 
the shore. 



24G DELIGHT OF THE RABBLE — OFFICIAL REGRET 

Nearly all Havana was on the wharves watching the spec- 
tacle, and among the rabble could be heard the cry of " Viva 
Espana! " and " Mueran los Aniericanos! " Expressions 
of delight were nnniistakable. 

While C^aptain Sigsbee and Licntcnant-C*ommander 
Wainwright were watching the details of the awful scene 
from the jioop, it became evident that they mnst take to the 
boats, as there was danger that the forward magazine might 
explode, for parts of it were constantly going off. Every- 
thing had been done that conld be done. So they left the 
ship and went to the City of Wasliington, where they fonnd 
the wounded and dying lying upon mattresses in the dining 
saloon. Many had been taken aboard the Spanish warship, 
where they were ])eing cared for. Having observed that the 
wounded were being attended to, and having directed a 
muster to be taken of those on board the rescuing vessels, the 
Captain went on deck and took a last look of the burning 
wreck of his vessel. At midnight he went below and dic- 
tated a telegram to the Xavy Department. While there 
several Spanish officers — civil, military, and naval — came 
on board, in their own behalf and in representative capacity, 
expressing sympathy and sorrow for " the accident." There 
were the representatives of General Blanco and of the ad- 
miral of the station, and the civil governor of the province 
was on board in person. Having finished his telegrams, C^ap- 
tain Sigsbee met the group of Spanish gentlemen and thanked 
them for their visit and sympathy. Invariably, their ex- 
pressions of sympathy were followed by eager inquiries as to 
Captain Sigsbee's idea of the cause of the accident, for acci- 
dent it must have been, they said. Invariably, the Captain 
replied that he must await further investigation. Doubtless, 
this curiosity was natural. Even if entirely innocent, they 
knew that Spanish designs would be sus]iected because of the 
bitter feeling in Havana toward the United States, and be- 
cause of the desperate character of the officers of the Volun- 
teers, as well as some of those of the regular army. But 



ABSURDITY OF THE ACCIDENT THEORY 247 

Cajitaiii Sig'sbce's visitors insisted that it iini.>t have been an 
accident. 

"I am eonvinci'd it was the dynamo I)()ih'i'," said a S[)an- 
isli naval otiieer. 

'' l]nt we had no dynamo/' said ('a[)tain Siu'sbee. 

" Then it must have lieen tlie boilers," said the Spanish 
officer. 

" Bnt the forward boilers had not been lighted for three 
months/' re])lied Sigsbee. *' Only the after boilers were 
used, and the explosion oeenrred well forward." 

*' Ihit the tor])edoes," someone snggested. 'Jdie torpedoes 
had nut been fitted with war-heads, and withont them the tor- 
pedoes were harmless. Besides, they were kept aft. As for 
the forward magazines, the ammniiition was ex})loding in de- 
tail Av'hile the oliieei*s were talking, and kept on exploding 
much of the night. Fifty feet aft from the bow was the first 
storeroom for ammunition. It was twenty feet wide across 
the ship, twelve feet fore and aft, and seven feet high. On 
one side was kept the shells and on ancvther the powder for the 
6-inch gims. Aft of this room was another of the same di- 
mensions, the storeroom for ammunition for the six-jionnder, 
and one-ponnder Hotehkiss guns. Back of this was the first 
of the shij)'s large magazines, twenty-eight feet wide and 
twenty-four feet fore and aft. It was divided into three com- 
pai'tmcnts l)y partitions, so that one-halt" of the magazine was 
used for powder for the 10-inch guns, and the other compart- 
ments containe<l powder for the six-inch gnns and shells for 
the lO-inch gnns. linnning along eitlu r side of the nniga- 
zine wore narrow eoal bunkers. Everything had been thor- 
oughly inspected shortly before the exph»sion. Had the ex- 
plosion oi'iginated in tliose magazines, thought the survivoi-s 
of the Mii'nir, there w<iuld have been nothing left to exjdode. 
But they kept their tliouglits to themselves. It was a critical 
time. 

The drsj^nteh r^a]itain Sig'sbee sent to the Navy Depart- 
ment was as f(»llows: 



248 NO ATTEMPT AT PROTECTION 

"Maine blown up in Havana harbor at 9.40 to-night and destroyed. 
Many wounded and doubtless more killed or drowned. Wounded and 
others on board Spanish man-of-war and Ward Line steamers. Send Light- 
House Tenders from Key West fur crew and the few pieces of equipment 
above water. None has clothing other than that upon him. Public 
opinion should be suspended until further report. All officers believed to 
be saved ; Jenkins and Merritt not yet accounted for. Many Spanish 
officers including representatives of General Blanco now with me to 
express sympathy." 

He also sent the following to Key West: 

"Tell Admiral Maine blown up and destroyed. Send LightHouse 
Tenders. Many killed and wounded. Don't send war vessels if others 
available." 

When asked afterwards at Washington why he had ad- 
vised against sending warships he said : " In the first place 
there was a great deal of excitement, and I wanted to work 
along withont men-of-war, and to allay the excitement in the 
city; and, in the next place, if there were any more mines, I 
did not want any more war vessels blown np. Up to that 
time I had strongly recommended that the Indiana be sent 
there, jnst to show them that the Maine was not the only 
vessel in the navy or the most powerful. After that time I 
had no more confidence in the people. Treachery had been 
shown ns, and there was no special care for us. They had not 
attempted to protect us." 

(Tcneral Lee w\as sitting in his room in his hotel when the 
explosion occurred, and as soon as he learned that it was the 
Maine he hastened to the palace and asked for General Blanco. 
He came immediately and Lee said that tears were in his eyes. 
He seemed to regTct it as much as anyone in Havana. But he 
soon heard that many Spanish officers were drinking cham- 
pagne at different cafes in honor of the event. 

Three liours after the Maine had been blown up, repre- 
sentatives of the press were rushing al)Out Washington in 
cabs at midnight, ringing doorbells, and informing the Secre- 
tarv of the jSTavy and every one connected Avith the depart- 
ment, of -'a bad accident to the Maine'' There was no 



EXCITEMENT IN WASHINGTON 249 

doubt in the minds of the Secretary of tlio Xavy and his 
assistants that something- nnfriendly had happened to the 
battleship sent on her " friendly mission " a little more than 
a fortnight before. Suppressed exeitemeut continued every- 
where. Early the next morning crowds were gathered about 
lilt" models of hatllesliips and cruisers in the lialls of the Navy 
Dej)artnient. j\Ien of the ])ress and othei's were keeping a 
well-worn ])ath between the l)e})artment and the White 
House, and here and tliei-e wvvo little groups of pale-faced 
people, talking in low tones. At the AVhite House were 
faces white and set, and the few words one heard were in 
strangely quiet undertones. The men on duty at the door 
and about the halls replied mechanically to questions of 
visitors. 

Up in the Cal)inet-room the President was talking it over 
with such members of his cabinet as were in town, and during 
the day tlw contents of the dispatches from Havana were 
given out from time to time. There was no disposition to 
withhold anything, and, indeed, it would have been very un- 
wise to have done so, under the strain of public excitement 
and anxiety. When the Attorney-General eame out of the 
Cabinet-room he was instantly surrounded by men of the 
press, eager for information. He said in cool, deliberate 
tones : 

"Everything known about the disastei- will be given out; 
the President directs it, and you will learn all from the Secre- 
tary of the Xavy. Perhaps It is just as well, therefore, that 
1 slionld say nothing more." 

Then, after an instant's pause, he added. " The Spanish 
government at Havana tenders its sympathy." He bowed 
and passed down the stairway. There was not a word oi com- 
ment. Men liad become hardened to the " fi'iendly rela- 
tion " ydiase of the Cuban policy. 

Ten minutes later the Secretary <d' the Xavy came out of 
the cabinet-room. 'I'liree men who had lieen wailing f<ir him 
were at his side at once. On their i-etui'n one was asked: 



350 FIRST BURIAL OF THE MAINE'S MARTYRS 

"' Well, wliat is tlie iinprossiun — the oliiciul iinpressioii ? " 
" Oh, the official impression is that it was an accident." 
"And the other impression — the general impression?" 
'^ Oh, the general impression is that it was not an acci- 
dent." 

In the meantime at the iSTavy Department telegrams were 
coming by the score from relatives and friends of the dead 
sailors bnried next day at Havana. A Conrt of Inquiry to in- 
vestigate the cause of the disaster was at once appointed, and 
it was also promptly decided not to send another warship to 
Havana for the present, General Lee, as well as C^aptain Sigs- 
bee, having so advised. 

The Spanish authorities, hoAvever, acted in the most sym- 
pathetic and cordial manner. The hospitals were opened for 
the wounded and the Spanish physicians and nurses assisted 
the surgeon of the slii]3 in alleviating the sufferings of the in- 
jured. It being impossible to embalm the dead and send 
them to this country, the bodies that were found were buried 
in liavann. Tlie first burial, of nineteen men, was at the 
expense of the Spanish authorities. There was a great 
funeral cortege, in which 5,000 people were in line, and every 
mark of respect Avns shown. The Bishop of Havana and 
Chaplain Chidwick of the Maine conducted the religious 
ceremonies. Xo trouble was spared in Havana to make the 
survivors as comf<)rtal)le as |)ossil)le and to show sympathy 
for the great loss by the " accident." 

The Court of Inquiry was composed of Captain William 
T. Sampson, at that time in command of the battleship Iowa ; 
Captain French E. Chad wick and Lieutenant-Commander 
William P. Potter, of the flagsliip New Yorl- ; and Lieutenant- 
Commander Adolpli ]\Iarix, at one time an officer of the 
Maine. I hey proceeded at once to Havana and began a 
secret investigation on j\!onday, the 21st. Divers were set to 
work under command of Captain Sigsbee. At first some little 
friction developed as to our rights in the wreck. When early 
on the morning of the 18th C*aptain Sigsbee and three of his 



THE COURT OF INQUIRY BEGINS ITS WORK 251 

officers rowed out to endeavor to lind in the hulk the bodies of 
Lieutenant Jenkins and Engineer Merritt, they were stopped 
by a iiuard of armed Spanish sailore surrounding the sunken 
battleship. Captain Sigsbee dechired who he was and his in- 
tentions, V»nt they told him that they had strict orders not to 
allow any diver cmi)loyed by Americans to go down unless 
accompanied by a Spanish diver. Captain Sigsbee returned 
and together with General Lee held a long discussion wdth the 
Admiral and General Blanco. It was urged that the wreck 
was American property and under the jurisdiction of Amer- 
ican officers, and the point w'as finally carried. Had the 
Havana autliorities insisted on their claims, the impression 
would naturally have been formed that they had reason to 
fear that something incriminating them would be found. 
They asked for a joint investigation, but the court preferred 
to act independently, with assurances to the Spanish officials 
that, on their part, every facility for making a separate in- 
vestigation would be extended to them. 

The administration had every reason for confidence in the 
members of the Court of Inquiry. Captain Sampson had 
been chief of the Bureau of Ordnance for several years, and 
was a man of positive convictions and judicial disposition. 
The other mend)ers had special qualifications which entitled 
them to confidence. 



16 



CHAPTER XXIII 

PREPARING FOR WAR — EVIDENCE OF SPANISH TREACHERY 
— MILLIONS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE — A HISTORICAL 
MOMENT — THE DRIFT INTO WAR. 

Effect of the Maine Incident upon Our Cuban Policy — A Plain, Concrete 
Case — The People Remain Patient — The President's Policy Inter- 
rupted — Reasons for the Accidental Theory — Not Really Believed in 
Official Circles — General Lee Informs the State Department that It 
Looked Like an Outside Explosion — Sudden Activity in Official 
Circles — Preparations for War — Oregon Ordered Home — Dewey 
Ordered to Concentrate His Fleet — Arrival and Departure of the 
Vizcaya — Our Precautions for Her Safety — Spain's Responsibility for 
the Safety of the Maine — Deeper and Deeper Misery in Cuba — Red 
Cross Work — Spain's Request for the Recall of General Lee — Her 
Reasons — Probing for the Weyler Letter — Laiue's Arrest and Ex- 
pulsion — Lee Finds a Weyler Telegram — Corroborative Evidence — 
The President Seeks Support in Congress — $50,000,000 for National 
Defense — A Critical Moment in Our National Life. 

IT is a question wliether the Maine incident really hastened 
or delayed actual hostilities. Undoubtedly, it crystal- 
ized American sentiment; here was something concrete 
in its character and appealing directly to the sentiment of the 
people as Americans. If they had been balancing doubtfully 
as to our grounds for interference because of Spanish excesses 
in Cuba and Spanish disregard of our rights, they could doubt 
no longer when a fine battleship lay at the bottom of Havana 
harbor, with the mangled bodies of 253 sailors and marines 
in the wreck. They might fail to appreciate the serious- 
ness of affairs when couched in the smooth words of di]>lo- 
macy, but the ruin of the Maine was understood. ISTo matter 
whether it suggested motives of revenge or not; it suggested 
action. There was something more than a general impression 
that it was not an accident. It was a belief. 

Nevertheless, the people were not at first impatient. Self- 
repression was a dominant characteristic, even in Congress. 

(252) 



DELAY CAUSED BY THE "• MAINE" DISASTER 253 

Kotliing' else was talked about in conversation, but little was 
said in public utterance to arouse the suppressed excitement, 
and though it was attempted it met a silent rc[)roof even from 
Cuban sympathizers who fully realized that action must fol- 
low. But it introduced a new pliase into our relations with 
Spain, and one which required a little time for an adjustment, 
so that we might not a2>2)ear to rush into war out of pure re- 
venge. It really interrupted the course of the policy which 
the administration had laid down. Spain had been given to 
understand that we could not contemplate an indefinite con- 
tinuance of the existing affairs in Cuba; our warships had been 
sent to the vicinity of Cuba, and as a preparation for a vigorous 
policy the President had collected from the consuls on the 
island a great mass of reports confirming all the assertions in 
the newspapers about the starving reconcentrados. Congress 
had called for these reports and the President was just on the 
point of giving them to Congress and to the w^orld when the 
news of the Maine explosion came. So the reports were held 
back in the fear that, when added to the disaster, the excite- 
ment might lead Congress to declare Avar on the instant, and 
prudence commanded that we should go to war, if we went at 
all, decently and in order. 

( ioing to war is not a simple business. It requires, besides 
ways and means, men and arms, and a motive which any Euro- 
pean nation favorable to Spain or hostile to the United States 
on general principles could not question. To rush into war 
might prove disastrous, and yet the President felt that if any- 
thing developed showing conclusively that the Maine was 
blown uj) from outside war would become inevitable. The 
peoj)le would hardly allow the government to tiike any other 
course, and no man ever had a greater respect for the sentiment 
of the peo])lo than President McKinley. They could not ap- 
preciate the ]>erils of the situation nor the tremendous respon- 
sibilities resting upon the executive, who knew we were living 
over a volcano. But he wisely counseled patience and allowed 
the people to think that he believed the Maine to have met her 



254 PREPARATIONS FOR ACTION 

fate through an accident. He had planned a Cuban policy 
upon broad lines, and it was a very serious matter to have such 
a disaster at such a moment suggesting in the hearts of so many 
the thought of revenge or swift retribution. Every considera- 
tion of prudence and safety required him to keeji this great 
moving patriotic sentiment of a nation of nearly 80,000,000 
peojile in check. But could he? 

General Lee sent but one disj)atch concerning the investi- 
gation of the causes of the disaster, and that was the day after 
the naval board began its inquiry. It was not given out until 
some time after its receipt. In it he said : '' Copper cylinders' 
ammunition found intact in 10-inch forward magazine, star- 
board side, this morning. Seems to show that magazine not 
exploded. Evidence beginning to prove explosion on port 
side by torpedo." 

The j)eople understood the pacific official expressions and 
were not surjjrised when preparations for action were suddenly 
begun. Vessels out of commission were being put in readi- 
ness; ammunition was being manufactured at an unusual rate; 
coal was being stored at convenient points along the coast; 
fortifications were being rej^aired and put in readiness for the 
defense of the coast; inquiries concerning the mobilization of 
the naval and ordinary militia were sent to a few States likely 
to be first summoned into action in case of war. On March 
9th it was decided to withdraw the battleship Oregon from the 
Pacific squadron. Such a step could hardly have been taken 
had peace been deemed probable, for it imposed upon the 
battleship a very long journey around the Horn. Orders were 
sent to Rear Admiral Dewey, commander of the Asiatic naval 
squadron, to concentrate his ships at Hongkong; in fact, no 
step was spared for placing us in a position to face a foe in the 
immediate future. Spain also began to negotiate for ships, 
and, fearing the successful consummation of such negotiations, 
Secretary Long on IMarch 9th cabled to the naval attaches of 
the Ignited States abroad to obtain options on armored cruisers 
and torpedo-boat destroyers. But, peace or war, the Presi- 



SrANLSH INVESTIGATION A FARCE ^iOO 

den bad a lixcd purpose in view. If forcible intervention 
came, it would be because Spain declined to consider inter- 
mediary propositions looking to the independence of the island 
through peaceful uicaus. lie determined to keep his existing 
C'uljau policy intact and to handle the Maine disaster as a sepa- 
rate incident. 

So far as could be seen, the Spanish authorities made no at- 
tempt to discover whether a plot to blow up the Mauie had 
existed. They seem to have taken it for granted that it was 
an accident, and their investigation was a farce — a most trans- 
parent effort to bolster up the accident theory. The whole 
forward part of the ship from a point just abaft the forward 
turret had been twisted fifteen or twenty degrees to starboard, 
and that part of the wreck was a wilderness of debris and curled 
and twisted plate?. 

But was the force of the explosion inward or outward? In 
seeking to answer this question the divers soon found con- 
clusive testimox.v. 

When it became evident from what little leaked out that 
the disaster could not have been caused by an explosion of the 
boilers, the " official impression " was that it must have been 
due to the explosion cf the forward magazines where the pow- 
der was. • 

It was evident by the 20tli that the administi-atioii had in 
reality abandoned the accident theor}', and at a cabinet meet- 
ing the possibilities of the future were discussed. Even if it 
were conclusively shown that the Spanish government either 
at Madrid or at Havana had nothing to di> with the design, 
Si)ain would be no less responsible for not protecting the ship 
while in the harbor, particularly if she had been deliberately 
anchored over a mine. Should it be established that the 
Maine was blown up cither through design or want of due 
diligence on the part of the authorities at Havana, Spain's re- 
sponsibility would be complete, and would justify the United 
States in resorting to drastic measyres of redress. 

The Spanish cruiser Vizcaijn, which had arrived at the 



256 INSURGENTS DEMAND INDEPENDENCE 

port of New York in the midst of the public excitement over 
the loss of the Maine, departed on February 2Gth. The pre- 
cautions of the port authorities to guard the Spanish vessel 
from all harm were thorough and eifeetive, and the extreme 
to which these precautious were carried was illustrated by 
the fact that even the Holland submarine boat was constantly 
watched. The government, in short, accepted its responsi- 
bility for the security of a foreign vessel of war visiting its 
waters on a friendly mission. 

Convinced that the Cubans would not accept the plan of 
autonomy proposed, the autonomist party in Cuba began to 
discuss additional measures without any assurance from Sjiain 
that she would consent to them. They were suggested with 
the evident intention of determining, if possible, to what ex- 
tent it would be necessary to go to induce the insurgents to lay 
down their arms. But the insurgents continued firm in their 
demand for absolute independence, and Spain Avas equally 
firm in her determination to maintain her sovereignty and re- 
ject any active interference by the United States. 

Financially, Spain was sinking deeper and deeper into 
debt, and knew not how to pay arrears due the army, civil 
servants, and other debtors, while an annual interest charge of 
$05,000,000 was due, and the Cuban indebtedness had arisen 
to nearly $500,000,000. Meanwhile, affairs both financial 
and military seemed to be drifting without any clear plan of 
action or distinct hopes for the future. Bad as this was, the 
starvation and suffering in Cuba were much worse. Official 
statistics as reported showed that in the province of Matanzas 
alone 50,000 people had perished, and a third of the popula- 
tion left were in destitution. 

Miss Clara Barton of the Bed Cross Society, on her arrival 
in Cuba reported that the condition was far worse than she 
had believed possible. The planters and business men were 
almost or quite mined. It appeared as if years of peace Avould 
be required to restore industry and commerce to a normal 
state. In short, the entire condition of the island was des- 



HOPELESS AND DISTRESSED CUBA 257 

perate and apparently almost hopeless. Wholly apart from 
the Maine disaster, the serious issue iu the Cuban (piestiou was 
a continuing one. Our government hud reached the belief 
that the time had nearly come when humanity and commercial 
interests alone required it to intervene. 

Wliik' (he Court of Inquiry was conducting its inquiry, the 
public waited patiently and with little knowledge of the nature 
of tlie testimony or of the impression made upon the members 
of the board, which observed the greatest secresy. But some 
points leaked out, such as, for example, the fact that much of 
the ammunition in the forward magazine w^as found intact. 
Everything went to confirm the general impression and belief 
that the disaster was not an accident. U'he public had made 
up its mind with an instinct which is generally unerring. 

If the official appeal for help for the starving reconcen- 
trados had been made in the hope that the sympathy of the 
people of the United States would prove the most humane 
factor, and therefore one of the most powerful intluences in 
the peaceful effort to bring the war to a speedy close, it was a 
hope with little promise of fulfillment. Apparently, it had 
no effect on Spain. The authorities at Madrid and Havana 
did nothing, and did not try to do anything. But the Amer- 
ican relief continued and could not be withdrawn when the 
need for it was becoming more and more }>ressiug. 

Up to the 10th of March the American committee for the 
relief of the reconcentrados had distributed rations to 18,000 
starving people in Havana and the neighboring towns of 
Guanabacoa, and 85,000 in the whole island. Still the misery 
was intense and people were dying by the hundreds every 
day. 

When, early in March, it was announced that fresh supplies 
would be carried to the island on two American warships — 
the Monffiomrri/ and the Nashville — the expedition was 
awaited with especial interest in view of the fate of the Maine, 
and this was followed 1)V much disturbance of feeling when 
Spain, through Minister Woodford, requested that supplies 



258 SPAIN ASKS THE RECALL OF GENERAL LEE 

should not be sent to Cuba on war vessels, and that our govern- 
ment should recall Consul-General Lee, through whose active 
efforts supj^lies had been distributed where most needed. The 
Madrid papers were charging that General Lee's sympathies 
were more with the insurgent than with tlie Spanish forces, 
and that he was in friendly relations with correspondents of 
papers which w^ere considered to be decidedly unfriendly to 
Spain. It would have been strange, indeed, had General Lee 
failed to have sympathy for the insurgents after what he had 
observed, but he at all times carefully refrained from official 
acts that would have compromised hira or the people he repre- 
sented. 

After the destruction of the Maine, the correspondent, 
Laine, whose story was afterwards told to a Senate committee, 
bethought himself of the Weyler letter, to the latter part of 
which he had paid little heed at the time a copy of it came into 
his possession. Laine asserted that he tried to see Diaz, his 
informant, and secure, if possible, the original of the letter, 
but could not. He assumed that Diaz, being a Spaniard, must 
have notified the authorities that he had a copy of the letter, 
for on March 4th he was arrested and kept in Cabana fortress. 
Through a friend vA\o had witnessed the arrest he was able to 
infoiTii the consul-general. On the 9th he was expelled from 
the island. lie averred that the Spanish police officials had 
informed him that they knew of his secret, but that it would 
die with him, and he considered that he had been expelled 
rather than killed because he had been enabled to make his 
arrest known. 

The letter was published in a ]N"ew York paper and drew 
forth a denial from Guzman that he had ever received it, and 
from Weyler that he had ever sent it. General Lee knew 
Laine well, and had, as he says, always found him " a very up- 
right, honest, straight fellow." When he saw the copy of the 
Weyler letter, therefore, he thought the chances were that he 
had a copy of a genuine letter, and he set some machinery at 
work with the result that he found a cablegram signed " Wey- 



GENUINENESS OF THE WKVF.EK LETTER 259 

lor," sent from Barcelona to Kva ('and and Santos Guzman. 
The former was (juite a noted Spanish woman in Havana who 
was a great admirer of General Weyh'r. 1 )iii'in<i the mob riots 
she had shouted " Viva Weijler! " and " M iicra Blanco! " and 
was finally expelled from the island by IHaneo and sent to 
Mexico. (hi/man was llie one to whom the h'tter Laine 
showed had been a(hh'essed. This cablegram read: 

"Grave circumstances cause nie to ask you to destroy llie last letter of 
February 18." 

General Lee was entirely satisfied that it was a genuine 
telegram received at Havana, and considered it corroborative 
of the letter shown by Laine. I'he cablegram seemed to I'efer 
to a later letter, and to all appearance was sent after receiving 
information that his former letter had been made public. It 
will be noticed that Laine's arrest occurred the 4th, the request 
for Lee's recall the 6th, an<l Laine's expulsion on the 9th. 

]\rany saw in Spain's request for the recall of General Lee 
the influence of L)e Lome, who had just arrived at ^fadrid, as 
he was known to have advised his government to take such a 
course when he was minister. AVhen the State Department 
first considered sending relief su]>plies to Cuba by warships, 
De Lome had been very ])rompt to protest, and he also spoke 
unofficially to mendiers of the State L)e]»artniciit of wliat he 
considered the im])ro])riety of General Lee's conduct in Ha- 
vana. 

The request for Lee's withdrawal was jn-omptly refused by 
the President, who said in a public statcMuent: " Tlie President 
will not consider the recall of General Lee. He has borne him- 
self throughout this crisis with judgment, fidelity, and courage 
to the President's entire satisfaction. As to the sui)i)lies for 
the relief of the Cuban people, all arrangements have been 
made to carry a consignment this week from Key "West by one 
of the naval vessels, whichever may be tlic l)est ada])ted and 
most available for the ]iurpose, to ^Lntanzas and Sagua." 

It was decided to send the su]iplies in the Fern witli the 



260 UNITY IN CONGRESS 

Montgomery as convoy, so, jjractically, both requests from 
Spain were refused and she was too wise to press them. The 
tone of the conservative press in Spain became very hostile to 
the United States, thongh the ministry made frequent ex- 
pressions of its desire for friendly relations. Elections for the 
Cortes were jDending and the Liberals were anxious that a ma- 
jority should be chosen in support of the Sagasta ministry. 
There had been no election since the Oanovas ministry, and 
thus the Liberals were in a minority, dangerous in view of the 
complications ahead. 

The trend of events was unmistakable. The administra- 
tion was doing everything possible to place the navy and army 
on a war footing and Spain was making efforts to buy war ves- 
sels. The President felt that the time had come to add to the 
fleet, and that required the support of Congress. His consulta- 
tions with the leaders of Congress plainly showed that he would 
be gladly supported in any preparations for war, though there 
was some hesitancy shown by the naval committee, curiously 
enough, from the representatives of the State of Maine. The 
result of the President's consultation was the introduction by 
Mr. Cannon, chairman of the House Committee on Appropria- 
tions, of a bill setting apart $50,000,000 for the defense of the 
nation to be used at the President's discretion. No statement 
was made of the reason why such a sum was demanded. But 
it was warmly approved throughout the country. The people 
simply knew that the controversy with Spain had reached 
such a point that the President felt it his duty to prepare for 
war. 

It was passed in the House of Pepresentatives on the 8th 
and in the Senate on the 9th of March, without a dissenting 
voice in either body and without debate in the Senate; and it 
was at once signed by the President. One of the striking 
features of the debate in the Honse was the apparently gen- 
eral agreement that it was essentially a peace rather than a war 
measure. The argument was that to be well prepared for any 
possible emergency was the best way to insure the calm and 



REVIVAL OF AMERICAN I'ATHIOTIS.M 2G1 

roasonablc consideration of lair j)r(>})o.sitions lur the mainte- 
nance of honor and justice without resort to war. The same 
reason was given for the continued activity of the army and 
navy, the reorganization of military (U'partnients, the purchase 
of war material, the equip])ing of ships, the enlisting of men, 
the increased estimates in the naval hill, the forming of two 
new regiments of artillery, which the army officials had long 
before unsuccessfully demanded as a necessity for coast de- 
fense. All of these steps were being taken, and tlic two days 
in which thv- resolution for defense was passed formed a dra- 
matic climax. They were days when stocks, bonds, and cal- 
culating self-interest were lost sight of in the rise of American 
patriotism; a cool, strong, determined unit of thought and 
action, sweeping everything before it in the (\)ngi-ess of the 
United States. 

If it was only a peace measure it was a jiretty big one. No 
step in the three years of our Cuban policy had so won the re- 
spect of nations. Its meaning was great and far reaching. It 
meant the freedom of Cuba — by peace if possible; if not, by 
war. That would depend upon Spain. President McKinley 
completely doniiiuitcd the situation. Congress gave to him 
$50,000,000 and a vote of confidence such as no Presideuit 
ever had, both without his making a promise in return. Tie 
deeply felt the trust imposed upon him, for he considered it 
as a trust and not as a vindication. 

History will certainly call that a striking moment in our 
national life when $50,000,000 were given to the President 
without a minute's hesitation or a dissenting voice. Such a 
vote was not recalled in the whole history of Congress — every 
man voting, and all on one side, ready and eager to go on 
record. The four hours' debate in the House wns not really a 
debate — but four Imurs of speeches all on one side. I'or the 
first time since the Civil War, Congress was united as one man 
in a common cause for the honor of a common flag. It was 
worth a few millions just to f^how t<^ the world that silver and 
gold, protection and free trade, and all other differences, with 



2G2 PREPARING FOR DEFENSE OR OFFENSE 

the party names of Republican, Democrat, and Popnlist had 
vanished, leaving no East, West, Korth, nor South, but instead 
one solid American party, with a single plank in its platform, 
pledged to stand by the government. The luition with such 
confidence in its government is a great nation. 

The measure certainly seemed to have a calming effect 
upon Spain, and a semi-official statement was made in Madrid 
to the effect that Spain was no more desirous of war than the 
United States. Undoubtedly, this was generally true, in 
spite of a feeling that a war with the United States might be 
necessary to save the throne. The statement said there was no 
cause for war, but this was from Spain's standpoint. She had 
no desire for war so long as the United States allowed affairs 
to go on in Cuba, and she hold there was no cause for war so 
long as the United States did so. But from the American 
standpoint the war in Cuba must stop, and the only chance for 
peace was in Spain's yielding, and she would welcome a war 
with the United States rather than do that. If she withdrew 
from Cuba, it must be at the point of the guns of the United 
States, not of those of Cuban bandits. The far-sighted in this 
country understood this perfectly, and therefore considered 
the $50,000,000 a war measure, not a peace measure. 

The government at once became intensely active in put- 
ting the country in a condition of defense. Enormous quan- 
tities of war supplies were ordered; negotiations for the pur- 
chase of warships building abroad were begun; recruiting 
stations for the navy were opened; the monitors, cruisers, and 
rams were put under commission; the great ordnance factory 
of the government was kept working night and day. and two 
cruisers, receiving finishing touches in English shipyards and 
intended for Brazil, were purchased. 



ClIAPTEK XXIV 

ATTITUDE OF EUROPEAN POWERS — INCREASING GRAVITY 
OF THE SITUATION — FINAL DIPLOMATIC EFFORT WITH 
SPAIN ^REPORT OF THE COURT OF INQUIRY. 

Souudiug Europeau Govfriiiufiits — Friendly Attitude of Englaud — Rea- 
sons for Cherishing an Alliance — Moral Influence of the Attitude of 
the United States — The Spanish Court of Inquiry — Marked Impres- 
sion Made by Senator Proctor's Speech — Dilfcring Policies — Renewed 
Activity in War Preparations — Senator Thurston's Speech Enthusias- 
tically Received — S])ain's Torpedo Flotilla Departs from the Canary 
Islands — Hastening Diplomacy — A Critical Situation — Our Demands 
upon Spain — Report of the Naval Court of Inquiry Suhmilted — Its 
Conclusions — Significance of the Keel Plates in the Wreck — Evidence 
Entirely Conclusive of Outside Explosion — ElTorls to Fix the Respon- 
sibilit}' — Suggestive Phrase from Spanish Rei)()rt. 

THE European govcrniiieiits, while not officially sounded 
as to their attitude in case of war, gave indications of 
their official position, and in all cases save one their 
responses were satisfactory'. Austria's manner, if not posi- 
tively unfriendly, was somewhat chilling. Gemiany gave us 
to understand that its friendship and trade witli tlic Tnitt'd 
States were of more importance to her than friendshij) and 
trade Avith Spain. But the most significant expression, and 
by far the most important, came from England. There had 
been some discussion as to joint action between the United 
States and England in case an attempt was made by conti- 
nental powers to close neutral ports in China, btit it had been 
indecisive. It was made idcar, however, that there was a 
practically unanimous feeling in England with regard to the 
strength and justice of the American position in the differences 
with Spain. Xevcr before in the history of England and the 
United States luid ihere been such outspoken aj)proval of 



264 ENGLISH SYMPATHY AND APPROVAL 

American policy; never before such warm expression of Anglo- 
Saxon fellowship. The sobriety of spirit and quiet determina- 
tion, first to be in the right, and next to support the right at any 
cost, which had thus far been shown by the President, by Con- 
gress, and by the people of the country during these trying 
weeks had won the English heart, and it was evident that if war 
came with Spain, England would stand as a warning against 
any interference from Continental powers. It was not con- 
sidered probable that there would be a formal alliance between 
the two countries, but their unconscious gravitation towards 
each other in time of danger showed again that blood was 
thicker than water. The historical and race kinship of the 
two peoples was evidently becoming more distinct in the . 
national consciousness, and promised to constitute a great fac- 
tor in the international problems of the future. 

England's disposition to cherish an alliance with us was 
very reasonably influenced by the diplomatic situation in 
Europe as to China. Rather than be deprived of the markets 
of the far East or to suffer the dismemberment of the Chinese 
empire, which was seriously threatened by the aggressive 
policy of Russia, Erance, and Germany, England had inti- 
mated that she would go to war. Matters had arrived at a very 
critical stage, and had not the trouble between Spain and the 
United States brought forth the evidences of an understanding 
between the latter and England, the three Continental powers 
threatening England's prestige in the East might have pushed 
her to active operations. When the influence, even though 
entirely moral, of the United States was thrown in the balance 
with England, the powers drew back. This, doubtless, had its 
effect in stirring up the severe criticisms of the TTnited States 
and the evident sympathy with Spain in the press of Russia, 
France, and Germany. It compelled a relinquishment of 
designs in the East at a time when they thought England to be 
unsu]>ported. 

Moreover, the Cuban war had been as disastrous in many 
ways to the interest of England as to ours. The railways had 



findtnt; of the Spanish court of inquiry 205 

largely been built with capital borrowed in London; over 100 
plantations were owned by Englishmen or were controlled by 
English capital, and England had been seriously coiiiiidering 
what she should do with all the chiiiiis of her citizens for 
damages in the Cuban war, — damages for wliich Sj)ain was 
liable. 

Little was heard fr(»m tlie Xaval ('oiirt of Tii([iiiry in the 
Maine disaster, though from unofficial sources came occasional 
intimations that the explosion was external and not internal. 
But, in the pressure of other events, the importance of the 
inquiry was lost sight of. The Presickmt of the Spanish Court 
of Inquiry, Oajitain Peral, i^ublicly stated that in his opinion 
the disaster was an accident, pure and simple. The prevailing 
idea was that much depended uj^on the report of our Court, 
and also mucli upon the reply of Spain to any denumd for 
indemnity that might be made. It was semi-officially an- 
nounced that Spain would resist the payment of an indenmity. 
This attitude, taken in advance of the report of our Court, and 
only upon the public statement of Captain Peral, gave abun- 
dant evidence that the United States could expect nothing 
from Spanish diplomacy. AVhen it took twenty years to col- 
lect the .Mora claim, which Spain acknowledged to \)0 just, 
there was little prospect of securing an imleiiinity f(ir the 
Maine. 

Spain remained as firm as ever in its refusal to consider 
the freedom of Cuba; Captain-Ceneral Llaneo, at a dinner 
given at Havana, declared that Spain would never give it up 
nor would she sell at any price. 

Xothing made a more marked impression ni)on Congress 
and the country at this time that the speech of Senator Proetor 
in the Senate on ^larch ITth. Owing to the aggressive char- 
acter of some of the pro-Cuban newspapers, many people had 
foi-nied the liabit of discounting the ncAVS wdiich came from the 
troubled island. Even when these statements were backed by 
reports from some corres|)on(lents of good repute, there was a 
disposition to doubt occurrences which hardly seemed possible 



200 EFFECT OF SENATOR PROCTOR'S SPEECH 

ill civilizc'l warfare. This doubt luauifested itself iu tlie Sen- 
ate among those who dreaded precij^itate action, and it was 
fortunate, therefore, that some of the senators and congTess- 
men had determined to see for themselves. Of all those who 
chose thus to inform themselves no man was more respected 
among his colleagues than Senator Proctor of Vermont, a level- 
headed, conservative i^ew Englander, with much acumen, 
sobriety of judgment, and due regard for the responsibilities 
of his othce. AVhen, therefore, he described in cool, dispas- 
sionate language the conditions of Cuba as he saw them in Feb- 
ruary and early in March, and voiced his judgment concern- 
ing the future of Cuba if it continued under Spanish rule, 
doubtfid people began to realize why it w^as that so many had 
long urged intervention. Ho assured the Senate that he 
spoke without any consultation with the President, and that 
his words could only be interpreted as an expression of his 
personal belief. 

It had become apparent that, assuming that the Maine 
incident was satisfactorily settled, two radically differing 
parties existed among those close to the President: those who 
advocated immediate intervention on the ground of humanity 
and commercial necessity, and those wdio preferred to give 
Spain a longer time to demonstrate the success or failure of 
autonomous government. All agreed that it would be useless 
and unwise to attempt to force the insurgents into accepting 
even the most generous Spanish terms, and all dreaded an at- 
tempt to settle the question by force at any time betvv'een May 
1st and October 1st, when the mortality from fever might be 
greater than that from Spanish bullets. Undoubtedly, many 
sincere friends of Cuba, who had made up their minds that 
force would be necessary and wise, would have been glad to 
continue the relief to the reconcentrados and to impress upon 
Spain diplomatically the necessity of her granting freedom to 
Cuba on honorable terms, but events could not be so easily 
managed. The action of tliis nation cannot be determined by 
the President alone, or by Congress, or by any special interest; 



A THRILLING SCENE IN THE SENATE 307 

in the last analysis it mnst Lo clotenuincd by the people. 
There arc times when the national consciousness rises higher 
tluin nnytliiiii;' else and snch times arc moiiicutoiis ones in the 
life of the nation. 

As the time for the report of the Xaval Board approached, 
the pulilic iiiipaticucc increased. By the 24th the <ii'avity of 
the situation couhl no longer he disguised by expressions of 
peace; tlie feiding of restk'ssness was noticeable everywhere. 
A crisis seemed at hand. The activity of preparations in the 
Ai-my and Xavy Departments constantly increased. Trooj^s 
had been ordered eastward ; important changes had been made 
in the naval commands; telegraphic orders for the purchase of 
tugs and toq^edo destroyers had gone forth. In Congress the 
nervous enthusiasm of the crowd of spectators who daily 
wandered about the great marble capitol found vent when 
S( iiator (iailinger of New Ilamjishire depicted the horrors he 
had witnessed in Cuba, and when Senator Thurston of Ne- 
braska, who had just returned from a visit to Cuba, where 
his wife had died, in a glowing speech described the dreadful 
scenes he had witnessed, and declared strongly for action. As 
he neared the close of his speech he l?roke down und(>r excite- 
ment, sympathy, and sorrow, and as he sat down ho bowed 
his head upon his desk and wejjt, and the g*alleries broke into 
applause that for the first time in the United States Senate 
wa< allowed to go on unclfcckcd. 

The gravity of the situation was increased by tlie departure 
froui the Canary Islands of a flotilla of torpedo boats, osten- 
sibly for the West Indies, though the opinion was held that the 
movement was for tlie purpose of influencing the elections to 
the Cortes to be held on the 2Tth. The Carlists, Conservatives, 
and Republicans were attacking Sagastii for alleged weakness 
in dealing with the United vStates. 

The Pre?:ideut early decided to treat the Maine question 

and the general Cuban question se]>arately. Keali/ing that it 

woidil be imjiossibh^ to restrain Congr(>ss and the people after 

the rejiort of the ('oiirt of lni|iiirv, the inevitable conelusions 

17 



268 ATTITUDE OF THE ADMINISTRATION 

of which the administratiou well knew, the President hastened 
on his diplomatic negotiations in every way possible. He im- 
pressed upon Spain his desire for peace, but declared that the 
situation in Cuba must be relieved. We should insist upon 
making the relief of the starving effective. It would be im- 
possible for the United States to allow the contest to go on, 
and as autonomy such as Spain had proposed would not be ac- 
cepted by the Cubans, it was useless to consider further the 
possibilities of that plan as a measure of peace. But if Spain 
could be induced to suspend hostilities and induce the Cubans 
to treat, it was possible that the United States might by some 
arrangement bring about the compliance of the Cubans. 

On March 23d Minister Woodford conveyed to the Spanish 
government the attitude of the administration, and two days 
later Spain replied to the effect that she could not agree with 
the " inaccurate conclusions " of the American government as 
to the conditions in Cuba, and she still insisted that autonomy 
was woTking well. Neither could Spain admit the interference 
foreshadowed in the American note and she deprecated the 
sending of official relief and war vessels to Cuba. 

There was little time left. The President received the re- 
port on the Maine on the 25th, and it would not do to hold it 
back from Congress. He saw that the only way to avert war 
for the time was to induce Spain to grant an armistice during 
which the Cuban question could be deliberately and dispas- 
sionately considered and settled. Accordingly, on the 27th, 
as a result of much previous correspondence, he sulunitted 
tlirougli the minister at Madrid propositions for an armistice 
until October 1st for the negotiation of peace on the basis of 
the independence of Cuba, with the good offices of the Presi- 
dent. In addition to this, he asked for the immediate and 
effective revocation of the order of reconcentratiou so as to 
permit the people to return to their fanns, the needy to be 
relieved with provisions and supjilies from the United States, 
co-operating with the Spanish authorities, so as to afford full 
relief. 



SPAIN RESPONSIBLE FOR THE "MAINE" 2G0 

_0n the following day, and while the President was await- 
ing the reply to what he considered a tinal eliort to settle 
atfairs diplomatically, the report of the Court of Inquiry was 
iiKidc public, hut it created no new excitement. The public 
uiiiid had already been made u]), and the report came chieily 
as a formal tinding in a case that had already been decided 
upon al)un(laut circumstantial evidence. Among a certain 
class some disappointment prevailed because the CV)urt had not 
been able to fix the ros2)onsibility definitely, the difiiculties in 
the way of such a board when endeavoring to detect a Spanish 
culprit, in such a state of affairs as existed at Havana, not being 
ai)prcciated; but it made little diifcrence whether the responsi- 
bility was fixed or not, for, in fact, and in the eyes of the people 
of the I'^nited States, Spain could not escape the responsibility 
of the outrage, even if her officials w^ere ignorant of any plot. 
She had failed to protect a vessel at Havana on a friendly mis- 
sion, and the fact that the evidence w^as quite conclusive that 
the Maine had been blown up by a mine made the case against 
Spain all the stronger, for a mine sufficient to cause such de- 
struction could not have existed without the knowledge of 
someone in authority about the fortifications of the city. Even 
had the Court reported that it had been unable to determine 
how the Maine had been blown up, it is doul)tful if it would 
have made any serious difference with the situation. The fact 
that a state of things existed in (*ul)a wlilch made it unsafe for 
American warships to ao there was sutlicieut. The great 
( 'uban question was still over and above incidental considera- 
tions; the Maine had simply determined the people to settle 
it, if not (piichly by peace, then (piickly by war. 

President McKinley sent to Congress the full text of the 
report, together with the voluminous evidence taken; a brief 
message recapitulating the well-known facts about the visit of 
the Maine to Havana, and the organization of the court ami 
its proceedings. 

Tn com-lusion, he s;iid tliat he liad directed the findings of 
the Coui-t and the views of this government to be coramuni- 



370 CONCLUSIONS OF THE COURT OF INQUIRY 

cated to the governniGnt of Spain, and added: " I do not pw- 
niit myself to doubt that the sense of justice of the Spanish na- 
tion will dictate a course of action suggested by honor and the 
friendly relations of the two governments." He refrained 
from making an immediate demand for indemnity, desiring 
first to see what Spain might see lit to answer to our presenta- 
{[(Jii of facts. 

The evidence tha+ the disaster was caused by an outside 
explosion was convincing to all who had a knowledge of the 
work of the (^ourt of Inquiry. The center of the explosion 
was beneath and a little foi-w^ard of the conning tower and on 
the port side, and not only did the wreck show that no ex- 
plosion of the forward magazines could have produced such 
effects, but that they were plainly the effect of a force from 
underneath the ship. The keel at this center of explosion was 
blown up above the surface of the water, and the forward 
part of the ship had been thrown over forward so that the 
l)ow \\as driven into the mud. Indeed, about all of the for- 
ward part of the shi}> which appeared above water were the 
keel plates. More than this, the divers discovered, under- 
neath this part of the raised keel and exactly where the center 
of tlie explosion M-as, a large hole in the mud, fully fifteen feet 
in diameter and seven feet deep. The Court was inclined to 
think that the force of the mine explosion must have exploded 
some part of the forward magazines, but, nevertheless, con- 
siderable ammunition from these magazines was found intact, 
whereas had the initial explosion taken place within them 
nothing would have remained. Besides, there was nothing 
to cause these ammunition stores to explode except an ex- 
])losion from outside. The evidence was entirely conclusive. 

Kecognizing the obstacles to the work of obtaining any 
evidence calculated to fix the re>^ponsil)ility for the outrage, 
the Court of Inquiry does not seem to have devoted nnicli at- 
tention to that branch of the investigation, although it secured 
some evidence that was not made public. As the Maine had 
been conducted to the buoy bv direction of the harbor author- 



A SUGGESTIVE SENTENCE 271 

itics, niul as siidi an (•.\|)losi()ii cdiiM imi havt' hccii wui'ked 
except by coiinivniicc with sonic one on shore in chai'f^c of or 
with a knowledge of the mines, an investigation to fix the re- 
sponsi])ility wonld naturally ha\(' taken the Conrt in the di- 
rection (if the authorities wlio wei'e investigating tlic case for 
Spain, and who had asserte<l from the heginning tliat it was 
an accich'ut. It was genei-ally thought that CJeneral Bhinco 
was innocent of any knowle(lg(> of a ]dot, hnt it was well 
known that a large i)i'o[)oi'tion of the guards were hostile to 
him, were adherents of Weyler, were bitterly hostile to the 
I'ldted States, Avere capable of almost anything in the way of 
outrage, and were, moreover, in a position to use mines if 
sneh there wei'c in the harbor. 

The report <if the Spanish Conrt of Tnqniry based its 
reasons for concluding the explosion an internal one mainly 
on the statements that no dead fish were seen abont the wreck, 
a fact entirely iucoiudusive, largely becanse there are few 
iish in the dirty waters of the bay. It was admitted that no 
effective examination had been made of the conditions of the 
wi'eck, but, it said, " this nnist not be undei'stood to mean that 
the accuracy of these pi'e-enl concJuions rei[nires snch proof.'' 



CHAPTER XXV. 

NEARING A CRISIS — " REMEMBER THE MAI]VE" — SVAIWS 
FINANCIAL STRAITS — HASTENING OUR NAVAL PREPA- 
RATIONS—SPAIN'S UNSATISFACTORY TACTICS. 

Public Impatience Restrained with Difficulty — The President's Trying 
Position — Radical Resolutions in the Senate — The President's Firm 
Hand — Liberal Victory in Spain — The Cuban Deputies — Arrival of 
the Vizcai/d and Almirante Oquendo in Havana — Spaniards in Hostile 
Mood — Spanish Torpedo Flotilla and Its Movements — Spain's Appeal 
to Europe — Suicide of the Dynasty — Desperate Financial Conditions 
— The Church as a Holder of Spanish Bonds — Putting the United 
States Navy in Readiness- The Key West Fleet and the Flying Squad, 
ron — Apparent Concessions — Only for Effect — The Pro]iosed Armis- 
tice — Congress Becomes More and More Impatient — The President's 
Reasons for Delay — Time Needed to Prepare — His Influence upon 
Congressional Leaders — Condition of Some of Our Battleships — 
Learning a Lesson. 

THE report of the Court of Inquiry was formally and 
witliont debate referred to the committees on foreign 
affairs, bnt it at once became evident tliat the public 
patience, which had endured till this formal act was com- 
pleted, coidd now be restrained only with the greatest diffi- 
culty. The navy was not disjwsed to rest content under an 
indefinite continuance of futile diplomacy while the murder 
of their comrades went unpunished, and this feeling was 
shared by a large portion of the public. Revenge is doubtless 
a questionable motive for war, but under the circumstances it 
could not fail to exist, and '' Remember the Maine " became 
a catch-phrase of the day. 

The President fully realized the increased difficulties of 
the situation, and, while he desired peace, he was in no mood 
to shrink from war if it became necessary; he simply wished 
to proceed in a manner which would leave no stain upon our 
action for history to record, and give none of the European 

(273) 



WAR SPIRIT IN THE SENATE :^73 

])(»\v(M-s a gruiiiul for just criticism. This desire was not influ- 
ciici'd Uy any fear of them, or tacit surrender of the right of 
tlic I'nited States to determine its own course in its own way, 
hut hccause he wished war, if it came, to stand upon a sound 
moral basis as far as this country was concerned. Having 
enjoyed a long career in ( "ongress as one of its leaders, he was 
fully able to appreciate its feelings, and he had no intention of 
defying a body for which he had the highest respect and in 
whose wisdom he had the greatest confidence. Still, he 
wished to use his own jjowers so that there could be no uustake 
resulting from the bitter passion of the hour. 

On the :29th, the war spirit in the Senate, so long con- 
tiu(=d, burst forth with renewed energy. Four resolutions on 
the subject were offered respectively by Senators Allen, Ilaw- 
lius, Foraker, and Frye, and were referred without debate to 
tlie Committee on Foreign Relations, the two senators last 
named being uHMubers of that committee. Senator Allen's 
resolution recognized the independence of Cuba and appro- 
l)riat(Ml $500,000 for relieving the suffering there; Senator 
Ivawlius made his a virtual declaration of war against Spain, 
authorizing the use of the army and navy to carry it to a suc- 
cessful conclusion. Senator Frye's resolution was more mild, 
authorizing the President to take such effective steps as in his 
discretion were re(iuired to bring about peace in ( 'uba ami the 
independence of the Cubans. The Foraker resolutiou called 
on S})ain to withdraw from Cid)a, and while not formally de- 
claring war, authorized the use of the land and naval forces of 
the country to enforce the demands. 

The same day the President held a conference Avitli some 
of the leading members of the two houses to arrange, if pos- 
sil)le, a plan for executive and legislative action with the Impe 
of heading off the too radical element in Congress, determined 
to have war at once and without reference to the existing 
diplomatic situatif)n. Those who were attempting to hold 
Iiack Congress till the executive cnnhl act were incline<l to 
think that he would n-.t be ;ible to maintain his control of the 



274 A FIRM HAND AT THE HELM 

situation and meet the expectations and demands of the people 
of the country unless he at once announced a positive policy, 
which would include a demand upon Spain for the immediate 
cessation of hostilities, not through the military device of an 
armistice hut by the actual evacuation of Cuba by the Spanish 
troops, the gTanting of full and complete autonomy, and the 
assurance of ultimate independence. They considered it too 
late to talk of an armistice such as the President had proposed 
at Spain's suggestion. The people were not in a mood to take 
Spanish suggestions with patience, and there could l)e no true 
armistice so long as the Cubans refused to suspend hostilities 
for anything except independence. 

But the President was able to ]ire\ail upon the leaders in 
Congress to curb their warlike spirit till after he could inform 
them whether Spain accepted or rejected the demands he had 
made in his last note, a reply to which he momentarily ex- 
pected. He was hopeful, thougli far from sangnine, that at 
the last moment Spain would yield to the inevital)le and ac- 
cept terms on which war could be avoided, at least till the 
summer season was over. For he knew full well that those 
who would plunge the country into war at once had no ade- 
quate conception of the difficulties of summer campaigning 
in Cul)a. 

The elections to the Spanish Cortes passed off (piietly on 
Sunday, the 27th, and resulted in an overwdielming victory 
for the Liberals. AVhile the other parties endeavored to se- 
cure popular support by declaring that the Sagasta ministry 
was not sufficiently firm in dealing Avitli the United States, 
Sagasta gave expressions to terms of defiance, declaring that 
Spain would not concede our right to intervene, and thus 
partisan lines gave way before a sentiment uniting all men in 
the support of those Avho were already in office. The result 
naturally strengthened the hands of Sagasta and gave him 
greater confidence in a determined policy. In the elections in 
Cuba, twenty of the thirty deputies to the Cortes were from 
the Autonomists, the rest from the Conservatives. Of the 



THE SPANISH FLOTILLA CAUSKS ALARM 275 

twenty Autoiiuiui^^ls chosen, only eight were natives of Cuba, 
and of the ten Conservatives bnt one was ( 'nban-horn, and he 
iiad lived mainly in Spain and was very pro-Spanisli. Five 
(if the Conservative de})nties were notorions for their hatred 
of the United States. Feeling against this (Mmiitry ran very 
high in llaxaiia, and Anici'icaiis ihci'e were far fi'oni being in 
a comfortable or sate position. 'i'liey wei'c apt to be insnlted 
wherever they went, and it was (htngcrous to resent it. 

The arri\al of the \' h.caijH al lia\aiia ereatecl an enthn- 
siasm which threatened to eml in an ontbreak of the lawless 
elements, (^-owds gathered to welcome the crniser, shouting 
'' Viva E-spana!" and " \'ir(( Wnjlcr!"' and it was only by 
taking- extraitrclinai'v ]»rei'antions that (Jeiieral Blanco was 
able to preserve the peace. A few days latei' the Alinirante 
Oijuendo arrived and was similarly welcomed. 

In the latter i)art of JMarch the report that the Spaiii>h tor- 
pedo flotilla which had stopped at the Canary Islands had been 
ordered to Puerto Ivico added to the gravity of the situation in 
this country and caused much alarm. As such a ilotilla was 
not needed in ('ni»a for the purposes of suppressing the re- 
bellion and was of an aggressive, not defensivi', character, it 
seemed likely that Spain had determined ui)on hostile actions, 
and even the Army and Nary Joiintdl went so far as to term 
it an act of war, justifying our immediate action, as if war 
had been de(dared by Spain. I bit in view of the preparations 
we had already nuide for action, if necessary, the appeai-ancc 
of the Spanish flotilla at I'nerto Kico could really be regai-ded 
as little more than justiliable ])recaution. 

Although the Queen and the Spanish govennnent made 
many diplomatic appeals for the help of Europe in preventing 
the im])ending intervention in Cuba, there was little indica- 
tion of success. Jn Furoi)e, as in the United States, the ques- 
tion whicdi statesmen and hmiuciers were asking was, Imw 
could Spain enter ujton a great wai- with a treasury so empty? 
— a wai- in which she would ulliiuately and inevitably stand 
to lose not only Cuba and Puerto Kico but the Philiiipincs, 



27G A THRONE IN PERIL 

and which might involve the overthrow of the monarchy. 
But in reality the Spanish people had been so persistently de- 
ceived by their government as to Spanish successes in (^iba, 
and as to the military weakness and boastfulness of the United 
States, that they really believed Spain capable of doing great 
things, of actually invading the United States; and to have 
drawn back in the face of sncli an opinion would have so en- 
raged the deluded people as to have at once overthrown the 
monarchy. The dynasty was likely to fall in either case. 
But if it stood any chance, it was in Avar. 

The Avisest in Spain as well as in the Ihiited States saw 
that the triumph of Spanish arms in (^d)a, or even in the 
retention of Spanish sovereignty, woidd be a fruitless, if not 
a dangerous, victory. It certainly could not be final. The 
interest on the Cuban debt would then amount to $30,000,000 
]ier annum, and the revenues could not be made to reach this 
amount even before the island A\as devastated and by recourse 
to every possible means of taxation. 

But beyond this, the maintenance of the army which 
w<mld be necessary, and of the civil administration, would 
cost $80,000,000 more. Spain would hardly be i\])\e to luake 
l>oth ends of her own budget meet, to say nothing of helping- 
Cuba. 

Continued Spanish sovereignty in Cuba had, therefore, 
become to Spain an absolute impossibility, and yet to yield it 
was a political impossibility ■ — the suicide of the dynasty. 

The financial condition of the Spanish government could 
hardly have been worse. Taxation, which before the war 
with C'Uba was reckoned to consume one-fifth of the total in- 
come of the people, had been increased by every expedient 
known to bankrupting finance. Confessing the corruption 
or incapacity of hei' own officials, the government had carried 
further the costly policy of turning over to private monopolies 
the collection of the various taxes. The old tobacco monop- 
oly had been renewed at a higher rental and mono])olies were 
created to deal in petroleum and explosives. The govern- 



DESPERATE CONDITION OF SPAIN'S FINANCES 277 

meiit had asked permission to turn over to private companies 
for twenty-five years the state lottery, and for fifteen years a 
iiiniiopoly in the sale of salt. The 4 per cent, bonds of the 
uovcninicnt, which three years Lefore had sold at 80, had by 
the end of JMarch fallen to 51, and the government, in its 
straits to borrow, had pledged its customs revenne, increased 
the privileges of the state banks, and offered the railroads 
subsidies and an extension of privileges till 1980 for assist- 
ance in raising loans. The debts nominally resting on Spain 
had not been materially increased, because the war loans 
figured as the Cuban debt; but the home debt alone amounted 
to $1,300,000,000, or $400 for every family in the poverty- 
stricken nation. The enormous Cuban debt was relatively 
a more serious matter, for it Avas a question whether all the 
))ro]Kn-ty remaining in (^iba after three years of war would 
have discharged the debt which the island would have been 
required to carry if S])ain had been victorious. The crush- 
ing weight of this prospective load was one of the factors 
which made submission worse than death to the patriotic 
C\ibans. 

The impending conflict, therefore, involved not only the 
Cuban del)t but the bankrn])tcy of Spain, and naturally the 
h(jlders of all her millions of (le])ts became greatly concerned 
over the situation. Much of this debt was held by the Church 
of Spain. 

In the early part of the nineteenth century the property 
of the Church had so accumulated that it might be said al- 
most without exaggeration that it had absorbed the wealth of 
the country. In 1820 there were no less than 150,000 priests 
in Si)aiu, and clericalism had played a large part in the strug- 
gle of the dynasties, factions, and parties. The success of 
Christina after the death of Ferdinand in 1833 meant a de- 
feat for the clerical ^larty, and it was followed by sweeping 
confiseatorv deerees which led to a protracted quarrel between 
llie \'atican iind llie S|);inisli govei-nnient. Tn ls5!», in ac- 
cordance with a eoni|ironiise between the Pope and the Span- 



278 SIGNIFICANT PURCHASES 

isli government, a large amount of clmrcli property was sold 
and there was issued to the church several hundred millions of 
dollars of interest-bearing Spanish bonds. It was natural, 
tli(M-ofore, that the church as a holder of such an enormous 
block of Spanish bonds should become especially anxious to 
maintain Spanish credit, and a war with the United States 
meant bankruptcy beyond peradventure. 

During the last week in March the government of the 
United States had further increased its army and navy an<l 
put it in a condition of readiness for possible war. Admiral 
Sicard was given six months' leave of absence because of ill 
health, and (^iptain William T. Sampson was appointed com- 
mander of the fleet at Key West, lie was considered an ideal 
ofli( ei- fo]- the important commission. A flying squadron with 
headquarters at Hampton Roads was organized with Commo- 
dore Winfield Scott Schley as its chief. It consisted of the 
l):itth'ships Texas and Massacliusetts, and the cruisers BrooJr- 
hj}), Minneapolis, and Columhia, the fleetest of our navy. 
Negotiations for the purchase of foreign warships continued; 
the entire fleet of revenue cutters belonging to the Treasury 
ne]^artment, which had for tliree years been kept busy in the 
effort to intercept Cuban filibusters, were by command of the 
President, as commander-in-chief of the army and navy, trans- 
ferred to the navy to co-operate with the naval service. 
Eleven of the finest yachts and largest tugs in the possession 
of jirivate parties were purchased to be fitted out as torpedo, 
dispatch, and gunboats. IFonitors tliat served in the C^ivil 
War were ordered into commission, and sent to the harbors of 
New York and Boston, there to be manned and handled by 
the naval militia. Ammunition Avas distrilmtcd to all the im- 
portant seacoast fortifications, and all reserve field and siege 
guns in the interior Avere ordered to coast ports, while the in- 
fantry and cavalry forces of the government were placed in 
such a condition that within three days the entire army could 
be mobilized either at Atlanta or at Wasliiugton. Our agents 
scoured Europe for available munitions, and we secured an 



CHARACTERISTIC SPANISH DII'LOMACY 27^^ 

option iipou everything' that \vuuld be needed if war were de- 
chircd. Most sigiiilieant of all was an order to paint the war 
vessels in colors never used except in likclihuud of hostile 
action. 

The war tide ruse l>y leai)s ami Ixmiuls during those few 
eventful hours in which S[)ain's reply was expected. The 
newspapers were full of conHicting statements as to what 
Spain proposed and what the President's policy was to be. 
Owing to the mystery which always surrounds diplomatic 
conimunications, the situatiun ai>pearcd much more complex 
and delicate than it really was. The President's note of the 
2Tth had demanded an armistice till October 1st for the nego- 
tiation of peace on the basis of the independence of the 
("uhans, the iiiimcdiute revocatioji of the order of reconccn- 
tration, and the relief of the needy. Spain saw that S(jme con- 
cession was essential to pacify Congress, but she endeavored to 
grant only that Avliich had the appearance but not the sub- 
stance of concessions. 

Her reply arrived at AVashington on the night of the 31st. 
She consented to release the reconcentrados at once (some- 
thing which she had ordered months before but without 
effect), and she announced that the cabinet had voted 
$(K)0,000 for the relief of the needy. But when it came to 
arranging terms of peace she said that she would confide that 
to the insular autonomist parliament, inasmuch as the con- 
currence of that body would be necessary to reach the final 
result, *' it bring uiidersfood, Jioircrcr, iliat the powers re- 
scn-cd 1)1/ the Coiislil iil ion to the centrat (/orrnnnrnt are not 
diminished or tessened.'\ In other words, she did not pro- 
pose to pcrnut the United States to take part in peace negotia- 
tions, and she did not propose to surrender her sovereignty of 
the ishnnl. She ])roi»ose(l to leave ])eace measures exclusively 
to an autonomous government which was a farce and a failure, 
with which the insurgents would not treat and which was 
really but a Miml to conceal Sjtain's ]>ui'|>i><e to handle the 
islaixl as sli^ alwavs luul liamlled it. .Moivover, this allege«l 



280 OPINION OP NAVAL EXPERTS 

Insular parliament would not meet for over a month. Spain 
said, however, she would not object to a suspension of hostili- 
ties if it were asked for by the general-in-chief of the insur- 
gents. It was well known that Gomez would do nothing of 
the kind. In fact, the reply, while calculated to give those 
prejudiced in favor of peace at any price a chance to say that 
Spain had offered all we had asked, had really given nothing. 
Even the order for the release of the reconcentrados and the 
appropriation of money for the needy were valueless, simply 
on paper and of no effect, as afterwards appeared. It was 
characteristic Spanish di]ilomacy, and the misfortune was 
that a certain international or diplomatic courtesy compelled 
the United States to wait on it. 

Following this and din-ing the first week in April our re- 
lations with Spain came to a crisis and the country was in a 
condition of feverish anxiety. Every day news was expected 
to show whether the outcome was to be peace or war, and as 
the days passed it became more and more apparent that war 
would be inevitable. The feeling in Congress was tense. 
An increasing number in both the House and Senate showed 
an eagerness for action which would bring the differences with 
Spain to a head. Undoubtedly, this feeling was strengthened 
by the report of tlie Court of Inquiry and by the further evi- 
dence concerning the disaster which was later given by Gen- 
eral Lee and Captain Sigsbee. The more the testimony was 
studied the more did the feeling gain ground that the blowing 
up of the Maine was an act of treachery. Xaval experts un- 
hesitatingly expressed their belief that when the Maine was 
anchored to one particular buoy it was known that a mine lay 
underneath her, and mines of that kind, they said, were not 
in the possession of individuals, nor were they to be pur- 
chased in the markets. It was hinted that certain Spanish 
officials knew of the location of the mine and had expected to 
use it in case hostilities were declared. 

l^othiug but the influence of the President prevented Con- 
gress from prompt action, which would have been a virtual 



DELAY THE PART OP WISDOM 281 

declaration of war. TTo coukl not liavo had any ^reat amount 
of faith in the possibility of bringing Spain to terms by diplo- 
matic nu'thods after Sjiain's reply, but at the same time some 
of the i'hiropean powers and the Vatican began to use their 
persuasive powers upon the proud but weak nation and some- 
thing might come of it. At h>ast the (h'hiy would enable the 
Cnitcd States to i)erfoct its prcparatious aud take the neces- 
sary steps for the safety of American citizens on Spanish ter- 
ritory. It would undoubtedly have been his wish to have 
continued the negotiations over the I'ainy season in Cuba, 
meanAvhile helping the reconcentrados, and in October, if 
necessary, to have struck the intervening blow to set Cuba 
free. It dou])tless would have been the part of wisdom. 
Our forces could have been drilled and acclimated iu southern 
camps, our navy could have been put in prime condition, the 
reconcentrados could have been helped back to their farms 
and started again, and sober sense might hy that time have 
convinced Spain that the best policy for her was to declare 
( ^il)a free. 

But the impatience of Congress, whose nunnbers were 
daily swamped with letters from the people clamoring f(U' 
war, could not be indefinitely curbed, and while the Presideni 
was awnre of it he did the best he could and much more than 
a man of less tact or one possessing in a less degree the con- 
tideuce of Cougi'ess could have done. Tie had cim-tant inter- 
views witli the leading men of both parties, took them into his 
confidence. e.\|)lained to them the exact sitnati<m and snc- 
ceedecl in convincing tliein that a little d(day woidd be wise 
from every point of view. These representations had their 
eifect upon a majority of the Senators and Congressmen, ami 
by common consent they agreed to wait a few days longer. 

rnfortunatelv, tliei-e wei'e soiue who, boasting of superior 
patriotism, were anxious to make political ca]>ital by making 
bitter speeches against delay, even attacking the motives of 
tlie President. T"nfortunat(dy also, the ])eace-at-any-iirice 
men in the conntvy, jtrofessing to b(die\(' that the President 



282 AN UNLEARNED LESSON 

was in accord Avith thcin, Legan to raise the cry " Stand by 
the President ! " thus adding to the impatience of Congress by 
creating the impression that he, like the peace men, had no 
idea of putting an end to the state of things which had be- 
come intolerable. 

1"he people of the Ignited States had lived so long at peace 
and had snch an inadccpiatc idea of the requirements of 
modern warfare that they conld not appreciate the wisdom of 
delaying the initiation of hostilities. Our battleships were 
far from ready. The foul growth on the bottom of the Mas- 
sachusetts liad decreased her maximum forced draught speed 
from sixteen to ten knots, while the Iowa, the fastest of our 
battleships, at Key West was reduced to a like speed, and the 
dry dock capacity w^as inadequate. ITad not the navy yard 
forces been kept at work day and night almost from the time 
of the blowing, up of the Maine, and all preparatory work 
been pushed with feverish haste, even while peace seemed 
possible, we should have been ill-prepared for an aggressive 
warfare beyond our shores at the time when the patience of 
Congress at last gave out. The people of this generation had 
yet to learn that two nations cannot proceed to war witli the 
]')r()m]itnoss vitli wliicli two street gamins scjuare off for a 
struggle with no other weapons than their fists. 



CITAPTEPv XXVI. 

THE C().U.IX(J PIJOBLlvM -SPAIN'S PRETENDED ASSISTANCE 
OF THE STAHVINU HECONCENTRADOS — AWAITING THE 
PRESIDENT'S MESSAGE. 

Tlie Army Ready to Move — Tlie Importance of the Coalim? Proljlcm — 
Spain's Small Supply — Coaling at Neutral Ports — Rlaucn's Orders to 
Help the Reeonceiitrados — No Charity p]xee|)t Throu<^h Fear of AV'ar 
— Spain Appropriates Mouey for Relief Fuud — No Chance for Money 
to Pass the Spanish Officials — Appeal of the Autonomist Govern- 
ment — Position of the Self-professed Friends of Peace — The Influence 
of the Commercial Spirit — April 6th an Exciting Day — Waiting for the 
Message — It Fails to Arrive — General Lee's Request for Time to Get 
Out of Cuba — The President's Courageous Act — Bitter Attacks upon 
Him in Congress — Bravely Defended — Other In)])ortaut Reasons for 
Delay — Spain's Foolish Action — The President's Exjiectatiou of War. 

TUlilXCi these days of uncertainty and excitement 
preparations for placing the armies and na^nes in con- 
dition for iiiinicdiate n?e, if eaUed upon, continued 
witli viuor in hoth S])ain and the T^nitcd States. The fleet of 
au.xiliary naval vessels was further increased hy flic jmrchase 
of tug's and yacht--^; a new cruiser, called the l)l<)(/rii('>t, which 
was built in CJermany for a foreign ]x>wefr, was bought in Eng- 
land; the shi])s at Key West and Hampton Roads were stripped 
in readiness for actual war, and every ]ire])aration was made for 
moving the army. The state of New V(>i-k ])laccil a milliun 
dollars at the disposal of the governor for ]uitting in readiness 
the military and naval reserve, and Ohio, Pennsylvania, and 
Towa took similar action. An effort was made to purchase 
the Danish Pland Cijist of Puerto Rico for a coaling station, 
but was abandoned because of the price aske<l. 

Tt was a! once rei-ogTii/ed that the coaling in'oblcin was 

oiu' of the mo~t iiii|iortaiit in modern naval warfare. Oidy 
18 (2s:{) 



284 A PROBLEM IN NAVAL WARFARE 

one poweir had really solved it in a satisfactory manner, and 
it is largely in the adequate establishment of a great number 
of coaling stations that Grreat Britain's commercial and naval 
strength lies. This had been so effectively demonstrated in 
the far East that Kussia, Germany, and France were eagerly 
endeavoring to follow her example. 

Spain was poorly prepared to meet the problem in Ameri- 
can waters, in spite of her poissessions. One port in Puerto 
Rico and a few in Cuba were all that she could count upon, and 
in these the supply was not large, not more than enough to 
coal her fleet for two months. As to her coaling at neutral 
ports — mostly British — the government of Great Britain, 
as far back as 1882, had drawn up a series of neutrality regu- 
lations by which it was declared that any belligerent ship 
should be allowed to buy only enough coal to take her to the 
nearest port of her own country, and, furthermore, that no 
two supplies of coal should be granted at any British neutral 
port within three months of each other. The same restrictions 
had been adopted by some of the other powei-s, and for many 
years those in the United States who had advocated the " for- 
ward policy " had urged upon our government that we not 
only needed coaling stations in the West Indies, but in the 
East, and that our station at the Hawaiian Islands sliould be 
preserved at all hazards. Some of our highest naval authori- 
ties had frequently asserted that our national policy ought to 
he that no foreign power should hereafter acquire a coaling 
station within three thousand miles of San Francisco. 

Spain sought to deprive the ITnited States of a certain 
moral advantage in the dispute at this critical time by order- 
ing Captain-General Blanco to rescind the infamous concen- 
tration order at once. Blanco stated that aftcT the publication 
of the order the reconcentrados and their families would be 
allowed to return with safety to their homes, that relief com- 
mittees would allow them to secure new houses, and that 
assistance would be given to them in obtaining work and in 
engaging in agricultural pursuits. Spain, moreover, officially 



MONEY FOR REVELS BUT NOT FOR RELIEF 285 

aniKonnood that tlie ministry had votetl an appropriation of 
$000,000 for the relief of the reconi'en'trados, and would 
accept whatever assistance in ailording relief the United States 
might send, if not sent ofhcially oa- by way of intervention. 

Nothing but the certainty of war had np to this time been 
sufficient to induce Spain to even make the show of appropriat- 
ing one peso i'nv the relief of the starving jieoplc, and there 
was little in Spanish methods to convince ns that she really had 
the intention of eft'octively relieving the suffering at this 
critical time. A vote of $600,000 by the niinistiy was a very 
different thing from the actual use of that sum in relief. 

During all those months when such steps on the part of 
Spain might have amounted to something, it was not known 
that the government, nor even the Queen, who was pictured 
as a woman much to be admired, had made the mildest sort of 
protest against a policy which would have disgraced the worst 
of the Sultan's Kurdish cavalry in Armenia. During the 
time when the whole world was ringing with the horrors of the 
Spanish policy in Cuba, and American charity was endeavor- 
ing to tind a way to carry relief without offending Spiin, all 
the Spanish illus'trated papers were full of lively accounts and 
showy illustrations of the carnival revels throughout Spain. 
AVhile nothing was contributed throughout the whole of Spain 
for the relief of the Queen's suffering subjects in the " Evei* 
i'^iitliful Isle," the. Si)aniards, with all their oft-mentione*! 
imj)overisliment and lack of resources, had wealth enough 
to lavish upon carnival frivolities. Meanwhile, the Spanish 
government, evidently satisfied with its policy of extermina- 
tion in (^iba, was somehow finding money all over Eumpe 
to spend in the purchase of munitions of war and additions to 
the navy with the purpose of fighting the United States. The 
Spanish element in Havana was able to give brilliant j)ul)lic 
balls and theatrical entertainments for the raising of money 
for the Spanish navy, while contributing inapprecialdy for the 
relief of" the wretdied iK>o|de who were dying daily in the very 
streets of Havana. 



386 MORE EMPTY FORMS AND PROMISES 

When, therefore, in tlie critical early days of April the 
Spanish ministry went through the form of appropriating 
money for the relief of the reconcentrados, there was very little 
reason to believe that a penny of it was i-eally intended to he 
used for the purpose proclaimed, and as the days passed there 
was no evidence that any attempt was made to so employ it. 
As General Lee pithily remarked to the Senate Connnittee on 
Foreign Relations, even if the money actually ever passed out 
of the Spanish treasury, none of it would succeed in running 
the gauntlet of the Spanish officials in Cuba, who would cer- 
tainly steal every dollar of it liefore it could reach the poor 
wretches for whom it was nominally intended. Officials who 
would steal e^•en in handling the money intended for the army 
and for national defense would liardly hesitate to take money 
sent for the relief of the Cubans whom they had ruthlessl}^ im- 
prisoned and starved in the hope of exterminating them. 

The first week in April was one of the most remarkable in 
the history of the country. Up to this time the peace people 
had hardly realized that a crisis was approaching; they had 
not believed such a thing as war possible. Indeed, up to the 
last moment a few self-possessed friends of peace in the United 
States declared their inability to discover any possible reason 
why we should give ourselves the slightest degree of concern 
about what was going on in Cuba. There are always men, 
otherwise intelligent, who are incapable of understanding 
events till they have receded some distance into history; they 
were born so. The bewilderment of the public as to the be- 
havior of these advocates of peace at any price w^as not les- 
sened by the fact that, to some extent, they were the same 
gentlemen who, but a short time before, had vehemently de- 
manded that the United States should make war upon the 
Turkish empire because it had not paid over to our govern- 
ment some thousands of dollars considered by us to be due for 
certain educational property destroyed by mobs several years 
ago in Asiatic Turkey. Some who had vehemently de- 
nounced the slaughter of seal pups on the Pribilof islands ap- 



ALARM OF CAPITALISTS 287 

pearcd to i)C unmuved wlicu tlic sl;nii;litcr of Culiaii women 
and children was mentioned. 

There was anotlier and a hu'iicr class who, while expressing 
no opinion eoneornino' the C'nban (piestion, were actnated by 
more worthy motives. They formed the opinion that Con- 
gress was driving- the eonntry into an nnneeessary war, which 
wonld cost an immense amonnt of money, disorganize busi- 
ness, wliieh was jnst beginning to recover from the previous 
depression, and cost much in American Idood. Asseml)ling 
as boards of trade, or chauibers of commerce, they petitioned 
Congress to sustain tlie President in his effort to procure a 
peaceful settlement. AVhile these men were patriotic citizens, 
ready to do their pai't if war became necessary, their efforts 
natni-ally lu'came associate*! with those in this comitry and in 
Europe who brought their influence to l)ear at Washington 
simply out of regard for the value of stocks and bonds. AVhile 
no appreciable part of the Sj)anish debt was held in the United 
States, the great bankers of Europe, who had large interests at 
stake in the maintenance of Spanish credit, had also intimate 
connection with great banking houses in Xew York, and these, 
in tnru, had intimate connection with banking houses in other 
parts of the country. The rich rewards which the large baidc- 
ing houses of Xew York reap from gigantic financial opera- 
tions are dependent upon their ability to enlist the co-operation 
of Enro]iean capital. Tt was nnfort]inale that many peo])le 
had tlu^ imi>ression that the President's message was being held 
back out of deference to these ])etitions, and this led to nniny 
bitter attacks np<in liiiii wliidi werc^ wholly nnjnstitiable. Tt 
was a trying time f(U' the President's friends as well as for the 
President. 

At last it was announced that the message was com]ileted 
and would be sent to Congress on AVe(lnes(lay, Api-il r>th. 
On Tuesday it was read at the cabinet meeting. The air of 
the capital was full of electricity. On AVednesdciy morning 
the (irowds surizini;- to tlie ("npilol i-ciiiiinled peojile of tlu^ ex- 
citinu' d;i\s of the ( 'i\il \\';ir. At .-ix o'clock in the iiK^i'ninir 



288 INTENSE INTEREST IN THE MESSAGE 

the entrances were besieged though the Houses would not con- 
vene till noon. The regular business of the House began and 
the time wore on without sign of that for which all were wait- 
ing. It was all very well to discuss the reorganization of the 
army, but the crowd were waiting for another story — the 
President's story of Cuba's wrongs. Five minutes past two 
and no message! At last notes were sent up from members 
on the floor to their friends in the galleries with the disap- 
pointing news that the message was not to be sent over, and 
reluctantly the crowd melted. 

AVlien the message had been read to the cabinet and was 
ready to be transmitted, word came from Consul-General Lee, 
suggesting that action be postponed till the following week, 
in order that all ofiicials of the United Sitates and all citizens 
so desiring might withdraw from Cuba in safety. Excitement 
was running high at Havana. The President at once saw the 
force of the a}>peal. Lee's message was not only a reason for 
further delay, but it was a convenient one, something that 
might hold Congress in check a little longer till the last peace- 
ful resource had been expended. The President intimated 
that he would comply with Lee's appeal. Immediately some 
of his ablest advisers in the cabinet protested that the tempei' 
of C'OngTess and the people was such that no postponement 
would be tolerated. A fear was expressed lest the President 
should suifer greatly from criticism, 

" It is not a question of what will happen to me," he is 
reported to have said, "' but what will happen to those in Cuba. 
I shall not send in this message till the last one of them has left 
the island." 

And he did not. It was a courageous thing to do when 
so many of the people Avere impugning his motives. One 
afternoon a Democratic Congressman from Ohio ventured to 
declare that. " influences in i^ew York wired oveir to Boston, 
wired from Boston out to the Western cities, and then back 
lu^re under the name of the peace party — which simply means 
the speculating party in stocks and bonds, a new name and a 



CRITICISM AND FALSE CHARGES -'St) 

disguise — doinonstratc that there will be no war." ..." It 
is a sympathetic fall in stocks that gentlemen who control the 
adiiiiiii-tratidii fear more than they fear war." 

This calk'd forth a ])rompt reply from another Ohio Con- 
girssman, (Jeneral (Jrosvenor, who said: 

" Tlie gcntk'inan from Ohio niakt-s a diarge that ought to comlcmn the 
President of tl)e United States to inipeaclimeut and iniprisounieut. The 
gentleman dechires that no message came from General Lee yesterday, tliat 
it was a 'fake' report; that it was false, and that it was given out for a 
c()rru{)t purpose by the President — namely, to affect the stock market. 
Every part of that statement is, without (jualilication, absolutely witliout 
foundation in truth. I will ask the gentleman from Ohio, suppose tiie 
message iiad gone to Congress yesterday, and suppose tiiat last night tlie 
blood of tlie ciiivalrous gentleman from Virginia [General Lee] liad soaked 
tlie soil of Cuba, what would have been the verdict of the Americau people 
against the administration?" 

It is a source of gratifieati'on that only one mend>er of Con- 
gTess was found at that time willing to give official publicity 
to this absurd and baseless charge. I3ut other rea.'^ons con- 
tributed to the President's wish to hold back the message, 
dilildiiiatic reasons which could not ]>rudently have been made 
public, an<l which, therefore, oidy increased the mystery, tlic 
impatience, and the criticism. Keference has already been 
made to the deep interest the Koman Catholic Church had in 
maintaining Spanish cre<lit, besides the interest naturally felt 
by th(> Pope in a Catholic nation. Poix' L(>o had for months 
beeti bringing his influence to bear at Madi'id, where his influ- 
ence was greatest, in a desire to ward ofl" a war. TTis adxiscrs 
in this country and in Ixome must have conflrmed his own in- 
tuitions that the American poojilc would nf)t acce])t his arbitrn 
tion or do anything to con<'(Mlc his authority as a tciii|>oi-aI 
ruler. Diit the Pope sf'cms to have clicii<lic.l llic liopc tliat 
Si'ain might be persuad(Ml to withdraw under such terms a< 
would not saci-ificc her jjridc at every point, while the es-eutial 
features ot the deiiiaiKb of .Xinericaii public opinion wnidd be 
grante(l, and Pre-iih'nt .McK'inley Iiad intiniateil tu the \'atican 
authorities that any influence which the Pope could bring to 



290 FALSEHOOD AS A SALVE TO PRIDE 

bear on Spain would be appreciated by lovers of peace. It 
was due to the joint pressure of the Pope and the European 
powers that Sj^aiu made new advances at a time when diplo- 
matic relations wctc thought to be closed. 

Unfortunately, the Spanish authorities allowed the Minis- 
ter of the Interior, Sehor Capdepon, who had had nothing 
to do with the negotiations, and, in view of his official position 
woidd not have, except as an adviser, to make a statement that 
the Pope had consented to act as mediator at flic suggestion of 
the United States! This Avas so utterly false that it did not 
need the official denial of the administration at Washington, 
which was, however, made. The Spanish government seems 
to have made the statement to satisfy its ungovernable pride. 
In answer to Spain's ap2ical the Pope had declared that if she 
would suspend hostilities for a time he would endeavor to make 
a pennanent peace. Spain accepted the condition just before 
the day ajiproached on which the President intended to send 
in his message, and such was the situation on that day wdien the 
message was held back. 

It was plain to the President that whatever form he gave 
his message, Congress would take its appearance as a signal for 
taking action leading to war. If he counseled peace, CongTess 
would take the matter into its own hands; if he counseled war. 
Congress would cheerfully follow. Ecalizing this, he felt it 
would be unwise to send in a message while the powers and the 
Pope were bringing their influence to bear upon S]iain. He 
was entirely right, but the expectant people could not under- 
stand his motives because of the mystery surrounding the 
affair. That the President fully expected war was evident, 
for the wrecking company which was at work on the Maine 
had been ordered to leave Havana harbor, a step that would 
hardly have been taken if any liopo of peac<e remained. 



CHAPTER XXVII 

THE JOINT NOTE OF THE SIX POWEKS-QUEEN CHRISTINA 
ACTS TOO LATE — THE I'KESIDENTS MESSAGE AT LAST 
— "THE WAR IN CUBA MUST STOP." 

A Littk- Play Behind tin- Scenes — Attempts of European Powers to Act — 
Austria's Interest in tiie Spanisii Dynasty — The French Investment in 
Sitonish Bonds — Plans for a Joint Appeal — An Impressive Moment in 
the White House — The European Note — The President's Reply — 
Humanitarian Considerations — Novel Proceedings in Our Diplomacy — 
Condition on which England and Russia Acted — A Good Opportunity 
for the President — A Similar Request Made at Madrid — Spain Replies 
that She has Gone as Far as She Can — The Queen Takes Matters in 
Her Own Hand and Would Go Further — Too Late — Blanco Ordered 
to Suspend Hostilities — Riots in Madrid — General Lee and Many 
Americans Leave Havana — No further Postponement of Message 
Possible — Useless to Listen to Spain's Insincere Diplomacy — Tiie 
Message Suhniittcd — History of the Troubles Reviewed — Spain's Pro- 
posals as to the M(dm — Thv. Time for Action at Hand. 

UP to this time the Euroi)ean jwwers had taken no con- 
certed action either to influence Spain or to plead 
Avitli the United States for peace. At tlic time oiir re- 
huions with Spain approached a crisis after tlic (h'strnction of 
the Maine, the European powers Avcre on the jioint of a crisis 
of their own because of affairs in ('hiiia. 'I'hc acare^siveness 
of Erance, Gerniniiy, iiiid Uiissi;i in scciu-inu i-iulits fi'i>ni tlie 
weakened Chinese empire liad stirred Croat I>ritain Id tlie de- 
fense of her riiilits, and caHed forth from licr ministers the 
declaration that slie would g-o to Avar rather than suffer a 
diminution of her rights in the East by the partition of China. 
Gennanv, Erance, and Pussia wore in a position to act with a 
dep:ree of concert against England, and were evidently on the 
\)(>]ui of doing' so when the Spanish-American crisis suddenly 
revealed the fact that England not only sympathized with us 
but was disposed to favor an English-speaking alliance, whose 

(2!»1) 



293 THE APPEAL FOR PEACE 

influence, of course, would be felt in the East as well as the 
West. The Continental powers, which had thought to take 
Great Britain unsupported, suddenly drew back when they saw 
that their action would force Great Britain into a natural al- 
liance with the United States. 

Austria had also a special interest in Spanish affairs, as the 
nation was ruled by a branch of the Austrian Bourbons, and 
the house of Hapsburg could not in decency neglect its own. 
The French government also had the further interest of pro- 
tecting her investors who had absorbed a large portion of 
Spain's bonds. The Spanish debt had been scaled down con- 
siderably after the Ten-Years War in Cuba, and the prospect 
of a war with the United States was a serious one for these 
French investors. 

AVhen these powers saw that it would be impossible to take 
concerted action in defense of Spanish sovereignty, the propo- 
sition was made for a joint appeal for peace to be presented to 
both Spain and the United States, and this was done on the 
7th, the day following the exciteuicnt over the delay of the 
message. The visit had been arranged in advance, the Presi- 
dent knew that an appeal would be presented the same day to 
the Madrid government; he knew just what the diplomats 
would say before they said it, and, indeed, their joint note had 
l>een inspected and vif^kl at the State Department before pre- 
sentation. jSTevertheless, it was an impressive momemt when 
the representatives of the European powers appeared before 
the President, and the British ambassador stated tliat they had 
been commissioned to approach him with a message of '' friend- 
ship and peace." He then presented the following note : 

"The imdersigned, representatives of Germany, Aiistna-Hunsrary, 
France, Great Britain, Italy, and Russia, duly authorized in that behalf, 
address in the name of their respective i^overnments a pressing ajipeal to 
the feelings of luimanity and moderation of tlie President and of the 
American people in their existing differences with Spain. Tliey earnestly 
hope that further negotiations will lead to an agreement which, while 
securing the maintenance of peace, will afford all necessary guarantees for 
the re-establishment of order in Cuba. 



A NOVRI. PROCEEDING 293 

"The powers do not doulil tluil the liuiniiiiit;iri;in ;m(l jmrcly liisin 
terested character of this represeutatioii will be fully reeogni/ed and apjjrc 
eiated by the American natiou." 

The Presid'ent replied : 

"The government of the United States recognizes the good will which 
has prompted the friendly communication of tlie representatives of Ger- 
man}% Austria-Hungary, France, Great Britain, Italy, and Russia, a? set 
fortli in the address of your excellencies, and shares the hope therein ex- 
{)ressed that the outcome of the situation in Cuba may l)e the maintenance 
of peace between the United States and Spain ])y afTording the necessary 
guarantees for the re-establisiiment of order in tlie island, so terminating the 
chronic condition of disturbance there, which so deeply injures the interests 
and menaces the trancjuility of the American nation by the character and 
consequences of the struggle thus kept up at our doors, besides shocking its 
sense of humanity. 

" The government of the United States appreciates the humanitarian 
and disinterested character of the communication now made on behalf of 
tlie powers named, and for its part is confident that equal appreciation will 
be shown for its own earnest and unselfish endeavors to fullil a duty to 
liumanity by ending a situation the indeliuite prolongation of which has 
become insufferable." 

The fact that the repTCsentatives of the powers were re- 
ceived in a collefctive capacity at all aroused some criticism in 
this conntry, for it was a distinctly novel ]iroceeding in our 
di})loniacy. Doubtless the President might have declined 
^vith propriety to be addressed by the particular gToup of 
European powers which of late years has assumed to impose 
its mandates upon the rest of the world. On tli(> other hand, 
the attitude of the powers was one to which this government 
could take no just exception, and it might have proved dis- 
advantageous had the reception of the appeal been declined. 
The British minister would not consent to act with the repre- 
sentatives of the other jx)wers until he was assured that no de- 
sign of menace lay in the proposition, and the "Russian minister 
declined to act till assured that the note would ho welcomed by 
the United States. He considered th(- affair a mere bit of 
foa-mality. Tt also gave the President an oijjmrtunity to make 
a statement which might remove any misconception in the 
minds of Europeans as to our right to deal with our own affairs 



294 A PRETENSE OE AN ARMISTICE 

unmolested, and of reminding them that, mnch as they depre- 
cated war from a hnmanitarian point of view, it was chiefly 
from this very point of view that we were about to go to war. 

The powers proifered the same request to the government 
at Madrid, and Sefior Gnllon, Minister of Foreign Affairs, 
simply replied that Spain had reached the limit of her policy 
in conceding the demands and allowing the pretensions of the 
United States. She, however, immediately embraced the op- 
portunity to bring forward another alleged concession, care- 
fully stating that it was in obedience to European intervention 
and not American demands. The concession took the form 
of an order to CJeneral Blanco to suspend hostilities for the 
present. Contrary to previous intimations, this so-called 
armistice was entirely without conditions, and its duration was 
to be determined by Blanco. It was not an armistice in any 
sense of the word, nor did it even include a request to the in- 
surgents to join in it. An armistice is, of course, an agreement 
betw(^en two hostile governments or military commanders for 
a mutual cessation of hostilities. In this case, so far from an 
armistice having been determined upon, Sehor Quesada, 
speaking officially for the Cuban Junta, said positively that 
the Eepublic of Cuba would not consent to any negotiations 
for armistice or suspension of hostilities unless the basis was 
the absolute independence of Cuba. 

The Spanish cabinet were reported as at odds over the 
question of the suspension of hostilities, but the Queen, in- 
fluenced apparentl.y by the Pope, took the matter into her own 
hands and insisted upon it. The Queen was evidently in a 
mood, when it was too late, to concede autonomy rather than 
lose the sovereignty of Cuba. But these repeated yieldings 
to what were considered the demands of the people of the 
United States made the royal position even more uncomfort- 
able by angering the Sjjanish masses. 

Eiots occurred in Madrid on Sunday afternoon and even- 
ing. The Prefect, who was witnessing the Easter Sunday 
bull fight, promptly left the ring, and by energetic measures 



AMERICANS WITHDRAW FROM CUBA 295 

prevented a serious outbreak. The demonstration Avas made 
by Carlists, liepublicans, and lionierists, and a number of the 
leadei'S were arrested. 

Meanwhile, the dehiy in the message gave the nee<led o\> 
portunity for the withdrawal of Americans fn>m Cuba. When 
the (wcitemcnt was running high, General Lee left (»n the 
Frill, reaching Key West Saturday evening, and with him 
r;inie most of the other American officials and residents in 
Cuba and many Cubans who believed their lives in danger at 
Havana. A deplorable but necessary result of the withdrawal 
of Americans from Cuba was the immediate cessation of our 
efforts to relieve the reconcentrados, for Miss Barton and the 
other lied Cross agents took General Lee's advice and left the 
island. ISTo consular officials remained in Cuba to supervise 
the distribution of supplies, and the regular freight and pas- 
senger service between Cuba and the United States ceased. 
Considerable supplies of provisions were left in Cuba, and it 
was the belief of the officials of this country that they would be 
used for the army, the Spanish taking no interest in relieving 
the reconcentrados. Indeed, nothing had occurred to indicate 
that Spain had taken the slightest step to use in charity any of 
the $600,000 A'oted by the cabinet several d«ys before. The 
move was regarded as insincere and made only to gain time. 

jSotwithstanding the apparent change in Spain's attitu<l(', 
it was evident that another postponement of the message would 
not do. Spain's crafty and insincere diplomacy might be kept 
up till doomsday. Having failed to accomplish ami^hing by 
it, nothing remained but to pass the issue over to CongTess. 
So not far from noon <>n Mimday, the 1 1th, the message was 
delivered substantially as drafted the week before, but snjv 
plemented with a statement of Spain's Latest action. 

The message opened with a long, thorough, and convincing 
historical review of th(> entii'c subjci't. I Iir President ]>oiiitcd 
out that the existing revolution was only one of several such 
disturbances which had caused tlie^ rnited States enormous 
loss in trade and had " by the exercise of criirl, barbarous^ and 



296 PRESIDENT M<KINLEY'S MESSAGE 

uiieivilized practices of warfare shocked the sensibilities aud 
off ended the humane sympathies of our people." He then re- 
ferred to the efforts of President Cleveland to bring about 
peace, and their failure; to the institution in October, 1896, of 
" the policy of devastation and concentration," and to the fact 
that by March 18, 1807, the mortality among the reconcen- 
trados from starvation and disease exceeded 50 per cent, of 
their whole number- — adding, " it was not civilized warfare; 
it was extermination. The only peace it could beget was that 
of the wilderness and the grave." 

The history of the attemjits of his administration to im- 
prove the condition of affairs in Cuba were next considered — 
the overtures made to the Spanish administration which suc- 
ceeded that of the assiassinated prime minister Canovas; the 
successful demand for the release of American citizens im- 
prisoned in Cuba; the appointment of a Cuban relief com- 
mittee; the appeal to the American people for contributi(>ns, 
and the action of the Ived Cross Society; finally, Spain's revo- 
cation of the order of concentration and a2>propriation of 
money for the relief of the sufferers. Still, he said, the situa- 
tion remained unendurable, and on Mareh 27tli he had made 
propositions thvcmgh Minister Woodford looking to an armis- 
tice until October 1st. To this Spain replied, offering to en- 
trust the effort to make peace to the Cuban autonomous par- 
liainent. This was quite unsatisfactory, as the parliamerit was 
not to meet till May 4th and its powers were indefinite. 

Then the President came to the question of what action the 
government should take. Forcible annexation, he said, would 
be "criminal aggression"; recognizing belligerency would 
" accomplish nothing toward the end for which we labor — 
the instant pacification of Cuba and the cessation of the misery 
that afflicts the island "; recognizing the independence of Cuba 
had no historical precedent clearly applicable to the situa- 
tion. He added: "From the standjioint of experience, I 
do not think it would be wise or prudent for this government to 
recognize at the present time the independence of the so-called 



FOUR GOOD REASONS FOR INTERVENTION 297 

Cuban republic." As to intervention, he held that there were 
good' grounds for such action: first, in the <'ause of Imnianitj; 
second, for the protection of our citizens in Cnl>a; tiiird, fixjm 
the injury to our coninierec and the devastation of the ishind; 
fourth, from the constant menace to onr |)eace in many and nn- 
cxpectcd ways, arisin^n' out of such a wai- at onr <l(H>rs. 'IMu; 
hist reason was ilhistrated and enforced hy this i-(d"erenee to 
the desta'uction (d' the battleship Maine: 

" The destruction of the noble vessel has tilled the national heart 
with inexpressible horror. Two hundred and tift\--three brave sailors and 
marines and two officers of our navy, reposing in the fancied security of a 
friendly harbor, have been hurled to death; grief and want brought to their 
homes and sorrow to the nation. . . . The destruction of the Maine, by 
whatever exterior cause, is a patent and impressive proof of a state of things 
in Cuba that is intolerable. That condition is thus shown to be such that 
the Spanish government cannot assure safety to a vessel of the American 
navy in the harbor of Havana on a mi.ssiou of peace and rightfully there." 

After referring to his statement in his message of tlie year 
before, that the time might come when it would be necessary 
to intervene with force, the President closed with these force- 
ful and manly words: 

"The long trial has proved that the object for which Spain has waged 
the war cannot be attained. The tire of insurrection may flame or may 
smolder with varying sea.sons, but it has not been and it is plain tliat it can- 
not be extinguished by present methods. The only hope of relief and 
repose from a condition which can no longer be endured is the enforced 
pacification of Cuba. In the name of humanity, in tlie name of civilization, 
in behalf of endangered American interests, which give us the right and the 
duty to speak and to act, the war in Cuba nuist stop. 

"The issue is now with Congress. It is a .solemn responsibility. I 
have exhausted every effort to relieve the intolerable condition of alTairs 
wiiich is at our doors. Prepared to execute every obligation impo.sed upon 
me by llie Constitution and the law, I await vour action." 



CHAPTER XXYIII 

RECEPTION OF THE PRESIDENT'S MESSAGE — ARRIVAL OF 
GENERAL LEE AT WASHINGTON — EXCITING DEBATES IN 
THE HOUSE AND SENATE — OUR ULTIMATUM TO SPAIN 

— BREAKING OFF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS. 

How the President's Message was Received — A Plain, Uiiinipiissioned 
Statement — Congress Expected Sometliing More Fiery — General Lee's 
Arrival at Washington — Ovations on the Route — A Warm W^elcome 

— Resolutions for Intervention — The Question of Recognizing the 
Independence of Cuba — The Tension of Feeling — Coming Togetlur 
on the Final Vote — Report of the Senate Committee — A Time to 
Drop Party Differences — An . Amendment to Recognize the Cuban 
Reiniblic Passed — Disagreeing Action and a Conference — The Final 
Draft — Wisdom of Going to War Without Recognizing Cuba — The 
President Prepares His Ultimatum — Signing the Resolutions — Min- 
ister Polo Demands His Passports — Spanish Ministry Withhold the 
President's Despatch to Woodford — Riots in Madrid and Barcelona 

— Woodford Given His Passports. 

THE message was very coldly received by Congress, 
which, for weeks, had been so wrought itp over the an- 
ticipation of it that they were disappointed to find 
only a plain, nninipassioncd statement of facts which had long 
been familiar. But once did the message strike the high note 
stiited to the war party's ears, and that was when it said, 
" Tills ivar must stop.^^ But Congress expected that the 
Presideitt would lead the way, and that it could follow on, 
shouting for war, but taking no responsibility in the premises. 
The President, however, cast the responsibility squarely upon 
it. " The issue is now with Congress," he said. " Prepared 
to execute every obligation imposed upon me by the Constitu- 
tion and the law, T await your action." This was a ]ilain as- 
surance that the President would now stand by Congress, 
though CongTess had only wath great difRctilty l)een induced to 
stand by him in his serious efforts to settle the trouble by diplo- 
macy. In this situation there was but one thing for Congress 

(298) 



lee's triumphal return 299 

consistently to do, and the iiicssngc was, without debute, re- 
ferred to the Committee on Foreign Affaii*s. 

On the ev^ening of the day the message was presented Gen- 
eral Lee arrived at AVashington. His progress northward was 
in the nature of a triunij)!!, being lustily checrod along the way 
and ;!t liichiuoiid loyally receiveil by (Joxcruor 'rylcr. Great 
was the enthusiasm at Washington; crowds were at the depot 
when his train rolled in, and lined the street as he was driven 
to liis hotel, to which a vast number of people flocked, some 
with torches, iu jn'ocessiou. A patriotic serenade was ar- 
ranged, and in s})ite of his wearisome trip he had to step out 
on the balcony and address the multitude. 

While the matter was in the hands of committees the world 
waited in almost breathless suspense for the outcome, l)nt it did 
not wait long. The House was the first to act. On the ioth 
a resolution was introduced by the acting chairman of the 
Foreign Affairs Committee following the reconinicndation of 
the President, authorizing and directing him to intervene at 
once to stop the war in Cuba, that permanent peace might be 
secured, and that a stable and independent government might 
be establishecl l)y th(> jyeoplc of Cuba, and empowering him to 
use the land and naval foi>?es of the United States for that pur- 
pose. There were those who desired more radical action, and 
insisted that there should be a recognition of the Cuban repub- 
lic, l)nt the administration forces held together admirably, and 
the resolutions of the majority of the committee were carried 
on a final vote by 822 to ID, on Saturday the IGth. 

The debate was extremely exciting at times. Though 
there was an agreement between the Democratic and Repub- 
lican membei-s of the committee as to the presentation of the 
resolutions and the minority pubstitnt(\ an unfortunate mis- 
understanding arose among the mondters of both parties which 
cast a blot on the historic proceedings of the day. During the 
excitement a personal rpiarrol occurred between two members, 
but explanations were made and the incident only serves to 
show the tteuision of feeling in Congress. 
19 



300 A TIME TO DROP PARTY DIFFERENCES 

In tlio final vote both parties came together and the unity 
of North and South and the common feeling at the last were 
worth remembering. It was certainly remarkable that out 
of that great body of men only nineteen were in opposition. 
The long-expected crisis had come and been met in a strong 
one-minded way and generally with dignity. The resolu- 
tion as passed by the House was understood to meet the de- 
sires of the President, which was another remarkable feature 
considering the severe criticisms to which he had been sub- 
jected by members who at last voted for the desired resolu- 
tion. 

In the Senate on the 14th the Foreign Relations Commit- 
tee reported resolutions in harmony with those of the House, 
accompanied by a strong and brilliant report prepared and pre- 
sented by Senator Davis, the chairman of the committee. It 
is probable that the resolutions of the majority would have 
been passed in short order but for the introduction of a resolu- 
tion recognizing the (Hdian republic, and conspicuously ad- 
vocated by Senators Foraker on the Ilepublican side and 
Turpie on the Democratic side. A long debate followed, 
some of the Senators making severe attacks upon the Presi- 
dent, declaring that his message was inconclusive, that his 
course had been vacillating, and that he had been under the 
influence of Senators interested in stocks and bonds. It 
was unfortunately apparent that certain leaders w^ere anx- 
ious to make capital for their party. These criticisms were 
repelled with emphasis by both Pepublican and Democratic 
Senators. A very few still thought we had no cause for inter- 
vention. 

Just before the vote was taken, Mr. Gorman, the Demo- 
cratic senator from Maryland, made a very impressive speech, 
defending the President, declaring that his course had been 
wise and ]>atriotic, and that l)oth branches of Congress ought 
to uphold him ; that it was a time to dro]i all party differences 
and to act, not as Republicans or Democrats, but as American 
citizens. He wished that the record of division already made 



A TRIBUTE TO THE PRESIDENT 301 

could be blotted out and <»idy a iiiiit('(l ])coplc presented to the 
world, lie added: 

"I pledge myself to forget that McKiuky was elected by the Uepul)!!- 
can party because I know and l)elieve that as Presklentof a united people he 
will bear his country's Hag aloft, and that no nation, Spain or any otlier, 
will receive from him aught else Hum that fair, manly, and brave treatment 
of an American President." 

The vote on the amendment recogniziug the Cuban repub- 
lic was 51 in favor to 37 against. The affirmative vote was 
made up of 29 Democrats, G Populists, 5 silver Kcj)ul)licans, 
and 11 regular Republicans; the negative vote consisted of 32 
Republicans and 5 Democrats, the latter being Gray, Calfrey, 
Gorman, Morgan, and Faulkner. 

The Senate resolutions came before the House on Monday ; 
Mr. Dingley moved concurrence with an amendment striking 
out the clause cou'cerning the recognition of the Cidmn rejmb- 
lic, and upon this motion called for the previous question, 
which was ordered, thus shutting oif debate. The Republi- 
can leaders had made preparations for the division, using all 
the influence they had to bring radical Republicans into line. 
The Democrats and Populists, who, \vitli a single exception, 
were solidly armyed in favor of the Senate resolutions un- 
amended, hoped for sufficient Republican help to carry their 
point; but in this they were disappointed. When the vote 
was taken Dingley's motion was carried by 178 to 156. Four- 
teen Republicans broke over party lines and voted in opposi- 
tion. Four of them were from Wisconsin, two from Indiana, 
seven from Illinois, and one from Xorth Dakota. 

The resolutions as amended then went back to the Senate, 
and, before they were received, ten of the Republican senatoi*s 
who had voted with the Democrats and Populists on Saturday 
had a conference and dc<'i(led to work against concuiTcnce in 
the House amendment. The Senate by a vote of 4() to 32, 
showing no change in the attitude of the two parties, resolved 
to adhere to its resolutions and sent them back to the House, 
which again voted to non-concur and returned the ressolutions 



.'W2 RESOLUTIONS PASSED BY BOTH HOUSES 

to the Senate with the indepeoidence clause again stricken out ; 
it resolved to insist on its amendment and asked for a con- 
ference. The vote was 172 to 148, showing a majority of two 
more than on the former vote. At 1:10 a. m. on Tuesday the 
conferees of the two Houses reached an agreement. On the 
part of the Senate, the clause recognizing the independence of 
the Cuban republic was yielded, and on the jjui't of the House 
the paragraph declaring that Cuba is and of light ought to be 
free was accepted. The two Houses then ^^asscd the resolu- 
tions in the following form: 

"Whereas, The abhorrent conditions which have existed for inoi-e 
tlian three years in the island of Cuba, so near our own borders, luive 
shocked the moral sense of the people of the United States, have been a dis- 
grace to Christian civilization, culminating, as they have, in the destruction 
of a United States battleship, with two hundred and sixty of its ofhcers and 
crew, while on a friendly visit in the harbor of Havana, and cannot longer 
be endured, as has ))een set forth by the President of the United States in 
his message to Congress of April 11, 1898, upon which the action of Con- 
gress was invited ; therefore be it resolved : 

" First. Tliat the people of the island of Cuba are, and of right ought 
to be, free and independent. 

" Second. That it is the duty of the United States to demand, and the 
Government of the United States does hereby demand, that the government 
of Spain at once relinquish its authority and government in the island 
of Cuba, and withdraw its land and naval forces from Cuba and Cuban 
waters. 

" Third. That tiie President of the United States be, and he hereby is, 
directed and empowered to use the entire land and naval forces of the 
United States, and to call into the actual service af the United States the 
militia of the several States to such an extent as may be necessary to carry 
these resolutions into effect. 

"■Fourth. That the United States hereby disclaims any disposition or 
intention to exercise sovereignty, jurisdiction, or control over said island 
except for the pacification thereof, and asserts its determination when that 
is accomplished to leave the government and control of the island to its 
people. " 

It was not without considerable diihculty that enough 
Republicans were held to the defense of the President's posi- 
tion. The feeling in behalf of Cuba and against Spain was 
so bitter that it required the greatest parliamentary skill and 
the strong hand of the Speaker to prevent concurrence with 



NO RECOGNITION OF CUBA AS A REPUBLIC 303 

the Senate. The great mfijority felt that thi- Ciihaii i-i'iniMic 
had won its freedom, and in their excitement they failed to 
grasp the legal reasons against .such action, Ke<cognitii)n of 
the Alaso government might follow later, but at the outset of 
intervention the recognition of that government would have 
undouhtcdlv lianrpcrcd our elVorts. Had we ackno\vlc(lged it, 
our only logical course would have been to form an <jtfensive 
and defensive alliance with this now sovereign ix>wer, and 
then, in a strictly subordinate way, co-operate simply with 
General Gomez. It was much better for us to enteir upon the 
conflict upon our own responsibility. Under the resolution, 
as adopted, our demand that Spain withdraw her troops and 
relinquish sovereignty in the island could mean nothing but 
that she should relinquish the sovereignty to the United States. 
This left us free to establish the Cuban government as seemed 
best for the Cuban people, but the same resolution distinctly 
avowed that in taking ujioii ourselves the responsibility of re- 
storing order in the island we should relinquish authority as 
soon as we had been able to establish an independcmt Cuban 
republic. Recognition of the Maso government would not 
only have hampered our military operations, but it would have 
been humiliating to have taken the field sim])ly as an ally of 
the C^d)an army, reserving no authority over the determina- 
tion of results. The shi-ewdest nu'U in Congress saw this 
plainly, although all theii' feelings were for tlu* Cuban re- 
public. If we had recognize(l (he republic nionfliN cnrlier and 
allowed the Cubans to win I heir own independence, it" they 
could, the case would have be(Mi dilferont. 

The resolutions were sent to the President late on Tuesday, 
the 19th. As there was reason to believe thnt if they were 
promptly signed diplomatic relntions would lie broken off 
before an ulliinalum conhl be -ent, the President del:iye(l the 
act of signing till an ultimatum had been pre]>nred. Shortly 
before noou on the 20th the nltinmtuni wns delivered to Senor 
Polo, the Sp;iui-li Miiii-ter ;il \V;i-liinL;ton. .\bouf ;ni hour 
earlier it was sent t<» Minister W ltor<l :is ;in o])en dispntch, 



304 THE ULTIMATUM PRESENTED 

aocompanied by an order tliat it be presented to tlie Sagasta 
ministry at once. 

Immediately on receiving the ultimatum Sefior Polo de- 
manded his passports, which were sent to him promptly by 
the State Department, and he closed the legation, leaving at 
once for Canada. The ultimatum arrived at the Madrid tele- 
graph office in due time, but by direction of the Spanish gov- 
ernment was withheld from Minister Woodford till the foll'ow- 
ing day. Spain, having learned the contents of the dispatch, 
decided to give Minister Woodford his passports before he had 
an opportunity to present the ultimatum, and this she did, 
seeking by a characteristic trick to win a technical advantage. 
But this she lost, as the ultimatum had already been officially 
communicated through Minister Polo. 

The ultimatum, a paraphrase of the resolutions of Congress 
couched in diplomatic language, was as follows : 

''To Woodford, Minister, Madrid: 

" You have been furnished with the text of a joint rosohition voted by 
the Congress of the United States on the 19th inst., approved to-day, in 
rehition to the pacification of tlie island of C'uba. In obedience to that act 
the President directs you to immediately communicate to the Government 
of Spain said resolution, with the formal demand of the Government of the 
United States that the Government of Spain at once relinquish its authority 
and government in the island of Cuba, and withdraw its land and naval 
forces from Cuba and Cuban waters. In taking this step, the United States 
hereby disclaims any disposition or intention to exercise sovereignty, juris- 
diction, or control over said island, except for the pacification thereof, and 
asserts its determination when that is accomplished to leave the government 
and control of the island to its people, luider such free and independent 
government as they may establish. 

"If by the hour of noon on Saturday next, the 23d day of April, 
instant, there be not communicated to this Government by that of Spain 
a full and satisfactory response to this demand and resolution whereby the 
ends of peace in Cuba shall be assured, the President will proceed without 
further notice to use the power and authority enjoined and conferred upon 
him by the said joint resolution to such extent as may be necessary to carry 
the same into elfect." 

In view of the swiftness with which the quarrel had come 
to a head the new Spanish Cortes was called l)v the Queen to 
meet on April 20th, a day somewhat earlier than that originally 



SPAIN RESOLVES UPON WAR 305 

set. The party groups held preliminary meetings on the 19th, 
by which time the action of the American Congress had be- 
come fully known in Madrid. Sagasta at the head of the 
Liberal party made statements of the most uncompromising 
character, and war was declared inevitable alike by all Sjjanish 
statesmen and tlie press. The lielief ])revailcd in this country 
that Spain would endeavor to resort to another evasive diplo- 
matic scheme, but she knew quite well that the President had 
resolved to listen no longer; he would approve the resolutions 
of Congress, and she resolved to let the war come. It had the 
desired eifect of bringing all parties together and of strength- 
ening for the time the position of the Queen. Don Carlos was 
forced to join the warlike procession, but he believed that 
his opportunity would inevitably come later. 

In her speech to the Cortes on the 20th, or at the very time 
President McKinley was signing the resolutions, the Queen de- 
clared " the unalterable resolution of my government to de- 
fend our rights whatsoever sacrifices may be imjiosed upon 
us in accomplishing this task." She added: " Thus identify- 
ing myself with the nation, I not only fulfill the oath I swore 
in accepiting tlie Regency, but I follow the dictates of a 
mother's lu^art, trusting the Spanish people to gather behind 
my son's thixme and defend it until he is old enough to defend 
it himself, as well as trusting to the Spanish people to defend 
the honor and the territory of the nation." She ascribed the 
most unworthy motives to those in the United States who had 
urge<l interference in Cuban afi'aii's. 

" Saga.-ta, in his opening address to the Cortes, used even 
stronger language, and amid universal enthusiasm said: 
'' Acts, not words, are required. . . . We are resolved not to 
yield in anythiuc: touching the national honor or the integrity 
of Spanish tcii'itory, because we :i<liiiit no negO'tiations in ques- 
tion of honor and we do not make a tratfic of shame." 

^linister Woodford left ^! ad rid prom]>tly after receiving 
lii> passports, having notitiecl the TnittMl States consuls 
throuuh Consul-! Jeneral i)owen at IJarcelona to close their 



oOG MINISTER WOODFORD LEAVES MADRID 

consulates. There were some demonstratiotis at his departure, 
but he was carefully guarded at the instance of the Spanish 
authorities. At Valladolid, the train was attacked and stoned 
and windows Avere broken; but the civil guards protected Min- 
ister Woodford's carriage with drawn swords. At Tolosa, the 
Spanish jjolice nuide an attempt to arrest Mr. Woodford's 
colored servant, claiming that he was a citizen of Spain. 
AVoodford protested and declared he would only allow the 
servant to be removed by force, and this was not attempted. 
It was a relief to him and his party when they finally reached 
Fi'cnch soil. The Sj)anish Jiiinister and his suite left Wash- 
ington without molestation or any hostile demonstrations, and 
made his way to Canada without receiving insults of any kind. 

The day after General Woodford left there were a number 
of enthusiastic processions in Madrid, and a mob gathered in 
front of the Equitable Life Insurance building, tore down the 
American escutcheon, and gleefully broke the American eagle 
in pieces. The civil governor allowed the mob full liberty, 
mingling with the crowd and saying in an address to the popu- 
lace : " The Spanish lion is aroused from his slumber. He 
will shake liis nume and disperse the rest of the brute creation." 

At Barcelona, Consul-Gencral Bowen reported that during 
the week before he left, eight angry mobs of over 8,000 persons 
each made violent demonstrations before the consulate. Once 
he was compelled to face a mob for some time before the police 
came, and the night before he left, a mob, including some of 
the most influential citizens, came to the building determined 
to secure the Eagle and Shield. On finding they had been re- 
moved, they were very angi-y and it required force on the part 
of the police to disperse them. 

The series of events indicates clearly enough that peace 
between the two countries was broken by the act of Spain. 
She considered the approval of the joint resolutions of Con- 
gress a virtual declaration of war, and at once broke off rela- 
tions with this government. The Cuban question became 
our war with Spain. 



CHAPTER XXIX 

OPENING OF TUE WAR— THE SPANISH AND AMERICAN 
NAVIES — DEPARTURE OP AN AMERICAN SQUADltON 
FOR CUBAN WATERS — THE FUtST SHOT OF THE WAR — 
THE CALL FOR VOLUNTEERS. 

IJci^iiiiiiiig Opcnitions — Plans for OiTensive and Defensive Action — Com- 
parison of the Spanisli and United States Navies — Spain's Armored 
Cruisers — Superiority of Our Ouns and Gunners — The Si)iril of tiie 
Navy — Lieutenant Commander Wainwriyiit's Plea for a Chance to 
Fight — Peculiar Positions of Antagonists — Spain's Rest Ships neither 
in Cuban nor Philippine Waters — The Cape Verde Squadron — Specu- 
lations as to Naval Results — Spaniards Suspected of Dark Designs 

— Commodore Howell's Auxiliary Fleet — Blockading Cuban Ports 

— Departure of Admiral Sampson's Imposing Fleet — Commodoie 
Dewey Ordered to Sail for Manila — Caution of the Naval Strategy 
Board — A Spanish Ship Sighted — The First Shot of the War — The 
Spanish Flag Comes Down — Other Prizes Captured — The Call for 
Volunteers — Prompt Response — A Conflict between Amateurs and 
Professionals — Reorganizing the Army — A Cause of Delay. 

WHEN on Tliui-riday, the 21st, the news of General 
Woodford's dismissal was received at Washington, 
it was considered as sufficiently in.ii-kiiig the be- 
giiiiiiug- of hostilities. Xo further answer could be expected 
to the ultimatum, and the administration felt free to begin 
a('ti\e operations at once. Jn adopting plans for the war the 
government was obliged to consider the requirements of both 
offensive action and of defensive precautions. The President 
at first kept strongly in view the possibility of carrying supplies 
to tlic reconcentrados, an object at once requiring a convenient 
l)ase of operations on the Cuban shore, which was in the hands 
o£ the Spanish, whom it was proposed to drive from the island. 
AVhile, to accomplish these objects, an army would be very 
soon r('(|iiircih it was evident that the initial stej>s would be 
taken at once by the navy, and it was decided to direct it 
towards two ends — a blockade of TTavana and the destruction 
of Spain's fleet. The idea of taking Havana at once was dis- 

(307) 



308 THE TWO NAVIES COMPARED 

carded as too risky, tliougii it was, doubtless, less risky than 
the cautious strategists of the government supposed. The 
fear of incurring the loss of some of our fighting ships and the 
susi^icion that Spain might await a good opportunity to strike 
our navy, when weakened by the loss or by absence of ships for 
repairs, or to strike at our extensive seaboard, led the govern- 
ment quite naturally to the conclusion that the safer and surer 
course would be to blockade Havana and await Spain's attempt 
to relieve the city, in the meantime seeking a convenient base 
of operations on the Cuban coast as near Havana as possible. 
A comparison of Spain's navy with ours showed but one 
first-class Spanish battleship, the Pelayo, to our four. Spain 
had two old second-class battleships, the Numancia and Vit- 
torla ; we had a modern one, the Texas. But if we were su- 
perior in battleships, Spain was ahead in armored cruisers; 
while we had but two, the Neiu York and BrooMyn, she had 
no less than eight — the Vizcaya, Almirante Oquendo, Carlos 
v., Card'uial Cisneros, Cvislobol Colon, CataJitria, Maria 
Teresa, and Princess de Asturias. In protected cruisers, 
however, the tables were again turned; Spain had eight, the 
United States had more than twice as many. In gunboats 
and dispatch boats, Spain's great number of eighty represented 
but small and Aveak vessels far inferior to those of the United 
States. Of monitors she had none; we had five modern and 
thirteen old-fashioned boats of this type, and one dynamite 
monitor or cruiser, the Versuvius, Avhose utility, however, re- 
mained to be tested. Spain's torpedo-boat destroyers num- 
bered six; we had none except such vessels as were armed in 
the auxiliary fleet. Spain's entire torpedo outfit numbered 
about sixty vessels, and ours about twenty. Many naval ex- 
perts considered armored cruisers and torpedo craft the two 
most effective engines of war and, therefore, regarded our navy 
as behind that of Spain in real effectiveness; but this was only 
a theory. As a whole, taking account of tonnage, speed, and 
armament, our navy was far better than Spain's. This was 
especially noticeable in guns, of which we had more than twice 



THE MAN BEHIND THE GUN 300 

as iiuuiy as Spain had. Taking into account our auxiliary 
fleet of eighty vessels, many of them of superior speed, we 
certainly possessed a good advantage over Spain in striking 
power. ]^ut the greatest advantage we had was in the supe- 
riority of American sailors, even if in number they were less 
than Spain's. The Spaniards had never had much drill in 
squad I'on maneuvers or in gun practice. 

AVe did not appreciate at this time as it deserved the fact 
that no matter how marvelous the gun it is really the man 
behind the gun who decides the contest. The modern gun 
had become a complicated machine, terrible if used effectively, 
but the chances of missing had been greatly increased unless 
skill had kept pace with the development. 

The spirit prevailing in our navy is well illustrated by the 
appeal of Lieutenant-Commander Wainwright, who was exe- 
cutive officer of the Maine, to be allowed to go into active 
service again. lie was formerly Chief Intelligence Officer 
of the navy, and Secretary Long had decided to restore him 
to his old duties. But he did not wish to stay on shore duty; 
he wanted a chance to fight the men who had been responsible 
for the destruction of the Maine, and he said so. The authori- 
ties finally gave way to his appeal, and he was placed in com- 
mand of the fast yacht. Corsair, which had been purchased 
from J. Pierpont Morgan and renamed the Gloucester. He 
looked eagerly for opportunities to meet the enemy, and, in 
time, they came. 

Like the Spanish military service, the naval service was 
in bad condition. As a matter of fact, the Sjiauish had liardiv 
mechanical skill enough to handle the new fighting craft which 
on paper gave her a fair strength. But this was not 
appreciated at first, not even in Spain, and certainly the United 
States goveniiiU'Ut couM not with wi-doiii place confidence in 
any apparent or theoretical weakness of the enemy. 

The naval position of the two antagonists was certainly 
peculiar at the beginning. Spain had no large, heavily- 
armored vessels to <>uard her interests either in the West 



310 Spain's scattered squadron 

Indies or tlie Philippines. The Vizcaya and Almirante 
Oquendo had a few days before, or when war appeared inevi- 
table, sailed from Havana, and were supposed to have gone 
to join the Cape Verde fleet. As far as the Xavy Depart- 
ment knew, the old cruiser Alfonso XII. and a number of 
small gunboats were all that remained in Cuban waters. At 
Puerto Rico there were a few gunboats, but nothing formi- 
dable. The most formidable and first available Spanish squad- 
ron was in command of Admiral Cervora, at St. Vincent in the 
Cape Verde islands, which belong to Portugal. This com- 
prised the armored cruisers Maria Teresa, Cristohal Colon, 
Vizcaya, and Almiranie Oquendo, with three torpedo-boat 
destroyers, three torpedo boats, the transatlantic steamer Cily 
of Cadiz, armed as an auxiliary cruiser, and a coaling vessel. 
As naval reckonings went, this squadron was considered to be 
a fair match for our flying squadron at Hampton Roads. 

Spain was apparently forming a second squadron at Cadiz, 
consisting of the battleship Peloyo, the armored cruisers Carlos 
v., Cardinal Cisncros, Numancia, Vittoria, Princess Mer- 
cedes, and a few gunboats, torpedo-boat destroyers, and torpedo 
boats. The Philippine squadron consisted of four cruisers, 
none of them armored, and several gunboats and small craft. 

A torpedo-boat de&troyer, the Temerario, was in the Rio 
de la Plata on the South American coast, and it was even con- 
sidered possible that she might be waiting there to make a 
night assault upon our battleship Oregon and the gunboat 
Marietta, which were on their long journey around Cape 
Horn. Two Spanish torpedo-boat destroyers were also being 
repaired in the British Isles. 

What Spain proposed to do with these ships was a matter 
of pure speculation; what the United States could do against 
them was quite as much so, for, with the exception of the short 
and sharp battle of the Yalu, in the war between Japan and 
China, there was little in the history of actual warfare to judge 
modern warships 1)v. All cnlciilntion^ had been theoretical 
and based upon the size of vessels, their speed, the number and 




PROMIXKXT AMKRICAX XAVAL OFKICERS IX OUR WAR WITH Sl'\l\ 
Captain Charles KCIark Captain Charles D. Sigsbee. 

Commander nf the "Oregon." Comman.ler of the '■ Maine." 

Commander Richard Waimvnght, Lieutenant Richmond I'. Mobson, 

Commander of the " Gloucester." One of the heroes of the "Merrimac ' 



NECESSITY FOR CAUTION 313 

eliarat'ter of tlieir gujis, and the (lualitics of tlicir armor. It 
was admitted tliat there mig^it be iiiidreani(xl-of possibilities in 
the aetiou of such lig-htiiig machines; the case with which the 
Maine had been blown up suggested the dangerous character of 
torpedo boats, and among the general public any fears were apt 
to be exaggerated. 

JMoreover, we had grown into the habit of always suspect- 
ing the Spaniard of dark designs, and it was a notable fact that 
owing to the strict censoi"ship of the Spanish ])ress and the con- 
centration of authority in Spain, it was dilHcult to know for 
a certainty where any of the Spanish shi])s were, or what 
strategy the wily Spaniard might invent. On the other hand, 
our plans of camjoaign were at first published openly in the 
papers, so that the Spaniards, if they cared to know, could 
easily perceive what we were thinking of and doing. Indeed, 
the Spanish minister, Scnor Polo, instead of departing for 
home, at once took quarters in Toronto, where he carried on a 
spy system and bureau of information for the Spanish govern- 
ment. An enemy in the dark is usually smaller than one in 
the open, but he always looks larger, and consequently our 
strategy board pTocecdcd with I he utmost caution, never with 
reckless bravado, though sometimes with apj)arent fickleness. 

In view of the possil)iJity that Spain might send one of her 
squadrons either lo hai-ass oiii- slii|>pitig, wliicli was mostly 
coastwise, or to attack mir coast cities, some of which wei-c not 
supposed to l)c well dcl'cndcd, thoiiuli liarbors were being 
rapidly iiiincd, il had liccii eai'ly (h-cidcil to eqni]i a patrol 
squadron iiikKt tlie coinniaiid of Coimiiodorc Ilowcll. com- 
posed largely of well built liners which liad been purchased 
and converted into armed cruisers. C(Uisj)icuous among these 
were four admirable ships of the l\rorgan line, which had 
joined the navy nndci- the ji'cturesque names of the Yanlrr, 
the Dixie, the Prairie, and the Yosemite. The splendid 
American-ltuilt transathintic liners Sf. Paal and SI. Louis had 
a'lso been impressed into the naval service, and Captain Sigsbee, 
of the ill-starred Maine, had been given the command of the 



314 THE PATROL SQUADRON 

former. The liners New York and Paris were also taken and 
reehristened tlie Harvard and the Yale. The attempt to buy 
warships abroad had brought a very small aggregate of results. 
The transformation of merchantmen and yachts into a naval 
auxiliary fleet had, however, been accomplished in a re- 
nuirkably successful manner. This auxiliary fleet did away 
with the necessity of keeping Schley's flying squadron at 
Hampton Roads, and left it free to strike for any point, while 
the main fleet, under Sampson, could at once begin operations 
on the Cuban coast, awaiting the movements of the Spanish 
fleet, if it should come in that direction. 

The necessity of these extensive preparations was made 
more conspicuous by the uncertainty as to what Spain would 
do as to privateering. The government of the United States 
at the beginning announced its intention of adhering to the 
declaration of Paris, though not a party to it, and of maintain- 
ing its four cardinal principles: abolishment of privateering, 
neutral flag to exempt an enemy's goods from capture except 
contraband of war, neutral goods under the enemy's flag not 
to be seized, a blockade to be binding must be effective. Spain, 
on her part, issued a decree recognizing that a state of war 
existed, breaking off all treaties with the United States and 
promxising to observe the rules of the declaration of Paris, ex- 
cept that she maintained her rights to grant letters of marque 
to privateers. But to carry on privateering after the old-time 
methods would have been to fly in the face of European senti- 
ment, and that Spain could hardly afford to do, great as was 
the temptation to prey upon American shipping, inflicting 
expensive injuries, though she might not overcome us in war. 

Regarding the breaking off of diplomatic negotiations as a 
virtual declaration of war, the President, without waiting for 
time limit set in his ultimatum to expire, ordered the Key 
West fleet to move at once to Cuba and form a blockade, and 
the same day, the 21st, he issued a proclamation declaring 
that the United States government " has instituted and will 
maintain a blockade on the north coast of Cuba, including 



DEPARTURE OP OUR WAR VESSELS 315 

ports oil said coast between Cardenas and JJaliia Honda, and 
the port of Cienfuegos on the south coast of Cuba." The 
proclamation added that neutral vessels approaching such 
coasts or attempting to leave them without knowledge of the 
establishment of the l)lockade wouhl be duly warned by the 
coniinaii(h'r of the blucka(h' forces and released, but upon at- 
t(Mii|iting the second time to enter any l)lockaded port they 
would be ea]>tui'cd and .-cut to ilic nearest American port as 
prizes. Neutral xcssels lyinu' in blockaded ports were allowed 
thirty days to issue therefrom. 

In accordance with this order Rear Admiral Sampson's 
Heet, the most imposing that had ever been gathered in this 
country, departed on the following morning in two columns 
for the Cuban coast. At the same time Commodore Schley 
of the Hying squadron was ordered to put his shi})s in readiness 
for instant action, and a little later two of his fastest cruisers 
were ordered off to sea to cruise in search of Spanish ships, es- 
pecially off the New England coasts, for there were various 
stories afloat of the presence of Spanish cruisers near those 
waters, a fair illustration of the uncertainty even in official 
circles of the probable movements of the Spanish navy. 

On the 21st also, orders were sent to Commodore Dewey, 
whose squadron was mobilized at Hongkong, on the opposite 
side of the globe, to proceed at once to Manila, the chief port 
of the Philippines, institute a blockade and destroy or capture 
whatever Spanish fleet existed there. To follow up these 
steps it was decided to call for 100,000 volunteer troops as 
soon as Congress could authorize it, and steps were taken to 
charter a large number of transports and supply ships as 
quickly as possible. 

It seems to have been the plan of Sj>ain to hold the flow(>r 
of its navy at the Cape Verde Islands in the hopes that Ad- 
mii-al Sampson's squadron would at once attack Havana and 
suffer considerable losses under the guns of its forts, whereupon 
the Spanish ships could hurry over and attack our fleet in a 
weakened condition. Some of the more warlike new.spapers 



316 THE FIRST SHOT OF THE WAR 

iu the country, less pruficieut in naval strategy than in the 
issue of extra editions, were raising the cry, " Smash Havana! " 
but our naval strategy board were too wise to risk their fleet 
while the Cape Verde ships were in prime condition, and 
orders were issued to Sampson not to attack Cuban ports for 
the present, though he could use his discretion if fired upon. 

The Key West fleet had proceeded but a short distance on 
the morning of the 22d, the flagvship New York- and the battle- 
ships lov^a and Indiana leading in one lino to the southward, 
and the gunboate Helena, Macliias, NaslivlUe, and Castine in 
another to the northward, when smoke was seen on the horizon 
to westward. By seven o'clock it was discovered that she was 
a merchantman flying a Spanish flag. The Nashville suddenly 
left the line and headed at full speed for the Spaniard. As 
she approached a shot was fired from her port battery, striking 
the water some distance ahead of the merchantman, which 
held her way as if nothing was happening. For a few minutes 
the Nasliville continued the chase and then fired another shot 
wdiicli apparently passed within a rod of tlie Spaniard's bow, 
and the captain quickly reversed the engines and hauled down 
the Spanish ensign. She was boarded by a half-dozen men 
from the Nashville, and was found to be the steamship Buena 
Veniitra, plying between ISTew York and West Indian ports. 
The captain said he did not know that war had been declared, 
but she was sent to Key West, where much excitement pre- 
vailed over the first shot of the war. 

The blockading squadron arrived off Havana towards even- 
ing of the same day; the red light was lighted in Morro Castle 
tower and three shots were fired as a signal that the Americans 
had appeared. Havana armed itself at once in anticipation of 
attack, not understanding our more peaceful intentions for 
the time being. Some shots were fired from the fortifications 
during the night, falling far short of our ships, which lay 
quietly out some distance working their searchlights and 
keeping a sharp eye for blockade runners. On the 23d and 
24th several other Spanish vessels were taken, including the 



A CALL FOR VOLUNTEERS 317 

steamers Juucr and Caialina, all being rich prizes, especially 
the latter, a large new vessel. Two ships were taken at the 
niuntli uf Havana harbor, indeed almost under the guns of 
J\iorro Castle. The President was diposed to release all Span- 
ish prizes taken during these first days of the war in considera- 
tion of the notice given by Spain allowing American vessels 
in Spanish ports freely to depart, but he waited to see. if Spain 
were acting in good faith. As a matter of fact, there were no 
American vessels in Spanish ports, except possibly a few pleas- 
nre yachts, and Spain's action might have been for effect and 
for the very purpose of })lacing our seizures of Spanish ships in 
as bad a light as possible. 

On the 20th, or immediately after the resolutions for inter- 
vention were disposed of, tlie House passed lUMiiiptly nnd with- 
out division a bill authorizing the President to call for army 
volunteers, and defining the terms on which volunteers from 
the state militia forces could lie eidistcd and officered. The 
bill was passed in the Senate the next day, but owing to de- 
fects it was sent back to both houses and did not become a law 
till the 23d, when the President, in conformity with its pro- 
visions, issued a proclamation calling for two-year volunteers, 
the total number apportioned iiinoiig the states according to 
population. Measures were taken fur the eidistment of as 
large a proportion as possible of tli(> Xati(^nal (luai'd in the 
1 iiited States Army, the pni'pnse being to amalgamate the 
regulars and volunteers as soon as possible. 

1'he requisitions made by Seci-etary Alger on the state 
governors calling for 125,0(10 volunteers, met with instant 
iiml adequate response, but also not a little adverse criticism 
finiu the Xatiounl Ciuardsmeu, whose jealousy of the regidar 
■•ii'iny hiid much td do with the defeat of the first TTull bill for 
its reorgani/.ation to meet re(|uireuu'nts. V>y the j>rovi<ions of 
that measure, the regular ai-uiy's war strength would have been 
raised to 104,000 men. Tu his telegraphic call Secretary 
Alger declareil thnt ]>reference would be given to reginuMits of 
the Xational Guard or state militia, iov the reason that they 
20 



318 FRICTION BETWEEN REGULARS AND VOLUNTEERS 

were armed, presumably equipped and drilled. In issuing his 
confirmatory letter, howe\'er, the Secretary of War said that 
the men called for were to be enlisted in the United States 
service, their state organizations being preserved as long as 
they remained in their own states. The result was that many 
regiments manifested a decided reluctance to act under an un- 
certainty as to the necessity of giving up their organizations. 

It was not so much a conliict between State and Federal 
elements as a conflict between amateurs and professionals, and 
when the fact was thoroughly understood there was no uncer- 
tainty as to results. Whatever the influence of the National 
Guard, the Federal government could ill-afford to have men 
enlisted as volunteers who would not serve unconditionally 
under army orders. It was very soon shown that while the 
National Guard in some states was in a high state of efficiency, 
in others it was far from being prepared for war. Some of the 
Western regiments came into the Eastern camps almost desti- 
tute of equipments. Even the New York state militia, ill- 
provided with overcoats and blankets, were sent to an unpre- 
pared camp, and the control was so poor that at first there were 
scenes of rowdyism in the villages about the camps. Had 
United States army officers been in charge there would have 
been nothing of this kind permitted. It was a useful lesson 
to state authorities, for it revealed the fact that the organiza- 
tions which had been maintained with so much expense, and 
which had been so often admired in parades, were not in a 
condition to meet a sudden call in defense of the country. 

Soon after gathering in their respective state rendezvous, 
the volunteers were forced to undergo the somewhat trying 
ordeal of examination by United States army surgeons before 
they could be accepted and mustered into service. In not n 
few of the states the percentage of men rejected, both officers 
and privates, was so large that state ofiicials endeavored to in- 
duce the Federal authorities to be less rigorous in their de- 
mands, but, for reason obvious enough, the Federal authorities 
declined to relent. 



ARMY REORGANIZATION BILT. 31!t 

If the militia iu some states had permitted otticers and i)i-i- 
vates to come to look upon the militia organization as a social 
institution existing chiefly for the pleasure of the men enrolled, 
it was certainly a fortunate event that disclosed the weakness 
at this early day of the war and at a time when not faced by a 
foe more dangerous than Spain. The Ferlcral authorities were 
quite right in insisting that men entering the army should be 
unlikely candidates for the hospital and pension roll, and, in 
spite of the influence of the Xational Guard in some states, the 
Federal authorities were supported by public opinion. 

On the :^5tli was passed a modified bill for reorganizing the 
regular army, giving it a maximum strength of G1,000, creat- 
ing the three-battalion form, and providing for the enlistment 
and promotion of the requisite number of officers. The im- 
perative necessity for passing the reorganization bill Avas that, 
owing to the complicated machinery of modern siege guns, it 
would be impossible to entrust volunteer forces with the coast 
defenses within three months. But considerable jealousy was 
shown between the amateur and regular forces, and it soon be- 
came apparent that the formation of the army would be respon- 
sible for delay in the war. 

Among the pooph:" who had not an adequate idea of tlie re- 
quirements of war there was the greatest optimism as to the 
pr()ni])tness with whieh it would end — a naval l)attle or two 
and it would all be over with, they thought; and the idea was 
also extensively held in official circles, though not among the 
army and navy. But the eo-opcration of the Cubans was exag- 
gerated, and, besides, the troops immediately available for 
military operations in Cuba were only those which could be 
?|)ared from the small regular army. Xone of the National 
Guard regiments were fitted at once for such campaigning as 
would be required in Cuba. At the best, from one to three 
months of preliminary training and seasoning was needed. Tf 
was shown unmist;ik;il»ly both in the ^Nfexiean and Civil AVar 
tliat ti'niniiig and di'illing ('(UHUiniiig nionths of time were ab- 
solutely necessary to get raw recruits into shape. 



CHAPTER XXX 

WAR FORMALLY PROCLAIMED — THE BOMBARDMENT OF 
MATANZAS — EXPERIEXCES ON A MODERN WARSHIP — 
COMMODORE DEWEY SAILS TOWARDS MANILA. 

Enthusiasm and Generosity among the People of the United States — Col- 
lege Patriotism — Prompt Action by the Women of the Country — Red 
Cross Nurses — The Dangers of Yellow Fever — Surgeon-General's 
Warning — Rejoicing in Havana — Blanco's Grandiloquent Manifesto 
— Congress Formally Declares War — Spain Talks of Scandalous 
Aggression — Trouliles in the Cortes — Imi)ortance of Securing a Base 
on Cuban Coast — Havana Ignored — Advancing to Matanzas — The 
Nature of the Bay — Waiting for the Word to Fire — A Shot from 
the Batteries — Engagement Becomes General — A Thrilling Sight — 
Following the Powerful Projectiles to the Target — Clouds of Smoke — 
Three Hundred Shots in Eighteen Miimtes — The Puriiau's Remark- 
able Shot — Terrible Destruction — The Concussion of Great Guns — 
General Blanco's Report of Casualties — " A Mule Killed " — The Cape 
Verde Spanish Fleet Sails — Commodore Dewey Points his Fleet to- 
wards IManila — Significance of His Orders. 

OX every side existed abundant evidence of patriotism 
and generosity. Of course, as in every war, there 
were avaricious speculators who iigured how much 
personal wealth they could grab from the national treasury, 
which required so much for the equipment of the forces. But 
the great multitude of tlie rich and poor alike had no such 
sordid ambition. Enlistments came in rapidly from every 
quarter, and from every station in life. The Federal Treasury, 
the Post-Office Department, the boards of aldermen in many 
of the cities, i)residents and directors of great railway corpora- 
tions and many patriotic employers of labor put their em- 
ployes at ease by either guaranteeing that all of them who 
cared to volunteer should be paid in full while away and re- 
instated when they returned, or that they should be reinstated 
merely. Prominent and rich people offered money and ser- 
vices to the government and valuable steam yachts were ten- 
dered for its use. John Jacob Astor, having offered free 

(320) 



TIIK (IKNEIIAL ENTHUSIASM 3:2 1 

transportation for troops over his railroads in Oliio and Illinois, 
and having put his yacht, the Nourmahal, at the disposal of 
the government as an auxiliary cruiser, then offered to furnish 
and equip a battery uf artillery for service in Cuba or in any 
place where the government might wish to use it. At the 
Colleges the enthusiasm was great, and mass meetings ad- 
dressed by the pi-esideiits and professors were held in many of 
the leading educational institutions. Many students volun- 
teered. As a recognition of the contributions of Yale and 
Harvard to our national glory in years past, the Paris and the 
Neiu Yoi'l; the fast steamers impressed into the service of the 
navy, were renamed after those institutions. 

The expression of patriotism from the women of the coun- 
try was what was to l)e expected. In several cities they had 
early organized, forming auxiliary corps to make comforts for 
the soldiers going to the war. Thase auxiliaries were indepen- 
dent, being formed without any immediate connection with 
regiments, and others woi'c foniicxl coiiiiccted semi-officially 
with companies and regiments of the Xational Cuard. 

The volunteers, nurses, and honorary members of the lied 
Cross Society received instructions at the hospitals. A detach- 
ment of the nurses of this society sailed from New York on the 
State of Texas on the 23d to be in readiness in Cuban watei*s. 
The nurses of the Ked Cross Society, and others \\•\\<^ nudutain 
an independent orgnni/ation, were not govci-ncd l>y the !^ur- 
geon-Generars idtiniatuin that the government would not ac- 
cept the services oi any nurse who \\-m\ not had yellow fever or 
passed through one or more c|)i(l(nii<*s of that disease. In the 
judgment of the Surgeon-Cencral. it would be adding burdens, 
and making more demands on the hospital resources of the 
government in Cuba and Key West, to send out nurses who 
were not innnune. TIm- male nurses meeting the government 
rer|uirements were \\\o only govci-niufut nurses at first sent out. 
This decision changed the character of the services rendered 
to the soldiers and sailois by the volunteer women and nui'ses, 
but did in>t lessen their entliu<ia.-tic determination to serve. 



322 SPANISH TROOPS CONCENTRATE IN HAVANA 

The Surgeon-General, who was considered one of the high- 
est authorities in the world on enteric diseases, strongly ad- 
vised against the immediate invasion of Cuba, predicting that 
the mortality among volunteers from yellow fever alone would 
be between 35 and 50 per cent, if undertaken before October 
1st. This fact, together with tlie other that many of the regi- 
ments from the different states were slow in recruiting and 
came to the national camps poorly equipped, led the authori- 
ties to delay any large military operations on the island for a 
time, though it was desired to secure a base for distributing 
provisions to the reconcentrados if possible, and arms to the in- 
surgents. But, as in most wars, it was found that plans had to 
be changed to meet new conditions. 

The news of the breaking off of diplomatic negotiations be- 
tween the United States and Spain appeared to be received in 
Havana with rejoicing, 'No further attempt to secure a con- 
ference with the insurgents in the interests of autonomy was 
made, and the Captain-General declared the island to be in a 
state of war. He annulled all his former decrees granting 
pardon to insurgents, and placed under martial law all ac- 
cused of rebellion. Spanish forces in the western provinces 
began to concentrate in Havana, burning and destroying the 
country as they came in. In a grandiloquent manifesto, 
Blanco declared his intention of shedding his blood for the 
honor of Spain, and he called upon all to vigorously repel the 
invader. The Correspondent of the London Times, whose re- 
ports were as impartial as any sent from the island, was ex- 
pelled, and other steps taken to prevent the exact state of 
things from being known. 

While no doubt as to when the war began was entertained 
by the administration, it was deemed best that Congress should 
adopt a resolution formally declaring the time when the state 
of war began to exist. In a message to Congress on the 25th, 
tlie President asked that, in view of the measures already 
taken by him and witli a view to tlie adoption of other neces- 
sary measures, Congress take formal action at once " to the end 



FORMAL DECLARATION OF WAR 323 

that the delinition of the iiiteniational status of tlio United 
States as a belligerent power may be made known, and the as- 
sertion of all it6 rights and the maintenance of all its duties in 
the conduct of a public war may be assured." Congress acted 
with the utmost promptness and passed a resolution declaring 
that a state of war existed and had existed between the I'nited 
States and Spain since, and including, April -M>t. The vote 
in the House was unanimous. 

The Spanish government followed up its circular of the 
ISth by another on the 2()tli, in which it expressed its regret at 
being compelled to appeal to force to expel the " scandalous 
aggi-ession " of the United States and defend the national dig- 
nity and historic integrity of the fatherland. 

It was the evident purpose of the United States govern- 
ment at this time, while the intentions of the Cape Yerde fleet 
were uncertain, to effect a landing in Cuba promptly and as 
near Havana as possible, in order to hold coninninication with 
the insurgents, to form a base for our own military operations 
and to carry relief to reconcentrados. 

All reports indicated that the Spanish army in concentrat- 
ing their forces had seized all available food in the la roe cen- 
ters, and the reconcentrados were in a worse predicament than 
ever. A base for our own military operations was quite as 
important. General Grant had pointed out many years be- 
fore, or when the Mrf/itiius case seemed likely to lead us into 
war, that the conquest of Havana could best be undertaken by 
an army landed somewhere east of the city while a Itloekading 
force held the approaches to tlie hai-boi-. 'i'his jdau was evi- 
dently in the minds of the government and it was the expecta- 
tion that such an expedition might lead the way in a short 
time. 

In carrying out this jioliey it became Admiral Sampson's 
duty to ignore the fortifications of Havana, keeping the block- 
ade effective at all times, while preparing a suitable base for 
landing troops. Tlie city of ^Tatanzas presented a cunvenient 
point for such a base, but the blockading fleet could see that 



334 



THE FIRST CONFLICT 



the Spaniards were very busy in placing new fortifications and 
more modern guns about the harbor, and consequently, Ad- 
miral Sampson set out to destroy them on the 27th. 

It was a very interesting event, drawing the first blood of 
the conflirt. For the first time in thirty years our warships en- 



HAVANA 

THE HARBOR AND DEFENCES' 

SCALE OF MILES 



G U 




MAP OF HAVANA, ITS HARBOR AND DEFENCES. 

tered ujion the serious business of war. In the afternoon Ad- 
miral Sampson on his flagship Neiv Yorh reached the harbor of 
Matanzas, where tlie monitor Puritan and the cruiser Cin- 
cinnati were maintaining the blockade. The city lies at the 
head of a bay about four miles from the sea and the mouth of 
the bay is about three miles wide. On its west side is Point 
Eubalcaya and on the east side Point Maya, both having a 
high elevation above the sea and giving their batteries a very 
commanding position. Stretching back from these batteries 
are commanding hills, in the shnil)l)ery of which the Span- 
iards had been busy placing concealed batteries. 

The Nc7V Yorlc led the way into the bay, followed a liun- 
(b-ed yards astern on the port side by the Puritan, while the 
Cincinnati was about the same distance behind on the star- 




j«-.D,VroRTHINOT0N £. G0.PUBL1SHXR.S, KAx.TFORD. C 




Q/CtC^^^-^i 



THE ATTACK UPON MATANZAS 327 

board. I'lie crews wore all at tlicii' quarters waiting for the 
" music " to begin, the orders being to open fire when the bat- 
teries fired their first >^hut. At a few minutes before one 
o'clock there was a pufi' of smoke from the east shore and an 
8-incli shell whizzed toward the iVciu Yurie and fell consider- 
ably short. The range to the east shore was still over three 
miles, but the llugship })roHiptly opened fire with one of her 
heavy guns. The engagement in a few minutes became gen- 
eral and shore and bay were covered with the wind-swept smoke 
while the hollows behtw the hills roared with the cannonading. 
Tlie Neiv YorJc steamed ({uickly in and circled around to the 
westward toward Point Ivubalcaya, while the Puritan swimg 
eastward to engage the ]\Iaya batteries. 

It was the first opportunity the gunners of the New York 
had enjoyed for target practice of this kind and it was a stir- 
ring sight to see. As a big puff of smoke rose from her side, 
the eye turning to the battery on shore would behold a cloud of 
dust and fragments flying high in the air, indicating the terrific 
force of modern projectiles. The Neiv Yorlc soon re<:luced the 
range to about a mile and a quarter, and was tossing shells into 
Rubalcaya at the rate of about three a minute with wonderful 
precision and apparently with great destructiveness. 

In the meantime the Puritan was taking care of Point 
Maya. It was a long shot to that battery and it was so well 
masked that the only target was the infn'(iuciit smoke of a 
gun, but when the Pi/rilaii found the range her shells burst 
ever}^ time within the fortifications, great clouds of dust and 
fragments rising high in the air with every explosioji. T"p to 
this. time the Cincinnati had received no order t(^ join in the 
action and her crew and officers could hardly contain them- 
selves. Finally, Captain Chester himself signaled asking ]ier- 
mission to engage, and it was granted by the fiag-liip. TIk^ 
Cincinnati quickly steamed up to within two thousand yards 
broadside on and all her guns seeined to go at once. P)Ut this 
grim sport was of short duration. 

At the end of eighteen minutes, the batteries apparently 



328 SUPERB MARKSMANSHIP OF OUR GUNNERS 

having been silenced, the New York gave the signal to retire, 
but soon after a last defiant shot was fired from the shore. 
Almost instantly one of the big guns of the Puritan, which 
was in line, replied. It was the best shot of the day and ex- 
cited the admiration of every witness. It struck the battery 
just where the smoke had showed the gun, tore its way into the 
earthworks and exploded with terrible destruction. Then the 
ships stood out to sea. 

The display of marksmanship on the American vessels was 
superb; the firing was rapid and ever)^ one of the three hundred 
shots fired seemed to do its work of destruction to the new 
forts, but not one of the enemy's shots hit the ships; they were 
absolutely unharmed except from the usual results of the con- 
cussion of their own guns. A correspondent wrote: " AVhen 
a 10,000-ton ship, usually as steady as a rock, shakes and 
trembles like a frightened child; when firmly-fitted bolts start 
from their sockets and window-panes and wood^vork are shat- 
tered; when the roar peals up from port and starboard and you 
feel your feet leaving the deck and yonr glasses jumping 
around your forehead, while blinding, blackening smoke hides 
everything from sight — then it is that you first realize the ter- 
rible power of a modern warship's batteries." 

ISTot one of our men was hurt, and the gunners and their as- 
sistants were delighted to embrace the opportunity they had 
so long waited for to " pump a little iron," as one of them ex- 
pressed it, " into those Spaniards." It is not kno\\ai what the 
casualties were on shore, but it is difficult to see how those who 
manned the batteries could have entirely escaped unless they 
ran away. Captain-General Blanco sent home a report of the 
usual Spanish color. IvTo lives were lost, he said, except that 
of one mule. Our vessels were injured by the Spanish fire, 
and he was quite sure a smokestack was hit. 

On the 2(ith the President issued an order proclaiming our 
policy regarding the rights of Spanish vessels and the rights of 
neutrals, indicating an intention to pursue a liberal course 
least calculated to irritate foreign powers, and giving Spanish 



1 



DEWEY SAILS FOK MANILA 329 

mercLant vessels within the ports of the United States until 
May 21st for loading their eargoes and departing. The right 
of search was to be exercised with strict regard for the rights 
of neutrals, and mail steamers were not to be interfered with 
except on the clearest grounds of suspicion of having contra- 
band goods or of violating the blockade. This proclamation 
was followed within a few days by decrees of neutrality from 
most of the foreign nations. (Ireat Britain was one of the 
first to declare her neutrality, sending notices to all ports in 
all colonies under her dominion. This, of course, necessitated 
a prompt departure from the port of Hongkong of Dewey's 
fleet, and it moved to Mirs Bay, a Chinese port, where also it 
could remain but twenty-four hours. 

Portugal, having dominion over the Cape Yerde Islands, 
at which the Spanish fleet was concentrated, delayed for some 
days to define her position, and it was at one time suspected 
that she might make common cause with Spain. At last, how- 
ever, she took a neutral jiosition, daring no longer to disregard 
the obligations of neutrality, and the Spanish fleet, which had 
been reported as having sailed several times, actually saih'd on 
the 29th. two days after Commodore Dewey sailed from Mirs 
Bay to ]\ranila. 

Public attention in the United States was so completely 
t;il<cn up with the situation about Cuba, especially after the 
news of the departure of Cervera's fleet from St. Vincent, that 
little was thought of Dewey's movements. In a general way, 
it was thought that neutral declarations having shut our 
Asiatic squadron off from Hongkong, it would be necessary 
for our fleet to secure a base for coal and supplies nearer than 
Honolulu or San Francis<:'0, and, as the Spanish Philijijjines 
lay but two or three days' sail from Hougk(uig, and as we 
were at war with Sjiain, it would be a stroke to secure a coaling 
station there. Very few in the discussion which preceded the 
actual outbreak of war had for a moment supposed that the 
armed intervention for the ])a<'ifi('ation of Cuba would begin 
with a campaign of conquest in ishuids on exactly the opposite 



330 A FATEFUL BLOW 

side of the world. It had been the declared purpose of our 
government to free Cuba and extend a helping hand to the 
starving people of that island, and it had begun by establishing 
a pflcific blockade which for the time shut oil' supplies not only 
from the S|)anish but from the reconcentrados, and all were 
expecting that as speedily as possible we would use the navy 
to strike at any naval force Spain sent to the defense of the 
islands, and also to assist in landing troops near Havana, estab- 
lishing a base of supplies for ourselves and for the suffering 
Cubans. Incidentally, we were at war with Spain, and it was, 
of course, our business to .^rike Spain wherever we found her. 
AVhile we were thinking of other things, and wondering at 
what point Cervera's fleet would appear, Dewey, obeying 
orders the signiificance of which had not occurred to the Amer- 
ican people, struck a blow that in a day changed the opinions of 
the nation and, apparently, the course of its policy. 

The revolution which had been proceeding in the Philip- 
pines against Spanis^li authority, for very much the same rea- 
sons as in Cuba, had up to this time attracted little attention in 
the world and least of all in the United States. Agreeably to 
the traditions of a hinidrod years, we had viewed with little 
concern the troubles of others in far-away lands. Having 
rigorously kept to the doctrine that the destiny of all peoples on 
the Westefn Hemisphere was a subject for our immediate con- 
cern, and having n])hold it whenever occasion demanded, we 
had confined our efforts on the other side of the world to the 
support of enterprising and daring missionaries, satisfied to 
take the heathen under our religious influence under whatever 
flag of authority the exigencies of European colonization im- 
posed upon him. As a government, we had grown into the 
habit of keeping our hands off. Spanish oppression and brutal- 
ity would never have tempted us to assume the duty of a maker 
of peace and a bearer of freedom of the Philippines had Culsa 
not been at our doors. But the coniception of our duty 
quickly enlarged after Commodore Dewey pointed his ships 
for Manila. 



CTTAPTKR XXX r 

THE PIIH.IIMMNK ISLANDS — THEIR EXTENT, ('1IAI{A('TEI{. 
AND NATIVE LIFE - KEliELLlON OF THE FILIPINOS AND 
ITS THRILLING INCIDENTS — THE TRAGK.' DEATH OF DR. 
RIZAL — AGUINALDO AND COMMODOUE DEWEY. 

M;i,i,a'lliin tlie Njivi<fator Hears of the Wouderf ul Spice Islands — Persuades 
the Spani.><h King tiiat tiiey IMiirlit Belong to Spain — Sailing Westward 
Instead of Eastward — Wonderful Voyage — Discovery of the Philip- 
pines — The Natives — Early Importance of Manila — The Slaughter of 
the Prositerous Chinese — Depressing Results — x\. Long and Ugly His- 
tory — Character of the Islands — Pe(-uliarities of Spanish Government 
— The Uprising of 1896 — Tin; Catapunan Society — Appealing to the 
Filipinos — A Bloody Conflict — Outrages on Both Sides — A Hundred 
Prisoners Suffocated in a Single Night — Public Executions — Dramatic 
Incidents — The Romantic Story of Dr. Rizal — His Love Affair — Sen- 
tenced to Detith — Married in his Cell Just Before his Execution — His 
Death — Patriotic Vers&s — His Widow Joins the Insurgents and is 
Welcomed as a Joan of Arc— Insurgent Leaders Leave tlu; Country — 
Insurrection Breaks Out Again — General Aguinaldos Exile. 

WIIKX Pope Alexander VI. divided tlic world be- 
tween Portugal and Spain ])\ a line from pole to 
pole some three linndred miles west of the Azores, 
as rclatcil in an cai'ly chapter, he diil ii<it iiiia::iiu' tliat one 
naviiiiitor sailing east and another west might meet somewhere 
oil the other side of the globe. Yet this very thing liap[)ene(l, 
aii<K ill conseipience of it, for three hnndred years the Spanish 
hail iiiic ilay too many in their cnleiKl;!!' ami the Pnrtiigiiesc 
one tlay too few. It happened that .Magellan, who was a Por- 
tnguese, had begnn his eareer as a navigator by sailing nndcr 
Portuguese commanders eastward around the Cape of (Jood 
Ilo])e to the Indies, ami he had a desire to lead an expetlitiun 
to the rich "spice" islands about which he had heanl. Put 
his king treated him ungratefully, so he transferred his al- 
legiance to the Spanish flag, and finally persuaded Charles V. 
of S|)ain that the wonderful islands woidd lie within that part 

of the world the Pope had given to Spain, if only good cave 

(331) 



332 THE FIRST JOURNEY AROUND THE WORLD 

was taken to sail westward instead of eastward. Thus it hap- 
pened that Magellan made that wonderful journey — " the 
most wonderful in history," as John Fiskc, the historian, calls 
it, " doubtless the greatest feat of navigation that has ever 
been performed." His ships were the first to circumnavigate 
the globe, though Magellan himself was killed by natives in 
the islands which were claimed by Spain and which were 
named the Philippines, in honor of Philip II., one of the most 
dishonorable kings who ever reigned in Spain. 

Antonio de Morga, writing about eighty years later, or in 
1009, put this maritime achievement in this way: " Having 
won America, a fourth part of the earth which the ancients 
never knew, the Spaniards sailed, following the sun, and 
discovered in the western ocean an archipelago of many 
islands adjacent to further Asia, inhabited by various nations, 
abounding in rich metals, precious stones, aud pearls, and all 
manner of fruit, where, raising the standard of the faith, they 
snatched them from the yoke and power of the devil and 
placed them under the command and government of Spain." 

Manila was an important commercial center while Liver- 
pool was only a fishing station and while the Indiaus were still 
occupying Manhattan Island. Formerly, the islands had been 
under Chinese dominion, but the yoke was shaken off by an 
invasion from India, and it .vas these invaders with whom the 
Spaniards chiefly had to deal. But the Chinese still main- 
tained a brisk trade with the Philippines in cotton, silks, 
metals, and quicksilver. Prom time to time a great many 
enterprisiug Chinese landed in the islands, and early in the 
seventeenth century they came in large numbers, but the 
Spaniards became jealous of their strength and began to per- 
secute them in many ways till at last they were goaded into 
rebellion. Several times the Spaniards endeavored to ex- 
terminate them, but they continued to arrive and to thrive 
till finally it was decreed that every Chinaman on the island 
of Luzon should be killed. Twenty-four thousand of them 
were put to death with one curious result, according to the 



THE BEAUTIFUL ARCHIPELAGO 333 

historian of that day: " When the war was at an end, the 
want and difficulties of the city began because there were no 
Chinese who exercised various arts and brought all the pro- 
visions; neither was any food to be found to cat nor shoes to 
\vear, not even for very excessive prices. All this weighed 
down the spirit of the Spaniards." 

We need not follow the long and ugly history of the Span- 
iards in these islands; in many respects it is similar to that of 
Cuba. It was the purpose and the endeavor of the Spanish 
governuient to make all the money possible out of the people, 
giving to them little in return but " the faith," which was 
always rather obstinately declined. 

Lying wholly within the tropics, the islands, big and little, 
inimlier lu-arly a thousand, varying in size from Luzon, which 
is somewhat larger than Cuba and about the size of the State 
of Illinois, to tiny islets hardly worth a name. Altogether 
llu'ir area is twice that of Xew England. The tropical scenery 
in the forests of this archipelago is of unsurpassed splendor, 
the heat and moisture combining to produce vegetation of a 
magnificence which beggars description. Gigantic trees 
towering to a height of two or three hundred feet are fes- 
tooned with graceful vines. Splendid tree-ferns rise thirty 
or forty feet into the air, while underneath are smaller varie- 
ties and exquisite orchids. So dense is the vegetation in some 
of these forests that the fierce tropical sun hardly penetrates 
to the ground beneath them and the dense undergrowth con- 
stantly drips with moisture. 

The nioniitains, rising to a height of 7,000 feet, are cov- 
ered to their very tops with forests of immense trees, yielding 
excellent timber and many of the most valuable sorts of wood. 
Teak, ebony, cedar, and gum trees, iron and sapan wood are 
intcrsporscfl witli brca<lfi'nit and cocoanut trees, oranges, 
citrons, mango, tamarinds, and other varieties of fruit trees. 
On the extensive slopes and in the valleys is cultivated luMn]\ 
of which abont (if), 000 tons are annually exported. In isiio 
8,000 tons of tobacco and 110,000,000 cigai-s are exported. 



334 



EDUCATION AROUSES AMBITION 



The other products are cotton, sugar, coffee, indigo, rice, 
wheat, maize, pepper, ginger, vanilhi, cinnamon, cocoa, etc. 




115 LoiiKltiide 



MAP OP THE PmLIPPINE ISLANDS. 



Of dangerons wild beasts there are none; oxen, l)nfPaloes, 
horses, goats, sheep, and swine are extensively reared; deer, 



AVAKirK ANT) FANATICIS .']3") 

wild boars, pheasants, ducks, ;iiid tine ti^li arc ahuiidaiil; the 
forests swarm with inonkcvs, sfjuirrcls, parrots, sunbirds, and 
bees; the juuiiles with li/ards, snakes, tarantuhis, inosqiiitoes, 
and other insects. (J old is found, also iron, copper, coal, ver- 
milion, saltpeter, (piicksilver, snli)hnr (in large quantities, 
\u>\\\ pure and mixed with copper or iron), mother-of-pearl, 
coi-al, auilter, and tortoise shell. 

The islands contain some 10,000,000 natives of different 
tribes, many of whom the Spaniards were never able to bring 
under their authority. Tlie main population consists of the 
Tagals. They, together with the various nuxtures of half- 
breeds, bore a burdensome taxation and other unhappy condi- 
tions for many years, and, so long as the only educated people 
on the islands were the rulers, there was little trouble. Little 
by little, the natives and half-breeds became educated, some of 
the young men of the richer families going abroad, and wdth 
greatel" education came greater ambition. The natives began 
to desire some voice in the government, the abuses of which 
they began to understand; and, of course, the proud Spaniard 
and the power-loving friar looked with as pronounced disfavor 
upon the demands of these people as they did ujion those of 
the Cubans. 

The church organization became very powerful in the 
hands of the various orders of Dominicans, Augustinians, 
Kecoletanos, and Franciscans, and even the Governor-General 
liimself dared not oppose tliem. The Archbishop received a 
salary of $12,000 a year, though to conduct the whole ecclesi- 
astical establishment cost no less than $1,000,000 a year. 
The Archbisliop lived in a palace in consideral)le state, and on 
the great feast days he was the only one allowed to ride in a 
carriage. 

The Governor-General received a salary of $40,000. 
ihougli the cost of his office to the colony was no less tluin 
$1,000,000 a year. As in Cuba, governors came witli empty 
pockets and went away with fidl one<. Tt was asserted that 
^^''evler put $6,000,000 to his credit during the short time he 
21 



336 GRIEVANCES OF THE FILIPINOS 

had control of the Philippines, and the sub-otticials stole in 
like manner. The peculations amounted to millions of dol- 
lars annually, and absolutely uothing was done for internal 
improvements. The budget showed that only $6,000 was 
appropriated for new improvements in this whole archipelago, 
and yet $60,000 was set aj^art for the Manila Cathedral, 
$4,000 for the choir alone. 

If a bridge was destroyed by a Hood or earthquake, it was 
never repaired. And so it went on for year after year. Had 
Spain been actuated by the spirit of internal improvement that 
charactei'ized the administration of England and Holland in 
adjacent countries, had she subordinated her religious fanati- 
cism and her avarice to a desire to better the natives, the com- 
merce of the islands might have been fifty times as great, for 
in natural productiveness there is no land on the globe sur- 
passing the Phili])pines. 

The beginning of the end of it all came in 1896 while 
General Blanco was Governor-General of the colony. Re- 
bellion broke out, and Spain, whose forces in Cuba under 
(General Campos had just been swept back to Havana, was 
called upon to face the brotherhood of the Katapunan in the 
Philippines. Tliis society was the strongest political society 
iu the islands, having a membership of about 50,000 " Fili- 
pinos " in Luzon alone, and through it the munitions of war 
were mostly contributed to the insurgents. They issued an 
appeal in which they said: " We make no racial distinction. 
We call upon all possessing honor and national dignity. All 
are sufferers, the Filipino, and the Asiatic, the American, and 
the European. "We invite all to help raise a down-trodden 
and tormented race — a country destroyed and hurled into 
the slough of degradation. We except no one, not even a 
Spaniard, because in our ranks there are some noble Span- 
iards, lovers of justice, free from prejudice, who are support- 
ing our demands for individuality and national dignity." 

Native Filipinos, residing in JMadrid, expressed their 
grievances in an address to the Spanish people, containing ex- 



A HUNDRED SUFFOCATED IX A NKiHT '.):]'', 

tracts from the I'liilippiiu' hiul^ct for 1890-97. It showed 
that the Philippine treasury was compelled to pay a heavy 
contribution to the general expenses of the government at 
]\Iadrid; pensions to the Duke of Veragna and to the Manpiis 
of Bedmar, besides jiroviding for the entire cost of the Span- 
ish consulates at all llic ini[)(irlaiit Asiatic ports. It con- 
tributed, like Cuba, a large amount of money for the office of 
the colonial minister, and for a purely ornamental and purely 
Spanish body called the Council of the Philippines. It paid 
the expenses of the jienal colony of Fcn'uando Po in Africa, 
and all the pensions and retiring allowances of all the civil 
and military employes who had ever served in the Philippines, 
a sum amounting to nearly $2,000,000 annually. 

The real fighting began in August, 189G, and repeated 
bloody conflicts followed. At first the natives were poorly 
armed; indeed, the majority bore no weapons at all. But 
after a wliik^ tlu^ oi-ganization was ini|)roved, holos, or long 
sharp knives somewhat like the Cuban machetes, were dis- 
tributed to the men, and a few secured firearms which were 
brought in from Hongkong and Singapore. Gradually, the 
area of discontent widened into llie ]>rovince of Cavite, where 
most of the fighting took place. Before reinforcements could 
be brought from Spain, the insurgents had practical control 
of that ])roviiice. 

The rebels were not as wisely controlled as the Cubans and 
many outrages occurred on both sides. The Spanish authori- 
ties, with their usual stupidity, endeavored to prevent the 
foreigners in the islands ,-cii(liiig out iut'oruiatiou. but, in spite 
of all precautions, a few details reached the outer world, show- 
ing that the rising was a serious one, that horrible outrages 
were committed by the rebels, and that the Spanish troops re- 
taliated with almost corresponding brutality. 

A himdred reliels, or suspected rebels, wen^ suffocateil to 
death in the " Dark Hole of ^Fanila " in one night. This 
place is an oM iiKini^itoi'ial iirisou, in ilic base of tlic main 
fortifications on the Pasig Kiver, which tlows through Manila, 



338 A FILIPINO PATRIOT 

a dark and unsanitary hole below the ground level, unused for 
more than a hundred years before this revolution, with stag- 
nant water, poisoned, stifling atmosphere, and infested with 
rats and vermin. Spanish officers on guard during that long 
and awful night heard the piteous cries of the miserable 
creatures who had been thrown into this horrible ])it, and their 
condition was made more terrible when, acting upon the 
orders of a lieutenant, the sentinel in charge covered up the 
only air hole in the dungeon, '' because it rained," he said. 

The public executions were made greater fetes even than 
in Cuba. An American who was present in the country at 
this time wrote : 

" These executions were generally made the occasion for quite a jubilee 
— a turnout of the elite, a gala day, a time for rejoicing. The fact that 
there was to be an execution was prominently, joyously announced, 
officially and otherwise, in the local newspapers. There was at least one 
military band in evidence, and the morning when unfortunates who had 
protested against Spanish misrule were to be shot found the Spanish colors 
flying from a great many buildings, and the warships in the harbor 
' dressed.' The Philippine capital had a holiday aspect. 

" The deadly work was generally performed in the cool of the morning. 
That these events were fully appreciated was shown Ijy the presence on the 
Lunetta of thousands of people. Hundreds of fashionably-dressed ladies 
and gentlemen 'graced' the occasion with their presence. For the most 
part these fashionables came in their equipages. These ladies would stand 
in their vehicles, determined not to mi.ss any part of the ghastly show. 
The signal from the commanding lieutenant that the victims were dead was 
the signal for these delighted lady spectators to wave their handkerchiefs 
or parasols as evidence of their .satisfaction." 

As in Cuba, this bloody work abounded in dramatic inci- 
dents, many touching examples of heroic martyrdom; and the 
fate of Dr. Rizal will have an enduring place in the history of 
these troubled isles. He was one of the prominent leaders in 
the secret organization which su])]iortod the insurrection 
against Spanish tyranny; a man of culture, an experienced and 
able physician, once the president of the Manila University, a 
leader in the educational and scientific as well as social life of 
his "beloved Filipinos." He was a lover of equality, and 
while Spain's yoke did not chafe his own shoulders severely. 



A LIFE SACRIFICED FOR TJBKin'Y oiJO 

he had pitv for the less fortunate natives about him, and his 
love of his native eountrv took ])rcce(h'ne(' of :dl else in his 
strong and impulsive nature. 

Although he did not nppear direct! v in connection with 
the organization <d' the rebellion, the Sj)ainsh secured evi- 
dence to show his intimate relations with the most active lead- 
ers of the insurrection. Two years before, because of his po- 
litical views, he had been sent into exile in the island of Min- 
danao, where he }n-actieed his profession with prolit, and 
where he met the lady who finally became his wife and his 
AAadow in a single day. Upon promise of freedom Dr. liizal 
seems to have been tricked, late in 18S)G, into returning to 
!Manila, where he was at once placed on boaivl the S]ianish 
cruiser CasfiUa and conveyed to Spain. 

^leanwhile, the Sj^anisli aulhoi-ities had seized certain 
papers of the Katapunan society which were thought to im- 
plicate Dr. Kizal, and to show that he had been in constant 
communication with the insurgent leaders in Luzon. Ar- 
riving at Barcelona, he was arrested and sent batd-c to Manila 
for trial. Once there, he was speedily condemned to death. 
The time for his executio-u was fixed for Decemb.er (ith. At 
six o'clock ou that fat(d"ul moi-ning, ^liss Taufer, his betrothed, 
was admitted to his c(dl. In two hours the execution would 
take ]dace. A ])riest was in attendance upon the condemned 
man. Dr. Ilizal proposed that a marriage ceremony be per- 
foi'uied then and lliei-e, and the lady assented. Thei'e, while 
the rays of the early tropical sun streamed through the little 
barred window of the cell, were s]>oken the solemn words 
which joined the lovers in wedlock. The wife remained 
with her husltaud till the summons came, and then they led 
her away. The execution was attended with the usual 
formalities and was a sad but im]io<ing spect;\(de. Great 
crowds of Spaniai'ds, including many ladies, attended, but 
the natives were not so numerous as on former occasions. 
"Rizal displayed great fortitude, walking from the prisou with 
firm tread and head erect, his arms pinioned behind his back. 



340 FAIR PROMISES 

With his eyes fixed upon the rippling snnlit waters of the 
bay, he received the volley of eight ritles, swayed and fell. 
Another bnllet vas pnt into the body at sliort range to make 
snre of death, and the Ijand strnck np the nsnal lively airs. 

The execntion cansed a great sensation in Ifanila because 
of his prominence and his romantic marriage, and a week later 
the widow set off on foot for the rebel camp at Imus, where 
she was hailed as a modern Joan of Arc and was received with 
great demonstrations. She followed the insurgents into many 
of their victorious engagements. 

During the long struggle many wealthy half-castes were 
implicated. Many fled the country and their estates were 
turned into the coffers of the government. More troops were 
hurried out from Spain, earthworks were thrown up at Cavite, 
and 8-inch guns looked out over the bay. jSTew batteries were 
planted behind the walls of Old Manila, stretching from the 
river south along the bay to the promenade, and families 
living in the suburbs pitched tents in the streets of the old 
city. Thus Spain held the insurgents in check, while the 
commercial interests of the islands suffered greatly. 

In December, 1807, (General Primo de Eivera, who above 
all Spanish generals had an intimate knowledge of the country 
and its inhabitants, found the situation untenable for both 
parties. It appeared to be somewhat like the Cuban situation-. 
Neither party could drive out the other, the rebels being se- 
cure in their mountain fastnesses and the Spaniards holding 
the chief towns and villages on the coast. Rivera, therefore, 
sent two well-known Philippine natives occupying high posi- 
tion in ^Manila to propose terms of peace to Emilio Aguinaldo, 
a young Pilipino at the head of the military movements of 
the insurgents. A council of the revolutionary government 
was held in which it was agreed to lay down their arms 
on condition of certain reforms being introduced. The 
principal ones which the Spanish authorities agreed to were : 
the secularization of the religious orders and their inhibition 
from all official vetoes in civil administration; a general am- 



AGAIN IN REVOLT 341 

nesty for all rebels and guarantees for their personal security 
and from vengeance of the friars after returning io their 
homes; radical reforms to curtail the ghii-iiig abuses in public 
administration; freedt)m of the press; representation in the 
Sjianish parliament; abolition of the system of the deporta- 
tion of political suspects. 

It" the Pliih'ppiiie insurgents had had the benefit of as 
much experience with the Sj)anisli government in such agree- 
ments as the Cuban insurgents had, they would have known 
that no such arrangement would have received the necessary 
sanction at Madrid ; but Eivera agreed to the reforms, making 
the significant condition that the principal rebel leaders must 
leave the country during the pleasure of His Majesty. As 
these leaders had lost all their property either by confiscation 
or plunder, Eivera agreed further to provide them with funds 
to live in a becoming manner on foreign soil. He was very 
glad to get them out of the way so cheaply, and it was gen- 
erally regarded as a bribe. To what extent the leaders were 
influenced by this offer it is difficult to say. 

The rebels laid down their arms and peace was apparently 
secured, but no sooner had they done so and had returned to 
their homes than the religious orders began again to persecute 
them and to trump up imaginary charges to procure their 
arrest. The Spanish government, on its side, imagining itself 
now secure, desisted fi'om carrying out the pi'opost'd reforms, 
a trick like that played on the ('ul)ans at Zanjon in 1878. 
The Filipinos, however, refused to be du])ed, and again rose 
in rebellion, not only arouinl Manila but all over the neighbor- 
ing islands, but they necessarily had to begin all over again, 
their arms having been surrendered and their leaders having 
left the country. 

(leneral Aguinaldo, accompanied by his aid-de-camp ami 
private secretary, had gone first to Hongkong, then to Saigon 
ill Fi-ench Indo-riiina. and then to Singapore, arriving ther(> 
incognito at about llic lime matters came to a crisis between 
Spain and the rnitfd States. The ])urp(isi' of his visit to 



342 THE INSURGENT CHIEF RETURNS 

Singapore, as the story goes, was to consult with some of his 
Pliilippine friends, and particularly with Howard W. Bray, 
an old and intimate English friend for ten years resident in 
the Philippines, abont the affairs of the islands generally, and 
particularly as to the advisability of lending his aid to the 
Americans in the Philippines in case of war. The repudia- 
tion of the reforms which Pivera had promised to immediately 
carry into effect left Aguinaldo and other leaders, many of 
whom had gone to Hongkong, free to act. Meanwhile, Mr. 
Bray was introduced to Spencer Pratt, Consul-General of the 
United States at Singapore, who was anxious in view of the 
contingencies to learn as much as possible as to the conditions 
in the Philippines. 

Soon after Aguinaldo arrived, therefore, an interview was 
arranged at Avhich Bray acted as interpreter. Aguinaldo ex- 
plained the nature of the co-operation he could give in the 
event of the American squadron operating on Manila, and 
said he would guarantee to maintain order and discipline 
among the nati^'e troops, preventing them from committing 
outrages upon defenseless Spaniards beyond the inevitable in 
fair and honorable warfare. He further declared his ability 
to establish a proper and responsible government on liberal 
principles and would be willing to accept the same terms for 
the Philippines as the United States proposed to give Cuba. 

The Consul-General placed himself at once in telegraphic 
communication with Commodore Dewey at Hongkong, and 
as a result of the interchange of messages Aguinaldo at once 
left for Plongkong. When the McCulloch went to Hong- 
kong early in May to carry the news of Admiral Dewey's vic- 
tory, it took Aguinaldo and seventeen other revolutionary 
chiefs on board and brought them to ]\[anila Bay. They soon 
after landed at Cavite, and the admiral allowed them to take 
guns, ammunition, and other stores. 



CHAPTER XXXIJ 

COMMODORE DEWEY AND HIS SQUADRON — INCIDENTS OF 
THE CRUISE TO MANILA — SEARCHING FOR THE ENEMY 
— THRILLING SAIL PAST THE BATTERIES AND OVER 
THE MINES — ADVANCING TO THE BATTLE. 

Coiiiniodore Dewey's Squadron — Its Guiis and Armor — Dewey's Service 
in the Navy — Admiral Porter's Tribute — Proclamation of the Gov- 
ernor-General of the Philippines — Bombastic Encourairement — 
Dewey's Cruise to Manila — Rolling in the China Sea — " Prepare for 
Action" — Practice on the Way — Stripping the Ships — All Unneces- 
sary Articles Thrown Overboard — A Look into Subig Bay — Move- 
ments of the Spanish Admiral — Why He Retired to Manila — The 
United States Squadron Holds a Council of War — Dewey Announces 
His Purpose to Enter IManila Harbor that Night — Engines Started 
Again — ]\Ien Quietly Sent to Their Guns- In Sight of the Forts — 
Increasing the Speed — Silent and Alert — Discovered at Last — A 
Flash of Light, a Pocket, and then the Boom of a Gun — Dewey's 
Orders — Silencing a Battery — Silently Onward — Breakfast at the 
Guns — The ^lorning Breaks over .Manila — Tl)e Enemy Sighted at 
Cavite — Heading for Battle — The Spanisli Squadron — Its Advantage. 

TlIK United States squadron wliicli sailed out of ^lirs 
Bay on April 27tli was not made up of " ironclads " 
or armored battleships. They were the four pro- 
tected cruisers, Olympia, Baltimore, Boston, and Raleigh, and 
the two g-unl)oats, Concord and Petrel. The Ohjmpia, which 
was the flacship, Captain C. V. Gridley commandinc;, carried 
ten rapid-fire 5-incli guns and four 8-incli guns mounted 
in harhette turrets, with armor of four inches in average 
thickness. This was about all the armor there was in the 
whole squadron. Tn her secondary battery were fourteen 
fi-pounders, seven 1-pounders, four (iatling>, and one field 
gun. riic lialtinwre. Captain N. M. Dy(M' connnanding, 
had four S-inch and six G-incli rifles, and four (»-pounders, 
with several smaller rapid-fire guns. The Boston, Captain 
Frank AVildes commanding, carried two 8-inch and six G-incli 
rifles, ami two O-pounders, with other smaller guns. The 
Ealeigh, Captain J. B. Coughlan commanding, had one 0- 

(343) 



344 THE SQUADRON AND ITS COMMODORE 

inch and ten rapid-fire 5 -inch ginis and eight 6-poiinders. 
The combined tonnage of the last three cruisers is less than 
that of the battleshi]) loiva. The tonnage of the (Jlympia, 
the largest and strongest of the squadron, is about one-half 
that of the loiva. 

The 1,700-ton gunboat. Concord, carried six 6-inch rifles 
and two 6-pounders; the 900-ton gunboat Petrel carried four 
0-inch guns. The combined tonnage of these boats was 19,- 
100. Accompanying the squadron was the revenue cutter 
Hugh McCulloch, which had just arrived at Hongkong, 
having been ordered by the Secretary of the Treasury to re- 
port to (^ommodore Dewey as a dispatch vessel. She carried 
four light pieces. Two merchant steamers, the Nanshan 
laden with 3,000 tons of Cardiff coal, and the Zafiro, carry- 
ing 7,000 tons of similar coal, having been purchased by the 
Commodore, went with the squadron, regarded merely as 
transports owned by the United States. It should be remem- 
bered that all these steps, including the concentration of these 
vessels at Hongkong, had taken place in the interval follow- 
ing the destruction of the Maine, and is a clear indication of 
the expectation of war which prevailed at Washington, and 
also of the expectation that the Philippines would figure in 
the conflict which had become inevitable. It was due to the 
prudent foresight of the authorities at Washington, seconded 
l)y the prompt and energetic action of Commodore Dewey in 
the Orient, that he was able to sail out of Chinese waters 
within a week after war was opened. 

Commodore George Dewey was a good type of the Amer- 
ican naval oflieer. He had been faithfully performing the 
tasks allotted to him for thirty years and the time of his re- 
tirement was approaching. In person he is slightly built, of 
medium height, with finely-chiseled face, firmly-set lips, and 
clear eyes. He was known as a man quiet in manner, sparing 
and incisive in speech, and decisive in action. He was just 
beginning his naval career at the time of the Civil War, and 
at the time of the capture of >s'ew Orleans was a lieutenant on 



A BOMBASTIC PROCLAMATION 346 

the old M i^sissl jipi, wliicli. wlicii li'viiiu to I'liii tlic Icittcrics 
of Port Ilnd-ioii ill Miircli, 1S(;:;, r;iii ai;rouiitl. Tlic ciiciny 
liad lici' in raiitii' and poured shells into her hull till her eoni- 
inandei", secnnii- she could not he saved, ordered her tired. 
('ai)tain Smith and Lieutenant Dewey were the last to leave 
the shi]). "it is in sneh tryiue; moments," said Admiral 
Porter in his official rejxirt, " that men show of what metal 
they are made, and in this in-tanee the metal was of the best." 

When, late in 18'JT, changes were made in the command 
of some of the squadrons. Commodore Dewey did not wish 
to go to the Orient. lie mnch preferred a station where there 
would he fighting if war came, for no one then thought of 
active hostilities in the East." Tie was, nevertheless, assigned 
to the Asiatic squadron and raised his flag on the Ohjmpia on 
January 3, 1898. 

AVhen information that Commodore Dewey would pro- 
ceed to threaten the Philip])ines reached ]\Ianila, the Spanish 
Oovernor-Oeneral issued several proclamations, one of which 
included the following: 

"The American people, composed of all the social excresences, have 
exhausted our patience and provoked war with perfidious machinations, 
acts of treacherj- and outrasj;es against the law of nations and international 
conventions. 

"A sfpiadron manned by foreit^ners and possessiiiLr iieitiicr instructions 
nor discipline is preparing: to come to tliis arcliipelago willi tlie riitlianly 
intention of robbing us of ail tiiat means life, honor, and liberty. 

" The aggressors shall not profane the tombs of your fatliers. shall not 
gratify their lustful passions at the cost of your wives and daughters, shall 
not cover j'ou with dishonor, shall not appropriate tlie property your 
industry has accumulated as provision against old age, and shall not perpe- 
trate any of the crimes inspired by their wickedness and covelousness, 
because your valor and patriotism will suffice to punish tliis miserable 
people, that, claiming to be civilized and cultivated, have exterminated the 
unhappy natives of North xVnierica instead of bringing them to a life of 
civilization and progress." 

Owing to the neeessitv of eeonoiuy in the use of eoal as 
well as the danger of (hM\ing into the i-ather heavy sea that 
was running, a speed of ahout eight knots was maintained in 
making the trip to the Philip]»in(^s. Kv(mi at this slow speed 



346 PREPARED FOR ACTION 

the heavily-laden Nanshan and Zajiro made a decidedly wet 
vovage. and the Petrel pitched and rolled deeply. Gnn-drills 
and other exercises kept the othcers and men occupied con- 
tinuously during this run. and from the time the squadron 
left Mirs J]ay until it came into the presence of the enemy 
there was not an hour in which preparations for battle were 
not under way. 

When the tired ship's company had finished its day's work 
on Wednesday, the lirst day out, and the Olipnpia had settled 
down to the quiet of the first wattdi, the stillness was broken 
with abrn])t harshness by the blare of the bugle, and red and 
while lights flashed up and down tlu masts of all the ships in 
response to the Commodore's peremptory signal : " Prepare 
for action." 

In two minutes each vessel was alive with men, who, but a 
moment before, had been soundly asleep, or were supposed to 
be. From the bridge of the flagship sharply-uttered orders 
proceeded, and in seven minutes the executive officer was able 
to re])ort to (Vq)tain Clridley: 

• " The ship is ready for action, sir." 

Looking back along the line of ships dimly visible in the 
moonlight it was easy to see that every one of them were 
stripped for battle, and the Commodore Avas naturally greatly 
pleased with the (piick and thorough response to his signal, 
for he knew that such readiness was very soon to be in serious 
demand, lie was preparing for the first naval battle of the 
new navy of the United States. 

Search-light and night-signal exercise took place during a 
large ]iart of the first watch on Thursday night, and the pro- 
gress made in working both the lights and the signals was very 
satisfactory^ Friday was passed without incident, except that 
the weather became very warm and muggy, and the work of 
the men below deck was exhausting, but in spite of the heat 
and the heavy sea the slii])s kept their positions with precision. 

The island of Luzon was sighted early Saturday morning, 
and being, as was supposed, in close proximity to the enemy. 



L()()KIX(; KOK THK SPANISH .\i>.mii;al 34? 

the whole squadron be{j;au its iiiial jn-cpai-atioii for battle. 
Chain-cables were coiled around the amiiiniiition hoists to give 
tlieni further protection. 2sets of tough ^lanila rope were 
stretched beneath all the boats and drawn across the ward- 
roctni bulkheads ti> pi'otect the woodwork, flying' splinters 
iVdUi wliicli, when struck b_v shot <tr shell, might become 
deadly missiles. All nnnecessary material was thrown over- 
buard and went swimnung off on the tossing China Sea. 

When a few miles distant from Subig Bay, a rather deep 
opening in the bold and rugged coast, about forty miles north 
of ]\Ianila, the Boston and the Concord were sent ahead to 
learn whether any ])art of the Spanish scjnadron was hidden 
there. Later, they were reinforced by the BaUlmore, the 
three vessels moving at a speed of about fifteen knots, while 
the other three remained with the transports and steamed at 
oidy six knots. In the afternoon the three scouting vessels 
returned, having e.\plore(l Subig Bay without finding any 
craft there except a few snnill sloops and schooners which 
were overhauled, but not otherwise disturbed. 

It had been reported from ^lainla several days before 
Dewey sailed that Montojo, the Spanish xVdmiral, had taken 
his fleet to Subig Bay and assumed a position favorable for 
giving the Americans a warm welcome, and while the Com- 
modore was taking no Spanish rejxjrts for granted, he took the 
precaution to look in. The bay is one of the best harbors on 
the coast, being used by steamers in the typhoon season in 
preference to ^Manila Bay. The latter is surrounded chieHy 
1)y lowlands, so that the fury of the st(^rm is not dinnnishe<l 
by the surroundings, while Subig Bay is am))ly protected by 
the Bataan ^Mountains on the east and a coast range on the 
west. About half way up the bay is (iramle Island, com- 
manding both sides of the entrance, which, at this point, is 
but about two miles wide, and if tlie island wei-e properly 
fortified it would be an absolute protection to the city ui 
Suliig. a place of about 12,00u iiilialiitaiil> at tlie head of the 
bay. Montojo went to the bay at about the time "f the 



348 



MONTOJO PUTS BACK TO MANILA 



declaration of war, iiiteiiding to fortify Grande Island, either 
to prevent Dewey from using it as a base in case he did not 




MAP OP MANILA AND SURROrXDING COUNTRY, SH0^^TNG LINE OF 
BLOCKHOUSES. 



enter Manila Bay, or to be used by the Spanish in case Manila 
became too unpleasant for them. Bnt he concluded that he 
conld not fortify the place in less than a month, and having 
heard that Dewey had sailed he put back to Manila on the 
30th, or the day Dewey's fleet came in sight of the island. 

AVhen the scouting vessels returned, reporting no enemy 
at Subig and none in sight along the coast, Commodore Dewey 
came to the conclusion that the Spanish admiral had with- 



THK SILKNT A IMMIOACll it > MANll.A ]{AV iU!) 

drawn to .Manila willi tlic inifiilinn df lidlding a<;'ainst him the 
iiKHitli ol' tlic liarlt(-»r, wliirli is alxtut ten iiiilos wide, between 
llaiikiiii; diaiiis of low nioimtains that start upward from the 
water's edge, each ])oint being occnpied by a fort. Dividing' 
this entranee inio two eiiannels are two islands, Corregidor 
and Caihdlo, hotli fortified, and lying so far to the north that 
the northern ehannel is narrow, while between the islands and 
the forts on the southern point there is a sweep of water over 
eight miles wide. The usual course for vessels going and 
coming from ( 'liinese ports is through the narrow channel, 
which Dewey knew was well mined, and while the other chan- 
nel was supposed to be mined, it presented less dangers because 
of its width and, though there were some shallows, dec^p water 
could be followed by an experienced navigator. 

Dewey halted his squadron a short distance from Subig 
Bay, and, while the vessels lay motionless on the calm sea, the 
commanding officers were summoned over to the flagship for 
instructions. He told his astonished captains that he intended 
to enler JManila Ba}' that night in spite of the forts and in spite 
of the mines. He felt confident that the Spaniards would not 
expect him to make such a move, and, therefore, he was re- 
solved to make it. He stated the details of his plans and gave 
his directions. The officers went back to their ships, the 
engines were started again, and the squadron idled along at a 
speed of about four knots, not wishing to appear at the en- 
trance of ^lanila Bay too early. The moon had risen, and, 
although it was occasionally obscured by light clouds, the 
night was not one in which a s(piadron ought to have been 
able to run through a well-defended channel without drawing 
upon itself a hot fire. Something of the kind was expected, 
and at a quarter to ten o'clock, as the ships drifted cpiietly 
along, the men w(>re sent to tlieii- guns, not by the usual l)ugle 
call, but l)y a whispered W(^rd of mouth. 

Every man was ready and the final steps of battle clearing 
were coiiq)lct('d in silence in a very few minutes — and they 
were dramatic moments. Ofi" to port could be seen the sullen 



350 THE ALARM — THE FIRST SHOT 

" loom of the land,'' where, for all tliey knew, the enemy was 
already watching their approach, and were preparing their 
guns for a terrific fire at the right moment. Closer and closer 
they crept, a long line of dark hulks with the transports in the 
rear. Not a light was permitted to show in any vessel except 
one at the very stern, wliicli was necessary as a guide to the 
following ship, and these lights were shaded on each side. 

As they approached the entrance and the first fort, the 
speed was increased to eight knots, and quietly the line slipped 
past the batteries on the north point of the entrance without 
any evidence that the enemy had discovered them. Every 
man was silent, but on the alert; every eye was fixed on the 
somber forts; every nerve was strained; every pulse beat 
strongly. Then Corregidor Island came abeam to port and 
every glass was turned on its frowning point. But not until 
the long line had swung into the broad channel — the Boca 
Grande as it is called — did the outlooks of C^orregidor catch 
sight of it. A little flame flared up from the smoke-stack of 
the McCuUoch. In a moment a bright light flashed up in the 
center of the island, and it was answered by a similar one on 
the north shore. Then a rather feeble rocket staggered aloft 
over Corregidor, and the American sailors standing by their 
guns felt sure every moment that the batteries would open. 
But they did not. The Spaniards were evidently taken by 
surprise. J^o one had been at the guns, and it took time to 
get the batteries ready for action. On went the American 
squadron deeper and deeper into the bay. And not until the 
leaders of the squadron had passed out of easy range did a gun 
greet the long line of silent ships. 

It w^as nearly half-past eleven when there was a bright 
flash from the batteries off to port, the boom of a heavy gun, 
and the vindictive whistle of a shot far overhead. It came 
from a battery too far astei'n to enable the leaders to return 
the fire to advantage, but the Commodore was somewhat un- 
easy about the three non-combatant ships in the rear. He, 
therefore, signaled to the Hugh McCuJIoch to lead the trans- 



THK BATTERIES SILKNC'ED 351 

ports lip to a position whore tliev would be protected by tlie 
cruisers and less exposed to attack. As the II ugh MrC ulloch 
was coiuinii' up she siiiualcil ihat her cliict' engineer had been 
taken with a stroke of heat jirostration and medical consulta- 
tion was asked for. lie died in twenty minutes of heart fail- 
ure, due, perhai)s, to the strain oi' tlio~e thrilling moments, 
during which all stood silent in tlie constant expectation of an 
exj)loding mine or a hail of shell from the shore. But the 
minutes dragii'cd by and the shi])s crept onward. 

The liolcKj]}, which was steaming along third in line, tired 
the first reply to the shot from the batteries from a o-iuch gun, 
and presei.tly the Boston followtnl suit. Another shot flew 
from the batteries, and, as the Commodore's ships were on the 
close lookout for the flash to obtain an idea of where to aim, 
the Concord placed a G-inch shell so exactly over the spot 
where the flash had occurred that an exclamation of admira- 
tion was heard on all sides. It was a marvelous shot. 
Dewey's sailors did not know it then, but that shot disabled 
the gun and killed nearly every man in the group of S])aniards 
about it. 

There were uo more shots tired from the shore, and as the 
Commodore did not wish to waste time on the batteries or to 
make any more "' fu>s " than necessary in a}iproaching Ma- 
nila, where he now su]>]X)sed the S]iauis]i fleet must be, the 
squa<h'on kept (»n its silent conrsc. Speed \va> reiluced to less 
than three knots, as there was no haste. The Commodore 
wished to ariive off Manila at the first break of dawn, but no 
earlier. I'he men lay down beside their guns to get what 
sleep they cctuld, ]»ut the time was not conducive to sleep, and 
the strictest lookout was kept for the enemy's shij)s and tor- 
pedo boats. 

\\ t'dur o'(doek cotTee and liai-dtack were served out to the 
men, and the officers were glad to get the same frugal refresh- 
ments. Xo one felt like sitting down to a formal bn^akfast. 
The lights of "Manila had long been in sight. The dawn of 

that Sunday morning began at half-past four when the scpiad- 
22 



352 THE SQUADRON SIGHTED 

roll was al)Oiit six miles from the city, lying on tlie low alluvial 
plains which form a sort of huge doormat to the main range of 
mountains running along the eastern coast of Luzon. As 
the sun came up exactly behind the city, the shadow cast by 
the land obscured the harbor foreground, but finally the city 
became clearer, looking like a white chalk-line on the low 
shore, and its domes began to glisten against the mountains 
fifteen miles beyond. Then the presence of a group of vessels 
in the foi-eground could be made out, but before five o'clock it 
could be seen that tliey were nothing but merchant sliips. 
AVhere was the enemy ? 

The cruisers were creeping up in close battle order, the 
flagship leading, followed by the BaUimo7'e, the BalcigJi, the 
Pcirel, the Concord, and the Boston. They had passed up the 
broad bay to the northward of Manila, and had turned toward 
the south, which position they were holding when the Spanish 
squadron was lighted in the little bay of Cavite, under the 
guns of the forts of that arsenal, the larger sliips lying outside 
the breakwater, while inside could be seen the smaller gun- 
boats. The enemy was found and the American squadron 
M'as holding a course tlirectly towards him. It was about five 
o'clock. 

The vessels under Admiral Montojo's command consisted 
of the cruiser Beina Christina, the flagship, 3,500 tons, and 
with a battery of six 6.2-incli, two 2.T-inch, six 6-pounders, 
an<l six 3-pounder rapid-fire guns; the Cast ilia, 3,300 tons, 
with a battery of four 5.6-inch, two 4.7-incli, two 3.3-inch, 
fonr 2.!»-inch, and eight G-pounder rapid-fire guns; the Isla 
(le Cnl/a and IsJa de Luzon, 1,030 tons each, with batteries of 
four 4.7-inch, four 6-pounders, and two 3-pounder ra]>id-fire 
guns; the Bon Antonio de VJloa and Bon Juan dc Austria, 
1,130 tons each, with batteries of four 4.7-incli, two 2.7-inch, 
and two 3-pounder ra]nd-fire guns; the General Lezo and 
Alareiues del Buero, 521 and 500 tons respectively, wnth bat- 
teries of small rapid-fire guns. The Yelasco was also iu port, 
but was undergoing repairs and her guns were mounted on 



THE ENEMY S ADVANTA(JE '.i')'.] 

cartlnvorks (ni the slioi-e. There wei-e nlsu I'mir Im-pedu bcjiit;? 
and two tiiio traiisj)orts, the Maiiihi and the Ishi de Min- 
danao. 

While the Spanish ships cxcopdod tliose of ( 'onninMhu-e 
Dewey's attaeking- squadivjn in nnndier and in the nninher of 
its men, tliey were less in aggregate tdimage. Neither were 
they as well j)roteeted as Dewey's shi))s, altliongh their gnns 
conld readily pierce the steel sides of the American cruisers if 
well aimed. If the Spanish squadron had been compelled to 
come out in the open sea and fight it would have had little 
chance even in the hands of experienced gunners. But what 
gaA'e the Spaniards an equalizing, if not a superior, advantage 
was the position they held under the protection of the shore 
batteries. Experts have estiiiiateil that one good gun mounted 
on shore is worth several aboard ship, having a fixed platform, 
and, therefore, able to lire with greater accuracy. Another 
advantage the enemy had was the perfect knowledge of the 
harbor and the exact distance of our ships at all times. The 
American fleet was compelled to maneuver in strange waters 
with a Spanish chart which they dared not trust. 



CHAPTER XXXIIT 

THE NAVAL BATTLE OF MANILA BAY — A TERRIBLE STORM 
OF SHOT AND SHELL— SCENES OF BLOOD AND CARNAGE 
— ANNIHILATION OF THE SPANISH FLEET — COMMODORE 
DEWEY'S GREAT VICTORY. 

Commodore Dewey's Squadron in Battle Array — Advancing Silently 
towards the Eneni}' — Mines Exploded in Front of the Olymfia — 
"Remember the Maine!" — The Time for Action Comes — Torpedo 
Launches Venture an Attack — Rapid Guns — The Rdna Christina At 
tacks the Olympia — Meets with a Terrible Fire — Destructive Shot of 
the B(M(>n — Retiring for Breakfast — Taking Account of Damages — 
The Fury of the Second Attack — Spaniards Fighting Desperately — 
Defiant Gunners Swallowed Up in the Bloody Water — Escape of the 
Spanish Admiral — A Gruesome Sight — Ships Burnt, Sunk, and De- 
serted — Surrender of the Fort — Care of the Wounded — Experiences 
on the American Ships — Cutting the Cable — Commodore Dewey's 
Modest Despatches. 



M 



AXIL A Bay extends in a northeasterly direction, its 
greatest length being some thirty-tive miles and its 
circumference about one hundred and twenty. The 
city of Manila lies to the extreme east side on both banks of 
the muddy Pasig River. On the south bank is the old city 
surrounded by a moat and massive walls, constructed in the 
sixteenth century and crowned by some antiquated guns and 
a few modern and high-power guns recently added. Xew 
Manila on the north bank is entirely defenseless. Eight miles 
distant and on the southern shore of the bay is Cavite, having 
a small bay of its own, formed by a projecting neck of land. 
This was Avell fortified by large guns and contained an arsenal 
and slips for large vessels. Under these heavy guns and 
drawn up in fair order for defense were the fourteen ships of 
the enemy, and apparently they had been taken by surprise, 
for they were in no ]iosition to maneuver as a squadron; in- 
deed, some were making hurried efforts to get up steam. 





f 



EA(iKK FOK TIIK I'KAV 



357 




/y^^^^^^^M <^"i<^ II<iilii>r\ \ 
"'^■'^^- y/^ 3IANlLAr- -,^ , 

of Manila ^"•'i^m' 



JVIAXILA BAY 



S CAtE or MIUE S 

r' 6 iF Ts 



.,^'^>- 



As the Oh/nipid, t\)lln\vt'<l l.y tlu- lidllimore, llnU'ujh. 
Pehrl, Couconl, niul lloshni in \\w ••nU'i- luuiicd, stftmied 
towards the enemy, every man was ..u the al.rt. Trim aii.l 
fresh-looking' in tlu'ir paint, .-ay with ihitterin- signals, they 
presented a real holiday aspec t as they eruised along, hut clus- 
tered ahout the decks at their guns, stripped for hot work and 
impatient for the 
signal w h i c h 
would mean a 
plunge into an ex- 
perience entirely 
novel, were eager, 
gallant men, while 
down out of sight 
in the howels of 
the ships at the 
amniTmition hoists 

, 11-1 MAP OF THE BAY AND nARBOK OF MANIAL. 

and at the l)Oilers 

were others equally eager Avho could not see what was going 
on outside but felt that every moment they might hear the 
boom of a gun and the rattle of projectiles. On the bridge 
were the commanding officers; in their proper stations were 
the signal officers, the range-finders, the navigators, all per- 
forming duties of the utmost importance upon a modern fight- 
ing ship. 

At intervals the range was called out. Xearer and nearer 
they were approaching the enemy. Vet the minutes, minutes 
of fearful tension, i)asse(l and not a sound liroke the stillness 
of that Sal)l>ath morn who-r Ihuiiiug light was breaking over 
the mountains back of ^lanila. 

Commodore Dewey's orders were to hokl the tire till an 
effective range had been reached. He did not propose to 
waste any more powder than necessary. On they went, the 
transports holding off out of range and their crews crowdmg 
the decks to watch the spectacle. 

At 5 :15, when about five miles from the Spanish tleet and 



358 THE BATTLE CRY 

about four miles from tlie Old Manila guns, two batteries 
from the former and three from the latter opened lire. But 
it was ill-directed. !Shot followed shot, churning up the 
water about (Commodore Dewey's squadron, on board which, 
as it steamed ahead, all was as silent as if the ships were empty, 
except for the whirr of the blowers and the throb of the en- 
gines and an occasional order. 

At intervals the range-finders exhibited their signal flags, 
and as each range was called the gunners lowered the sight 
bars. The range from C^avite was decreasing fast and the 
shots from its guns and from the Spanish cruisers, which now 
opened fire, began to shriek through the air and lash the water 
about them. Faster and faster they came, when suddenly, 
some distance ahead, a great cohimn of water shot into the 
air, and then another close by. The enemy had fired two 
mines, but tliey were too far away to do any damage, and the 
ships pushed on. " The air seemed full of things," as one of 
the officers expressed it. The heat was intense. Stripped of 
all their clothing except their trousers, the gunners waited 
im]>atient]y at the port guns to line them on the enemy. 

AVhen about tliree miles from (avite, the Olympla began 
to swing her poi't batteries towards the Spanish line, and just 
then a shell burst dire-tly over her. From the boatswain's 
mate at the after a-inch guns came a hoarse cry : '' Remem- 
ber the Maine! " And then the cry arose from the throats 
of every man on the decks. 

The time had come. The gunners had the range. One 
after another the ships followed after the Olympia with their 
port batteries to the enemy. At exactly i ineteen minutes to 
six, or more than twenty minutes after the enemy had opened 
fire. Commodore Dewey, who stood on the bridge closely 
watching events, turned to the captain of his flagship and said : 

" You may fire, Avhen ready, C'aptain Gridley." 

In an instant one of the OJipn jii(i''s 8-inch guns sent a shell 
screeching into ('avite fort three miles awav. Big guns and 
little guns chimed in from all the ships before the roar had 



THE C'EASLESS THUNDER OF CANNON ob'J 

died away. A liailstonu of iron flew at the Spanish ships 
from the rapid-lire guns, while hirge shells dropped upon the 
fort. It Avas one continuous roar. The fire from Cavite and 
the Spanish ships was redoubled. Shot and shells flew all 
aitout, splashed the water about the ships, throwing it over the 
decks and drenching the men. Occasionally, they came 
whistling through the rigging and rattling aliont the sides of 
the vessels. A great cloud of smoke enveloped them, for 
there was very little wind, and signaling became difficult. 
Still the terrific fire was poured into the enemy as the squad- 
ron steamed by. It was a scene of awful magnificence. 

"■ Another unpleasant thing about the Spanish shells," 
said an eye-witness on the Olyinp'ia, " was the way they had 
of coming at us even when they had not been properly aimed. 
Thus it often happciuM] that a projectile which had not only 
fallen short, but which was not even a good line shot, would 
be upset by its impact with the w'ater and would come 
tund)ling end over end, far out of its original direction. And 
how these fellows did roar, jilainly visible if they came any- 
where near us, and as they rose from the water and spun round 
and round, they seemed to be about the size of a barrel, es- 
pecially if an observer ha|)|)en('d to lie close on the line of their 
eccentric flight." l>ut all these flying missiles did no serious 
execution, while our sailors could see through the rifted smoke 
that the broadsides poured by our vessels were making some 
impression on the Spanish ships. 

Having ])assed the line firing the port batteries, the 
(Jh)ihpia came around, taking a course back and closer to the 
enemy's ships, and the others followed, a great roaring, smok- 
ing, flashing, sluicking ]>i-oc('ssion, and, as it passed along, 
the starl)oard hattcries blazed away at the enemy. 

'I lie i'o;ii- of the steady tlnindci- <if cannon was terrible. 
A\ lien tlic fort was ponriiig its tci-rilic tii-c upon onr sliip< it 
looked to tlio-c on the M tC iilhirh iiiid the transports as if onr 
ves.sels could not possibly endure the fusilhide. Heavy sliells 
and solid shot fell about them like hail from the clouds, and 



360 ADMIRAL MONTOJO S GALLANT ASSAULT 

many exploded immediately over the ships. At one time the 
Americans ^^■ere anything bnt snre of victory, and this was 
after the fire had been kept np for an hour. It looked as 
though every gun of the Spanish ships had been turned loose 
on Dewey's cruisers, and the shore line was a veritable blaze 
of fire from the batteries. The din was simply indescribable. 

Tons aud tons of shot continued to fall over our ships, 
whose salvation was the bad marksmanship of the Spaniards. 
Most of their shots were high, falling over into the bay be- 
yond. This was especially noticeable after the American 
ships had swung about and run back nearer to the enemy's 
line. The Spanish gunners did not change their range ex- 
cept on the forts, where the marksmen were better trained, 
or had the advantage of a solid platform and a better defense. 

In the midst of the terrific din a couple of torpedo 
launches were seen leaving the shore and heading for the 
American ships. Quickly the gunners turned their rapid- 
fire guns on them, and in the terrible hail of shot and shell 
which fell u])on them one was immediately sunk and the other 
so badly damaged that she ran on the beach to save herself. 
That was the first and last venture of the Spanish torpedo 
craft. 

Round came the Olympia again, after having passed the 
enemy's line to the eastward, and nearer still toward it the 
procession retraced its course, using again the port batteries. 
Then the licina Christina was seen coming out towards the 
Olympio to give her battle. Admiral J\[ontojo stood on the 
bridge, and his vessel made a gallant assault. But the fire of 
Dewey's squadron was concentrated upon the reckless Span- 
iard. Shells riddled her sides and swept her deck, and just 
as the admiral stepped from the bridge a shot struck it and 
carried it completely overboard. She quickly turned back 
towards the harbor, and, while speeding in, the Boston sent 
an 8-incli shell into her stern, swee])ing through the vessel, 
creating terrible havoc, and setting the ship afire. Many of 
the men were killed. Yet through his glass the American 



( 



A LULL IN THE TEMPEST 361 

commodore could see tlie Spaniijh admiral calmly walking the 
deck while the Spanish sailors wore keeping their guns hot, 
discharging shells which flew all around the Ohjmpia and 
her fdllnwiTs. doing very little damage to the flagshi[), but 
how much to the others he could not tell. 

Round swung the line again, giving the starboard batteries 
another chance, and this time closer still to the enemy. From 
the beginning of the engagement, the three batteries at Ma- 
nila had kept up a continuous fire, which the American squad- 
ron had not returned, paying its attention entirely to the 
Spanish fleet and the Cavite batteries. At this point, Com- 
modore Dewey sent a message to the Governor-General to the 
effect that if the Manila batteries did not cease firing he would 
shell the city. It had the effect of silencing them. Tlie 
Governor-General couhl not fail to appreciate Commodore 
Dewey's advantages in the situation, for, if he withdrew his 
ships from in front of the Cavite batteries to ^lanila, eight 
miles away, he could shell the city without probable inter- 
ference from the Spanish fleet, whose admiral would not dare 
to attack Dewey unaided by the strong forts at Cavite after 
what he had seen of American gunnery. Dewey would 
doubtl'ess have been very glad to have enticed the Spanish 
admiral away from the Cavite forts so that he nu"ght speedily 
finish his shi])s in open battle. This would have left him free 
to return to Cavite and devote his undivided attention to its 
batteries. 

After steaming past the Spanish line the fifth time, Com- 
modore Dewey, at 7 i'';"), gave orders to witlnlraw across the 
bay for breakfast. The men had been fighting for two hours 
on nothing but the coffee and hardtack whicli they had at 4 
o'clock. The commodore also wished to take account of his 
damages and the loss of life. 

When the American '* Jackies " reali/.cd that they were 
being withdrawn from the lii^ht. there was a wail of disap- 
pointment at first, illustrated by the almost tearful appeal of 
one gun captain to Commander Lamberton of the Ohjmpia: 



362 MARVELOUS ESCAPES 

" For God's sake, captain, don't stop now. Let's tinish 
'em up right oft". Damn breakfast ! " 

In passing- the last time by the enemy's line the American 
cruisers had gone within very close range, and while the 
officers could see that they had wrought sad havoc with some 
of the Spanish ships, the batteries and vessels were still firing 
vigorously. One shot passed through the BaUimore, and the 
Boston was hit not far from the water line. Dewey did not 
at this time appreciate how^ nearly he had the enemy whijjped, 
and the Spanish did not realize as yet the straits they were in. 

Seeing the storm of shells striking about the Ohjmpla and 
bursting close aboard the ships of the squadron, the Commo- 
dore had reason to fear that our loss had been heavy. lie 
knew that the Oh/mpia had escajx'd without serious casual- 
tics, but as she had had a dozen hairbreadth misses, it did not 
seem possible that the others had been equally fortunate. On 
the other ships the situation was similarly regarded; indeed, it 
was thought that the Ohjmpia had been seriously damaged 
when she pulled away. 

It was not long before it was discovered that no serious 
harm had been done his ships and not a life had been lost. It 
seemed nothing less than miraculous that they should have 
come out of such a hail of iron so little damaged. 

"When it was found that not a man had been killed, and 
that none of the vessels had been seriously harmed, an old 
gunner on the flagship remarked : '' The Spaniards couldn't 
hit a flock of barns." 

But the lack of precision in the aim of the Spaniards w^as 
not more remarkable than the small damage done when their 
shots did hit, for in such a rain of iron some could not fail to 
strike, even if the aim had been poor or at random. The 
escapes were wonderful. The shell which pierced the Boston 
went crashing into the wardroom and exploded within five 
feet of Paymaster ]\r;irtiu. He was not hit, though it set fire 
to the hx'kers and did considerable damage hefore the fire was 
extinguished. The fragments of a single shell struck within 



THE SPANIARDS ENCOURAGED 363 

;i radius of nftooii feet of ( '(»iiiiiiinlnrc I )c\\cy. An aniioi'- 
picreiiig projectik' struck a box of ;>-i)ouii(lcr auiniuiiition on 
board the Balihnore, ('xi)lo(lo(l it, and the whole discharge 
passed between two groups of men so near togetlier that it was 
(liliicult to ^cc liow all cscajjed, and vet but a half dozen were 
wounded and that oidv slightly. 

The Spaniards knowing that the BnUhnorc and Boston 
had been liit, and tliiiddng that all their tiring must have done 
some damage, when they saw the American ships draw away 
concluded that they had been obliged to give up the attack. 
They set up a cheer, and the story at once went to ^fanila and 
from there to Madrid that the American scpiadron had at- 
tacked, partially destroying the Spanish fleet, and had flnally 
been obliged to retreat. But the American sailors were only 
resting on their guns and taking a little well-earned breakfast; 
and as they did so tlie damage they had done ihc enemy be- 
gan to ap]iear. Tlu" Rcina Christina was seen to be burning 
fiercely and two of the other ships were on fire. 

In tolling his own story afterwards. Admiral Montojo 
said: " 1 observed fire on my ship forward and our steering 
gear was damaged, rendering the vessel unmanageable. We 
were subjected to a terrific hail of shell and shot. The en- 
gines were struck and we estimated that we had seventy hits 
about our hull and sui)erstructure. The boilers were not hit, 
but the pipe t(» the condenser was desti-oye(l. A few mo- 
ments later, 1 oiiserved tliat the after ].art of the -hip was on 
fire. A shell from an American slii|» had jteiietrated and 
burst with deadly effect, killing many of our men. ^fy flag 
lieutenant said to me: ' The ship is in flames. It is impos- 
sible to stay on the Christina any longer.' He signaled to 
the gunboat /s/a de Cvha, and I and my statf were transferre.l 
to iier and my flag was hoisted. jJefore leaving the Christina 
my flag was hanle<l down. :My flagshi)) was now a mass of 
flames. T ordere(l away all the boat< [ conld to save the crew. 
^Umy of the men jumped ovei-boai-d without (dofhini.-; and 
succeeded in reaching the shore several hundred vards awav." 



364 CHEERING THE BALTIMORE 

As the Americans looked through their glasses they could 
see that the enemy's fleet was done for. In a little time the 
Reina Christina was a mass of flames, and the CastiUa and 
the Don Antonio del IJlloa were bnrning fiercely. It wonld 
be an easy matter to rush in and finish the fleet, bnt the Cavite 
fortress remained to be silenced, and there was no telling what 
its guns might do at close range, (^ommodore Dewey de- 
cided to run in and do his worst. AVhat followed is thus con- 
cisely told in his official report : 

"At 11.16 I returned to the attack. By this time the Spanish flagship 
and almost all the Spanish fleet were in flames. At 12.30 the squadron 
ceased firing, the batteries being silenced, and the ships sunk, burned, and 
deserted." 

This modest statement gives a very inadequate idea of the 
fury of that final attack. This time the Baltimore, which the 
enemy supposed had been disabled, took the lead, followed by 
the Olympia. The Baltimore had orders to attack the shore 
batteries furiously, and hers was one of the most daring deeds 
gf tlie engagement. The batteries mounted 10-inch guns, a 
shot from one of which, had it struck her, might have sunk her 
innnediately. But, using the lead for soundings, she dashed in 
at high speed until she was close under the blaze of the guns on 
shore, when she swung around and let them have her big shells 
with all the fury they were capable of. She was the admira- 
tion of the whole fleet. Cheer after cheer went up from the 
Olympiads men, who had borne the brunt of the first battle. 

The other ships turned their rajnd-fire guns upon the 
S]-)anish fleet, particularly the Isia de Cuba, to which the ad- 
miral had transferred his flag. The Don Antonio del Ulloa 
made a magniflcent show of desperate bravery. When her 
commander found that she was so torn by American shells 
and swe]')t by fire that he could not keep her afloat, he nailed 
her colors to the mast and she sank with all hands fighting to 
the last. The Isla de Culm was soon on fire, but her men 
were fighting with desperation. This soon left the Don Juan 
de Austria practically to make the fight alone, the gunboats 



SPANISH SHIPS ABANDONED 367 

Loiiig alrciuly disabled or withdrawn to tlie little harbor be- 
hind the fort. For a few niiniitos this cruiser received the 
hail of Dewey's rapid-tire guns, when su<ldcnly a shell struck 
her and exploded in her forward magazine. Like a fan, 
splinters, men, guns, parts of tlie superstructure, and thou- 
sands of movable things shot high into the air. The next mo- 
ment the Don Juan de Auslrin was siidving. Still the men 
aft worked their guns, and as the shi]) sank they went down in 
a frenzy of impotent rage, shrieking defiance as the blood- 
stained water closed over them, and still the American ships 
relentlessly advanced. 

The I si a dc Cuba sought refuge behind the pier at Cavite, 
where, recognizing the futility of fighting any more, Admiral 
Montojo prej)ared to disend^ark, and he gave orders for the 
evacuation of the remainder of the ships. His last signal to 
the captaius of his fleet was, " Scuttle and abandon your 
ships." Then he escaped in a small boat into Bakor Bay, 
and finally to Manila. The American vessels closed in and 
rained a deadly fire upon the forts, and at 12.15 the Spanish 
flag was hauled down and a white flag went up, amid great 
cheering from the decks of the American vessels. 

One guidxiat was sunk a1 the end of the engagement. Her 
crew had left her Avitli her colors flying and she went down 
thus — a very impressive picture. 

It was a gruesome sight whicdi the bay presented. The 
smoking hulks of the Spanish vessels wdiich had not fully 
sunk were seen to be strewn with corpses and wounded men, 
and bodies were floating about in the water. 

At 12 :."»() the s(|uadi'on rcturncMl and anclioivil off Manila, 
the Pi'lrcl being h'ft bchiiul to coniiilctc tlic (h'sti-)i<-f ion of 
the snialh'r vcs>cls, which had iiin in behind the })oiut of 
Cavite. 'ibis duty was pei'foi'iiied in the most expeditious 
and com]ilete manner. There was plenty of material for dis- 
cussion among the gallant sailors of Commodore Dewey's 
squadron that night. They had experienced their flrst battle, 
the first battle of the new navy, 'i'liey realized, as only men 



3G8 BRAVERY ON BOTH SIDES 

after such a battle can, the dangers from which they had es- 
caped unscathed. Even when no shots entered the ships the 
experiences were anything but pleasant. The concussion of 
the big guns when fired across the deck made havoc with the 
breakables on board. " Bookshelves were torn out/' said one 
officer in speaking of his room, " and everything — clothes, 
electric fans, books, tobacco, curios, and the rest — was on the 
floor in one mass." 

An American officer, writing home a few days later, said : 
" I have often wondered, as I dare say everyone has, how 
people in a scrap would feel and behave; have wondered 
whether calm, deliberate action would be possible to a tender- 
foot. Personally, I sincerely hope I have seen my last, as 
well as my first, battle. All the same, I was delighted to see 
that, so far from being rattled or excited, we seemed to do 
what was to be done as deliberately as on parade. I have 
more respect for the Spaniards than ever before. Their fight- 
ing their ships as long as they did in the condition in which 
they were is wonderful. I said as much to one of them in a 
party on board yesterday. He replied, with a bow : 

" ' AVe but did, or tried to do, what you did; we did our 
duty.' " 

Early the next morning the squadron returned to Cavite 
to take possession, but when the officers, sent in on the Petrel, 
approached the shore, they were surprised to find the 
arsenal still occupied by a force of Spaniards with Mauser 
rifles. As the white flag had been hoisted the day before, 
Commander Lamberton of the OJympia, who had been sent 
ashore to represent the Commodore, could not understand 
what the Spaniards intended to do. On landing he was met 
by Captain Sostoa of the Spanish navy and they went to the 
arsenal hcadriuarters, where they were at once surrounded by 
an armed guard. AY hen asked why men were under arms 
when they had surrendered the day before. Captain Sostoa 
replied that they had not surrendered, but had merely hoisted 
the Avhite flag to enable the women and children to repair to 



SURRENDER OF THE ARSENAL 360 

places of safety. Thoro \vas some fui-tlicr parley, ami tiiially 
('oininaiulei' I.aiiilierton said that tliey were imt tliere to dis- 
cuss past events, hiit to take possession of the arsenal, and if 
all the Spaniards there did not surrender their guns and per- 
sons as prisoners of war the American ships wonld open fire. 

The Spanish ca])tain asked for more time, and finally 
Commandei- l.and)erton said that he would izivv them two 
hours, and if the white flag was not hoisted over the arsenal 
hy noon fire would l)e reopen(Ml without any more parley. He 
then returned to report to the ( 'ommodore. While tliey 
waited the crews from the ships rowed about the wn'ecks and 
observed the destruction they had made. But the Spaniards 
wished to parley further, and in a lirtl(^ while army officers 
came out to the tlagshij) and said that the navy would sur- 
render, but the army could not. 'i'licy were told that they 
must or take the consecpiences, and a general recall was 
sounded for the men off in the boats. The Oh/mpia offered 
the Spanish officers coal for their launch to take them back, 
and while they stood on (hn-k they were given an object lesson. 
A small steamship was reported leaving Cavite for ]\ranila. 
'' Give her a shot," was the order to the ()hjtnpi(i''s gunners, 
and in less than a half-minute a shot was tossed across her 
bows. She did not stop, but another caught the range ex- 
actly and she was at once beached. 

At (|uarter to eleven th(> white flag was hoisted on the 
arsenal, but when a landing ))arty was sent to take possession 
in the afternoon they found that every seaman had marched 
off to Manila, taking his Mauser rifle with liini. As they had 
been announcing that th(> Americans would kill everyone in 
Cavite, the landing ])arty was met by a long jirocession of 
priests and Sisters of ^lercv, beguing them not to injure the 
^voulld(•<l men in the hospital. As a matter of fact, the 
Americans had already rescued about 200 Sjianiards and sent 
them ashore, but they had been so misled by the priests and 
friai-s that they expected to he killed. Our men ]iroceeded to 
take care of the wounded, to bui-\- the dead, and to defend 



370 IMPRESSIVE DESPATCHES 

the place from the swarm of native looters that had rushed in 
on learning that the Spanish gnard had withdrawn. The 
same day the Baleigh and the Baltimore went down the bay 
and secured the surrender of the batteries on Corregidor 
Island, paroled the garrison, and destroyed the mines and tor- 
pedoes past which the squadron had had the good fortune to 
sail unharmed. 

Having learned that the Governor of Manila had refused 
to allow the cable company to transmit his message announc- 
ing the result of his visit to Manila, Commodore Dewey sent 
the Zafiro a short distance to cut the cable, which was done, 
thus making the world dependent for several days upon the 
first Spanish report for information as to the situation. On 
Thursday the Hugh McChdJodi sailed for Hongkong, and so 
ended the first chapter of the Manila campaign. 

Commodore Dewey's own modest account of the conflict, 
which he sent to Hongkong on the McCulloch, and which 
arrived in Washington six days after the battle, was as 
follows : 

Manila, May 1st. 
The squadron arrived at Manila at daybreak this morning. Imme- 
diately engaged the enemy and destroyed the following vessels : Reina 
C/iristina. Castilla, Don Antonio de lUloa, Ma de Luzon, Isla de Cuba, 
General Lezo, Marques del Duero, El Oano, Velasco, transport Ma de 
Mindanao, and one other vessel and water battery at Cavite. Squadron is 
uninjured. Only few men were slightly wounded. The only means of tele- 
graphing is to the American consul at Hongkong. I shall communicate 

with him. 

Dewey. 

Cavite, May 4tli. 

I have taken possession of the naval station at Cavite, Philippine 

Islands, and destroyed its fortitications. Have destroyed fortification at 

bay entrance, paroling the garrison. I control the bay completely and can 

take the city at any time. The squadron is in excellent health and spirits. 

The Spanish loss is not fully known, but very heavy ; 150 killed including 

cajitain, on Reina Christina alone. I am assisting in protecting the Spanish 

.sick and wounded. Two hundred and fifty sick and wounded in hospital 

within our lines. Much excitement at Manila. Will protect foreign 

residents. 

Dewey, 



A BATTLE UNSURPASSED ,171 

The orders Avliieli Coimnodore Dewey luul received from 
his governineiit were to destroy the Spaiiisli ileet. He oheyed. 
Seven thousand miles away from a home hase of siij)[)]ies he 
set out calndy to i-uii the gauntlet of mined harbors and hind 
fortifications. His answer to his government's instructions 
was in the brief dispatches above, brief, but as impressive as 
anything in naval history. 

The losses of the Spaniards included ten warships, several 
torpedo boats, two transpoi'ts, the navy yard, and nine l)at- 
teries. About 1,^00 men Avcre killed or wounded, and the 
estimated value of the Spanish i)roperty destroyed or captured 
was $0,000,000. On the American side the total loss was 
eight men slightly wounded, and $5,000 damage to the ships. 

The moral of it is that unskilled bravery is no match for 
bravery mated with skill in the use of the modern machinery 
of war. Civilization has ad\'anced beyond the crude instru- 
ments that in their management demanded nothing so much 
as a strong arm and a l>ra\c hcai't. The modern lighting ma- 
chine requires training and skill. 

Xeithcr squadron contained an armored ship. The Amer- 
ican vessels had their vitals covered by what are known as pro- 
tective decks, while but two of the Spanish ships were so built. 
But for all that they might have riihlled or sunk some of our 
scjuadron; the forts might have done this alone had they been 
able to shoot straight. I'he little Pelrrl, secure in their wild 
inaccuracy, dance(l up to within a tliousand yards of their 
forts. 

Xothing but audacity that was much more than bravado 
could have acconq)lished so uuudi; an audacity born of the 
conviction that they had vessels which were honestly con- 
structed, guns that had been tested in target practice, gunners 
that had become so expert in sub-caliber practice that they 
scarcely e\'er missed fire. The Spanish w(>re ovei-lioni(> l>y 
the torrent of metal whi(di rained down on their slii])s, their 
guns, and their men. They fought desj)erately with juire 
animal courage and sank with their ships rather than surren- 



373 THE EFFECT AND MORAL OF THE VICTORY 

tier tliem. The Spaniards were Avitliout skill, fired in tlie old 
fashion, blazing away with only general aim, while every 
American gunner was an expert sharpshooter, trained b}- tar- 
get practice, and their shots told with terrible effect. 

The international effect of the victory was at once to give 
the United States prestige among the nations of the world as 
a naval power. Its effect in the United States was to give a 
good degree of sober self-confidence as to the result of any 
engagement in American Avaters between the Spanish and 
American fleets. Another Spanish fleet might be more for- 
midable than that at Manila, bnt there would be the same 
difference between the Spanish and the American gunner. 

]S^o wonder the President, without waiting for further 
action, promoted Commodore Dewey to be acting rear ad- 
miral, and Congress promptly complied with the suggestion 
to create him a rear admiral and to extend the nation's thanks. 
Beautiful was the spirit of the comments of brother officers 
upon the valor and glory of the oflicers and crew of the Asiatic 
squadron. Xot the slightest trace of jealousy, naught but joy 
in the result and entire willingness that honor be given to 
those to whom honor is due. As for the carping critics of the 
navy at home, they became as dumb as the Sphinx. 

In tlie combined sagacity and boldness of Commodore 
Dewey this naval engagement was unsurpassed in the naval 
history of the world; in the results achieved, unequaled. 
ISTever before had an entire fleet been destroyed without the 
loss of a ship or even of a single life on the part of the attack- 
ing forces. The silent sail at midnight past the fort which 
was supposed to command the entrance to the bay, the almost 
contemptuous disregard of the mines placed in the harbor for 
its protection, the calm pushing forward after two mines had 
exploded in front of one of the vessels, the silent receiving 
without return the earliest fire of the enemy, the terrible fire 
poured upon the fleet and shore batteries when the Commo- 
dore had reached the point where he could make fire most 
effective, the stopping after two hours of cannonade for break- 



DRAMATIC AND DECISIVE 373 

fast, and taking account of damages, and then the resuniptiuii 
of the hat tie, the sailing closer to the shore by the aid of the 
lead to make the th-e more effective, the l)i'a\c, hut hojxdess, 
resistance of the Spaniards till their every shi[) was aljsoliitely 
destroyed or placed entirely Jiors de conihal, the quick and 
chivalrous attention to the Spanish wounde<l by Commodore 
Dewey as soon as victory was complete, the report wired to 
the government at home as modest as the deed was heroic — 
all combine to make this naval engagement one of the most 
dramatic, as well as one of the most decisive, in the world's 
historv. 



CHAPTER XXXiy 

AWAITING ADMIRAL CERVERA AND HIS SPANISH FLEET — 
ANXIETY FOR THE BATTLESHIP OBEGOJV—C^BY'ERA'S 
UNEXPECTED ARRIVAL AT MARTINIQUE. 

A Period of Uncomfortable Uncertainty — Where would Cervera Appear ? 
— Relative Distances of the Hostile Squadrons — Three Theories as to 
Cervera's Probable Course — Plausibility of the Theory that He Might 
Intercept the Oregon — The Oregon at Rio Janeiro — Captain Clark has 
no Fear of Spanish Fleet — Possibility of a Spanish Attack on Coast 
Cities — General Opinion that Cervera -would Steer for Puerto Rico — 
Admiral Sampson Starts Out to Meet Him — His Formidable Fleet — 
The Anticipated Battle — Days of Anxious Waiting — Strategists all at 
Sea — Renewed Concern for the Oiegon — Strength of the Spanish 
Cruisers — Astonishing Announcement that Cervera had Returned to 
Cadiz — News from London — Spanish Denials Disbelieved — Sudden 
Preparations for Invading Cuba — Cervera Sighted off Martinique — 
Sampson Shells the Forts of San Juan. 

THE month of May, wliioli opened so gloriously for our 
arms in the Orient, proditced a most exciting period 
of nneertainty on this side of the world, where we 
were supposed to be immediately engaged in war. So crush- 
ing was Dewey's ^'ictory that, while hardly a blow had been 
struck in the west, many began to speak of peace, assuming 
th'at Spain could not possibly be so rash as to pursue a warlike 
course with such unfavorable prospects; but, by her naval 
strategy, which consisted of dodging under cover of misleading 
reports, for many days she kept not only our people, but the 
government, in a state of uncertainty, at times bordering upon 
fear, and in the end her maneuvers resulted in a complete 
change of the government's plans for the invasion of Cuba. 

When it was definitely known that the Cape Verde fleet 
under Admiral Cervera had actually sailed on April 29th, Ad- 
miral Sampson's squadron was maintaining without notable 

incidents the Cuban blockade, and Commodore Schley's flying 

(374) 



A DOUBTFUL PROBLEM 375 

squhdron was impatiently awaiting orders, with steam np, at 
Hampton Koads. It was reported that some of the iSpanish 
torpedo craft when sailing out of the Cape Verde harbor had 
taken a northerly dirwtion, ae if bound for the Canaries, while 
the four armored eruisers and three torpedo-boat destroyers had 
taken a westerly direction. A dispatch boat in the service of 
a New York newspaper followed the main fleet for some hours, 
and, when it was seen to continue in a westerly course after 
nightfall, returned to St. Vincent, the information being 
cabled to this country. Apparently, this was the only infor- 
mation the government had of the intended course of the 
Spanish squadron, and the question before the naval strategy 
board at once became: AVhcre will Cervera appear? 

The nearest Spanish port in western watei's was San Juan, 
Puerto Rico, which is 2,300 miles from the Cape Verde 
Islands. It is also about 1,100 miles from Havana, off which 
lay Sampson's squadron, and about 1,300 miles from Hamp- 
ton Roads, where Schley's sailors were pining for Spanish 
targets. It is something over 3,000 miles from St. Vincent 
to important ports on our Atlantic seaboard, and on the other 
hand it is only about 1,600 miles from St. Vincent to the 
eastern point of Brazil, to\\'ards which the battleship Oregon 
and the gunboat Mariella were making their way, convoying 
the unarmed Nidheroy, which had been purchased in Brazil, 
and was to become the cruiser Buffalo. 

To the government and to everyone in the United States 
obliged or disposed to speculate upon what Cervera would do, 
there appeared three c(Uirses, more or less rational, o]ien to 
him. He might adopt the shortest trip, that to the Brazilian 
coast, and attenq)t to take or destroy our battleship and its 
attendants; or he might jiroceed at once to Puerto Rico to re- 
plenish his stock of coal and supplies and lonrn the situation; 
or, he might count wpon our looking for him in these more 
southerly ports, and, tluM-efore, endirace the op|)ortunity to 
take the longer journey to the Xew England coast or to }X)rts 
further south on the Atlantic seaboard. 



376 ANXIETY FOR THE "OREGON" 

All three of these theories had their supporters, but the 
fact that the enemy, if wise, is apt to appear where least ex- 
pected added its share to the spicy uncertainty of the problem. 

Some plausibility was given to the theory that Cervera 
would endeavor to intercept the Oregon and her consorts, be- 
cause he had deferred sailing till a date which would naturally 
be adopted if having in mind the accomplishment of that ob- 
ject. The Oregon, which had left Callao, Peru, on April Ttli, 
had on the 17th arrived at Punta Arenas, the Chilian port in 
the Straits of Magellan, where the JllarieUa was waiting. 
They delayed two days taking on coal and proceeded on their 
way northward. By malting the same speed as on the trip from 
Callao, they would naturally arrive off the easternmost point 
of South America at about the same time that the Cape Verde 
fleet would reach it, if steaming in that direction. The force 
of this conjecture was strengthened on the 30th, or the day 
after Cervera's squadron sailed, by the arrival of the 
Oregon and Martetia at Rio Janeiro. He who studies the map 
will observe that the eastern point of South America, around 
which the American vessels would be compelled to sail, is 
about half-way between Rio Janeiro and the Cape Verde 
Islands, whence Cervera's fleet sailed. 

The government strategists regarded such a Spanish pur- 
pose as a possibility, and when Captain Clark of the Oregon 
reported from Rio Janeiro, he was at once informed that he 
might possibly meet the Spanish squadron unless he took an 
out-of-the-way course. Even then he might be caught, as 
the Spanish cruisers were fast, while the battleship could not 
be expected to make much better than ten knots an hour. But 
Captain Clark was made up of material similar to that in other 
American naval officers. He intimated that he did not wish 
to be hampered by instructions, and added : " I am not afraid 
of the Spauish fleet.'' 

The possibility that Cervera would sail northward and 
suddenly appear at some poorly-defended, yet important, port 
of the Atlantic seaboard, was grounded simply in the belief 



EXPECTATIONS OF A NAVAL BATTLE 377 

that Spain was too crafty to risk her fleet in an encounter with 
the strong squadron Admiral Sampson had in Cuban waters, 
but would confine her hostility to spiteful efiforts to inflict 
damage to American coast cities, withdrawing in time to run 
away from any ships sent northward to attack her fleet, and 
possibly adopting the opportunity to make Havana when the 
blockade force had been weakened by vessels sent to the de- 
fense of the coast. In other words, by such a policy Spain 
might hope to prevent the concentration of our fleet. 

The more general opinion was that Cervera would proceed 
directly to San Juan, Puerto liico, and that locality was 
selected by the strategists of the press for a great naval battle 
about May 9th, for it was calculated that Cervera would re- 
quire that time to nuike the voyage. This opinion was evi- 
dently held by Admiral Sampson, to whom, as commander of 
the United States naval forces, was committed the important 
task of meeting and destroying Spain's fleet, for when informed 
of its departure from St. Vincent, he gathered his larger ves- 
sels at Tvey West to be coaled, and prepared to proceed to 
Puerto Pico. His instructions left him free to use scouts and 
to go in any dirC'Ction in which he had reason to suppose the 
Spanisli fleet lay; if possible, he was to prevent the fleet from 
entering San Juan and departing with fresh supplies, and 
under no circumstances was he to endanger his ships by a fire 
on forts till Cervera's fleet should have been destroyed or cap- 
tured. 

Accordingly, at daybreak on ^\i\y 4th, Admiral Sampson 
left Key "West, sailing eastward with the flagship Xoc l^nrl-, 
llie l)attleships Toira and Tndinna, the two monitors, Auiphi- 
frife and Puritan, the protected cruisers Detroit, Montgomery, 
and MarhJel}ead, and the torpedo lioat Porter, and other 
smaller vessels. Thereupon, the United States waited breath- 
lessly for the great naval Ttattle of the war. Tt w:i> calculated 
that Cervera would arrive near Puerto Pico about the 0th 
and that Admiral Sampson woidd arrive there at about the 
same time. 



37S SAMPSON GOES TO MEET CERVERA 

The Oregon and her consorts left Rio Janeiro on the same 
day Sampson's fleet left Key West, and the opinion was that 
she would not reach the waters of Puerto ]vico for at least 
twelve days, or too late to participate in the great battle, unless 
Cervera went after her. 

Nothing further was heard of the fleets till the 8th, when 
the cruiser Monigomevy, which was acting as a scout for 
Sampson's fleet, put into the port of Cape Haytien, on the 
island of Haiti, sending dispatches to Washington, and receiv- 
ing messages for the admiral. The fleet had been making 
very slow progress, because of the monitors, which, while ex- 
pected to give a good account of themselves in close fighting, 
had small coal capacity, and were being towed by nimbler ves- 
sels, the others accommodating themselves to the reduced 
speed. The date of the anticipated battle was, therefore, post- 
poned; it was then expected that Admiral Sampson's fleet 
would arrive off Puerto Rico by the 11 th, and that the battle 
might take place the following day, but nothing was being 
heard of the whereabouts of the Spanish ships, which were 
already ten days out from St. Vincent. The exciting mys- 
tery was further enhanced by the orders of the ]Sravy Depart- 
ment that nothing concerning the movements of the vessels 
should be given to the public for the time being. 

Two days more passed, and nobody was able to answer the 
question which everyone was asking as to the whereabouts of 
Cervera. The Oregon and her attendants arrived at Bahia, 
Brazil, on the 0th, having seen nothing of the Spaniards. The 
"N'ew England coast became concerned because it was reported 
that a S]ianish fleet had been sighted off ISTova Scotia, heading 
for the shore? of ]\raine. Xey "West became anxious because it 
was reported that Cervera had sailed for the Florida coast. 
There were many re]wrts of battles and of Spanish fleets, not 
all of which could possibly be true, and none of which proved 
to be true. 

Tt was evident that the irovernment was workins: in the 
dark. On the morning of the 10th the ships were all at sea, 



ALL AT SEA :J71» 

and so was our strategic board. As tlic hours passed and noth- 
ing definite was heard of the Cape N'cnh' lU'cl, ilic >iiaiegists 
inclined to the theory that it had gone to intercept the Oregon, 
and at once the news from Brazil was breathlessly awaited, for 
if C'ervera had gone in that direction, he must now be in 
striking distance of our battleship and gunboat. 

The possibilities of such a contest could not but be regarded 
with some concern by our government. It was true that the 
Oregon was one of the most powerful of her class afloat, but 
there were plenty of naval experts in this country and abroad 
who declared that we had no ships in our navy equal in real 
efficiency to the swift armored cruisers of Ccrvcra's fleet. The 
Oquendo, Maria Teresa, and Vizcaya were sister ships of a 
class not found in the American navy — cruising battleships. 
They carried battleship armor, 12-inch side belts and 10-inch 
gun protecting armor. The armor was much inferior in 
quality to the Oregon's, but sufficiently heavy to keep out all 
but the heaviest shells. The armament of these ships was 
much superior to that of our cruisers, but inferior to the Ore- 
gon''s. Each ship mounted a ]iair of 11-inch guns, ten 5.5- 
inch guns (the Vizcaya^'^ being ra])id-fire), in addition to six- 
teen small guns, similar to those on the Oregon. 'Y\\q Colon 
was a less formidable ship, but she, too, was a fighting cruiser. 
She carried 6-inch armor and her heavy guns were a pair of 
9.8-inch rifles. She was rcMiiarknbly strong in rapid-fire guns, 
mounting ten O-inch and six -kT-inch guns of this type. She 
had been built but a short time, and was regarded as one of the 
finest cruisers afloat. 

Certainly, four heavily armored cruisers, carrying two 
dozen torpedo tubes, would be a formidable fighting force 
against the battleship Oregon^ the unarmored cruiser Buffalo, 
and the little unarniovcd gunboat Marirlla, with but ten tor- 
pedo tubes on all three. The unannored boats woidd be of 
little value in a fight against annoi-clnds. The Oregon would 
bear the brunt of the fight, and upon the fighting qualities of 
her oflncers and men would d('])cnd the issue of the battle. 



380 PREPARATIONS FOR INVADING CUBA 

But late on the 10th, when Admiral Sampson was supposed 
to bo drawing near to the port of San Jnan in Puerto Eico, 
and when Admiral Cervera was supposed to be very close to 
Captain Clark off the coast of Brazil, came the surprising an- 
nouncement from London that Cervera's fleet had returned to 
Cadiz! Cervera had apparently been afraid to cross the At- 
lantic, and avoiding the frequented lanes of commerce, so that 
he might meet no one to tell of his cowardice, had at length, 
when in need of fuel, been compelled to swallow his pride 
and go home to Spain. 

The statement made by Admiral Bermejo, Minister of 
Marine, denying that Cervera's fleet had returned to Spain, 
and declaring that it was actually Avhere it ought to be in 
accordance with the instructions given to its commander, had 
little efl^ect because of the general belief that the crafty 
Spanish strategists deliberately misrepresented everything, 
and owing to the close watch kept in Spanish ports it was im- 
possible, apparently, to verify the reports from Cadiz. The 
opinion was general that the government was seeking in every 
way to delay operations so that the troo])s of the United States 
would not make a landing in Cuba till the summer should be 
well adA'anced and the dangers of sickness increased many fold. 

l^elying, apparently, upon the news from London that the 
Spanish fleet had wholly deserted the Avestern side of the 
Atlantic, the government formed the opinion that there was 
no longer reason for delay in proceeding to occupy Cuba with 
a large force of men. A few days previously the plan had 
been to begin occupation with a small advance guard to co- 
operate with General Comcz and other Cuban commanders, 
to whom it was also intended to send a large quantity of re- 
peating rifles and ammunition, so tliat they might be prepared 
for rendering assistance wben the real invasion should come. 

But in view of the improbability of naval interference from 
Spain, preparations were at once begun for moving the regu- 
lars and the available volunteer troops to convenient places 
for embarking. Chickamauga w^as abandoned as a place for 



PLAN OP INVASION POSTPONED 381 

receiving the greater part of the army, and instructions were 
given on the lUth lor mustering in the Nolnntcers as rapidly 
as possible and sending them to Tampa and other points on the 
Ciulf fur spc't'dy ti'ansjKirlal i(»n la Cuba. It was announced 
that General JMiles himself would go to Cuba, General Wesley 
!AIerritt, who, it had been su})posed, would be the leader of the 
forces in Cuba, having been selected to lead the expeditions to 
the Philippines. It was proposed to send General Shafter 
with a force of regulars in his connnand to secure a base on the 
Cuban coast, which he should hold till reinforcements enough 
to warrant an attack u[)on Havana could be taken over. There 
was the greatest excitement at the camps at Tampa, Mobile, 
and Xew Orleans, and hurry orders were sent to some of the 
state governments t'ur uiustci-iug in troops. On the 11th 
everyone was looking for the iniuKMliato uinvenieiit of the army. 

But all this was changed in a single day. 'Jlie plans of in- 
vasion were suddenly and indefinitely postponed. Just be- 
fore midnight of the 12tli the ISTavy Department received a 
cipher dispatch from Ca])taiu Cotton of the Ihifvard, from 
Fort de Fraiu-e, .Martinique, and dated the day ix'fore, saying 
that the Spanish fleet was otf that place. An intimation that 
the fleet might be in thos(> West Indian watcn-s had come to 
this country early on the 12th in the form of a dispatch from 
Madrid giving an official statement of the ^liiu'ster of Marine 
to the effect that the Sj)anish fleet had that i\:\\ toucluMl at the 
French Island of Mailiiiii|U(>, which i- one of the AViudwai-'l 
Islands forming the eastern fringe that encloses the Caribbean 
Sea. The fast cruisers. Yah, Harvard, and St. Louis, had 
been patrolling the waters about Windward Islands for days, 
and were doing so at the time Cervera was a])])ro:iching ^Farti- 
nique, but, unfortunately, just at that time none of them were 
in that particular vicinity. 

The authorities Inul considered Ciuadalou]ie the most likely 
place for Cervera \n juit in for new<. if he ])iit in at all. and for 
that reason the Sf. Louis had cruised in tho-;e waters. Com- 
mander Goodrich remained about the islands till the 11th, and 



382 SAMPSON MAKES A CALL 

indeed, steamed by Martinique a little before Cervera's fleet 
came into sight. Martinique has good cable connections, and 
thus Admiral Cervera was at once in communication with 
Madrid, and, presumably, w'itli the very active Spanish agency 
which Seuor Polo had been maintaining in Canada since his 
retirement from service as Spanish ]\Iinister at Washington. 
It was, of course, fair to suppose that Admiral Cervera's dis- 
patches, which had been received and held for him by the 
Spanish consul at the port of Martinique, duly informed him 
of the position of the United States squadrons, of the exact 
condition of the Cuban blockade, and of the fact that Admiral 
Sampson had called for him with some rather good fighting 
ships at Puerto Rico, and not having found him as expected, 
had shelled the forts of San Juan on that very morning of 
May 12. 



CHAPTER XXXV 

ADMIRAL SAMPSON'S BOMBARDMENT OF SAN JUAN — 
THRILLING SCENES DURING THE ACTION - SKILLFUL 
AMERICAN GUNNERY — SAMPSONS WITHDRAWAL. 

Admiral Sampson's Cruise to Puerto Rico — The Gallant Sailors Expect a 
Great Fight — Approaching San Juan — Preparations for the Combat 
— San Juan Learns of Sampson's Approach — The loira BecoTues the 
Flagship— Peculiarities of San Juan Harbor — Admiral Sampson's 
Plan of Attack — Running up the Stars and Stripes — Speeding into 
the Bay — The Duty of the W'unpatuck — '6Am\)m\\, Finding Cervera 
Absent, Decides to Shell the Forts — The First Shot — The Music of 
the Projectiles — Spaniards Return the F'ire Vigorously — Bravery of a 
Spaniard at an Old Gun — Some Dangerous Guns on the Forts — 
Marksmanship as Worthless as Spanish Promises — "Threaten, Puff, 
Splash !" — Cruising by the Forts Three Times — Shells Land on the 
JS'ew York and Iowa — One Man Killed — The Withd'-awal - Admiral 
Sampson's unicial Report — Sjianiards Think They Have Driven Him 
Off — Not even a Spanish Gunboat in the Harbor — Criticism of Admiral 
Sampson's Attack. 

THE cruise of Adniiral Sampson to Puerto Rico seems 
to have been undertaken in the confident ex- 
pectation of meeting Cervera and destroying his 
ships in those waters. San Juan being a well-defended 
Spanish port, the nearest point for Cervera in western 
seas, and being well supplied with coal, the admiral, not 
without good reasons, supposed that Cervera would cer- 
tainly try to make that port about the 9th of ^lay, and h'" 
planned to make his own appearance there at about the same 
time. After making preparations to leave Key AVest on the 
afternoon of ^fay 3d, the fleet was held till midnight, and the 
flagship did not start till the next morning. Coing direct to 
the blockading squadron off Havana the admiral was there 
joined by the battleships Town and Tiidiann, and, ju-oceeding 
westward, they arrived off Cardenas at dark, where they came 
up with the rest of the fleet, including the cruis^Mv; Deirolf and 
Montgovicry, the monitors AmphUrite and Terror, the torpedo 

(383) 



384 THE SHIPS PREPARE FOR BATTLE 

boat Porter, tlie tug WompatucJi, and the collier Niagara. In 
order to make better time the Iowa took the AfnpJiitrite in tow, 
and a little later, the Terror s speed proving too slow she was 
taken in tow by the New York. On approaching the port of 
Cape Haitien the .Montgomery was sent in to receive any dis- 
patches from Washington, but, obtaining only the information 
that Cervera had not been reported anywhere, the 8th and 9th 
were spent in tilling some of the exhausted coal bunkers of the 
fleet. Meanwdiile, preparations were going on aboard the 
fighting ships for a battle. The sailors pitched through the 
portholes all sorts of movables, and over the sides into the sea 
flew doors and parts of wooden bulkheads. Piles of sand- 
filled bags were also arranged to give increased protection to 
some of the gunners against the fragments of Spanish shells 
that were expected to fly about the decks a little later on. 

But it seems that while lying off Cape Haitien the shipping 
lookout on top of the mountain west of the town had seen the 
squadron and reported '.he fact at once, and the Spanish consul 
immediately wired the information to Puerto Rico and Madrid. 
When, on the 9th, Admiral Sampson learned this he turned 
the squadron about and headed for Key West again until the 
Cape Haitien mountains were well out of sight, then he put out 
to sea, and gradually headed back for San Juan, hoping that 
the Spaniards had be.n thereby deceived; but whether they 
were or not made very little difference, as a cruel chance or- 
dained that Sampson should appear at San Juan just in time 
to have the fact known to Cervera as he sailed into the waters 
of Martinique. 

Admiral Sampson led his fleet on without further inter- 
ruption till about five o'clock on the afternoon of the 11th, 
when about fifty miles northwest of San Juan. The flagship 
hove to in a smart sea, a boat was lowered, and the admiral and 
his staff were rowed to the Iowa, and the two-starred blue flag 
soon fluttered from the top of her military mast. The admiral 
had concluded to make the battleship lova, instead of the ar- 
mored cruiser New Yorl', his flagshi]^ and every one knew 



A FAMOUS OLD CASTLE 385 

from this that ho expected soon to smell powdei-. That after- 
noon the admiral distrihiited among his vessels the j)laii of pro- 
cedure he had adopted, hased, as will be seen, upnn t he expecta- 
tion of finding- the Cape Verde fleet in the harbor of San Jnan, 
which is a bay projecting into the north shore and is formed by 
a small island which I'lins ahuig the shore, ending in Morro 
Castle at the month of the harbor. This island, which at its 
eastern end is separated from the mainland by a tidal stream 
only, and is, therefore, more of a peninsula, is something in the 
shape of a hnman leg, having a stnl)l)y foot at the west end, on 
which San dnan lies, ^lorro being at the extremity of the toes. 
This old castle, with its thick frowning walls, has stood here 
since the days of the old corsairs, but the Spaniards have in the 
course of time run anoTicr line of defense along the sea, end- 
ing in another old fort. The sole of the foot also has another 
line of defense enclosing the town on the west. 

Across the mouth of the harbor on the opposite point of 
land is Fort Cahuelo, and between ^Morro and this fort, and a 
little out to sea, is Cabras Island. Several miles further west 
on the main shore is Point Salinas, behind which the Ameri- 
can vessels were steaming u]i. 

The admiral's instructions were that the squadron was to 
pass near Salinas Point and then steer about east to pass just 
outside the reefs off Cabras Island, the column to be formed 
with the flagship loira in the lead, followed by the Indiana, 
New York, Amphitrile, and Terror. While approaching, a 
close watch was to be kept on the coast for toi-jiedo craft, and 
when near Cabras Island tli(> Porirr was tn rapidly cross the 
mouth of the harbor and stand close under Morro to the west- 
ward, screened from the fire of ]\Iorro's western battery, and 
if the old guns on the north side of ^Forro were opened she was 
to lia\'e the enjoyment of silencing them. P>oth the Drfroii 
in front and the Monigompry in the rear were also to keep a 
sharp lookout for any torpedo boats coming out of the harbor. 

There were to be two objects of attack — the batteries upon 
!^^orro and the men-of-war. If it was clear that the Spanish 



386 ENTERING THE BAY OF SAN JUAN 

vessels were lying iu jjort, lire was to be opened upon them as 
soon as they were discernible over Cabras Island, the action 
of the flagship being followed in this regard. If, however, it 
should be evident that neutral men-of-war were in line of tire^ 
a tlag of truce would probably be sent in before fire on the 
vessels was opened, and the Porter^ was to hold herself in readi- 
ness for this service. Care was to be used to avoid striking 
the hospitals on Cabras Island, and if it became necessary to 
silence the Moi-ro batteries a portion of the fire would be 
directed with this object, but the principal object was to de- 
stroy the ships. 

The plans of Admiral Sampson had been worked out with 
extreme care, and a definiteness which had been entirely im- 
possible for Commodore Dewey in searching about the great 
])ays of the Pliilijipines for Admiral Montojo; they were 
worked out in the faith, shared by his gallant captains, that 
Cervera would by that time be in the harbor of San Juan. 

AVith the first flush of color in the eastern sky on the morn- 
ing of the 12th and while the ornamental bows of Cervera's 
cruisers were courtesying to the shores of Martinique 500 odd 
miles away, the Detroit and Wompatucl- led the way in unmo- 
lested, wdiile the torpedo boat Porter ran off to the eastward, 
and stopped about a mile from the shore. About 1,400 yards 
from Morro the Detroit turned eastward and steamed slowly 
along the beach, while from the loira fluttered the signal for 
the hoisting of the American ensign on every ship. Up to 
every masthead and every staff-head fluttered the Stars and 
Stripes, a picture worth a long voyage for any American to 
see. For a few minutes the vessels sped in towards the bay, 
and shortly after 5 o'clock the little Wompatucl', having ac- 
complished her purpose of fixing a small boat at the proper 
place to indicate the deptli of the water, a mark to steer by later 
if the smoke obscured the marks ashore, scurried back to 
where the non-combatants lay. By this time, Admiral Samp- 
son, standing on the bridge and peering anxiously into the har- 
bor, saw to his gi-eat disappointment that Cervera's fleet was 



THE SHOCK AND KOAK OF BATTLE 387 

not there, lie still believed, however, that Cervera would 
try to make the port, and he concluded that the best thing to 
do was to test the batteries with which he should have to con- 
tend if he later fought the Spanish in that harbor. If he 
could destroy them, so much the better. So, at 5.17, the ad- 
miral gave Captain Evans of the Iowa the wortl Id lire, and a 
long G-pounder at the starboard end of the lowas bridge was 
fired at ]\[orro. The battle was on. The forward turret had 
already been turned so that the great 12-inch guns pointed 
directly at the old castle walls, and very soon after the order, 
with a niighty report and a roar like that of an angry lion, a 
great projectile Hew towards one of the batteries, and then 
another and another, with such deadly aim that no shots were 
fired from that battery during the remainder of the engage- 
ment. 

Then while the big guns smoked, the 8-inch guns took up 
the work, and sent their lean projectiles with an eager, whin- 
ing cry to hunt for Spaniards. The little Detroit, unarmored 
though she was and with only 5-incli guns in her battery, 
joined in. For days the gunner in charge of a rifle on her 
quarter deck had carried a tiny flag over the breach of his gun, 
to the joy of every one who saw it; but he took it down now, 
rolled it up, shoved it into his shirt, and, bending low over the 
breech, he looked clear-eyed through the siglits, pulled the 
trigger, and drove a shot straight iiitn the pnrthdlc on the face 
of Morro. In quick succession his shipmates of tlie other 
guns, six clean, 5-inch rifles, followed his lead. The boom of 
the huge guns had awt-d, l)ut the sound of these rifles was like 
the music of '* Yankee Doodle " played on a snare drum; and 
it thrilled the spectators on the non-combatant's boats till they 
involuntarily shouted aloud for the glory of the flag and the 
honor of the American gunner. 

Then came the Indiana with the solemn thunder of her 

13-inch volcanoes to take the place of the flagship that, with 

her stern turret hurling winged dcatli to the fort, was by this 

time steaming out to sea. Her 8-inch guns took up the cry 

24 



388 MISSPENT ENERGY 

as well. Indeed, every gun of whatever caliber that would 
reach from either vessel was engaged. 

Soon after our fire began, the forts began to reply vigor- 
ously on the squadron. On top of the front wall of Morro 
and near the west end, stood an old-fashioned gun, under the 
charge of a man worthy of a better training and of a more 
generous nation. His was a useless task, for no shot from 
his old smooth-bore could harm the battleships; but there he 
stood, aimed, fired, swabbed, loaded, aimed, and fired again, 
while the shots splashed in the water half way to the ships, as 
a rule, though now then one exploded in the air because the 
time fuse was short. Xever but once did they come near a 
ship, but save for brief intervals, when the rapid-fire batteries 
afloat drove him to the bomb-jiroofs, this Spaniard worked 
on with delirious energy and spirit. 

But there were other guns of a less harmless character. 
In the Morro itself were pieces which could not be counted 
because the smoke kept the wall so obscured. Moreover, they 
were worked irregularly because the gunners on the American 
vessels, having rapid-fire cannon, had the range of the em- 
brasures and portholes, and at times made it too uncom- 
fortable for the Spaniards. On the crest just east of Morro 
and back of the cemetery two 10-inch guns were diligently 
worked. At the barracks a little further east was another bat- 
tery, and over at the east end of the town was an old stone fort, 
its face towards the west, and there were at least four modern 
rifles of large caliber, and still further eas4:, on a point, were 
other large guns. All these batteries, save the last, opened 
on the fleet within five minutes after the first gun from Morro. 

But the marksmanship was Spanish. " JSTcvcr," wrote an 
eye-Avitness, " will an American see hostile guns make a more 
pleasing spe<^tacle than these; for they stood on emplacements 
forty to sixty feet above the sea on the crest of a hill, whose 
lower slopes were green and the upper slopes house-covered. 
The green sea was below and the fleecy trade wind clouds 
above and behind them. They gleamed like wicked Spanish 



SPANISH SHOTS FALL HARMLESSLY 391 

eyes and then puffed white like Spanish eigarette smoke. The 
song of the projectile was like the music of the fandango, and 
the marksmanship as worthless as Spanish promises. Threaten, 
puff, splash! ^^ot since modern rifles with gun sights were 
invented has any one seen such shooting as from tlicse cre-st 
batteries. Shot after shot, dozens and scores, and at last the 
count rose into hundreds, were fired with never a hit, and, 
indeed, with every shot flying above and beyond huge targets. 
High as the New York stood above the water when she rounded 
to before Morro, third in the moving line; broad as the Iowa 
lay on the water as she headed the procession, not a shot struck 
them as they passed before the fort. Even the Detroit, lying 
perhaps, 1,200 yards from the nearest battery, and too busily 
engaged firing to think about getting hit, rcnuiined wholly 
untouched. Quite as interesting as the position of the Detroit 
was that of the torpedo boat Porter. She was recognized, of 
course, soon after the engagement became general, and the 
guns at the eastern end of the island began sending greeting. 
The gun on the i)oint at the extreme east end of the Spanish 
works was so placed as to be unable to reach either the Detroit 
or the line of l^attleships, but it found the Porter within easy 
range, and with deliberation that indicated a sober desire to 
hit something, the captain worked the piece. ■ He was aided 
at times by the guns from the higher fort near by, but for 
hours he kept his eyes on the Porter. As a rule, no shot fell 
more than a half-mile wide of the target, though now and then 
one would strike as much as a mile short or three-quarters of a 
mile beyond. At rare intervals a shell would by accident get 
within 200 or 300 yards, and then Captain Freemont would 
turn his little 1-pounders loose and fire back as John Paul 
Jones fired his pistol at British batteries at White TTaven." 

The marksmanshiji of the American squadron on the first 
round was not up to target records, for while a majority of the 
shots hit Morro, some fell considerably short, but there was 
no more of this after the first rouiul. After passing the forts 
the column turned to the left and ui;ide a complete circle, 



392 AN IMPRESSIVE LESSON 

The Iowa came in again as the monitors were passing out, so 
that there was a constant fire. As the Iowa came down the 
second time the Spaniards worked their guns with increased 
fury and with increased wretciiedness of aim, until she reached 
the turning j^oint and once more began her 13-inch practice, 
with the Indiana following. Shell after shell passed through 
or over Morro to land in the city behind it, and many of the 
Spaniards fled from their guns, while the Americans were as 
cool as at target practice. 

One of the first shots to fall over into the city struck the 
huge barracks east of Morro, and a cloud of brick-dust rose 
high in the air, obscuring the building till the flames were seen 
to burst from it. Within ten minutes a half-dozen other 
shots had fallen elsewhere in the town, and by the time the 
New Yorlx had turned out to sea on the second round, as many 
different fires were seen in the western portion of the city. 
The forts were now more obscured by the bursting of Ameri- 
can shells than by the firing of their own guns, for most of the 
Sj^aniards had by this time fled for shelter. The guns at the 
east of the city, however, continued to work, as they received 
only occasional attention from the ships. 

Meantime, the Deiroit had turned away to the westward, 
and, running close under the guns of Morro, attacked a new 
earthwork built on an island on the west side of the channel. 
Two 8-inch guns there might have destroyed the cruiser at 
the first round had they been properly handled, but she ran in 
to a range of less than 1 ,000 yards, firing as she went; and the 
Spaniards scampered away from their great guns. There was 
no more trouble from that battery. It was an impressive 
lesson in the effectiveness of rapid-fire guns intelligently and 
bravely handled. Undoubtedly, the work of the cruisers was 
risky with such large guns on the forts, and they were then 
ordered to follow the battleships out, and to stay out after the 
gfecond round; but they fired as long as they could, and their 
sailors were evidently disinclined to give up the dangerous 
sport. The Porier also reluctantly withdrew. 



THE FIRST FATALITY 393 

A few minutes after seven o'cloek the loiva opened fire 
on the third ronntl, and the others followed in another blaze 
of fire and smoke. As the luira tunud away she aimed her 
last shot at the big fort east of the city and knocked a hole in 
it. Five gnns had been working steadily from this fort, but 
only two continued after the Iowa's shot, and these were 
silenced wlu'u the Neic Yorl- came along and fired her broad- 
sides; but about eight o'clock, just as the New Yorl- finished, 
and was setting out to sea, a C-inch shell from the eastern bat- 
teries came aboard over the port quarter, struck the top awn- 
ing stanchion and eN])lo(U'd in the cutter, which was in the 
port after-cradle on the superstructure deck. The fragments 
killed one man and wounded four. Parts of the shell went in 
all directions; the cutter was an absolute wreck, parts of it 
flying higher than the smokestack. A searchlight was de- 
stroyed and some damage was done to other small boats. At 
about the same time a 10-inch shell struck a gallows frame on 
the Iowa and burst, liui-ling frag-ments in all directions, 
slightly wounding three sailors. Both these shots were plainly 
accidental, coming on board at long range and being ap- 
parently aimed at vessels which were still nearer in action. 
Xo damage was done the Indiana nor the monitors, which had 
maintained a destructive fire during the three rounds, and 
though shells had burst over them they were not in the least 
injured. 

Admiral Sampson's purpose in attacking the fortifications 
was, according to his official report to the government, simply 
to learn their character. "Upon approaching San Juan," he 
-aid. " it was seen that none of the Spanish vessels was in the 
harbor. I was considerably in doubt whether they had reached 
San Juan and again departed fen* some unknown destination, 
or whether they had not arrived. As their capture was the 
object of the expedition, and as it was essential that they should 
not pass to the westward, I decided to attack the batteries de- 
fending the port in order to develop their position and strength, 
and then ^vithout waiting to reduce the city or to subject it to 



394 SPANIARDS FIND CAUSE FOR REJOICING 

a regular bombardment, which would require dne notice, 
turned to the westward. I commenced the attack as soon as 
it was good daylight. It lasted about three hours, when the 
signal was made to discontinue the firing, and the squadron 
stood to the northeast until out of sight of San Juan, when 
the course was to the westward with a view to communicating 
with the department at Port Plata and learn if the department 
had obtained information as to the movements of the Spanisli 
vessels." 

Whether Admiral Sampson could have continued the 
attack and taken the city then is a question which has been dis- 
puted, but as he still had Cervera's four armored cruisers and 
torpedo-boat destroyei's to meet he naturally avoided doing 
anything to weaken his own vessels. It was the general 
opinion among the officers of the fleet that it would be a 
difficult matter to reduce the forts with ships alone; but, ac- 
cording to reports which came from San Juan later, they had 
done much more damage than they supposed, and tlu' Span- 
iards could not understand why they should have withdrawn, 
unless they had been compelled to by losses. They were, 
therefore, inclined to rejoice. Impartial witnesses from San 
Juan said that several of the large guns in Morro were com- 
pletely disabled. It is a curious fact, in view of the general 
understanding of the superiority of smokeless powder, that the 
Spaniards excused their poor marksmanship on the ground 
that the Yankee ships were so enveloped in smoke that it was 
impossible to get a good aim at them. 

AYhen one of the monitors ran in close to Morro with her 
decks awash, the Spanish gunners, occasionally getting a 
glimpse of her through the smoke her big guns were making, 
supposed that she had been hit and was sinking, and they set up 
a great shout of joy. But they were puzzled when the same 
vessel continued to pour enormous shells into the forts with 
deadly effect. The loss of life in the city was not great, 
though considerable damage was done to buildings and a little 
to shipping. 



HOSTILE FLEETS MISS EACH OTHER 395 

It is a curious fact that Sampson not only missed the 
Spanish squadron he had gone on his long cruise for, but missed 
the Spanish war vessels which were supposed to be stationed 
there. It appears that the troop vessel, Alfonso XIII., had 
been sent over from Cadiz, and was expected to arrive at 
Puerto Kieo at about the time the Cape Verde vessels did. A 
few days before Sampson arrived the Spanish men-of-war, Isa- 
bella II., Concho, and Ponce cle Leon, had left San Juan east- 
ward to meet the troop ship and conduct her in. She arrived 
alone, however, the day before the bombardment, having 
missed the gunboats, wdiich came steaming in shortly after 
Sampson had finished the bombardment and turned westward. 

Some criticism was made of Admiral Sampson for attack- 
ing the forts when he know the fleet he was looking for was 
not there, and when he had no intention of taking the city. 
The Spaniards complained that he had bombarded the city 
without the notice which is customary in war. But the guns 
were at no time directed upon the town, and whatever damage 
was done to it was incidental. ]\[oreover, the rule which re- 
quires previous notice applies to undefended cities, and to those 
whose defenses are so placed that they cannot be attacked with- 
out endangering the city. It is possible that had the admiral 
waited outside and out of sight till he had sent scouts in to dis- 
cover whether the ships wore in San Juan harbor, Cervera 
might have endoavororl to mnkc tlmt pm-f aftor loavina' Alarti- 
niquo. Then Sampson would have lunl the Si)anish fleet 
whore he had expected to find it. As it was, ho loft the forts 
just as two of his vessels had been struck, left the Spaniards 
boasting that they had driven him away, and convinced Cer- 
vera that it would bo wiso for him to sail for Cuba while 
Sampson was waiting for him at Puerto Rico. 



CHAPTEK XXXVI 

INCIDENTS ON THE BLOCKADE LINE — FIRST AMERICAN 
BLOODSHED AT CIENFUEGOS — THE BRAVE AND BLOODY 
FIGHT OF THE TORPEDO-BOAT WIN8L0W AT CARDE- 
NAS — SWEPT BY SHOT AND SHELL. 

The Blockade in Early May — The Capture of the Lafayette — Recklessness 
of Some of the American Vessels — Work of Cutting tlie Cables — Eager 
Volunteers for a Dangerous Task — Advancing Close to Shore in 
Launches and Cutters — Fire from the Spanish Masked Batteries — Men 
Drop at their Oars — Ship's Guns Drive the Spaniards to Shelter — 
Dead Men in the Cutters — Shelling the Lighthouse — First Adventure 
of the Torpedo Boat Winsloio — Laying a Trap for the Spaniards — In 
a Nest of Red Buoys — A Spanish Trap — Deddly Fire Pours in on 
the ^XimlolD — The Hudson to the Rescue — A Fatal Shell — Death of 
Ensign Bagley and his Men — Terrific Fighting — Brave Act of the 
Hudson — Getting the Winslow Out — Spanish Gunboat Disabled — 
Scattering a Spanish Garrison. 

DURTlSiG the weeks following the inauguration of the 
blockade of Cuban ports there was little of incident 
except the early capture of prizes till attempts were 
made to cnt cables in different ports and to tempt out some 
of the Spanish gnnboats, which timidly remained behind the 
protection of the forts and mines. 

The most important incidents of the blockade during the 
first week in May were a renewed short bombardment of the 
fortifications outside of Matanzas and the capture and release 
of the French vessel Lafayette, which was boarded, told that 
a blockade had been established, and forbidden to enter 
Havana. But as soon as she was released she made all haste 
for the harbor, and again was brought to and taken as a prize 
to Key West. The government, however, ordered her im- 
mediate release, as the State Department had promised the 
French eml)assy to give her a safe conduct, a fact unknown 

on the blockade line. Thus the danger of arousing French 

(396) 



CAPTURE OF THE "PANAMA" 307 

antnc'onisni was averted. One of the amusing features of 
the chase for Spanish prizes was the capture of the steamship 
Panama by the little MaiKjrovc. The Panama was trying to 
run the blockade and had a valuable cargo. The Mangrove 
happened to fall in with her, and the ridiculous thing about 
it was that the Panania's guns were superior to those of th(3 
Mangrove, but the hitter's commander boldly dashed in and 
the Spaniard surrendered without firing a shot. At about the 
same time the Argonauta, a Spanish ship with supplies, 100 
soldiers, and General de Corlejo and staff, was captured bj' the 
A^asJiviUe while trying to run the blockade at Cienfuegos. 

]\Iany of the American yessels had acquired such a con- 
tempt for Spanish gunnery from such exhibitions of it as they 
had seen that they somewhat recklessly ran within close range 
of some of the fortifications, and as our sailors were brave and 
eager for action which should distinguish them they welcomed 
any orders which would take tli(>m into the line of danger. 
One of the tasks devolving upon the blockading fleet as well 
as upon some of the scouting vessels was the cutting of tlu; 
various cables which afforded Havana communication with 
^ladrid and witli other Cuban ports. In pursuance of this ob- 
ject, an attempt was made early on the morning of the 11th of 
May to cut the cables running out of the harbor of Cienfuegos 
on the south coast to Santiago, which was connected with 
Euro]K'an linc^, an attempt which resulted in the first loss 
of life among American forces. 

'I'he naval force on the south coast of Cuba, Captain ^le- 
Calla commanding, was composed of the cruiser M arhJelicad, 
the gimboat NasJivillr, the revenue cutter Windom, the con- 
verted yacht Eagle, and the collier Sahivn. r\>mmander ^fc- 
Calla placed Lieutenant Cameron ^fcK. AVinslow in charge 
of an expedition to cut tlie ocean telegra]>h cables. Second in 
cominand was Lieutenant E. A. Anderson. A call for volun- 
teers was made, to which the whole of the crews of both the 
Marhleliearl and the XafihriUe eagerly responded, even after 
a warning that the service would be especially dangerous. 



398 VOLUNTEERS FOR A DANGEROUS SERVICE 

A steam cutter containing twelve men and a launch con- 
taining sixteen were manned from each ship. In addition to 
the crew, a sergeant of marines and half a dozen men to man 
the guns of the cutters were put on board. In the meantime 
the Marhlehead took a position 1,000 yards off shore opposite 
the Colorado Point lighthouse, which is on the east side of the 
narrow entrance of C^ienfuegos' harbor and just to the east 
of the cable landing, and with the Nashville a little further to 
the west began shelling the beach, upon which were the signal- 
station, barracks, and cable-house. The rifle pits behind the 
cable-house were deserted by the Spaniards as fast as the ships' 
fire reached them, and, as their answering fire slackened and 
died out, the boats were ordered in shore. 

At five minutes to seven, the boats headed for the land, 
the steam cutters, in command of Ensign T. P. Magruder, tow- 
ing the launches. The ships were firing upon the cable-house, 
which soon fell in ruins. When three or four hundred feet 
from shore the cutters stopped, and the launches worked ahead, 
protected as far as possible by the fire from the cutters, which 
followed about a hundred yards astern. The cable leading to 
Santiago was picked up about a hundred feet off shore, but 
no sooner had the work of cutting began than the Spanish 
fire was renewed, the soldiers skulking back to their deserted 
rifle pits through the high grass. The cutters replied to this 
fire, and tlie five from the shi]is quickened. But, though the 
Spanish fire slackened momentarily, every now and then it 
became stronger. 

The men in tlie boats succeeded in lifting and cutting the 
first cable, a laborious and perilous task, and coolly proceeded 
to G-rapple for the next, which led westward to Patabano. 
Meantime, the Spaniards were firing low in an evident endea- 
vor to sink the cutters, but many of their shots fell short, wliile 
close over the heads of the men flew the shells from the Marhle- 
head and NaslwiUe. The second cable was finally grajipled. 
Several men were kept at the oars to hold the cutters in posi- 
tion, and the first man wounded in the fire was one of these. 



SILENT ]rp:KOES :)UU 

No Olio else in tlio l)oat knew It, liowcvcr, till lie t'iiintcd in his 
t-eat from loss of blood. Otliors took the c-iic from this and 
there was never a groan or eoinplaint Irom ilie two boats as 
the bullets came thicker and faster, the men going on with 
their work with unflinching courage. 

The second cable was finally cut, and the third, a smaller 
one, connecting the cable-house with Cienfuegos, was grap- 
pled and hoisted to the surface. The fire of the Spaniards 
had reached its maximum, the bullets from the Mauser rifles 
falling like hail about the boats. 

"Use shrapnel," came the signal for the ships, and then 
can after can exjiloded over the Spaniards, who broke and 
ran to cover behind the lighthouse, and to this place they 
dragged a number of the machine guns and again 0})ened fire 
on the cutters. This fire could not be answered so well from 
the launches, and the encouraged Spaniards fired the more 
rapidly. Man after man in the boats was hit, but not one let 
a sound escape liini. Like silent machines they w^orked, grimly 
hacking and tearing at the third cable. For a half-hour they 
had worked on it, but the fire from behind the lighthouse was 
becoming too deadly, and, reluctantly, at Lieutenant Ander- 
son's signal, the cable was dropped and the boats retreated. 

The work had lasted more than three hours; one man was 
ki]l('(l, one mortally wounded, six men seriously wounded, and 
one officer sliglitly injured. The loss among the Spaniards 
was much greater, at least tlii-cc liundred being killed or 
wounded. As the boats withdrew, the Marhhhrad began to 
shell the lighthouse, which had not been fired on before accord- 
ing to the usages of international law, though it had l)eeii used 
as a shelter by the Spaniards. The Wiiulom steamed in, and 
at close range took part in the bombardment. Tlie tower of 
the lighthouse was cut through by the shells, and, falling, de- 
molished the light-keeper's house. AVith the collapse of their 
protection the Spaniai-ds fled to escape the screaming shrapnel. 

On the day following, or the day on which Admiral Samp- 
son was shelling the forts of San Juan, a similar and somewhat 



400 PLOTS AND COUNTER-PLOTS 

more bloody engagement occurred on the ojDposite side of tlie 
Cuban coast. In the bay of Cardenas there were three Span- 
ish gunboats, which the Americans hoped to ca])ture, but their 
commanders carefully kept them out of reach within the 
harbor. On the 8th the torpedo boat Winslow had been 
ordered to steam in and, if possible, entice the gunboats within 
reach of the United States gunboat Maclilas. The little tor- 
pedo boat steamed boldly into the channel, where the Machias, 
drawing more water, could not go, and succeeded in rousing 
one of the Spanish gunboats, whereuj^on the Winsloiu hurried 
back, followed by the Spaniard. At the same time the enemy 
at the signal station on Chalupa Key, thinking an opportunity 
was offered for overcoming the two American vessels, signaled 
to two other gunboats to come out. The little Winsloir fired 
sixty rounds from her 1-pounders and succeeded in getting one 
of the Spanish gunboats far enough out so that the Machias 
hit her with a 6-pounder. This was too much for the courage 
of the Spaniards, and they put back into the harbor, while 
from the shore a small submarine mine was exploded near the 
torpedo boat, but not sufficiently near to do any damage. 

But this little affair whetted the appetites of the Americans 
for a better chance at the gunboats, and plans were laid to force 
them out. The Spaniards, evidently mistrusting that the at- 
tempt would be made, laid traps of their own, by placing con- 
cealed batteries along the shore of the entrance at night, while 
the operation could not be discovered by the blockading fleet. 

Early on the morning of the same day, wdiile the torpedo- 
boat Winslow was coaling from the gunboat Wilmingion, Com- 
mander Merry of llie Jllaclnas, the senior officer of the station, 
conferred with the other officers as to destroying the Spanisfi 
gunboats, and the Winsloiv, with the revenue cutter Hudson, 
was ordered to sound the little-used channel between the 
Romero and Blanco Keys. The other channels into the har- 
bor were known to be mined, but this third was sounded and 
dragged, and found to be safe and deep enough for all except 
the Machias. When this was reported to the Wilmington it 



THE '"WINSLOW'' IN A TRAP 401 

was resolved to make the attempt in the aftemoon. There- 
fore, at about two o'clock the three vessels started up the bay, 
the Winslow to the cast, the Wilmiiigton in -the center, and 
the Hudson to the west. AVhen about three thousand yards 
from the water front of the town of Cardenas, a Spanish gun- 
boat could bo plainly seen lying alongside the wharf. 

The Winslow was ordered by Commander Todd of the 
W i/niingloti to run in and cut out this gunboat, with the 
heavier guns of the other American vessels to protect her from 
the distance. So Lieutenant J. B. Bernadon of the Winslow 
ordered his little vessel ahead, while the Hudson followed 
some distance behind. There was no thought of real danger, 
for no batteries were supposed to exist at that point. "When 
within 1,200 yards from the shore the men on the Winsloiv 
noticed bobbing about them a number of red buoys which 
were supposed to mark the channel, but in reality they were 
range buoys which had been put there for the guidance of the 
masked batteries on a jutting point a little to the left of where 
the Spanish gunboats lay. Suddenly the gunboat opened fire. 

The gallant little crew of the Winslow were taken entirely 
by surprise. The first shot of the engagement was the signal 
for the batteries to open a continuous and long-sustained fire. 
The shells came thick and fast, churning the water into foam. 

The Spanish trap bad caught its victim; the decoy gun- 
boat had lured the brave little fighter to the very point where 
the Spaniards had deliberately calculated the range. It was 
then a fight to the death, and the three little 1-pounders of the 
torpedo boat, whose steel shell was but half an inch thick, 
began to pour their missiles into the shore and into the gun- 
boat, which had also opened fire ahead of them. 

But it was a sadly unequal contest. Again and again 
shells crashed into the little Winslov. One went through the 
top of the forward conning tower, cutting the steam pipes, 
disabling the steering gear, and knocking the wheel from the 
helmsman's hands. A fragment struck the brave commander 
of the little craft in the thigh. He tied a towel about the 



402 DEATH OF ENSIGN BAGLEY 

wound and went on with his duties. At that moment a water- 
tender came ujd from below and coolly reported, " The for'd 
boiler 's gone, sir," A shell had exploded in the boiler, de- 
stroyed the tubes, thrown open the doors, filled the boiler- 
room with steam and dust, and scattered the fire over the floor. 
Another shot wrecked the blower engine. Others struck the 
deck, \vent through the smokepij)e, wrecked the forward en- 
gine, and disabled the forecastle gun. But the brave men 
kept firing away with their remaining 1-pounders. Help was 
coming, for the Hudson was steaming ahead at full speed, and 
the Wilmington^s 4-ineh guns were dropping shells into the 
murderous battery ashore. 

So far, although the Wiiislow had been completely dis- 
abled, not a man had been killed in the terrible rain of shot and 
shell. Amidships near the ammunition stand was Ensign 
Worth Bagley, directing the engineer to steam alternately 
ahead and astern with the one remaining engine in an affort 
to thwart the Spanish aim. All the electrical contrivance? 
had been wrecked, so orders had to go b}' word of mouth, while 
the screeching shells were filling the air. By the ensign wa? 
standing four men of the fire-room force. Then came the 
fatal shell. It struck the deck, glanced, and exploded. The 
Hudson was then so close that her crew could plainly hear 
the words of the brave men as they went to their death. 

"Save me! Save me!" shouted one poor fellow whose 
face was partly torn aw^ay, as he staggered back and nearly fell 
into the sea. Someone reached an arm to him, caught, and 
pulled him back, and laid him on the deck. Ensign Bagley 
threw his hands into the air, tottered forward, and fell against 
the signal mast, around which he clasped his arm, sank slowly 
down in a heap, and died instantly. 

Two others were killed outright, an oiler and fireman. 
Two others, a fireman and a cook, were so badly injured that 
they died within an hour. They had come up on deck to pass 
ammunition and get up the hawsers. 

The Hudson had by this time reached a position to extend 



BRAVERY OF THE " HUDSON'S " MEN 40;} 

aid to the ]Vi)islou'. Her gunners were doing ik.Mv, indeed, 
while in that trying position endeavoring to get I he Wintilow 
out, her guns iired U^T) rounds in a iialMiour. I!;irriii<>- a few 
scratches, none of her men were hurt, tliougii the water about 
them was continually lashed by shells. " Every man and boy 
on board," said one of the Hudson's gunners afterwards, 
"acted with coolness, and placed each shot just right, until the 
time when trying to get the WinsJotv in tow, and the fatal shot 
fell in the group about Ensign Bagley. Then they cried and 
yelled, and the way the shells flew into the guns was terrible. 
It was a wonder the shell man's hands were not out off by the 
way l\o. 2 threw the breech lock in and out. The gun became 
so hot it could not be touched. Cartridges began to jam, and 
they were pushed in by main strength." 

A long line was thrown from the Hudson to the Winslow 
and made fast, but the latter being disabled would not tow 
easily, and as the Hudson backed away the line parted. An- 
other line was made fast after twenty minutes' work, undei- tlu> 
constant fire of the enemy, and the Winslow towed to a point 
noar the Wilmington. The bravery of the Hudson's captain 
and crew in rescuing the Winslow from her perilous position 
was unsurpassed even by that of the men on the toi-pedo boat. 
The Wilmington, in the meantime, had i)layed havoc with 
the city of Cardenas. By the time the smaller vessels were in 
safety, the town along the shore was on fire; the Spanish 
gimboats also caught fire, and soon the shore batteries ceased 
to answer the Wilmington's guns. ]\rany of their guns were 
wrecked and tlicii- artillerymen were killed. 

When the iii'ing coased, Lieutenant iMTiindou signaled to 
the Wilmington. ''Many killed and wound. d. Send boat." 
A surgeon at once put off in a boat and took the wounded 
into it. Among them was the cook, terrildy mutilated, but 
brave, and while his comrades were rowing him across the bay 
from one ship to the other, he died with these last words: 
"Tell them I died like a man." 

Another wounded man died soon after being put aboard 



404 THE FLAG UNFURLED ON DIANA KEY 

the Wilmington. Of the crew of twenty-one men, five were 
killed and five were wounded. 

While all this was going on in the bay, the Machlas was 
knocking to pieces the signal station on Diana Key, where 
there was a blockhouse and a small battery. This was two 
miles southwest of where the vessels entered the bay. The 
Spaniards fied to the mainland and Commander Merry sent a 
boat crew ashore on the key, and having searched the block- 
house and found a quantity of arms and some official papers 
of the Spanish conimandant, they set it on fire. The Ameri- 
can flag was unfurled from the key and remained there un- 
disturbed. 

The Spanish reports, of course, claimed the day as a vic- 
tory, and the Cardenas garrison Avas warmly congratulated by 
Blanco and eulogized at Madrid. The usual complaint was 
made as to the town being fired on without notice, but in this 
case the fire was abundantly justified. Notwithstanding the 
loss of life and the damage to the ^YinsJow, it was really an 
American victory, for the Spanish gunboats were disabled, 
two of them being riddled and sunk. 

The lesson of the day was a rather wholesome one, in that 
it made the blockading fleet more cautious. Torpedo boats 
were not intended to run in under the heavy guns of hostile 
shores, and there had already been much criticism of the un- 
necessary daring displayed by their commanders. After some 
of the larger vessels were withdrawn from the blockade about 
the north shore to join. Admiral Sampson in his cruise to 
Puerto Eico, the Spanish gunboats at Cardenas had become 
venturesome in the face of the smaller craft left. Their cap- 
ture or destruction would put an end to the possibility of their 
interference with the maintenance of the blockade. This was 
accomplished by a brave and daring deed. 

During the second week in May an attempt was made to 
put a large quantity of arms and ammunition into the hands of 
the insurgents, one of our daring anny officers having secretly 
made his way to the insurgent headquarters and arranged for 



CARRYING ARMS TO THE INSURGENTS 405 

a meeting place. The expedition sailed in the steamer Gussie, 
under Captain Dorst, with two companies of United States 
reg-ulai-s, and a landing place was made west of Cardenas bay 
under the protection of the gunboats. Evidently, the Span- 
ish forces had received warning of the expedition, for when 
our soldiers landed a lively fight cn?ued, and the enemy were 
driven back with considerable loss, while our soldiers were un- 
injured. But the insurgents failed to put in an aj^pearance, 
and our forces finally re-embarked and returned to Key West. 



25 



CHAPTER XXXVII 

CHASING CERVERA'S FLEET — THE FLYING SQUADRON — 
DAYS OF EXCITEMENT AND UNCERTAINTY — SAxMPSON 
AND SCHLEY AT KEY WEST AND CERVERA AT SANTI- 
AGO. 

Cervera Raises another Question for the Strategists — Scliley Receives Orders 
to Leave Hampton Roads — Cervera Reported at Curayao — He Seelis 
Coal and Supplies — Sampson a Day's Sail from Santiago — More Days 
of Uncertainty — Cervera and Sampson Both Sailing in the Same 
Direction — Sampson and Schley arrive at Key West and Cervera at 
Santiago — Cervera's Luck as a Dodger — How He Entered Santiago 
while our Scouts were away — Schley Hurries to the South Coast of 
Cuba — Unaware of Cervera's Arrival at Santiago — Schley Prepares to 
Attack Cervera at Cieufuegos — Finds Cervera is not There and Pushes 
on to Santiago — Doubt as to Whether Cervera is Really There — 
Sampson Turns Back — Schley Steams up before Santiago. 

AUTHENTIC information that Cervera's ships were in 
the waters of Martiniqne was received from Captain 
Cotton, whose auxiliary cruiser, the Harvard, injured 
her machinery and put in to a Martinique port for repairs. 
Captain Cotton's dispatch was delayed for twenty-four hours, 
so that the United States did not receive official information 
till some hours after Cervera had taken on board some required 
supplies and a full complement of advices and departed, but 
the French government of that island officially denied that it 
had been unfairly detained. The problem presented by Cap- 
tain Cotton's dispatch, which arrived near midnight of the 
12th, constituted a very fascinating strategic puzzle, and the 
navy strategists were credited with a rather sleepless night. 

To the best of their information, Admiral Sampson was 
cooling his guns somewhere off San Juan, which is about 520 
miles from Martinique, 1,100 from Havana, and 700 from 
Santiago. Commodore Schley was still in Hampton Roads, 

(406) 



STRATEGISTS AGAIN PUZZLED 407 

where he had been impatiently waiting with stoam up for 
nearly a month; he was over 1,000 miles from the Cuban coast 
and about 1,000 miles further from Martinique than Sampson; 
Commodore Watson was about Havana and the other block- 
aded ports of Cuba with the smaller unarmored craft which 
Sampson had left him, and which was no match for Cervera's 
armored cruisers and large guns. 

The general opinion of the naval strategists was that Cer- 
vera had left Martinique with the intention of either proceed- 
ing along the southern route to Cuba, putting in at Santiago 
or Cienfuegos, hojjing to catch some of the weaker blockading 
vessels there, or of moving through the AVindward Passage be- 
tween Cuba and the island of Haiti to strike the blockading 
fleet on the northern coast of Cuba. It was not thought that 
he would run to San Juan, though he, doubtless, would have 
done so had he not heard of Sampson. Cervera's ships were 
as a squadron the fastest in the world, and hampered only by 
the torpedo-boat destroyers, which might have to stop to be 
coaled, and it was calculated that he could probably reach 
Cienfuegos by the evening of the 15th, or the blockading ves- 
sels on the north by the morning of the 16th. He might 
reach Santiago the 14th, but little thought was given to that 
port. Admiral Sampson's fleet was, on the other hand, slow, 
being hampered by the monitors. The machinery of the 
battleship Indiana was unreliable, and there was an insufficient 
supply of coal. As Cervera had already started and would be 
nearly two days out before the goveniment had the good for- 
tune to get word to Samx)son, it was not probable that the latter 
would catch Cervera unless he happened to run upon him. 
Schley's squadron hardly deserved the name of flying squad- 
ron, as it was hampered by the battleship ^fnf^sarlnisctfs, which 
could make l)ut about thirteen knots an hour, but it might 
reach the north coast of Cuba at about the time Cervera would 
arrive there, supposing that was his purpose. 

In this state of affairs, the authorities promptly abandoned 
the plan for the immediate dispatch of a large expedition to 



408 DEPARTURE OF THE FLYING SQUADRON 

Cuba. Early on tlie morning of the 13tli Sampson's dispatcli 
from St. Thomas telling of the San Juan bombardment and 
of tlie non-aj)pearanee of Cervera there reached the naval 
board, which immediately returned to the waiting Yale infor- 
mation of the appearance of Cervera, who might at that mo- 
ment be steaming through the Caribbean within 200 miles 
of Sampson. With this startling information and instruc- 
tions the Yale hurried back after Sampson's squadron, which 
was well off the coast of Haiti. Early that same morning sail- 
ing orders were sent to Commodore Schley, whose sailors 
jumped with joy when told that their long idleness was over, 
and that evening, the 13th, the squadron was off southward 
with instructions to call the government up at Charleston. 

Assuming that Cervera had been fully informed at Marti- 
nique of the location of the American squadrons, his best policy 
would seem to have been to have sailed direct for either San- 
tiago or Havana, the latter if he had been disposed to inflict 
any damage on our blockading fleet while the armored vessels 
of the United States were away. With a start of over 200 
miles he would have stood a fair chance to have broken the 
blockade about Havana, and even if Schley caught him in the 
act of breaking it, Cervera had four armored ships to Schley's 
three. H the Spanish admiral was informed of the speed of 
Sampson's squadron he must have seen that his chances of 
getting through the Windward Passage before Sampson could 
arrive there were excellent. But Cervera's movements were 
evidently directed from Madrid and it was the apparent pur- 
pose of the Spanish government to postpone as long as possible 
the onerations of the United States against Havana by divert- 
ing attention to other points till the rainy season approached, 
for in that season the difficulties of offensive action were 
greatly increased, while the advantages of defensive action 
were correspondingly increased. On the other hand, the 
United States authorities desired to prevent Cervera from 
getting under the strong guns of Havana. 

On the 14th Cervera was reported at the Dutch island of 










LISHEr.S. KAP.TJ: CKD. C ONN 




THE SPANISH FLEET AT CURASAO 411 

Curasao, which is about oOO miles further west than Marti- 
nique, but three degrees further south, indeed, it is about tifty 
miles from the coast of Venezuela. On the same day Samp- 
son, returning westward along the north coast of Haiti, and 
making the best timi' possible, having left the monitors behind, 
sent the torpedo boat J'orlcr into the jiarbdi- of Puerto Plata, 
San Domingo, for news, but the government not being certain 
then as to the location of Cervcra, the Poiier put in the next 
day at Cape Ilaitien, about a hundred miles further westward. 
By this time the reports were that Ccrvera's ships were surely 
and still at Curacao taking on coal and supi)lies. 

On the evening of the same day Schley's tleet arrived ofi" 
Charleston, S. C, or less than half the distance from Hampton 
Tvoads to Havana. Running into a fog soon after (l(']iarting, 
the squadron had made but nine knots. Dis])at('hes had l)een 
sent to him at Charleston and were taken out to him on a 
revenue cutter, so that there was a delay of only an hour, ami 
as night fell the squadron was cruising on southward. 

It was certain by this time that Cervcra could not reach 
Commodore Watson's fleet about Havana before Commodore 
Schley did. Assuming that Cervcra intended to make for a 
Cuban port, it was calculated that he could hardly cruise 
through the Windward Passage to the north coast without 
l)eing in danger of encountering Sampson, and he could hardly 
])ass westward tlii'ongli tlio. ^'u(•ataIl channel without encoun- 
tering Schley, though it was })ossible for him to pass either 
fleet at some distance away without being detected, evcTi 
though l)otli American commanders made the best use of their 
scouts. 

It seems to be clear that Ccrvera's fleet was in a bad way: 
at least he desired to pick up all the coal and supplies he could 
before making for a Cuban ])ort. lie lind a>ke(l peniiis>ioii 
from the Dutch governor to bring his whole lleet into tlu^ 
harbor for coal and provisions. The United St^ites consul 
had protested, though in doidit at first, considering that it 
miffht be best to allow tlieni to eome in while \V;i-hingt<m had 



412 CERVERA HURRIES ON TO SANTIAGO 

a longer time to plan the capture. The governor had finally 
decided that he would allow two of the vessels to come in for 
necessary provisions, and at noon of the 14:th the Maria Teresa 
and the Vizcaya dropped anchor in the harbor. The other 
vessels were two and a half miles out. 

The consul sot about learning all he could concerning the 
condition of the Spanish squadron, and heard that they were 
so short of rations that the officers had been living on beans for 
four days, and the crew had been put on half rations. The 
vessels stood very high out of the water, indicating that they 
were short of coal. The torpedo-boat destroyer Terror had 
been left behind at Martinique for repairs. 

The Spanish officers started at once to get in all the coal 
and provisions they could, but all the fuel to be had was 300 
tons of slack coal, condemned by the Dutch government, and 
it had been lying there for about two years waiting for a pur- 
chaser. They took this and an enormous stock of provisions, 
all to the value of $16,000, which they were required to pay 
in gold or drafts on London. All day Sunday they worked 
loading up. Towards night a cable dispatch was received by 
the Spanish officers, and they began to make preparations for 
immediate departure. They got away at 6 o'clock in an evi- 
dent hurry, for they left behind two lighter loads of coal and 
some provisions they had purchased. They also left behind 
the idea that they were bound for Puerto Rico. It transpired 
afterwards, according to Admiral Cervera's reports, that this 
cablegram came from General Blanco, ordering Cervera to 
hurry at once to the port of Santiago. Apparently alarmed 
by the approach of Schley's squadron, Blanco considered San- 
tiago the best port for Cervera to hide in while taking on sup- 
plies. Cervera thought otherwise and disliked the order. 

On the same day, therefore, and indeed at about the same 
hour, that Sampson left Cape Haitien westward, and Schley 
left Charleston southward, Cervera left Curasao, and, accord- 
ing to reports, westward. Thus Sampson was about 500 miles 
from Cervera; Schley about 1,500. Sampson and Schley 



RELATIVE POSITIONS OP THE FLEETS 4l3 

were each about COO iiiilos from Havana; Ccrvera nearer 
1,000. Cervcra was about 000 miles from Santiago; Sampson 
only about 200, and Schley considerably over 1,000 by either 
route. The Oregon, though well-nigh forgotten in the ex- 
citement of the moment, was actually about where Cervera 
had been four days before, off the Windward Islands. 
The public had the impression, and naturally so from this 
arrangement, that Schley was simply going to the relief of the 
blockading squadron, the danger to which had been greatly 
lessened by Cervera's trip to Curasao, while Sampson, who had 
been looking for Cervera for two weeks, and was now so near 
him, would with little difficulty find the Spaniard and have 
his desired encounter. 

Had Sampson sailed westward a day through the Wind- 
ward Passage along the south coast of Santiago province, and 
there quietly dropped his anchor and waited, Cervera would 
have come sailing directly into his presence. But Sampson 
was of the opinion that Cervera intended to make for Havana, 
and destroy the blockade, which was then weak, so many largo 
vessels having been withdrawn in the hope of meeting him. 
If Cervera's immediate destination had been Havana, how- 
ever, he would hardly have lost the opportunity he had of 
reaching there before either of the American squadrons could 
have prevented. It was strongly suspected that one of Cer- 
vera's objects was to land munitions of war for General Blanco, 
but this he could accomplish by running into Cienfuegos on 
the south coast, and joined by railroad with Havana. But, as 
already related, the cable at Cienfuegos had been cut on the 
1 1th, and that left Santiago as the most available point for him 
to touch for further advices from :Madrid. It would have 
been natural to suppose, therefore, that he would, on leaving 
Curasao, at least look in at Santiago, although Sampson had 
his magnificent fighting ships within a day's sail of that port. 
Then followed four days of the most exciting uncertainty 
and rumors of battles. The government advised all its con- 
sular offices in West Indian and South Am('ri"-n ports to make 



414 A MESSAGE TO MADRID 

every investigation possible and report at once any information 
of the Spanish squadron. Scouts were sent to watch ditierent 
ports. Admiral Sampson was supposed by some to be lying- 
in wait in the Windward Passage. Schley was supposed to be 
hurrying about the western end of Cuba to guard the Yucatan 
channel. 

Asa matter of fact, both Cervera and Sampson were sailing 
in the same direction — to the northwest, with Cervera's bows 
pointed towards Sampson's sterns. On the afternoon of the 
ISth Sampson arrived at Key West in the New York, where 
he found Schley, wdio had arrived that morning, and who 
left the next day for Cienfuegos. On the evening of the 19th 
Sampson learned by cable from Havana that Cervera had 
reached Santiago on the morning of that same day. It was 
l)elieved by both Sampson and Schley that Cervera w^:)uld 
make for Cienfuegos with munitions of war for Havana, Cien- 
fuegos being within easy communication by rail with tlie 
ca]ntal. On the 19th Cervera sent the following message to 
Madrid: 

Santiago, 19. 
This morning I have, without incident, entered this port, accompanied 
by the squadron. 

Cervera. 

Had this information been kept a state secret, it is impos- 
sible to say when Cervera would have been found. Owing 
to the conditions of the harbor of Santiago, it was impossible 
for a ship on the outside to have any idea of what was inside. 
Cervera had entered a blind pocket unobserved by the enemy, 
and, if Madrid had kept still, onr ships having not the slightest 
clue to his whereabouts, might have sailed around the whole 
Cuban coast and been none the wiser, until, possibly, Cervera 
saAv his opportunity to slip out. But the fact that he had been 
able to get into a Cuban port without incident was considered 
at Madrid as too good news to keep. The ]\finister of Marine 
immediately called at the residence of Sagasta, and then at the 



MORE LUCK THAN SKILL 415 

palace to lay tlio dispatch before the Queen Regent; the Queen 
at once ilispatc-hcd licr cougratulatiuns to Cervera, and the 
whole proceeding was given the greatest publicity. 

The naval strategists, who had become somewhat sensitive 
over the thoughtless criticisms of their conduct, were not sure 
whether they should be pleased or otherwise with Cervera's 
alleged appearance in Santiago. They could not fail to be a 
little nervous over his possible csca})e from that place as soon 
as he had coaled, for with nearly all the American naval vessels 
at the other end of Cuba, Cervera had ample opportunity to 
make another quick movement wath his fleet ships, and be out 
of reach of either Sampson or Schley before either could get 
to Santiago. 1'he opinion still prevailed that he would en- 
deavor to come to Havana's relief, possibly by sending muni- 
tions from Cienfuegos, or, probably, by watching his chance 
to steam direct to Havana. 

The cruiser St. Louis, which, under command of Captain 
Goodrich, had been scouting about West Indian waters since 
j\[ay 1st, had met Admiral Sampson on the 14th, while he was 
hurrying westward off Haiti, and, receiving orders, had arrived 
off Santiago on the 18th, without any intimation that Cervera's 
four armored cruisers were at that time pointed for the same 
ptji't and not a day's sail away. The St. Louisas orders were 
to cut the cable connecting Santiago and Jamaica. She began 
the search with the ■armed tng Woiripaiucl', commanded by 
Lieutenant Jungen, who had escaped from the Maine disaster, 
at about six o'clock on the evening of the 18th, gradually 
working ncai'cr the forts at the ninutli of tlic harbor, expect- 
ing every moment to draw their fire. About noon, having 
reached a position less than two miles from ^Nforro, the grapnel 
caught the cable, and the Spaniards sccni to liave then dis- 
covered the purpose of the Americans, for a battery on ]\[orro 
opened fire, which was returned by the St. Loiiis's 6-pounders. 
The engagement became quite fierce and the St. Louis was 
in ^ome danger of the fire from n mortal" batterv which her 
guns could not reach; but, fortunately, the cable was brought 



416 AN EXCITING MYSTERY 

up and cut in time to allow them to get away uninjured, and 
that night she steamed oil" eastward to cut the cable from 
Guantanamo, about thirty miles east of Santiago, to Mole St. 
Nicholas, Haiti, a work at which Commander Goodrich was 
engaged when Cervera slipped into Santiago, and this gave 
rise to the Spanish report, so joyously received at Madrid, that 
the American warships had disappeared on Cervera's approach. 
Had the St. Louis and the little Wo^npatuck loitered about 
Santiago a few hours longer they would have had early infor- 
mation of the whereabouts of Cervera, and possibly more than 
they could have successfully carried away, in view of their 
lack of armor and their inferior guns, though they were com- 
manded by skillful and vigilant officers. 

Acting upon the news of Cervera's arrival at Santiago, the 
Harvard was ordered to go at once to Santiago and watch for 
the possible departure of the Spanish fleet. As soon as the 
government at IMadrid perceived that our naval board were 
proceeding to work on the supposition that Cervera was at 
Santiago, fresh batches of Spanish reports began to arrive, re- 
ports that Cervera had departed, that he had been sighted off 
Costa Rica, and even that he had not been at Santiago at all. 
Nothing was wanting to make it one of the most uncertain 
and exciting problems of naval strategy, entirely without pre- 
cedent in history, and, if anything were lacking to give the 
finishing touch to the exciting mystery, it was the remarkably 
varying reports of the movements of the American squadron 
under the stress of enteqirising journalism hampered by the 
censorship at the convenient cable stations. 

It should be understood that Schley did not know when 
he sailed that Cervera had reached Santiago. That informa- 
tion had been reported late in the day, soon after Schley had 
departed in the expectation that he would most probably find 
Cervera at Cienfuegos, and in the hope that he might find him 
cruising into the Yucatan channel, and there settle which was 
the best man. The news being repeated over the cable it was 
sent to Schley, with instructions to go to Santiago. It reached 



"ready for anything" 417 

him ou the 23d, and lie left Cienfuegos on tlie 24tli, arriving 
off Santiago on the evening of the 28th. 

Admiral Sampson again prepared some of his ships for 
action, and departed with them to the blockade line in front 
of Havana, where he spent the 21st and 2 2d in reassembling 
his fleet, w liicli came in one by one, starting some of the slower 
ones on ahead for another cruise eastward. In order to re- 
ceive the latest news from Washington he waited till Monday 
morning when, with his fleeter vessels, he started on after those 
he had sent ahead. 

Meanwhile Schley, still withont any information that 
Cervcra had been reported at Santiago, was making his way 
around by the longer route through the Yucatan channel, 
expecting to meet the Spaniard at any moment. Guns were 
loaded and the men slept at their stations. The east end of 
Cuba was sighted on the afternoon of the 20tli, and shortly 
afterwards, while bearing tlirough the channel, the squadron 
felt sure the enemy was at hand. Men were sent to quarters, 
and the ships were cleared, but the vessels turned out to be 
friendly. As the squadron approached Cienfuegos early on 
Sunday morning, Commodore Schley signaled " AVe will l)lock- 
ade Cienfuegos. Have steam up to-night and be ready for 
anything. Do not know if enemy is in port." 

Just as the flagship passed the promontory at the entrance 
to the harbor, the rest of the squadron being about two miles 
off, five shots were fired from the shore. Tliey were appar- 
ently rifle shots, but the commodore signaled to clear for im- 
mediate action. Everything movable went overboard to the 
sharks, guns were manned, and up went the battleflags. Rut 
as the squadron swung by the mouth of the harbor, nothing 
could be seen from the foretops but the masts of three sailing 
vessels and the gray funnel of a steamer. A small coast 
steamer came out towards the mouth of the harbor, but 
quickly turned and hurried back out of sight. Somewhat dis- 
appointed, the vessels swung out from the coai?t, the men were 
dismissed from the guns, and the battleflags were hauled down. 



418 SCHLEY GOES ON TO SANTIAGO 

The commodore was not disposed to waste any ammunition in 
bombardments unless the Spanish fleet were really there. 

Whether there or not, Schley could not make cer- 
tain by a simple reconnoiter, for the topography of Cienfuegos 
is somewhat similar to that of Santiago. Both harbors have 
long, narrow entrances, protected by high land, and a whole 
fleet can lie in the inner harbor and be invisible from the out- 
side. But Schley determined to make sure, and found a way 
to communicate with some Cubans ashore on the following 
day. The result was that he was satisfied, though disap- 
pointed, that Cervera was not there. Then came Sampson's 
instructions to proceed to Santiago. 

Meanwhile, the swift St. Paul, which, having arrived at 
Key West on the 18th, in advance of either Schley's or Samp- 
son's squadrons, and having received orders there to proceed 
to Cape Haitien, had on the way picked up the Yale, and to- 
gether they reached the cape on the 21st, where the *S7. Paul 
was ordered to hurry to Santiago to watch for the possible 
escape of Cervera from Santiago, that is, if he were there. 
Reaching the waters off Santiago, she fell in with the Harvard, 
which had arrived there shortly after Cervera without seeing 
him, and the Minneapolis, which had been cruising about the 
Caribbean for several days with similar results. For the next 
four days, or from the 22d to the 26th, they cruised about the 
mouth of the harbor hoping to catch a glimpse of what was 
within, sometimes running in close, and again running far out 
to sea in the hopes that the Spaniard, if he were there, would 
be bold enough to show himself. But all their maneuvers 
were apparently in vain. 

As soon as the Washington strategists learned that Schley 
was approaching Santiago on the south, while Sampson was 
about the same distance away on the north, they ap]>car to 
have become alarmed over the fact that most of the strength 
of the fighting navy was concentrating on the eastern end of 
the island, when they had not the slightest official assurance 
that Cervera was there. The government was not disposed to 



PATROLING THE CUBAN COAST 410 

put any credence in Spanish reports after the Cadiz rumor, and 
felt anything but j^ure that the reserve Spanish squadron, under 
Camara, which had been rejxtrted so persistently at Cadiz by 
Spanish advices, niig-ht not be approaching the Atlantic coast 
at some point or seeking Havana by some out-of-the-way route. 
With Sanipsnii and Schley botli converging on Santiago, there- 
fore, the strategists became alarmed at the serious possibility 
that either Cervera or Canuira might break the blockade and 
upseit all the plans of war. 

The result was that Sampson oame about again. "Wlien 
nig'ht closed in on the 24:th, or the day Schley sailed from Cien- 
fuegos, Sampson's magnificent fleet of fifteen vessels was plow- 
ing its way eastward off the coast opposite Santiago; when the 
sun came up on the 25tli the fleet was plowing its way along 
the same coast — but to the westward, back towards Havana, 
where he arrived at about" the same time that Schley steamed 
u]) l)cforo Santiago's fi-owuing ]\Iorro. The slow-going moni- 
tors had been towed back and forth for the service they might 
render in a battle which could not be brought about, and when 
at last the battle did come, neither the admiral nor the moni- 
tors had an aggressive part in it. 



CHAPTER XXXVIII 

IN THE HARBOR OF SANTIAGO — ADMIRAL CERVERA'S AL- 
LEGED STRATEGY — COMMODORE SCHLEY MAKES SURE 
HE HAS THE ENEMY — CERVERA "BOTTLED UP." 

A Beautiful Harbor — Morro Castle — Background for Many Bloody 
Scenes — The Winding Channel and the Bay — Irrational Movements 
of the Spanisli Admiral — Guided Largely by Necessities — Opportunities 
which He Refused to Embrace — Evidence of Cervera's Presence in 
the Harbor — All Doubts Removed — Schley's Attack on the Forts — 
Cervera's Ships Fire at Random over the Hills — Remarkable Reports 
from Madrid — Too Late for Falsehoods — Cervera "Bottled up" — 
The Government at Once Takes Steps to Send Forces to Santiago — 
Admiral Sampson Arrives at Key West and Prepares to Join Schley 
— The Monitors Left Behind — Remarkable Trip of the Oregon — Thir- 
teen-thousand-mile Run and then to Battle — Admiral Sampson Takes 
Command — Organizing the Army — Found Unprepared at the Last 
Moment — The Departure at Last. 

THE harbor of Santiago has often been called one of the 
most beautiful in the world, but it must be admired 
from the inside, not from without. Approaching 
from the sea, it is utterly impossible to make out the mouth 
of the entrance even from comparatively close quarters. A 
long range of high and steep mountains seems to form an im- 
penetral)le front. But coming near the coast a rift appears 
in the ramparts, disclosing a passage only 180 yards wide, 
with a picturesque castle on the eastern bluff, a relic of the 
sixteenth century. Like Havana and San Juan, Santiago has 
its Morro, but it antedates all others. It is an antique, yel- 
low, Moorish-looking stronghold, with crumbling honey- 
combed battlements and queer little flanking turrets, grated 
windows, and shadowy towers. Built upon the face of a lofty 
dun-colored rock, upon whose precipitous side the fortifica- 
tions are terraced, the light and shade formed by the time- 
stained walls make a strikingly artistic picture. A flight of 

(420) 



SANTIAGO AND ITS DEFENSES 421 

well-worn -steps winds from the water's edge up the side of the 
grim old walls, while the uioat, drawbridge, and other sui-- 
roimdings make iij) the charming picture, more suggestive of 
the days of gallant knights and imprisoned maidens than of 
modern seaeoast fortifications. 

It was a formidalilc defense in the days of the buccaneers, 
but its old guns have lain there in the sun, wind, and rain of 
the tropics for years and years, and for as many years Morro 
has been little used except as a prison for political offenders. 
Those who visited Santiago before the war with the United 
States could, as they sailed past its frowning walls, see pallid 
faces at the grated windows; but prisoners generally remained 
there but a short time. They were either taken out on the 
ramparts, shot, and thrown into the sea, as the morning sun 
streamed along the picturesque shore, or were carried off to 
the African penal colonies. Old Morro has been the back- 
ground for many a bloody scene in the pages of Spain's his- 
tory of bloodshed and torture. 

On the mountain to the left of the entrance is the Castle 
Socapa, also presenting a very picturesque appearance, while 
a little further inland and on Morro's side is a small fortifica- 
tion resembling a star in shape, and for that reason called the 
Batteria de la Estrella. Still further in to the left is a little 
island, on the hillside of which is built the hamlet of Smith 
Cay, of late years patronized by the best families of Santiago 
as a watering place. Then comes a narrow winding channel, 
a mile in length, between the mountains and broad meadows 
covered with rank verdure, cocoanut groves, and little fishing 
hamlets. Thrifty laurels, palms with their graceful ]>lume& 
of foliage, and banana trees line the way, while here and there 
upon the banks appears a pleasant country house in the midst 
of a pretty garden of flowering shrubs. Then a sharp angle 
in the hills was passed, from which look the guns of the Punta 
Ciorda battery, and the l)road sheltered bay of Santiago lies i:i 
full view, with the quaint rambling old city on a hillside at 
the northeni end. 



422 cervera's lost opportunity 

It was in this unique harbor that were fought many bloody 
battles in the old days; here was a three-days contest betweeji 
a French corsair and Spanish vessel; here, too, was brought 
the Virginius, and here were slain the members of her crew; 
in these regions began the Cuban struggle for independence, 
and here it was that the United States, because of Cervera's 
alleged strategy, was first to plant its flag. 

Assuming that Cervera had brought his armor-clad vessels 
over for the practical purpose of fighting, his entrance into 
Santiago was deemed a reckless or irrational move, but his 
continuing there for a week without anything to bar his way 
except two or three converted merchantmen and liners, was 
considered inexplicable, and, therefore, improbable. Spain 
was manifesting considerable elation over the notion that her 
fleet was accomplishing great things. Some of the expert 
nautical critics of Europe wrote learnedly of the way Spain 
was out-maneuvering us. C^ervera acquired a brief reputa- 
tion as a strategist, Avhen, as a matter of fact, he does not seem 
to have been able to exercise sufficient option to make strategy 
possible. He had steamed from Martinique to Curacao, and 
from Cura(^ao to Santiago, and it was due more to his good 
fortune for the time than to any strategy he exercised that 
every American vessel in those waters happened to miss him. 
Guided largely by his necessities, he acquired the reputation 
of an artful dodger, much to the disparagement of his reputa- 
tion as a brave fighter; for it was fair to suppose that he had 
brought his armored vessels over here to fight, not to incapaci- 
tate them in a land-pocket; and had ho liad the inclination to 
fight, the favorable opportunities were not lacking. In view 
of the swiftness of his vessels, he could readily have engaged 
either Sampson or Schley while separated. How he would 
have come out of such a fight with oitlior of the American 
commanders, it is impossible to say, but if he stood any chance 
at all of success it was in taking the American naval forces 
when separated. But these opportunities, which chance 
afforded him, he took good care not to embrace even after he 



THE TEIJ.-TALB MAST 423 

had cnterGcl the harbor of Santiago, " without incident "; for 
eight days his exit was opposed only by ships, all of whit-h any 
one of his cruisers, properly handled, could have sunk, if they 
had ventured any opposition. There was coal at Santiago, as 
it turned out, and he could in two days have filled his bunkers. 
With his iniir f;i>t ci-iiisers he couhl have run to Puerto Rico 
while Sampson was running to Key West; having coaled at 
San Juan he could have run back to C*ul)an waters, or, possi- 
bly, have intercepted the Oregon^ which he could not fail to 
know nuist l)y tliis time be approaching Cuban waters. But, 
for some reason, which nuist, perhaps, remain a mystery until 
some future liistorian has the pri\ilege of delving among the 
archives of the Spanish government, Cervcra remained in the 
trap as if indifferent to the possibility of its closing upon him. 
As a good sailor he must have known that on the 27th, when 
the lookouts on the forts saw Schley's scjuadron steaming by 
the entrance to the harbor, the trap had closed. It seems 
probable that Cervera had really intended to send out a couple 
of vessels for the attack upon the unarmored scouts, for the log 
of the Cristobal Colon shows that the vessels moved down to 
the mouth of the harbor on the 25th, and on the 2Tth, as 
Schley steamed by he saw through his glasses at least one 
vessel, which he took for a meml)er of Cervera's fleet, the 
Cristobal Colon having a ])eculiar construction, a military 
mast between the smokepi])es. 

" lie will never get home again," Schley is reported to 
have remarked as he took his glasses from the tell-tale mast; 
but while the American connnodore was pretty well satisfied 
himself that he had the Spaniard in a pen, he needed more 
evidence to convince the strategists at AVashington, or Samp- 
son, who IkkI arrived back off Plavana. Inhere was the possi- 
bility that even if one or two of the S]>anish vessels were in 
the harbor that Oervera had left them there as a decoy, and 
gone elsewhere, possibly to effect a junction witli the Cadiz 
fleet, and with the intention <A' (lr<i])ping on the blockade line 

when all the American fighting vessels had concentrated be- 
26 



424 BRAVERY OP LIEUTENANT BLUE 

fore the Santiago decoy. But by the 28th Schley was able to 
report to Washington that he had made out three of Cervera's 
Heet in the lower part of the harbor, and the Naval Board be- 
gan to make its plans accordingly. 

Schley, however, manifested a disposition to have it out 
with tli« enemy then and there if possible. On Sunday, the 
29th, or the day when his first dispatches reached Washington, 
he ordered the Marhlehead to run in close to Morro in order 
to see as far as possible into the winding entrance. The 
cruiser started, and as she ajiproached within range of Morru's 
guns, she was going at a speed which would have required far 
better marksmanship than the Spaniards had yet displayed to 
hit her. She kept a course that carried her clear of the shoal 
water which extends from Morillo Point, and, as she went by 
the entrance, those aboard of her obtained a fair view of the 
harbor nearly as far as Punta Gorda, and caught a further 
glimpse of Spanish cruisers. To make assurance doubly sure, 
Commodore Schley had the benefit of the services of Lieuten- 
ant Blue, who went ashore, and, without guard, bravely 
worked his way to high ground, till he was enabled to secure 
a full view of the harbor, and to clearly see the four Spanish 
cruisers and two torpedo boats. lie returned from his dan- 
gerous trip unharmed. It was one of the most daring and 
successful deeds of the war. All doubt having been removed, 
Commodore Schley determined to draw the fire of the forts in 
order to discover their position and the locality of any masked 
batteries, and also, if possible, to draw out Cervera. If he 
had crossed the ocean with the desire of fighting for his 
coimtry, Schley determined to gratify it. 

At noon of the 31st the Commodore left his flagship 
BrooMyn, which was coaling from the collier Merrimac, two 
miles out to sea, where lay also most of the other vessels occu- 
pied in routine duties, and lioisted his flag from the battleship 
Massachusetts, which soon headed for the entrance of the 
harbor, followed by the cruiser New Orleans and the battle- 
ship Iowa. Near the mouth of the channel could be seen the 



AN hour's fierce BOMBARDMENT 425 

Cristobal Colon, lying" Avitli her port broadside towards the 
American ships, and Hying an immense ensign. The Span- 
iards had their awnings np fore and aft, and the crew were 
moving hizily about the decks, apparently taking the move- 
ment of the American ships for another parade by the forts, 
siu'h as had taken place before. Behind the Cristobal Colon 
could also be distinguished the Vizcaya and the Ahnirante 
Oijuendo, while close by were the destroyers Phdoii and 
Furor. 

As the Massachusetts passed the entrance she opened fire 
upon the Cristobal Colon, using her forward 8-inch guns on 
the port side and her 13-inch rifles. The Spanish cruisers and 
four batteries, two on the east side of the entrance, one on the 
west, and one on Smith Cay, began to reply. Some of the 
guns on the batteries were 10 and 12-inch Krupps, and the fire 
on both sides was so well sustained and the reverberations were 
so thrown back by the mountains that hardly an interval in 
the roar could be distinguished. Both sides showed bad judg- 
ment in getting the range, as the American ships made their 
first maneuver past the fortifications, but on the second round 
the Americans showed a decided improvement, and ancient 
Morro was struck again and again, each shell tearing great 
rents in the yellow walls and sending skyward masses of 
masonry which had lain undistnrl)ed for three centuries. The 
Si)anish artillerymen also began to show a sui'])rising accuracy 
of aim on the second round. Several of their shells burst over 
the loiva, and three fell dangerously near the New Orleans. 
The Spanish vessels seemed to be firing over the hills at ran- 
dom, but they did not venture out. Aft(M- the cannonading 
had lasted for a half-hour three of the batteries ceased firing, 
having been badly demolished, and a few minutes later the 
American ships desisted and sailed contentedly away. But 
the Cristobal Colon and (he battery on the western shore kept 
U]) a weak and harndess fire for about twenty niinut(>s longer. 
AltogetluM-, the firing lasted less than an hour, but it satisfied 
Schley still further of the presence of the Spanish cruisers 



426 "bottled up" 

near the mouth of the harbor. One of the shells of the Iowa 
had struck the Cristobal Colon and started a fire, which was, 
however, quickly extinguished. The latter fired the last shot, 
and the Spanish reports claimed in the customary manner that 
the Americans had been driven off. Senor Aunon, Minister 
of Marine, declared in the Senate that the news was a good 
augury for further victories that would be gained by the cour- 
age and merit of the Spanish sailors, and the Senate unani- 
mously adopted an expression of satisfaction at the striking 
victory gained by the Spanish fleet. Thus were the exigencies 
of domestic politics in Spain met. But what was more re- 
markable was the ofiicial information from Madrid the same 
day that only the Cristobal Colon, which was repairing her 
boilers, was at Santiago, the others had gone ! 

But the time for maneuvering under cover of false reports 
had passed. Satisfied of the correctness of Schley's reports, 
the United States government was already preparing for the 
campaign. The troops which had been hurried to the south- 
ern ports two weeks before in the expectation of striking at 
Havana, were now to be headed for Santiago. Cervera had 
changed our plans of invasion by allowing himself to be, in 
the popular expression of the day, " bottled up." Finding 
ample field for the exercise of his genius, the cartoonist repre- 
sented the Spaniard in traditional garb crouching at the 
bottom of a bottle, labeled " Santiago Preserves," while over 
the mouth of the bottle hung LTncle Sam's old beaver hat, and 
Uncle Sam himself, resting after a long and somewhat ardu- 
ous chase, was seated close by, looking contentedly at the 
agonized Spaniard within. 

Admiral Sampson, having again reached Key West at 
about the time C'onnnodore Schley had assured Washington 
of the presence of the Spanish ships in Santiago harbor, at 
once made preparations for joining Schley and taking com- 
mand of the naval operations. But in this trip he left the 
monitors behind. Having been helped back and forth in 
search of Cervera, these unfortimate vessels were in the end 



SPLENDID RECORD OP THE "OREGON" 427 

denied the opportunity of showiiii;' their efficiency in a real 
naval battle, while the ()ir(j<>n, which had heen steaming for 
three months, and had arrived at Key West a little ahead of 
Admiral Sampson, was destined to proceed at once to the 
scene of o})erations and take a glorious part in the destruction 
of Cervera's Heet. Her cruise and successful ai'i'ival excited 
the admiration of the woi-ld. It spoke volumes for the 
efficiency of a battleship Avhich could make a 13,000 uiile 
run, throw in fresh coal, and steam off ready for battle with- 
out eveu stopping to tighten a crank pin. Her achievements 
were among the most notable in the whole war, and no crew 
of American sailors had more right to be proud than the crew 
of the Oregon when she set out with Admiral. Sampson for 
Santiago, before which they arrived on June 1st. 

Had the government of the United States arranged the 
movements of Cervera in its own way, it could have hardly 
distributed them to better advantage for its own convenience; 
for not simply was the Spanish fleet placed where it could 
neither help the Spaniards in Cuba nor hurt the Americans 
outside, but the weeks of uncertainty in locating him had been 
of considerable advantage to the army department. It was 
one of the peculiar features of the situation at this point that 
while the steps had b{>en taken to mol)ilize a large army as soon 
as war was declared, and whih' the governuwut luul j)lann(Ml 
an immediate invasion of Cuba in the niidijlc of May, when 
Cervera was supposed to be at Cadiz, the army was actually 
far from ready to move by the 1st of June, when its presence 
at Santiago became an inipci-ative necessity, the harbor of 
Santiago having been fixed so that Cervera could not get out 
nor Sampson get in. Tt had been supposed that the army 
had been waiting for the navy; but Avhen the mivy had Cer- 
vera " bottled u]),'" it had to wait for the army. 

In prejiaratioii for th(> organization of the army, both 
regular and volunteer, it ha<l been decided during the first 
week in ^lay that it should \>r dixidcd into seven army corps, 
and that into these should be put both regular and volunteer 



428 NEW GENERALS APPOINTED 

regiments. In order that there might be a sufficient number 
of major-generals and brigadier-generals to officer these corps, 
the President had on the 4th sent to the Senate, which had 
promptly confirmed it, a long list of nominations. For major- 
generals he named for promotion eight regular army men and 
four civilians; the former being Joseph C. Breckinridge, El- 
well S. Otis, John J. Coppinger, William R. Shafter, William 
M. Graham, James F. Wade, and Henry C. Merriam. The 
civilians raised to this high rank were General Fitzhugh Lee, 
Congressman Joseph Wheeler of Alabama, J. FI. Wilson of 
Delaware, and Senator Sewell of New Jersey. This list, as 
well as the longer list of nominations for brigadier-generals, 
was notable as containing, so far as could be seen, no political 
nominations, though great stress had been brought upon the 
President to secure such appointments. Of the four civilians 
who became major-generals, two served in the Union and two 
in the Confederate army during the Civil War. The ap- 
pointment of two Confederate veterans was conclusive evi- 
dence that sectional feeling had become a matter of past his- 
tory, and the wisdom of the President in securing trained 
leaders had, doubtless, been derived from his own four years' 
experience in the Union army in the field. The North had 
spent two years in learning how to fight and in discovering 
and educating its generals, and at the end every man who had 
secured a first place in either army was a graduate of West 
Point. The President proposed to secure the results without 
incurring the perils of a season of education. He, therefore, 
selected men of expert training and experience, not amateurs 
and politicians. The great majority of men were graduates 
of West Point, who had spent all their lives in the jjrofession 
of arms, and those who were not graduates, and who came 
from civil life, had had the training of one of the most terrible 
wars of modern times. 

Up to the latter part of May no thought had been given to 
Santiago, which, while an important port, was in a province 
largely controlled by the insurgents, and there the reconcen- 



NO HELP FOR RECONCENTRADOS 431 

trado order had not taken effect. Miss Clara Barton had ar- 
rived at Key West in a very few hours after the declaration 
of war with over 2,000 tons of provisions, ready to advance 
M'ith the army, and, tinding that there was no army there at 
that time, nor likely to be for some time, she sought permis- 
sion of Admiral Sampson, who was maintaining the blockade, 
to take her provisions to the starving reconcentrados. But 
the admiral pointed out to her that it would be useless for him 
to blockade Havana if the Red Cross took in provisions for 
the pco])le, wlio, however mucli tliey needed it, would be 
thrust aside by the Spaniards, the supplies being taken for the 
maintenance of the Spanish army, to cut off which the block- 
ade was proclaimed. She appealed to the President, but, 
wliilo lit' sympathized ^\•itll her purposes, he agreed with the 
admiral that nothing in the way of relief should be done. So 
]\Iiss Barton whiled away the time about Key West, feeding 
Cuban refugees and prisoners on the prize boats. And as 
time went on the public interest became absorbed in Cervera, 
the reconcentrados slipped out of mind and, to a large extent, 
out of this world and into the next. 

And now Havana its(>lf was to lose its importance in the 
public interest, except to the weary lookouts on the block- 
ading fleet, which had been rolling in the sea for a month with 
nothing more exciting on hand than the chase of an occasional 
fishing smack. Santiago had become the center of opera- 
tions. But while the delay in definitely locating Cervera had 
been of considerable convenience to the Department of "War 
engaged in lhe monumental and novel task of not simply re- 
cruiting an army, but of providing for its sustenance, it was 
at once apparent that a little longer delay would have been 
useful. The regulars had been moved up promptly, hail 
taken to cam]) life natui'ally, and a large })art of them had 
been at Tampa for weeks, '' marking time." (iradually, as 
the volunteers were mustered in and e(]uipped, they had been 
moved up from State encampments to Caiup Alger, across 
the Potomac from Washington and ( liickamauga, the volun- 



432 THE ARMY UNPREPARED 

teers moving in as the regulars moved out for Tampa. As 
the volunteers were moved on to Florida, the operation of 
amalgamating them with the regulars proceeded, and a new 
camp was located at Jacksonville, under the command of 
General Lee. 

As the number of troops sent to the Philippines was much 
larger than was originallv contemplated, and as many of the 
regiments of the volunteers under the first call remained in- 
complete, it was deemed advisable to have more men mustered 
in, and on May 2Gth the President issued a call for 75,000 
additional. Up to the 1st of June about 118,000 of the 
125,000 called for in the first proclamation had been mustered 
in and recruiting for the regular army had raised it 30,000, 
making 155,000 in all. Including the 10,000 men authorized 
to be enlisted as immunes, this provided for an army, when 
fully mustered, and the regular army when increased to its 
legal limit, of over 260,000. 

Yet, when the campaign was suddenly transferred to San- 
tiago and the order came for an expedition of about 12,000 
under General Shafter to invest the city, it was found impos- 
sible for it to get away promptly. The men were ready, had 
been ready for some time, but when it came to the point of 
putting them on transports, it was found that the commissary 
department was weak. Line after line of freight cars loaded 
with supplies came into Tampa, but for a time there seemed to 
be no one who knew what was in the cars or where it was to 
go. N'ot having had a war for nearly forty years, the officers 
in charge of the commissary arrangements had not risen to the 
emergency, however efficient they were in the routine of 
times of peace. The little, but very important, problems of 
fitting out even a small army with all essentials, uniforms, 
ammunition, tents, picks, spades, shovels for throwing up in- 
trenchments, food, medicines, and so on to the end of a very 
long list, had lieen unfamiliar to our army officers, and, while 
it was disappointing, it Avas not surprising. It was fortunate 
that we were dealing with an enemy no livelier than Spain, 



OFF FOR CUBA 435 

and it provided a very ])r()lital)le lesson to be kept in mind in 
future. 

But the officers worked untiringly, with the residt that 
by the 8th the troops were on board the transports, and the 
expedition had actually set out under the convoy of the In- 
diana. It had oone but a little distance when it was per- 
emptorily recalled, much to the disgust of the troops, who 
were crowded into rather close and warm quarters. At the 
last moment the AVar Department considered that it would 
be rash to set out without a stronger convoy. There had l)een 
repeated rumors that Spanish ships of war had been seen in 
the neighborhood of Cuba. They had generally been re- 
garded as only new editions of similar rumors and reports that 
had been circulated from the very beginning of the war. 
These rumors gave Spain the credit of having a fleet almost 
everywhere on the Atlantic coast; but at just the moment the 
expedition was to set out for Santiago, where the navy was 
impatiently awaiting, came a circumstantial story declaring 
positively that a Spanish battleship, a cruiser, and two torpedo 
boats had been sighted sneaking about in the proposed path 
of the expedition. It was difficult to see where such a fleet 
could come from, imless the Cadiz fleet had slipped over un- 
announced; but the department proposed to take no chances, 
and back the expedition came, to await other war vessels. 

At last, however, on the 15th, the expedition got under 
way for good. It consisted of sixteen infantry regiments of 
the regulars, two volunteer regiments (the Seventy -first Xew 
York and the Second Massachusetts), detachments of heavy 
and light artillery, engineer and signal corps, and a part of the 
First Volunteer Cavalry, under Colonel AVood and Lieuten- 
ant-Colonel Roosevelt, a division of expert horsemen and 
sharpshooters, which had been organized by Tioosevelt, and 
whi(di was ]iopularly known as the " Rough Riders." 



CHAPTEE XXXIX 

THE BRAVE DEED OF LIEUTENANT HOBSON AND HIS CREW 

— GOING INTO THE JAWS OF DEATH — FEARFUL EXPE- 
RIENCES AND A WONDERFUL ESCAPE. 

Plans for Destroying or Capturing Cervera's Fleet — Hobson Presents a 
Plan to Prevent His Escape — Admiral Sampson Gives His Consent — 
Preparing the Merrimac for a Dangerous Trip — Asking for Volun. 
teers — Drawing Lots — Details of Hobson's Plans — Preparations 
Made at Last — The Crew as Selected — Hobson Speaks of His Chances 
of Success — Battleships take up Position at Sunset — Hobson Appears 
on the Bridge — Everything Ready — The Merrimac Moves in — 
Watching in Breathless Interest — Disappearing in the Mist of the 
Shore — A Blaze of Fire — The Search of the Little Launch — Hobson 
Given up for Lost — How He Steamed into the Sheet of Flame — A. Mine 
Explodes under the Merrimac — On the Deck in a Hail of Shot and 
Shell — Slipping Overboard and Clinging to the Catamaran — A Spanish 
Launch Appears — An Offer to Surrender — " It was Admiral Cervera " 

— Prisoners in Morro — Their Fate Made Known. 

FROM the time the authorities at Wasliington became 
confident that Cervera was at Santiago, plans for 
tightening the cork of the bottle, so to speak, were 
considered. Having the Spaniard there, every effort should 
be made to prevent his escape. Realizing his situation, as he 
certainly must have done, it might fairly be expected that on 
a dark, foggy, or stormy night he might work his way out 
sufficiently far to escape before being recognized. The Carib- 
bean is noted for the fierceness and suddenness of some of its 
tropical storms, and in one of these the American fleet might 
be separated, or at least obliged to lie off at a great distance 
from the shore to ensure safety. At once, therefore, inquiries 
had been set afoot for some available old vessel which might 
be taken to Santiago and, possibly, sunk in the channel. In 
view of the defenses at the entrance, however, the dangers of 
the proposed operation seemed to render it impracticable, but 

Admiral Sampson kept it in mind when he set out for San- 

(436) 



AN INGENIOUS AND DANGEROUS PLAN 4:57 

tiago, hoping' that wlii'ii lie had h">kc'd over the dcfciisos a way 
might be foiuul for such an attcin})t, and one of the first per- 
sons to chum an audience with him on his arrival on June 1st 
was Assistant Naval Constructor Richmond Pearson Ilol)son, a 
native of Alabama, twenty-seven years old, a graduate of tlie 
Xaval Academy in 1889, a student of naval construction 
abroad at one time, and at this time holding the rank of lieu- 
tenant in the navy, and attached to the Neiu Yorlx. 

He luid looked over the mouth of the harbor and laid be- 
fore Admiral Sampson a plan which he claimed would effect- 
ually block the channel, so that a large part of the fleet would 
be at liberty to cover the landing of the expected troops else- 
w^here. It was a daring expedition which he proposed, and 
with true courage he offered to lead it himself, indeed, he de- 
sired the privilege of doing so. His plan was to select a volun- 
teer crew of just sufficient number to navigate the collier 
Merrimac, to strip the old ship of everything of value except 
the coal remaining in her, and then under cover of darkness, 
while the fleet engaged the forts, to nin her straight towards 
the narrowest part of the channel, swing her across it, and sink 
her by firing explosives in her bottom. He and his crew would 
jump overboard as she sank and endeavor to make their way 
out so as to be picked iip by the torpedo boat Porter or a steam 
launch from the New York, which should lie in close to shore 
for that pur]>ose. It was a startling ])roposition, an expedi- 
tion whicli the admiral could not feel justified in ordering, as 
it Would seem like sending men to certain death; but when one 
of his subordinates offered and begged to undertake it and 
urged the plan in eloquent and persuasive language, the ad- 
miral determined to put it into execution if possible. He had 
seen evidences of the cool ])raverv of ITobson at San Juan, 
where he had stood at the Xnv York's range-finder through- 
out the bombardment. 

Hobson was ready to act that night, and he received his 
commission to ]M-epare the Mrrrhiinr for the m-dcal Immedi- 
ately. AVhile the officers of the collier were contentedly eat- 



438 PREPARING THE " MERRIMAC " 

ing their limchj Hobsoii appeared on board and made the 
startling announcement that he was going to sink their ship 
that night in the channel, and he proceeded to fit her for the 
emergency. The four transverse bulkheads were located and 
their positions marked on the outside at the rail. A belt line 
was run along the port side of the ship parallel to and under 
the water line, and on this sus]:)ended line in 8-inch copper 
cases were hung seven charges of brown prismatic powder, 
each weighing seventy-eight pounds. An igniting charge of 
four ]:)ounds of quick black powder was placed in the center of 
each can, and the whole covered with a mixture of tallow and 
pitch for protection against the water. Each torpedo also 
liad a girth-line extending completely around the ship to hold 
it firmly in place. The wire and battery for exploding the 
charges were made ready, and as far as possible all stores were 
removed, leaving little in the ship except 2,000 tons of coal. 
The anchor chains were laid out on deck so that they would 
run out without hitch. The men worked merrily, singing as 
they prepared the collier for her fearful mission. At sunset 
a thunder storm blew up, covering the mountains about San- 
tiago with dense clouds, which were rifted by brilliant flashes 
of lightning. The echoes of the thunder peals rolled off to 
the fleet in dull rumblings, like distant cannonading, and in 
the intervals could be heard the voices of the men on the 
Merrimac as they sang " The Star Spangled Banner " and 
" Home, Sweet Home." 

These preparations took time, and Hobson and the crew 
were busy all that afternoon, and far into the night. JNIean- 
while, the admiral was making other preparations. Shortly 
after Hobson had gone to the Merrimac, the ships' crews of 
the fleet saw the following signal flying from the Neiv Yorl;: 

" An attempt will be made to-nitrlit to sink the collier Merrimac at the 
entrance to the harbor. One volunteer, an enlisted man, is requested from 
each ship." 

Immediately the men were mustered on the quarter decks, 



ships' crews volunteer 4.)0 

aii<l the ciiittiiiiis laid the ])l:iii Ix'forc tliciii, carofiilly ('\])laiii- 
ing tlu' uimsnal risks ilmt the xnlnntcci's woiiM incur, Init 
l)rac'tically the entire companies of the ships volunteered for 
the clangorous work. On Conmiodore Schley's flagship, the 
Brooh-ltpi, aloiic, 150 men volunteered; on the Texas 140 
siuniticd tlicir d(>sirc to go; Ilobson and the admiral really had 
the pick of the men of the fleet. Sailors, machinists, flremen, 
engineers, petty ofiicers, junior ofiicers, all begged to be al- 
lowed to go. Commander Miller of the Merrimac was par- 
ticularly anxious to go, and only left the ship after the ad- 
miral's formal order. The Neiv Yor]i''s launch was selected 
to run in shore and pick up survivors. There was intense 
rivalry among the volunteers for this service. 

The volunteers, their comrades envying them as they de- 
])arted for a task that meant certain glory, but almost as cer- 
tain death, were taken to the Men-imac, where Iloljson and a 
large force were busily at work, and where the admiral came 
aboard to examine the preparations. The scjuadron was 
moved down to the entrance of the harbor, lying oiT in a semi- 
circle, and there they awaited the Merrimac. Ilobson and 
his men worked away with a will. Idealizing that in sucdi a 
hazardous undertaking a mistake might prevent success, 
every detail was carried out with precision. 

It was Ilobson's purpose to creep in and api>roa(di the en- 
trance from the westward until he could shape his course as 
near as possible directly for Estrella Point. lie wished to 
])ut the bow of the boat near this point and then swing her 
across the channel. When tlic ship was snfliciently near, in 
his judgment, the helm was to be put hard aport. This would 
swing the ship across the channel and stop her headway. 
AVhen she began to swing, the starboard bow-anchor would 
bo let go with sixty fathoms of chain; then ihe stai-l>(>ai"<l stiM-n- 
anchor would le let go to check her, and the mines exploded. 
The strong flood tide "was to be relied upon for assistance. 
The powder charges were about thirty-five feet apart and ten 
feet below the waterlinc. 



440 THE ADVENTURE DELAYED 

The signals to tlie men at the anchors were to be given by 
ropes attached to their wrists and leading to the bridge, where 
it was Hobson's purpose to stand till he felt the ship settle. 
The other men, as soon as they had done the dnty assigned to 
them, were to jump over the side and make for the lifeboat. 
Each man was carefully instructed in the duty he was ex- 
pected to perform, and fully appreciated the desperate nature 
of the undertaking. 

At last all preparations were completed, but by this time 
it was dawn. Hobson headed his shi]) in at about a 10-knot 
speed, but had been running but a few minntes when she was 
signaled to make for the flagship. This recall was a great dis- 
appointment to Hobson, and, in answer to the admiral's order, 
he signaled, requesting that he be allowed to make the at- 
tempt, late though it was, feeling certain that he could suc- 
ceed. But the admiral feared that daylight might spoil the 
chances of success, and a positive order was given Hobson to 
stop. 

So the fires were banked, and it was decided to postpone 
the attempt till the following night. The men left their sta- 
tions and the vessel steamed further off shore. The strain 
had been very great on the men, who had nerved themselves 
for the trying moment, and the reaction was most depressing. 
One of the crew, named Mullen, boatswain of the Mcrrimac, 
assigned to peculiarly hazardous duty, and who had been at 
work all night and the previous day, was so much exhansted 
that Captain Chadwick forbade his going. His substitute 
was selected by the crew of the Iowa as their representative. 
The crew was then made up as follows: 

Lieut. Richmond Pearson Hobson. 
Osborn Warren Deignan, a coxswain of the Merrimac 
George F. Phillips, a machinist of the Merrimac. 
Francis Kelly, a water-tender of the Merrimac. 
George Charette, a gunner's mate of tlie Nno York. 
Daniel Montague, chief master-at-arms of the New York 
J. E. Murphy, a coxswain of the Iowa. 
Randolph Clausen, a coxswain of the New York. 



IN BATTLE ARRAY 441 

The men lay arouiul the Mcrrimar most of tlio day, at- 
tempting- to seciiro a little rest, and some slight changes were 
made in the plans. Additional batteries were obtained, and 
an additional jMiwdcr chariic was made ready on the port side. 
Tlu' large catamai-an <>t' the .^liip was slung over the side by a 
single lino, llobson decided that it would be safer to ex- 
plode eaeli charge seitarately, and directed that the men be- 
low, as soon as their duties were i)erformed, should assist in 
this work before juuipiug overboard. 

llobson, who hatl spent most of the afternoon on the flag- 
ship, boarded the Mervimac again at seven o'clock, went be- 
low and tried to secure a little rest, of which he stood sadly 
in need. 

At sunset the fleet again took up its formation before the 
entrance to the harbor, in an arc of a circle of five miles 
radius, with Morro Castle in the center. Beginning to the 
westward they stood in this order: Vixen, Brooklyn, Marhle- 
head, Texas, Massachiiseits, Oregon, Iowa, New Yorh, New 
Orleans, and Mayflower. The other boats remained outside 
the circle, while the Dolphin and Porter acted as dispatch 
boats. The evening wore away slowly. A full moon bathed 
tlie quiet waters of the Caribbean in a splendid luster of silver, 
and the high mountains in front of Santiago lay in a robe of 
white mist. The scene was beautifully peaceful. 

On the decks of the ships lay the crews, with mdy rubber 
blankets beneath them. The men are nundiei-eil. and when 
in the pre-ence of tlie enemy the even and the odil nunibei*s 
sleep alternately, two hours at a time, with their guns and 
small arms at their sides. Tn the event of a torpedo attack 
each man slaps on the shoulder the man next to him who is 
sleeping, and then the guns are turned ou the enemy. So 
they were sleeping on the moonlight night of the 2d of June, 
into the moonlight morning of the 3d. 

At about 1 :30 a. >r., TTobson came up on the bridge of the 
Merrinmr. All the men who were to go with the Any wiu-e 
called up and given final iii~t ructions. Everything was made 



142 IN A STORM OF SHOT AND SHELL 

ready below. Ilobson's men took their positions, and at 
al)ont 2 :30 o'clock the ship began to steam slowly towards the 
entrance. 

Every man on the fighting ships, odd or even, was awake 
now, and the progress of the big black hnlk of the Mevrimac 
was watched with breathless intcre-t. On towards the misty 
entrance she moved, followed by the lannch of the New York; 
with a crew of five, in command of Cadet Joseph W. Powell. 
The moon sank behind a bank of clonds near the horizon, and 
then the Mcrrimac conld no longer be distingnished from the 
ships. The lower shore line was indistinguishable in the haze 
which hid the entrance; still the crews on the big ships 
watched and waited, expecting to see a burst of fire from the 

forts. 

The crew in the steam launch had a nearer view and saw 
the Meri'imac heading straight in; Lieutenant Hobson stood 
on the bridge; the other men were at their posts, in a uniform 
of underwear, with life preservers to aid in their escape if 
they should be compelled to swim a long distance. The 
watchers saw the old collier head straight for Estrella Point, 
saw her swing across the channel, apparently undiscovered, 
for not a sound had as yet broken the stillness, heard two of her 
seven charges explode, and then began a screaming, flashing, 
death-dealing fire from the Spanish ships and batteries. The 
rest was hidden from the view of the ships and the launch. 

It was about 3:15 when the first gun flashed out in the 
misty entrance, but it was followed by a fusilade of rapid-fire 
guns. Some of the batteries near the entrance directed their 
fire at the little launch, but in the face of it all Cadet Powell 
and his crew continued to wait and search for Hobson and his 
gallant heroes. They saw the guns of the Cristobal Colon 
and the Beina Mercedes, which had been supposed to be gun- 
less, turned on their launch and thundering in their ears. 
Still they searched and waited. Those on the line of battle- 
ships could see only the sheet of flame ahead. At last the fire 
slackened somewhat, and by the light of tlie dawn, now tinge- 



GIVEN UP FOR LOST 443 

ing the sky and land, the little hmiic-h was seen steaming from 
west to east near the month of the entrance. 

Then she steamed hack from east to west and hegan skirt- 
ins: the coast to the west of tlie entrance. The hatteries were 
still firing at her, hut she went as far as a small cove on the 
shore, tlu>n ]n\\ nhout and stcaiiic<l for the flagship. 

It was hroad daylight hy this time. As the lanncdi came 
alongside Cadet Powell shonted : 

"No one has come out «d" the entrance of the harhor." 

His words seemed like the death knell of all who had gone 
in on the Merrimac, and as it grew lighter they could see the 
tops of the old collier's masts in the center of the channel, 
ahont where Hohson said he would sink her. 

It seemed incredihle, almost impossible, that any of the 
Merrimac's heroes could have lived through that awful fire. 
There were few men in the fleet who did not think that all of 
the crew had i)erislied. Still they hoped against hope. 

But we must return and follow the Merrimac as she dis- 
appeared from the view of the ships, first in the mist and then 
in the blaze of fire which broke out from both sides. Ilobson, 
standing on the bridge, kept his eyes fast fixed on the channel 
ahead, every nerve strained, waiting for the time when he 
could sink the ship. That was the work before him. He 
could pay no attention to the fire and he was not there to 
answer it. The shells from the large guns on the hills first 
roared about the ship and then the rapid fire from the Spanish 
cruisers joined in, their shots screaming through the rigging; 
troops from some of the camps in the hills came rushing down, 
and as the collier approached the Estrella battery the soldiers 
lined the foot of the cliifs; rifle bullets whistled above them, 
l)Ut TTobson could see that they were, firing wildly at him; the 
Spaniards were actually killing each other with their cross 
fire, those on one bank shooting down tliose on the otlier. 

The Merrlrnnr^a steering geiir \v;is disabled when she 
reacdied Estrella Point, and a hii'uc projCet lie cut the ancdmr 
lashing. Oidy two df ihc tni'pcddcs expjddcd, but a large sub- 
27 



444 SEVERE TEST OF DISCIPLINE 

marine mine fired by the Spaniards exploded directly beneath 
her. Her stern instead of her bow ran on Estrella Point and 
she began to sink slowly and steadily. She was just across the 
channel, going just where Ilobson wished her to, but as she 
settled the tide drifted her around. 

After firing the torpedoes and getting the ship in place, 
Hobson and his men all ran aft and lay down on the deck 
waiting for the water to reach it. Shells and bullets were 
making a terrific din about them. The air seemed full of fire. 

Torpedoes from the Reina Mercedes came tearing into the 
collier, crashing into the wood and iron, while the plunging 
shots from the forts broke through her decks, riddling it all 
about them. 

"" Xot a man must move," shouted Hobson to those lying 
beside him ; and it was largely owing to the splendid discipline 
of the men that they escaped the terrific fire. As the shells 
rained over them, minutes seemed hours of suspense; the old 
vessel seemed to sink ver}" slowly. The men's mouths grew 
parched, but they dared not move. 

" Hadn't we better drop off now, sir ? " a man would ask as 
he lay prone on the deck expecting the next shell to come their 
way. 

" Wait," said Hobson. " AVe must wait till daylight, per- 
haps." 

Wait in that hail of shot and shell ! But Hobson knew it 
would be impossible for them to escape in the life-boat to 
any place but the shore, which was lined with soldiers. He 
hoped that by daylight some of the fleet might rescue them. 
Fortunately, the Spaniards fired mostly at the bow of the old 
Merrimac. It was being riddled and she was sinking faster. 
Still Hobson and his men lay there motionless. Finally, the 
water came to the decks where they were. It had become 
daylight; the Spaniards thought no life remained on the Mer- 
rimac, and the firing ceased. Then the men slipped off into 
the water and clung to the sides of the catamaran, which was 
floating amid the ^vreckage but still fastened to the old hulk. 



PRISONERS OP WAR 445 

Only their heads were above the water, and the boats that were 
out with lanterns looking for refugees did not find them. The 
Spaniards seemed to have overlooked them. 

As it grew lighter they noticed a Spanish launch coming 
towards the Merrhnac, and Lieutenant Ilobson hailed it. A 
squad of marines filed out and pointed their rifles at their 
heads. 

" Is there any officer on that boat to receive a surrender 
of prisoners of war ? " shouted Ilobson. 

An elderly man leaped out from under the awning and 
waved his hand. It was Admiral Cervera. The marines 
lowered their rifles; and Ilobson and his men, two of them in 
the last stages of exhaustion, were helped into the launch, 
objects of admiration and awe to the Spanish marines. The 
lieutenant surrendered himself and his men, and they were 
treated with the kindest courtesy. They were taken ashore 
and put in cells in that ]\rorro upon which they had looked 
so often from the sea, and now through their barred windows 
they beheld the fleet where officers and crews were wondering 
and perhaps despairing of their fate. 

I'he day dragged on. Ilobson and his men were given up 
for lost. Finally, in the afternoon, a Spanish launch flying a 
flag of truce was seen coming out of the harbor. Had it come 
to tell them that Ilobson and his men were dead ? Or had it 
come to tell them that they were alive ? Out went the Vixen 
to meet the tug; a Spanish officer was taken on board and the 
Vixen hurried off to the flagship. Then every man's eyes 
were on the New Tori-, and at last they read a signal : 

"Collier's crew prisoners of war; two slightly wountled. 
All well." 

A mighty cheer wont uj). The Spanish officer informed 
the adinii'nl tluit the jirisoners were confined in Morro Castle 
and tliat Admiral Cervera had considered their ndventnre an 
act of snch great bravery and desperate daring that he deemed 
it proj)or to notify the American commander (d' the safety of 
the men. Whatever the motive for sendinu- out the officer 



446 ONE OF THE BRAVEST DEEDS IN NAVAL ANNALS 

uuder a flag of truce, the act was considered a very graceful 
and courteous one, though the suspicion at once crossed the 
minds of the American oihcers that the prisoners might have 
been placed in Morro to save the fort from attack. The Span- 
ish officer is reported to have said in reference to the sinking 
of the Merrimac: " You have made it more difficult, but we 
can still get out." 

From the bearings taken of the Merrimac, whose masts 
and smokepipes only could be seen, it was plainly evident now 
that she had swung around so that she was not lying across the 
channel; so far as completely blocking the channel, the at- 
tempt had not been wholly successful. Still, the event de- 
served a place in history as one of the bravest and most daring 
deeds in naval annals. 

Xo parallel to the achievement could be found in naval 
A\'arfarc. Somers had showii a magnificent daring when he 
l)Iew up the ketch in the harbor of Tripoli and Cushing's dash 
upon the AlhemarJe was likewise heroic. But both of these 
crept to their destination in little vessels. Hobsoij steamed 
into a narrow channel with a huge 4,000-ton ship, in plain 
view of the l)atteries, almost under the muzzle of their guns; 
he moved to a particular spot, maneuvered his vessel in a par- 
ticular way and worked to sink her in a particular position, 
under a hail of shot and shell which rendered the chances of 
success infinitely remote. To conceive that the thing could 
be done was an inspiration; to be willing to do it was the 
highest heroism; to do it coolly, deliberately, and with pro- 
fessional skill under the fearful fire was marvelous. The 
men who went Avitli Hobson should not be forgotten, and 
when it is recalled that hundreds of others were ready to fol- 
low his lead, and were greatly disappointed that they could 
not, there need be no discounting the valor of Americans. 



CHAPTEK XL 

LANDING OF MARINES IN (JUANTANAMO BAY — SUR- 
ROUNDEU BY HIDDEN ENEMIES — SPANIARDS Cx^UGHl' 
AT LAST — SHARP NAVAL FIGHT AT SAN JUAN. 

Si>:iiii:ir(ls Stirngtlien Tlit-ir Position — Bombarding the Forts at the 
Harbor Mouth — The Reina Mercedes Wrecked — Looking for a 
Possible Place for the Army to Land — Pluck of the Naval Re- 
serves — Landing the Marines — Preparing Camp McCalla — Its 
Peculiar Position — Fatal Search for tlie Enemy — No Sleep for the 
Marines — ^Mauser Bullets Continually "Whistling Through the 
Camp — Bravely Facing the Foe — Untenable Position of the Camp 
— Spaniards Fire upon a Funeral Cortege — Driving Them Back 
and Resuming the Services — Attacked from a New Quarter — A 
Critical Situation — The Enemy Caught in a Trap — Slaughtered 
without ^lercy — The Camp Moved to a Less Exposed Position — 
The Blockade of San Juan — Arrival of the St. Paul — The Terror 
Makes an Attack — A Broadside from the St. Paul. 

DISHING the long wait for the appearance of the army 
upon which it was proposed to ]^hice the bnrden of 
taking the citv, the navy was much of the time lying 
idly off Santiago, and Cervera's sliips were apparently as idle 
within the harbor. Tlie Spaniards, however, being fully in- 
formed of tlie intended military expedition and of the purpose 
of the United States to reduce the city and capture the Spanish 
fleet before doing anything more, became very busy in 
strengthening the land f(n'tifications, so that alt(tgether, from 
a theoretical point of view, their position was impregnable. 
Admiral Sampson, who was opposed to any rash experiments 
endangering his fleet, endeavored to make some preparations 
likely to be of advantage when the army arrived, lie was 
compelled to bear in mind the fact that ("ervera might at auv 
time seek to escape, for it was now understood that TTobson's 
lieroic act had not been entirely successful. Kither in a battle 
with Cervera at the entrance of the harbor or in co-operating 

(447) 



448 REDUCING THE BATTERIES 

with General Sh after, who was to command the army, the 
forts might give some tronljle, and he, therefore, set out to 
weaken or reduce their batteries on June 6th. 

The fleet was formed in a double line about six miles from 
shore. They approached to within 3,000 yards of the bat- 
teries, pouring in a tremendous fire for an hour with generally 
fine marksmanship, driving the S})aniards from their guns, 
crushing down masonry and earthworks, and receiving un- 
harmed the fire of the Spanish Krupp and .Vrmstrong guns. 
As Mr. Ilobson and his men were then confined in the Morro, 
written orders were given not to fire upon it, but it was occa- 
sionally struck by stray shells. Only one man on the fleet 
was injured, and he but slightly. During part of the en- 
gagement American vessels went within 1,000 yards of the 
forts and drove the Spaniards from the guns. The Beina 
Mercedes, which lay near the mouth of the harbor, was prac- 
tically wrecked, but the Spaniards had already removed most 
of her guns and mounted them on shore. 

In searching for a favorable place for the expected troops 
to land. Admiral Sampson's attention was attracted towards 
the harbor of Guantanamo, about forty miles east of Santiago. 
To clearly understand the problem which General Shafter 
was to meet wdien he came to consider the landing of his 
troops, it should be borne in mind that the coast of Cuba be- 
tween Santiago and Guantanamo is in a general way formed 
of three parallel ranges of hills. First there is the rampart 
on the sea front, a high flat-topped ridge very steep in most 
places, and broken into terraces by outcropping ledges of lime- 
stone; l)cliind this are foothills rising out of the wooded val- 
leys, and behind that and another line of valleys or ravines 
are the high mountains of the coast range, about six miles 
from the shore. In the vicinity of Santiago the rampart or 
outer ridge along the sea front is about 300 feet high, stretch- 
ing eastward and westward like a great stone wall. At two 
places this wall is cut do-uTi to the sea level in two narrow 
clefts or notches about 100 vards wide at the bottom, and 



A DIFFICULT LANDING PLACE 



Ud 



these .appear to 1)C the only openings throiigli wliicli the in- 
terior of tlic (Mtuntry is accessible to an invading force. In 
one of these and the nearest to Santiago lies the village and 
railway station of Siboney, and in the other the village which 
takes its name from the Daiqniri River emptying at that point. 




m 



-L ^'^ -^ ' yCAYO DEL 

I 3 ^^^V^Il, Ihospita, 




BRAOLir & I'UAie.S, LNfill'fi, N.T 



ENTRANCE TO HAHBuK OF GUANTANAMO. 

Showing Camps of the Marines, where the first Engagements between ih 
American and Spanish forces occurred. 



Bnt it ('r)nld not f;iil to :ii>]>ear to Admiral Sam]ison or to 
anyone that a laiidinu in cillicr of these places wonld bo diffi- 
cnlt, perhaps impossible, if opposed strongly by a daring 
enemy. Even withont artillery, 1,000 men with ]\[ansers on 
the heights snrronnding the notches and tlie approaches might 
keep back a strong landing force for days, for, if ilri\('ii fr<)m 
the tops of the bbiff, the Spaniards could fnrtit'y the foot- 



450 IN GUANTANAMO BAY 

hills beyond and he out of reach of the heavy guns of the war- 
ships. 

If General Shafter should, upon examination, prefer not 
to land his troops in Guantananio Bay, because it would imply 
a march through the foothills of forty miles to Santiago, the 
harbor would at least be very useful as a naval rendezvous 
and coaling station. The ships had lain out to sea a long time, 
and at times had been obliged to coal under extremely un- 
favorable conditions. Guantananio Bay afforded a splendid 
shelter for the fleet, and it was believed that a small party of 
marines could establish themselves there and control the en- 
trance. 

On the day after the attack on the forts about ]\Iorro, 
therefore, Admiral Sampson sent the Marhlehead, with the 
Yankee and St. Louis, to shell the defenses of Guantananio 
Bay, cut the cables, and prepare for a landing. The Spanish 
fortifications were battei-ed to pieces, and while the Spaniards 
stood by their guns for a time they soon retreated. The naval 
reserves, who manned the Yankee, acquitted themselves 
with great credit under the fire. A Spanish gunboat had the 
temerity to come down and fire upon the American ships, but 
the Yankee's guns quickly drove her back, and soon after- 
wards the Marhlehead took a position to hold the harbor till 
the landing party should arrive. 

It arrived on the lOtli of June, a body of 600 Brooklyn 
marines on the Panther, and with them came the Oregon, 
DolpJi in, and Yoscm itc to protect their landing. The marines, 
who had been chafing under inaction for nearly a month, 
joyfully jumped into the boats and were landed without a 
shot being fired. The Spaniards had apparently deserted the 
landing point, which was chiefly occupied by the huts of the 
Guantanamo fishermen and pilots, and these huts, as well as 
the blockhouse, which had been partly destroyed in the pre- 
vious bombardment, were burned as a precaution against yel- 
low fever. The Stars and Stripes were quickly raised on the 
bluff bv Color Sergeant Silvey, and the marines set merrily to 



A FIERCE ATTACK ON THE OUTPOSTS 453 

work getting' tlieir tents and other appliances ashore and hiv- 
ing out a camp to be called Camp McCalla, in honor of the 
commander of the Marhlehead. 

All the land, except that on the top of the bluffs selected 
for the cam]\ was covered with woods and thick tropical 
bushes, and the oidy road was a ninh' j)ath skirting the moun- 
tain. The landward a])proach was on the south side, and liere 
the hill fell awav to a foothill, backed up against the high 
ridge or rampart I'unning along the shore of the Caribbean. 
West of the camp was the bay, to the north was Fishernuurs 
Point, where the landing was effected, and to the east was a 
lagoon putting into the foothills above mentioned. All that 
night and the next day the marines worked with energy in 
establishing their camp, and incoming sentries on the morning 
of the 11th reported that none of the enemy had been seen. 
The w^orst foe they had encountered were the mosquitoes, 
which abound in the cha})arral or thickets. 

But at about 5:30 o'clock that afternoon a weather-beaten 
old insurgent rushed into camp from the road leading from the 
valley over to the tall hills three miles distant, and reported 
that a skirmish line of Spaniards was advancing. He w'as not 
a moment too soon, for a bullet from a Mauser rifle came hot 
on his trail. Before the camp could make any preparations, 
the Spaniards were making a fierce attack on the outposts from 
the bushes near the lagoon. 

Fully fifteen minutes of lively firing followed. Every 
nmrine in the camp wished to dash into the bushes and at once 
chase the hidden foe, but Colonel TTuntiugton an<l his officers 
kept their men in check, and prepared to resist the attack on 
the camp. Trenches had not been dug and the only shelter 
for the few sick men and non-combatants was in the ruins of 
the blockhouse. So fierce was the firing tluit Comnumdcr 
^FcCalla of the MarJ)lr]irn(l, thinking tlie Spaniards were at- 
tacking the camp with a large force, hiUTied hi-^ marines ashore, 
and fifty or sixty of the camp marines, Avho had been refresh- 
ing themselves by a batli in tlic l>ay. ran half-naked nji the 



454 FIRING FROM AMBUSH 

liills, caught up their guns, and went to the aid of their com- 
rades. For nearly three-quarters of an hour shots were ex- 
changed, now brisk, then a scattering tire across the lagoon, or 
out of the thickets. It was nearly dark when the outermost 
sentries came in, hot, wearied, and panting. Three of their 
men were missing, but one of them appeared later all right. 
Two had been killed in the bushes. 

There was a hasty meal of hardtack and coffee, but no 
sleep fur the men that night. The enemy continued to harass 
the sentry lines, and Mauser bullets constantly whistled 
through the camp. Commander McCalla kept the search- 
lights of his vessel trained upon the dense thickets, but the 
Spaniards concealed their movements. At least a dozen dif- 
ferent attacks were made on the camp between dusk and dawn, 
the heaviest and the best organized being made about one 
o'clock in the morning. Then, apparently, the Spaniards had 
completely surrounded the camp, and they poured in volley 
after volley. But the marines, though hemmed in, bravely 
kept their faces to the foe, and maintained a lively return fire. 
At no time was it possible for the marines to see objects twenty 
yards away, and only by the flash of the enemy's guns could 
the whereabouts of the attacking party be learned. 

During the hottest of the fighting, four of the little camp 
force were killed, including Dr. Gibbs, a Xew York physician, 
who was picked off by a guerrilla as he stood near the hospital 
tent. The enemy's loss proved to be heavy, but the marines 
at the time could judge nothing of the effect of their volleys, 
as the bushes seemed to be full of Spaniards, maintaining an 
exasperating fire, first from one side and then the other. The 
Marhlehead and other vessels in the harbor dropped shells into 
the thickets from which the Spanish fire seemed to come, and 
this caused its temporary cessation from that quarter, only to 
be soon and suddenly renewed from another. 

At last the officers were convinced that the camp was un- 
tenable; while it was on high ground aud ought to be advan- 
tageous in case of attack, little could be done against the Span- 



A BURIAL SERVICE INTERRUPTED 455 

iards hiding in tlic surrounding thickets and having a full view 
of the exposed cauii). It was dccidcil to i-cinovc il Id aiiotlier 
location on the hillside^ ncai- the sea, and this work was vigor- 
ously prosecuted on Sunday, the 12th, wliile the Spaniards 
maintained their annoying attacks, well illustrated by tlieir 
fire upon the little party attending the funeral services of those 
who had been killed the day before. 

The bodies of the dead marines were wrapped in black 
oilskins taken froui their tents. Graves were dug on the edge 
of a hill overlooking the bay to the northward of the camp. 
A squad of marines from the Texas, under command of Lieu- 
tenant Radford, acted as escort to the cortege as it passed 
slowly along to the field where the dead were U> be laid to rest. 
It was impossible for all the men to attend the funeral. They 
had other work to do, work on which depended the safety of 
every man ashore. While some of the naarines took the bodies 
of their comrades to their graves, the others proceeded witli 
the main work, some continuously on the lookout for the 
enemy, others busy M'ith the details of removing the camp. 

There had been a lull for a few minutes in the firing, and 
the men had a chance to look about and see what was going on. 
One by one, as they observed the little funeral procession 
stumbling over the loose stones on the camp ground, those who 
could do so liurried forward, fell in behind and grouped them- 
selves about the empty graves. The stretcher bearing the 
bodies was lifted to its place, and (^haphiin Jones of the Texas 
was about to begin the reading of tlie l)urial service, when the 
Spaniards, who could see plainly what the men had gathered 
for, gave a remarkable exhibit inn of their boasted chivalry. 
Concealed in the bushes and trees of the western thickets, they 
began shooting at the party, mid this acfinn C(^nviuced the 
marines, if conviction were needed, that the stories told of 
Spanish barbarism were true. 

The graves were deserted by all save the chaiilaiu and the 
little escort, who still stood uuiiioNcd. Kverywhere men 
sprang to arms and placed themselves behind the rolled tents, 



456 A CRITICAL SITUATION 

their knapsacks, the bushes in the hollows, or boxes and piles 
of stones with rifles ready and eyes strained into the brush. 
The little Colt's guns which had been brought up from the 
ships began their clatter, howitzers roared, blue smoke arose 
where the shells struck and burst in the chaparral, and rifles 
snapped angrily. There was trouble for the Spaniards in that 
particular place whence their bullets came, and shortly the 
firing ceased everywhere in the brush and the funeral was re- 
sumed. The Texas kept using her smaller guns on the cha- 
parral near the camp, and once more the men gathered about 
the grave and Chaplain Jones began reading the Episcopal 
service. lie had nearly finished when the rifles of the enemy 
cracked again, this time to the cast. 

A dozen men in the pits by the old blockhouse answered 
and the chaplain kept right on with the solemn service. When 
he had finished, the men again took their rifles and resumed 
their watching, and the Panther shelled the brush to the east. 
I'rom that time on less trouble was experienced. In the after- 
noon, the tents were all struck and carried to the low stretch 
of laud rising from the beach, but were not again pitched, be- 
cause tliey made too good targets while the Spaniards were in 
the brush. 

The situation for a time seemed decidedly critical. The 
marines were obliged to forego all sleep and the skirmishing 
was incessant day and night. The vessels in the harbor 
dropped shells into the bushes, but the Spaniards kept reap- 
pearing at different places. In the end, however, the incom- 
parable superiority of the Americans in marksmanship, in cool- 
ness, and steadiness of nerve w^as triumphant. On Tuesday, 
the 14th, Colonel Huntington abandoned defensive tactics and 
sent out four scouting parties with orders to make an aggres- 
sive fight. This they did in a most effective manner. Each 
detachment fell in with the skulking Spaniards and gradu- 
ally worked them between their fires. Early in the after- 
noon, Captain Elliot drove the main body of the Spaniards 
over the crest of the third hill, where Lieutennnt Magill had 



THE ENEMY IN A TRAP 457 

another division, wliicli ponred a deadly fire into tliem as they 
descended. They ran Itack to the crest of the liili, and this 
the Dolphhi, which was in jxjsition, swept witli a murderous 
fire of 4-iuch shells. The Spaniards rushed down the hill 
again, and again fell into the clutches of Captain Elliot's men, 
inchiding sonic ('nlians, who fought their old enemies like 
demons. Spaniards were falling all along the line, and they 
rushed back, endeavoring again to escape along the crest of the 
hill, and there they were again met by the Dolphin^s shells. 
Turn which way they would, they were face to face vnth an 
American iire that had no mercy in it. As the Spaniards 
rushed along the crest of the hill, they came face to face sud- 
denly with a third scouting party under Captain Spicer. Then 
in desperation they turned back and ran into the marines under 
Captain Elliot and Lieutenant Magill. Thus they fought 
desperately, refusing to surrender till more than 200 lay dead 
on the hill. And the only casualty that day on the American 
side was one Cid)an killed. The Americans left their (hd)an 
allies to pursue the remnant and returned to camp with a score 
of prisoners and a large quantity of arms and ammunition. 
They had no more serious trouble with the enemy at Camp 
iMcCalla. In view of the dangers to which the camp had been 
exposed for five days, almost constantly under tire, it is cer- 
tainly remarkable that no more than five lives were lost. 

On the 15th, the Texas, Mdi-hlchrfirl, aiid Smrdiife steamed 
up the bay and attacked the fortifications at Caimanera, about 
three miles above Camp ]\[cCalla, and a bondiardment of a 
few minutes was sufficient to drive the Spaniards from their 
guns, and an hour conipletely destroyed the forts and earth- 
works which formed the main defense of the inner bay. 

But it was plain to the eyes of the officers that the place 
was not n good (tne for the landing of an army for the invest- 
ment of Santiago forty miles away. Xo roads existed, and it 
would liave been a difiicult undertaking to have han<lled heavy 
artillery in such a mountainous conntry, which had been so 
well adapted to the Cuban guerrilla warfare. Tt was near 



458 SAN JUAN BLOCKADED 

Guantanamo, it will be remembered, that Goulet and his bands 
had their early successes in the Cuban revolution. 

Little was left for Admiral Sampson to do until the army 
arrived, but he did not leave the Spanish forces at Santiago 
unoccupied. On the 16th, he again shelled the enemy's 
batteries and demolished some new earthworks within his 
reach. Having received information that Hobson and his 
men had been transferred from the Morro prison to the bar- 
racks in the outskirts of the city, he no longer felt any hesita- 
tion as to breaking down the historic walls of the old castle. 
Again the wretched marksmanship of the Spaniards saved the 
fleet from any damage. One of the most interesting features 
of the ^^'ork before the harbor at this time was the successful 
practical trial of the gunboat Vesuvius. This boat, which 
threw through her pneumatic guns charges of guncotton 
varying from two hundred to four hundred pounds, would 
fire her three guns in quick succession. The explosive force 
of her shells was tremendous. They wrought havoc where 
they struck, and the performance was repeated several times, 
much to the terror of the Spaniards. 

The war was not without some important and interesting 
incidents in other quarters at this time. From the beginning 
it had been the purpose of the government to operate in Puerto 
Rico, and arrangements for sending an expedition to that 
island were under way even while the one to Santiago was 
causing so much trouble and delay. In accordance with this 
plan, a blockade had been declared against the port of San 
Juan, and the St. raid, commanded by Captain Sigsbee, was 
sent to institute it. Tn the interval between Cervera's arrival 
at Santiago and the beginning of operations against Santiago, 
the torpedo boat-destroyer Terror, which Cervera had left at 
Martinique for repairs, had made her way to San Juan, and as 
there was no way of her reaching Cervera then, there she re- 
mained. The IsaheUa II., an old cruiser, and one or two 
gunboats, were also in the port. 

When the St. Paul arrived before the harbor on June 2 2d, 



THE BRAGGART CAPTAIN OF THE "TERROR" 4G1 

the Spanish lookouts took her for tlic *S7. Louis, which they 
knew was lightly uriiied, aiul tlie cDiiiuiaiulers of the Terror 
and Isabella II. figured that they could run out and destroy 
the former liner before they were within reach of her guns. 
So confident were they that they boastingly made public their 
plans, and as a result the Spanish i)eople in the city gave the 
officers a great ovation, and the commander of the Terror made 
a speech in the public scpiare, declaring that he was going out 
to engage the Yankee warship and inviting the people to 
ascend the hills and watch the fight. This they did, and the 
cloud of witnesses were noticed through the glasses of the 
officers on the SI. Paul before they knew what it meant. 

About 1 o'clock, when the men were at mess, the lookouts 
discovered a steamer coming out of the harbor. The St. Paul 
was then about seven miles out, but she was turned towards 
the approaching vessel and steamed at full speed to meet her. 
The character of the vessel had not been made out as yet, but 
the prospects even of holding up a merchantman was sufficicnl 
to bring every man to the deck. The strange craft wasted 
litth' time in informing the ^7. Paul of her character, for she 
(h'opped a shell within a thousand yards of the liner, w^hich was 
inniiediately put around so that the Isabella II., for she it was, 
nu'ght have the ])enefit of a broadside when she approached 
near enough. Hut the Spaniard decided to eoine no nearer, 
much to the disgust of the men at the guns of the St. Paul. 
It was at this moment that the lookout reported the little de- 
stroyer sneaking out of the harbor under cover of the cruiser. 
Under all the recognized rules of naval warfare, it was rathei- 
dangerous for the converted liner to attack a cruiser reinforced 
by so dangerous a craft as the Terror was supposed to be, but 
our sailors were eager for a fight. 

The Isabella II. continued to throw shells in the direction 
of the St. Paul, but Captain Sigsbee paid little attention to 
her at this time. Instead, lie worked along with the Terror, 
endeavoriiiu to se].arate her fnun tlie evni-^er and to keo]) liei' 
in the trough of the sea if she undertook to run for the St. 



4G2 THE SPANISH SHIP A WRECK 

raid. This she did when her commander saw that the St. 
Paul was thus maneuvering. It was a dangerous moment, 
for everything depended upon the gunnery of the *S^^. PauVs 
men. Unless stopped by well-directed shots, there was noth- 
ing to prevent her from getting close enough to launch a tor- 
pedo, and then no one on the *S'^. Paul might live to tell the 
tale. But Captain Sigsbee and his men Avere perfectly cool; 
they allowed the Terror to get within 6,000 yards, and then 
they let go the whole starboard battery. 

The Terror had evidently been hit, and botli Spanish 
vessels began to act as if they were rather sorry they had come 
out. The St. Paul worked up closer, and the Spaniards at 
once made preparations to retreat. After putting two shots 
into the Terror and knocking her after smokestack into the 
sea, Captain Sigsbee turned his attention for a moment to the 
Isahella II., which had been wasting hundreds of dollars 
worth of ammunition in a wild fire. Then another gunboat 
came out of the harbor and the Terror began to show further 
signs of fight. Her gunners were beginning to get the range, 
and were dropping a few shots uncomfortably near the *S'^. 
Paul. But as soon as the latter's guns were again trained on 
the saucy torpedo boat, she turned about and started full speed 
for the harbor. At this juncture a remarkable shot was made 
from one of the St. Paul's 5-inch guns. A shell struck the 
retreating Terror on the port side near the stern, and went 
clear into the engine-room, killing the engineer and wounding 
several others, wrecking the machinery, and placing the boat 
in a sinking condition. Her propellers stopped working, and 
she drifted in a westerly direction, signaling for help. In a 
few moments a vessel came out and took her in toAv, but it was 
too late to run her into the harbor; she was taken ashore and 
beached in shallow water. The people on the cliff who had 
come out to see the Yankee sunk saw her still afloat, while the 
wreck of the Terror lav on the sands. 



CHAPTER XLI 

LANDING OF THE TROOPS AT DAIQUIRI AND SIBONEY — 
THE ADVANCE THROUGH CUBAN THICKETS — A MAG- 
NIFICENT CHARGE AND A DECISIVE VICTORY. 

Arrival of the Transports with General Shafter's Army — Admiral Samp- 
son and General Shaftcr Consult — Meeting the Cuban Leaders — 
Enthusiastic Cubans — Daitjuiri Selected as a Landing Place — Plans 
and Preparations — Anticipating an Attempted Escape by Cervera — 
Incidents of a Difficult Landing — Unfurling the Stars and Stripes — 
On the Road to Santiago — Yankee Ingenuity — The Enemy's Retreat 
to Guasimas — General Wheeler Decides to Attack — Moving Ahead 
on DiHk'ult Trails and under a Burning Sun — The ^Music of a Mauser 
Bullet — Rough Riders Attacked — A Fierce Battle is On — Deploying 
Through the Tliickets — Death in the Ranks — A Relentless Advance 
— Victory and a "Well-earned Rest — The Dead and Wounded — 
Caniiira Leaves Cadiz — llis Trip to the Suez Canal. 

WITH tlags flying and the guns of Admiral Sampson's 
flagship booming a salute to General Shaftcr com- 
Miandiiig, the armv of invasion steamed grandly 
np ahnost to within range of the gnns of jMorro, or what was 
left of thom, at a little after noon on June 20th, just two 
montlis after the opening of the war, and one month after 
Cervera had entered Santiago harbor. The great transports 
and their convoys presented an impressive sight, stretching 
out over eight miles of the Cari])bcan Sea and gently moving 
with the heavy ground swell as thougli courtesying to the 
grim warships which had so long awaited their coming. The 
decks were thronged with soldiers gazing at the remarkable 
scene before them. Tlie line paraded in single file past the 
warships, each vessel dip])ing lier flag to tlie admiral as she 
passed. The battleship Jndinnn was'in the lead, followed by 
the gunboats Bnnrroff, Cnftfinr. Macliiafi, and Aniwpolif!. 
Then followed the transports, while the rear was brought up 
28 (463) 



464 CONFERENCE WITH THE CUBANS 

by the cruiser Detroit and several other smaller convoys. 
General Shafter was immediately taken to the flagship, where 
he informed the admiral that the trip had been without inci- 
dent of note, and plans were at ouce considered for the landing 
of the troops, eager to leave the crowded transports. 

The admiral had already made arrangements for a con- 
sultation with the Cul)an leaders, and that afternoon a pre- 
liminary landing for this purpose was made at Aserraderos, a 
point about twenty miles west of Santiago, wdiicli the Cuban 
General Kabi had occupied a few weeks before and was still 
holding. Admiral Sampson and General Shafter, with but a 
small escort, were rowed to the beach in a small boat, which 
was met by a mounted force of Guban officers. The party 
was conducted to General Eabi's headquarters, where a con- 
ference was held, General Garcia, the Cuban commander in 
the province, being present. The camp was a curious col- 
lection of shelters made of pahn leaves after the Cuban 
fashion, situated on the crest of a rugged hill. The soldiers, 
though only half clothed, were well equipped with arms. 

It was evident that Aserraderos was no place for a landing, 
for the so-called road leading to Santiago was only a mule 
path over which it would require many days of hard work to 
transport artillery, and the city was on the opposite side of the 
bay. Guantanamo, on the east, Shafter considered equally 
bad, and still further away. It was agreed that Daiquiri, 
about fifteen miles east of IMorro, would be the best place, 
though it was admitted that it would be difficult to land there 
if the Spaniards made a very stout resistance. AVith the aid 
of the ships and a plan for diverting the attention of the enemy 
to other points, however. General Shafter thought it could be 
done without great loss. 

The plan as finally agreed wyion was to begin the landing 
at Daiquiri soon after daVlight the 2 2d. General Castillo was 
ordered to bring a thousand Cubans to flank out the Spanish 
on the east of the landing, while four vessels were to shell the 
beach and blockhouses, the Detroit and Castine on the west- 



KEEPING AN EYE ON CERVERA 467 

ward flank and the New Orleans and \Yasp on the eastern 
flank. In order to deceive the enemy, feints were arranged 
for other points; vessels were to take positions at daylight in 
front of Siboney and Aguadores, Loth to the eastward of Morro 
and somewhat nearer than Daiquiri, and also in the bay of 
Cabanas to the westward of Morro. In the latter place a feint 
of landing would be made. The Brookhjn, Massachusetts, 
Iowa, and Oregon were to retain their positions in front of the 
mouth of the harbor. The last clause of Admiral Sampson's 
order to his vessels was significant. It read : 

"The attention of commanding officers of all vessels engaged in block- 
ading Santiago de Cuba is earnestly called to the necessity of the utmost 
vigilance from this time forward — both as to maintaining stations and 
readiness for action, and as to keeping a close watch upon the harbor 
mouth. If the Spanish admiral ever intends to attempt to escape, that 
attempt will be made soon." 

The plan as outlined worked at first with satisfactory suc- 
cess. The feints deceived the Spanish; the bombardment by 
the ships was described in the Spanish reports to ^Madrid as 
terrific and insupportable; the Cubans did their share in dis- 
tracting the enemy, which fled from Daiquiri's blockhouse to 
posts along the coast towards Sevilla, a town about six miles 
east of Santiago and about three miles from the shore. Be- 
fore they fled from Daiquiri an attempt was made to burn the 
town and the supplies, but much of it was left unharmed, even 
food was found cooking for the Spaniards' breakfast. The 
only damage sufi"ered by the fleet in the engagement was on 
board the Texas; a shell from Socapa battery happened to 
strike her, killing one sailor and wounding eight. 

AVhen the signal for landing was given, scores of rowboats, 
steam launches, and dispatch boats crowded with soldiers 
made for the little pier belonging to the Spanish-American 
Iron Company. The men at the oars pulled hard in a desire 
to be the first to land, the steam launches rolled and ]Mtehed 
and jMifTcd, while over them flew the shots from the gunboats, 
teariiiii" ofl" the rot.ifs of the huts and batteriii"- the blockhouses 



468 THE STARS AND STRIPES UNFURLED 

to pieces. The waves ran high and as the first of the launches 
approached the pier it was suddenly lifted and the men, in 
attempting to spring out, were tlirown violently to the wharf; 
others were scrambling out of rowboats through the surf; then 
a clieer arose and was caught up by the sailors on the warships 
and the soldiers on the transports; men waved their hats, 
jumped up and down and cheered. But the noise was even 
louder when a little later four men were seen scaling the sheer 
face of the mountain up the narrow trail to the highest block- 
house; for a moment they were outlined against the sky by 
the side of the blockhouse and all was still; then up went a 
flag, out flashed the Stars and Stripes against the blue sky at 
tlie very top of the ridge. Sailors, Cubans, and soldiers, on 
land and on sea, shouted and cheered again, and every steam 
whistle for miles around shrieked and tooted and roared in a 
pandemonium of delight and triumph. 

Throughout the day smoke was issuing from the burning 
buildings of the town. Outside were the transports, ranging 
from the huge coastwise steamer to side-wheelers and nonde- 
scri^jt vessels. All were constantly moving to overcome the 
drift of the current. Among them and spread out to either 
sliore were the convoys whose keen-eyed lookouts scanned the 
beach and hills beyond. Small boats Avere everywhere. They 
came and went singly, in pairs, in groups, in long lines, rowed 
and towed. They clung to the ships, they lined the landing 
wharf, and they filled the space between. 

The men, after landing at the low wharf inside the iron 
pier, straggled up a level bit of sand beyond it. Then they 
fell into companies, and, marching away, were soon lost to 
view in the tangle of tropical underbrush. Of the thousands 
who landed, not more than 200 were in sight at any time on 
shore. 

xVll day long and all the next day the boats went back and 
forth, landing the soldiers at Daiquiri without resistance, and 
the Spaniards having evacuated Siboney, that place was taken 
for the landing of other troops and the horses and mules; the 



DIFFICULTIES AND DANGERS 4G9 

latter were pitelied overboard in the expectation that they 
would swim ashore, and most of them did so, though a few 
swam directly out to sea and were drowned. Landing 15,000 
men, with arms and equii)nient and all the paraphernalia of 
war, on such a beach without the aid of lighters was a long and 
difhcult undertaking even when unresisted. If the Spaniards 
liad made a bold sraud at the first it would have been much 
more ditHcult, if not impossible, but they feared the guns of 
the fleet and fell back to the hills. 

General Lawtou, who was in command of the advance 
landing party, occupied the town of Daiquiri the first night, 
posting sentries about in the hills, and General Young's troops 
had advanced some distance on the road to Santiago. The 
next day the head of the column was pushed fui'tlicr on. One 
road runs along the coast behind the cliffs for some distance, 
but it was found to be hardly more than a wood path over- 
grown with bushes and shut in on either side by the chaparral. 
Another road, but no better, runs to the north of this to 
Juragua and Seville, where the Spanish general, Linares, had 
assembled his forces for resistance. Either road was a dan- 
gerous one to follow and artillery could be moved up but 
slowly. Yet the men worked bravely on, the line moving 
ahead on the roads as it was landed from the transports with- 
out a challenge from the enemy. 

An interesting incident of the march through the village 
of Demajayabo on the 23d was the capture of a locomotive 
left by the Spaniards standing on the track with steam up. 
Before they scampered away they attempted to disable the 
engine, but their efforts merely served to again illustrate Span- 
ish lack of mechanical skill and the ingenuity of the Yaidcee. 
The railroad employes had hurriedly taken off the connecting 
rods, throttle gear, and other important pieces of the ma- 
chinery, concealing thorn bcliind fences and under (\irs, antl 
even burying some of them. Then, after blocking the piston 
guides with ])ieees of wood, tliev ran off in the firm belief that 
they had put the locomotive permanently out of commission. 



470 THE PEACEFUL PROLOGUE ENDS 

But in the Yankee forces were half a dozen old railroad 
engineers and mechanics who shouted with joy when they saw 
the engine. In a few moments they were clambering all over 
the machine, and it took tliem but a minute to discover its 
condition. A search was started for the missing parts, some 
of which were found; clever makeshifts were resorted to in 
place of those not found, and in a short time the locomotive 
was puffing away in the direction of Juragua drawing a train 
of ore cars filled with Yankee soldiers. 

On the 24th the end came to this peaceful prologue and 
war began in earnest. The hot sun came up from behind the 
mountain peaks, lifted the curtain of morning mist and re- 
vealed the advance line of the army scattered along the narrow 
valley Avhicli traces irregular paths between Daiquiri and 
Sevilla. Two miles to the rear were the tents of the second 
division marking with a white line the road to Demajayabo, 
to which General Wheeler had moved and established head- 
quarters during the night. 

General Lawton's headquarters consisted of a cluster of 
half a dozen huts two miles inland from Siboney, whose little 
harbor was crowded with transports, launches, and small boats 
still engaged in landing troops. The third division was clus- 
tered about the beach, some bathing, others gathering the scat- 
tered equipments, and still others making preparations for 
breakfast. Par to the front was the thin line of Castillo's 
Cuban outposts, their flags faintly moving in the morning air. 

According to reports brought to General Wheeler, who 
was in command of the forces which had already landed, while 
General Shaffer was still ou his ship, the Spaniards, after their 
evacuation of Siboney, had retired to a point three miles away 
near Sevilla, and had intrenched themselves at a junction of 
two roads or trails called Guasimas. From that point a single 
road leads to Santiago. General Wheeler had in this locality 
the Twenty-third Infantry, four troops of the First Cavalry, 
four of the Tenth Cavalry, and the troops of the Eough Riders 
— in all about 1,000 men. After making an examination of 



CLIMBING TOWARDS GUASIMAS 471 

the country in whicli tlio cnomy was supposed to have lialted, 
he returned to his headquarters and notified his officers that 
he proposed to attack. Colonel Wood of the Rough Riders 
was ordered to approach the enemy from the left while the 
force under General Young followed the road to the right, the 
two meeting at Guasimas. 

Gradually the sun chased the lingering shadows out of the 
ravines and began to scorch the hillsides. Camps were broken, 
columns of soldiers were formed, and the advance was re- 
sumed. Blazing blockhouses here and there indicated that 
the enemy was still in full retreat, hastening to the shelter of 
the entrenchments nearer the city. !Xot a Spaniard could be 
seen, although hundreds of field glasses scrutinized every part 
of the landscape in a vain effort to penetrate the thickets. 
Early in the morning General Young started towards Guasi- 
mas with the First and Tenth dismounted cavalry, and, ac- 
cording to the agreement of the night before, he took the trail 
to the right of the Rough Riders, who as yet had not come 
into possession of their horses and were therefore dubbed the 
" Rough AValkers." They left their camp at 5 o'clock, and 
at 7 entered the village of Siboney. After a short halt they 
began a long climb up the steep western trail toward the ren- 
dezvous. By this time the heat of the sun was beginning to 
be keenly felt by the men. Laden with full marching equip- 
ment, they toiled slowly u}) the rocky jiath in single file. Not 
enough air was stirring to make a leaf flutter. Along the hill- 
side several halts were necessary before the men could reach 
the mountain. A dozen mules carried the reserve ammuni- 
tion and the scanty hos[)ital supplies. The beasts were se- 
riously affected by the heat also, but despite these obstacles 
the toilsome ascent Avas finally made and a refreshing sea 
breeze afford(<l a trifling lelicf. r^'forc the Rough Ridel's 
stretched for nine miles a comparatively level plateau half a 
mile in width, dotted with chaparral thickets and frequently 
broken by «mall ravines. 

^leanwliiic, ^'oun!J,■'s men were sjowlv windiiiii' their wav 



472 IN THE CHAPPARAL 

along al^ont a half mile to Wood's right, but the bushes were 
so thick in every direction that neither line could see the other. 
Skirmish lines had been sent ahead to prevent a surprise. The 
men advanced in high spirits, but the heat was so intense that 
at last some began to fall out of the ranks and drop exhausted 
under the shade of convenient bushes. 

Still no sign of the enemy. The columns labored along 
over the narrow uneven path for an lioiu- and a half, when 
Wood called another halt and rode forward to meet C^aptain 
Capron, who had been sent on ahead and who was now coming 
back. He had gone within sight of the enemy's outposts, and 
the officers knew that a battle was at hand. The Rough 
Iliders had not been ambushed, but they had been oixlered 
ahead to attack the enemy, whose position was known in a 
general way, but it is doubtful if such a battlefield Avas ever 
seen before. The place where the Hough liiders were halted 
was where the trail narrowed and proceeded downward. On 
one side of it was a stout barlied wire fence and on both sides 
was a dense chaparral, which in places was absolutely im- 
penetrable. Wood and (.^apron came back and said to Roose- 
velt : '' Pass the word back to keep silence in the ranks," 
and then they disappeared again towards the front. The men 
had no knowledge of what was ahead and merely welcomed 
the opportunity for a little rest and a chance to shift their 
packs. As a matter of fact they had little expectation that an 
enemy w'hich had made no resistance to their landing would 
oppose the march very seriously till in force before Santiago. 

After waiting about ten minutes, Wood returned and gave 
orders to deploy the troo]is at either side of the trail. 
Capron's troops were ordered down the trail itself; Troop (r 
into the bushes on the right, and K and A were sent down into 
the hollow to connect with Young's column across the valley, 
which had also come up with the enemy and had begun firing. 
Troops F and E were deployed in skirmish line to the left. 

But the movement had hardly begun when, with sur- 
prising unexpectedness, there was a sharp crack which seemed 



THE RUSH OF THE ROU(iH RIDERS 475 

very near, and the peculiar nmsic of a ^lauser bullet sounded 
over the Ivouah Jiiders' heads. There Avas no more gossip in 
tlie ranks, hut the men scattered in the directions in whicdi 
they had been ordered, Itoosevelt leading the men to the right 
and AVood down the grassy slope to the left. The music of the 
l)ullets at once became constant; the enemy's fire was heavy. 
A\'liile the Kuugh liidi'rs luid iiui Keen strictly taken by sur- 
prise, the lay of the land placed them at a terrible disad- 
vantage. But no one seemed frightened. Though a moment 
before they had scarcely been able to realize that they were 
actually at war, they now rushed forward with an excitement 
which amounted almost to ecstacy. Whether the Spaniards 
could see our men or not, our men could not see the Spaniards, 
and yet the lire was not more than eighty yards away and was 
so hot that our men could only lie in the grass and fire in that 
position. As they rose up to rush a little further towards the 
enemy, some dropped not to rise when the next order for an 
advance came. The advances were made in (piiek, desperate 
rushes, and sometimes the ground gained was very slight. 
There was but an occasional glimpse of the enemy, and our 
men could only tire their volleys into the places whence the 
shots seemed to come, but they fired with perfect discipline 
and the advance was steady. Gradually the line became di- 
vided by the trail into two wings, that in the valley and that 
on the left, swinging ai'ound on the enemy's right flank. 

AVhen the fighting had lasted about an hour, the line 
reached a more open country in front of a slight hill, ^lean- 
time, the troops that had pushed <>nt in the direction of Y(Uing 
lia<l jnin('(l his line, wlijch was meeting a (lespcrate resistance 
and which had thus far been unable to dislodge the enemy 
from hi-^ rifle pits. V>y this time also the troops in the rear, 
the Tenth ("avalrv and the Twenty-second Infantry, hearing 
of the battle ahea<l. had Imrricd f(»rw;ii-(l to reinforce their 
comrades. Both AVood and Koosevelt led their men in a 
charge up the incline, aiul the enemy, thinking that the whole 
army was behind ihein, retreated. The Rough Riders, re- 



476 A MAGNIFICENT CHARGE 

inforced by the men hurrying np from the rear, pressed their 
advance relentlessly, throwing away everything that could 
impede their progress and rushing on regardless of danger. 
Such an advance in the face of terrific volleys was past the 
comprehension of the Spaniards. " When we fired a volley," 
said one of the prisoners later, " instead of falling back they 
came forward. That is not the way to fight, to come closer at 
every volley." Many striking incidents occurred. One pri- 
vate continued firing after being hit by three bullets and re- 
tired only when the fourth had disabled him. One who had 
been sent to the rear seriously w^ounded caught up a rifle, and, 
running back, joined in the charge. It was a magnificent 
dash, and when the enemy had disappeared towards Sevilla, 
the Itougli Eiders and their comrades rested on the ground 
they had gained and where some of their bravest men had 
fallen. The Spanish force engaged has been variously esti- 
mated, but numbered at least 2,000. When the battle began, 
the American force at the front was less than a quarter of that 
of the enemy, wdiich, moreover, had a marked advantage in 
position. The Rough Riders had made a night march the 
evening before, had secured l)ut about three hours' sleep on 
the wet ground, and had been marched under a burning sun 
and over a difficult trail right into action. Few of them had 
ever fired a Krag-Jorgensen rifle l)cfore, as they had secured 
their arms but a short time before leaving Tampa, and prob- 
ably not over 80 per cent, had been under fire before. Of the 
Rough Riders, eight were killed and thirty-four wounded, and 
of General Young's force there w^ere eighteen killed and 
rijihteen wounded. Among the officers killed were Captain 
Allvn Capron and Sergeant Tisli, a grandson of the Secretary 
of State under Grant. Both Wood and Roosevelt were in the 
thick of the fight, and walked cnlmlv about the lines encour- 
aging their men, but neither was hit, though they had many 
narrow escapes. 

The Spaniards had not siinply lost many men, but their 
courage. From this time they acted simply on the defensive. 



CAMARA'S fleet leaves CADIZ 477 

In tlieir retreat tliey passed beyond many places where tliey 
might have secured a terrible advantage over our advancing 
troops, and devoted themselves entirely to an ingenious de- 
fense of the outer intrenchments of Santiago, 

Shortly after General Shafter's expedition had departed 
from Tampa it was announced that Admiral Camara's fleet 
had left Cadiz. Having derived some satisfaction from the 
manner in which Cervera had eluded Sampson the month be- 
fore, Spain apparently decided to use similar tactics at this 
important time, when the better part of the American navy 
was engaged in liolding Cer^■era. Admiral Camara's ships 
dei)arted after the most solemn ceremonies, the blessing of 
flags by the bishops, and a brilliant procession. For some 
days its destination was mere guesswork. It was considered 
probable that Camara was coming to the relief of Cervera. 
While the number of the ships was considerable — sixteen 
altogether — but two were really formidable, even in theory. 
These were the l)attleship PeJayo and the armored cruiser 
Carlos V. AVith them were three new" torpedo-boat destroyers 
and two auxiliary cruisers. The remainder were gunboats and 
colliers. 

On the 25th, Sagasta announced that the fleet was b(Uind 
for the Philippines, and the movement was considered as of 
little importance except as a sop to public opinion in S])ain, 
for the people complained that the government was weak in 
not relieving Governor-General Augusti at Manila. They 
still supposed that Cervera was preventing the United States 
from doing anything in Cuba, and were inclined to think that 
Canmra could easily redeem tlie Philippines. On tlie iOth he 
reached the noi-th end <if llio Suez Canal and acted as if he 
intended to go on. "While the Ignited States government saw 
nothing to seriously fear in the Cadiz squadron, as the lAo/i- 
terey and C'lKtvlrslon woidd arrive at ^laiiiln before Camara 
possibly couhl, it announced on the 2Ttli that an American 
sr|ua<lron under Conunodore AVatsou would prejiare for im- 
mediate cruise to the coast of Spain. The Spanish coast cities 



478 A TRIP TO SUEZ AND RETURN 

at once became alarmed and fortifications were strengthened 
in a liurrj. But Watson's fleet did not sail at once. In- 
deed, the announcement seemed to be mainly intended to di- 
vert Camara's ships from the Philippines and back to Spain. 
If such was the strategy, it proved entirely successful, for, 
after hovering about the entrance of the canal for some days, 
paying toll money amounting to $250,000, and, after taking 
the fleet to Suez, he turned about, paid return toll, and even- 
tually started homeward, to the amazement and bewilderment 
of everybody. This return movement, however, did not occur 
till after Cervera's fleet had been destroyed and the capitula- 
tion of Santiago had become inevitable. 



CHAPTER XLII 

CONTINUED ADVANCE OF THE AIMEHICAN TROOPS- GEN- 
ERAL 8HAFTKR ARRIVES AT THE FRONT- PREPARA- 
TIONS FOR A GENERAL ATTACK — INGENIOUS SPANISH 
DEFENSES. 

Advaucing the Auierican Liues — The Spanish Retreat — Trials of the Trail 

— Soldiers Pushing Ahead Faster Than Supplies Could be Brought 
Up — Impossible to Land Heavy Guns — Cutting a Way Through 
Tropical Jungles — General Shafter Leaves the Ship — The Cuban 
Soldiers — A Remarkable Collection of Warriors — Famished and 
Naked Patriots — No Understanding of Organized War — Their 
Value as Scouts and Guides — Their xV version to Spades and Picks — 
Good Reasons for an Immediate Attack — Dangers of the Climate — 
Stretching the Line Northward — Within Ritie Range of the Enemy — 
Traps Laid by the Spaniards — Disguised Sharpshooters in the Treetops 

— Rifle Pits Trained on the Openings through Which our Trooi)s ]\Iust 
Advance — Riflemen Placed Like Machiue-Guns — The Block Houses 
and Masked Batteries — Expecting to Take Santiago in a Day— Inade- 
(piate Hospital Arrangements — The Greatest Land Battle of the War. 

AFTKR tlio ongagoiiients of the 2-itli, Clciieral Wheeler 
])uslied forward Lis comniand throitgli the valley and 
(Jeiierals Lawton and Kent with their commands oc- 
eiii)i('»l the adjacent hills as fast as troops were landed. By 
the night of the 25tli there were abont 8,000 American and 
Cuban troops in and about Sevilla, which the Spaniards had 
evacuated without resistance. On the following morning the 
advance guard, led by the Seventh Infantry under Colonel 
Benham, jmshed forward about three miles, halting and camp- 
ing near San Juan on the (luamo River about four miles from 
Santiago. I)uriiig the day the entire First Brigade moved 
forward and cain])ed within two miles of the Seventh Infantry, 
while the Cubans, whose knowledge of the country surpassed 
that of the Spaniards themselves, were kejit a little in advance 
of tjie most advan('(Ml American lines. They were indeed 
within two miles of the Spanish ontjiosts in the hills, a short 
distance east of the city. The scouts had explored the terri- 

(479) 



480 HARDSHIPS AND HEROISM 

tory between the liead of the column and the Spanish outposts 
and no considerable body of Spaniards was reported. The 
remainder of our army was camped along the hills between 
the front and the landing places at Daiquiri and Siboney. 
These detachments were being mo^^d forward as rapidly as 
possible, but in the face of the most unfavoralde conditions. 
Xo opposition was met from the Spaniards, however, who 
seemed to have been dazed by the rapidity and daring of the 
American advance. They had abandoned position after posi- 
tion witli scarcely a show of resistance. If they had fought 
every inch our army would have been in a very difficult posi- 
tion. One Avho has not gone over the trails in this section of 
Cnba in a pouring rain or burning sun cannot understand the 
sufferings to which the American troops were subjected and 
the heroism with which they bore it. These infantrymen 
from cool northern climes toiled hour after hour along these 
^ so-called roads and paths, through jungles of cacti, poison 
vines, and high grass which cuts like a razor, in a blistering 
sunlight which made the horizon waver before the eyes, or in 
a torrent of rain which drenched to the skin, while from the 
stagnant pools gray mists arose, and everywhere vultures wath 
outstretched wings looked greedily down. 

And yet all the men were anxious for the fighting to begin, 
many of them as yet without any adequate idea of what real 
fighting was like. They chafed at the delay caused in bring- 
ing up supplies, which was, of course, a very hard task in such 
a country, especially when the commissary department had 
been mismanaged. General Shafter had hurried forward the 
light guns as fast as he could and did not wish fighting to begin 
till he had the batteries in position, but the heavy guns were 
still on the transports. There was only one lighter to take off 
supplies. The spirit of the men was such that they would, 
have rejoiced at an order to carry the city by assault, big guns 
or not. But General Shafter had no intention of attacking 
till the subsistence department hnd become able to provide 
three days' rations for the soldiers' knapsacks, and it appeared 



GENERAL SHAFTER AT THE FRONT 481 

impossible to work the provisions along as fast as the eager 
soldiers advanced. "With a high sea running it was dangerous 
work ev(Mi to land the supplies, and yet the soldiers at the 
front, often obliged to wait a disagreeably long time for their 
rations, were ready to throw away their knapsacks and rush 
upon Santiago. Tii-cMl, footsore, drenched as they were, they 
were eager for any order involving some daring deed without 
any consid(>ration of what might follow^ 

On the 2C)th, General Shafter left the ship on which he 
liad iiKuIc his licad([iiarters during the work of landing the 
expedition and went along the road and among the camps, 
consulting with his generals and the Cuban leaders. He was 
informed that General Linares, who was in command at San- 
tiago, was about to be reinforced by a division from Man- 
zanillo, and he decided to send a detachment of Cuban troops 
to intercept them, or at least keep them at bay till the city 
could be completely surrounded. AVhen General Shafter 
reached the front on the 29th, having had abundant oppor- 
tunity on the Avay to observe the obstacles under which the 
transportation of military supplies had been made, he found 
that a large part of his troops had reached a position so close 
to the Spanish lines before Santiago that only the intervening 
hills remained to be taken. Jn view of the difficulties of the 
country, General Shafter had reason to feel proud that in a 
wreck's time his army had made such headway. The soldiers 
were in good form; the Cubans added greatly to the nundiers, 
and while they had not as yet been tested in regular battle, 
they had proved of great advantage in scouting. General 
Garcia was working cordially with him and seemed to be 
ready to do whatever was ordered. 

Up to this time the Cuban soldiers had been regarded with 
something like ('ntlm-ia>tic intcre>t. They were the most re- 
nuirkable collection of Avari'i(U's which our army officers had 
ever seen. On the morning of the 29th, for instance, one of 
the transports had landed at Siboney 2,000 insurgents which 
had been brought arouiul from Aserraderos under the com- 



482 CHARACTER OF THE CUBAN SCOUT 

mand of General Sanchez. They were landed through the 
heavy surf and lined up emaciated, half naked, and in some 
instances almost entirely nude; but, weak as they were, they 
stood up proudly and shouted " Cuba Libre ! " much to the 
astonishment of the foreign military representatives, who were 
utterly at a loss to understand the enthusiasm of men in their 
miserable condition. These famished men fell to devouring 
the rations served to them like starving wolves; some of them 
ate so much that they nearly died, but then they cheerfully 
])rcpared to march to the front among the Cuban scouts. The 
American officers soon found, however, that the value of these 
allies was mainly confined to their scouting. In a certain way 
their bravery was phenomenal, but they had no understanding 
of organized war or discipline. In the excitement of the fight- 
ing they paid no attention to orders; they would lacerate the 
treetops with their bullets, then fling down their rifles and rush 
through the bushes at a few Spaniards with their machetes. 
All the work of making intrenchments, of widening the roads 
for bringing up guns or food was to them a puzzle. They 
would cheerfully scout, but they would not work with spades 
and picks; and naturally the Americans became indignant 
when they saw the Cubans sitting around munching the food 
brought up with so much difficulty, while hard digging in 
trenches M'as to be done. These half clad, lean, and dusky 
fellows would sneak through the underbrush up under the 
noses of the Spaniards, and when hit with a bullet would throw 
up their arms, shout " Cuba Libre! " and drop dead; but all 
the Cul)ans in Cuba could not have taken Santiago. Our 
soldiers could readily understand why the Spaniards had never 
been able to drive them out of such a country, and why the 
Cubans had seldom shown a disposition to fight in the open. 
Gomez's plan of wearing out Spain was the only one in which 
his picturesque forces had any chance of success. 

But leaving the possible assistance of the Cubans out of 
the question, General Shafter took an optimistic view of the 
situation as he found it at the front. So weakly had the Span- 



REASONS FOR PROMPT ACTION 485 

iards resisted his ];uuling- when they niiojit liave made it ex- 
ceedingly diftieidt, so quickly had they abandoned strong posi- 
tions and fallen back on their intrenchnients, that Shafter 
thought they could be easily beaten out of their last defense. 
Nearly everything went to confirm him in this opinion. De- 
serters from Santiago told him of the desperate condition of 
the Spaniards in the city. It had been expected that they 
would make a strong defense of Aguadores near the coast and 
on the left of the American line, for they had strongly in- 
trenched it and had some artillery there, but on the 30th they 
deserted it and moved to the seaward fortifications a little to 
the west and containing the strongest batteries on the coast. 
But they were within reach of the fleet, and therefore the left 
of the American line was ordered to move up to the position 
the Spaniards had deserted. 

But while General Shafter had his army within rifle range 
of the enemy, his heavy guns were still on the transports; his 
soldiers had forged ahead over roads which could not be made 
passable for heavy guns for days. It is not altogether strange 
that he decided not to wait for them. 

The country was such tliat inactivity might prove more 
fatal to the soldiers than action; sickness due to climatic con- 
ditions might in a few days weaken and demoralize such an 
eager army; in their desire to push on rapidly they had thrown 
away much that they were likely to need when waiting in their 
position. They were still in excellent form, but as one or 
two of the oflicers had become ill and General Shafter himself 
began to feel the efl^ects of the climate, prompt attack seemed 
wise. ]\[oreover, reinforcements were hurrying to Linares 
from the vrest and the Spanish near Guantanamo might take 
advantage of delay to seek a position on the American right. 
Everything teudi^l to convince Shafter that it might be fatal 
to wait. I,ater exjierience justified his conduct. The risks 
of the ("u])an climate to Xorthcrn men, exposed to the furious 
sun (luring the days and compelled to sleep through the damp, 

chill nights with no shelter, were at least as great as could be 
29 



486 THE DECISIVE MOVE 

expected even from stubborn Spanish resistance. At first the 
weather had been very good, but rains had begun during the 
advance and the men suffered discomforts which finally told 
on their health. But this was after the fight had been won. 
When they fought they were fresh and vigorous. Had 
Shafter waited for the heavy guns there might not have been 
as many lives lost in the furious assault, but he might have 
had a discouraged and enfeebled army. His decision, which 
seemed to some so unwise, was really the critical move upon 
which everything depended. It meant l)loodshed, but it also 
meant victory and a speedy termination of the war. 

To the north of the American position lay the fortified 
village of El Caney, which it was deemed necessary to reduce 
lest the enemy threaten the rear. The garrison there was 
supposed to number about 800 men. To the south was Agua- 
dores, where the Spaniards had already abandoned better forti- 
fications than were supposed to exist in El Caney. Directly 
in front, and all that prevented the Americans from marching 
up to the city intrenchments, was the fortified hill of San 
Juan. General Shafter considered that El Caney would make 
but a sliglit resistance and that Lawton's (the Second) division 
of 6,000 men could take it, while Kent's (the Eirst) and 
Wheeler's cavalry were advancing in the valley towards San 
Juan hill. Having reached El Caney, Lawton would be able 
to return and co-operate with Kent and Wheeler before San 
Juan, which ajipeared to be the strongest defended. At the 
same time General Dufiield, in command of the Thirteenth 
Michigan Volunteers, a battalion of the Thirty-fourth Michi- 
gan, and with 2,000 Cubans, could make an attack on the 
Spanish near the coast and prevent their going to the assist- 
ance of those at San Juan and El Caney. 

During the 30th the troops gradually assumed the posi- 
tions convenient for such a general movement. Admiral 
Sampson was prepared to open fire on the shore battery to 
which the Spanish on the south of our line had taken refuge, 
while the land division at Aguadores attacked from that side. 



INGENUITY OF THE SPANISH DEFENSES 487 

Kc'itlier Adiiiinil Sniiipsnii nor (ioiicriil (iarcia agreed with 
General Shafter on tlu' weak resistance likely to be expected 
from the Spanish, Garcia said that in their final intrench- 
ments they would fight desperately, and he was right. But 
Shafter was justified in hastening operations as much as pos- 
sible. 

The American officers had no idea, nor could they have 
even after the most efTective woi-k of scouts, of the ingenious 
character of the Spanish defense. While they had been 
weakly surrendering outside^ positions, they had l)een work- 
ing persistently at devices which they had planned as traps. 
So, indeed, they were. Against a less courageous and aggres- 
sive army, their effect \voidd have been practical annihilation. 
According to all military rules, the Spaniards had made them- 
selves impregnable and had craftily led the Americans on into 
the jungle to fall a victim to their devices. 

The Spanish plan was to stop our advance by three differ- 
ent methods and at three different stages of attack. It must 
always be remembered that the roads and trails in this vicinity 
had all been cut through dense tropical jungles, in some places 
so wild and tangled with vines and creepers as to be almost 
impenetrable. ITere and there were openings or glades of 
high grass dotted with clumps of bushes. The first or outer 
line of Spanish defense consisted of sharpshooters posted in 
the treetops along these roads and trails. It was the business 
of these men to harass and, if possible, demoralize our troops 
by subjecting them to galling cross fires from a series of petty 
ambuscades. Such a scheme cimld never have been thought of 
except by Spaniards and could never have been carried out 
except in a country of this kind. But it was carried out 
with thoughtful attention to every detail. These sharp- 
shooters were hidden in cai-cfully ju-epared nests of leaves in 
the tops of dense trees; some of them had tunics of fresh palm 
leaves tied around their bodies from the shoulders down, so 
that at a little distance they could not be distinguished from 
the foliage in wliidi they were concealed. They could neither 



488 ELABORATE PREPARATIONS 

be seeu, driven in, nor dislodged; they nsed Manser rifles with 
smokeless powder and they were posted in the trees in the 
confident expectation that they could pick off our soldiers as 
they advanced. After our men had passed by, these skir- 
mishers could still fire at them, shoot them in the back, worry 
them by an unseen fire, and shoot those bringing up supplies 
or carrying back the wounded. 

But failing in the attempt to check our troops by these 
petty ambuscades, the Spaniards had made careful and elabo- 
rate preparations to slaughter them in the glades or openings 
through which the troops must pass on the way to the city. 
Almost every one of these openings was within range of either 
a line of rifle pits or of a substantial log blockhouse, placed in 
a commanding ])Osition on a knoll or hill. The distance be- 
tween the rifle pits or blockhouses and the openings had been 
carefully measui'cd and large sheets of what appeared to be 
metal roofing had been set U)> back of the glades to serve as 
aiming guides. Machine-guns had Ijcen accurately trained 
on these sheets of metal and given the proper elevation. In 
some of the blockhouses firing boards consisting of slightly 
inclined tables or shelves with deep grooves cut in them for 
rifle l)arrels had been prepared as a means of directing the 
fire of the soldiers to the particular opening in the road which 
M'^as to be swept when the American troops appeared in it. 
The inclination of these boards was such that all the Spaniards 
had to do was to load and blaze away, thus preventing wild 
random firing in the excitement of battle. It was virtually 
equivalent to turning a file of riflemen into a machine gun, 
the range for which had been accurately calculated and which 
waited only for Americans to ap]iear in front of the target, as 
they inevitalily must if they advanced. 

The third and final lino of Spanish defense consisted of 
the blockhouses with a few open or masked batteries of light 
guns and a network of connecting or encircling rifle pits and 
the barbed-wire entanglements intended to prevent a rush as- 
sault and detain our troops under a murderous fire. These 



THREE BATTLES IN ONE 489 

intrencliments were not coiitiiuioiis along our whole front, but 
they were at all points in such a way as to command all the 
easy and natnial approaches. It is not strange that the Span- 
iards after such preparation confidently counted on resisting 
the American troops before which they had so weakly retired, 
and as these devices were not suspected by the American 
officers, it is not strange that they advanced confidently to 
take a })osition which, technically, it was impossible for them 
to take. 

So general was this sanguine feeling that when dawn broke 
they would begin a march which would in a few hours end 
within the walls of Santiago, that preparations for remaining 
outside were neglected and preparations for possible fatalities 
or reverses were inadequate. One small field hospital with 
equipments had reached the front on the 2IJth and been placed 
in one of the glades of high grass near the road and surrounded 
by a jungle. It provided tent shelter for but about a hundred 
wounded men. The supply of blankets was very short; and, 
indeed, no cots or mattresses had been brought forward. So 
rapid had been the advance of the brave army that it had been 
impossible to follow up with all the rc(]uiremcnts for severe 
fighting, but as General Shafter apparently did not expect 
this, nor the army fear it, too little thought was given to it. 

Under such conditions was begun the battle of July 1st, 
the greatest land battle of the wai-. It was really three battles 
in one, for the taking of El Caney occupied Lawton's division 
so long that it was unable to co-operate in the center before 
San Juan as expected. As the line of battle was so extended 
and the whole country was so covered with woods and chapar- 
ral, those fighting in any one place had little idea of what was 
going on elsewhere, and it was not till the sun went down 
that the army knew what a great day it had been. It will be 
impossible to describe the l)attle as one general engagement, 
but the fighting at the three different points must be described 
separately, the reader rememliering that the troops were simul- 
taneously engaged all along the line and all day. 



CHAPTER XLIII 

DESPERATE AND BLOODY FIGHTING AT SAN JUAN, EL 
CANEY, AND AGUADORES — INADEQUATE PROVISION 
FOR THE SUFFERING WOUNDED — A DARK OUTLOOK. 

The Morning of July First — Grimes's Battery Opens Fire — The Spanish 
Reply — The Advance in the Center towards San Juan — A Tell-tale 
Balloon — Critical Position of the Seventy-tirst New York — Storming 
the Hill — General Hawkins' Brave Charge — Capturing the Spanish 
Position — Roosevelt Leads the Charge up San Juan Hill — Lawton's 
Attack upon El Caney — Desperate Defense of the Spaniards — The 
Dash of the Colored Troops — Storming the Fort — El Caney Falls — 
General DutKeld's Attack at Aguadores — Inadequacj' of Hospital 
Arrangements — Terrible Suffering but Brave Endurance of the 
Wounded — Provisions Run Short — General Shafter Sick and Dis- 
heartened — A Dark Outlook — Looking to the Fleet for Help — The 
Spaniards also in Despair — Cervera Receives Orders to Escape. 

THE morning of July 1st was hot with tropical intensity. 
Thickets and overhanging palms were wreathed in 
vapors. To the north of the forces in the center of 
the line rose a range of verdant peaks. Along the road lead- 
ing to El Poso were silently marching the troops. Beyond El 
Poso was a dense Cuban forest into which regiment after regi- 
ment was marching, and, somewhere in that thick nnder- 
growth, was forming a line of battle. Enrther on rose the 
green hill of San Juan capped by its blockhouse, and to the 
right and left along the crest were Spanish intrenchments. 
Over the uneven valley floated the buzzards waiting for the 
carnage — " all in a hot and copper sky." On a little hill to 
the left of El Poso ranch house, an artistic old building with 
tiled roof, was posted Captain Grimes's battery of four guns, 
and at twenty minutes to 7 Grimes gave the order : 

" l^umber one, ready ! Eire ! " This was followed by 
one gun after another with solid shot and shrapnel, making a 

(490) 



THE BATTLE OPENS 491 

very exhilarating' spoetaclo in the bright sunshine. In the in- 
tervals eonld be heard the boom of C'apron's battery, whieli 
liiid (tpc'iuMl on the defenses of El C'aney far oii" to the right, and 
;ib(i\c ihc palms ro^e a cloud of smoke marking its position. 
(ii'iiiu's's ginis li;id boomed a few times when a voice down in 
fi'oiit caUcd nut, " Here it comes! " Men instinctively ducked 
tlicir heads and the first Spanisli shell came screaming over the 
artillerymen a!id throwing shrapnel into the ranks behind. 
AuDther came and burst among our men near the ranch house, 
wt)unding several ; another exploded in a dip under the hill, 
where twelve Cubans were torn to pieces. The music of 
shi-a]mel is anything but pleasant, but Grimes's voice was as 
clarion-like as ever, the " Heady ! Fire ! " coming as regular 
as clockwork. One of his shots tore through the roof of the 
blockhouse, others damaged the Spanish battery, and finally 
their fire ceased. Grimes continued to fire a little longer, and 
then for a mouK'nt all was still, excepting for the occasional 
crack of a Spanish rifle — no one could tell where. 

Far to the front the war balloon was slowly moving down, 
keeping pace with the firing line of infantry, and suddenly a 
volley crashed from the Spanish rifle pits; there was an an- 
swering crash from the rifles of our men and the gi'cat battle 
of San Juan had fairly begun. 

Wheeler's dismounted cavalry had been ordered nff the 
hill to the front, while Kent's infantry moved similarly on the 
left, but the road nari'owed, crossing several fordable streams, 
and Kent recei\'ed ordei-s to allow the cavalry the right of way. 
Ihit. compelled to wade the river and othei- streams to get into 
line, tlie j)rogress was necessarily slow, aiul it had to be made 
under a galling fire not simply from the Spaniards on San 
Juan hill but from sharpshooters in the treetops. The for- 
tunes of the Signal Corps' war balloon were not conducive to 
the belief in the efiiciency of such nu\ins in warfare, es])ecially 
in such an engagement. As it kept pace with th(> move- 
ments of the division, it only indicated its line of march and 
drew upon it the enemy's fire. Soon the balloon itself be- 



492 UNDER A GALLING FIRE 

came a target for the enemy's gunners and riflemen; it was 
pierced many times and the occupants of the car gave them- 
selves up for lost. It ^^ as linally brought do^vn to the bed of 
a stream and abandoned. 

Whenever the men waded the streams the enemy's fire fell 
among them like hail, and they went down dead, wounded, and 
dj^ing on every side without having even seen the face of a 
Spaniard. The fire increased steadily, coming from all direc- 
tions, even from the sharpshooters in the rear and from the 
shrapnel aimed at the balloon. At this point General Kent 
was infoi'med that a trail or narrow way had been discovered 
by the signal men in the balloon, leading to the left to a ford 
lower down the stream. Into this he turned the Seventy-first 
Xew York Kegiment. General Kent, in his official report of 
the battle, says : 

" This would have speedily delivered them in their proper place on the 
left f)f their brigade, but under the galling tire of the enemy the leading 
battalion of this regiment was thrown into confusion and recoiled in dis- 
order on the troops in the rear. At this critical moment the officers of my 
staff practically formed a cordon behind the panic-stricken men and urged 
them to go forward. I finally ordered them to lie down in the thicket and 
clear the way for others of their own regiment who were coming up behind. 
This many of them did, and the second and third battalions came forward 
ill better order and moved along the road to the ford. One of my staff offi- 
cers ran back waving his hat to Imrry forward the third brigade who, upon 
approaching the forks, found the way blocked by men of the Seventy-first 
New York. There were other men of this regiment crouching in the 
bushes, many of whom were encouraged by the advance of the approaching 
column to rise and go forward. As already stated, I had received orders 
sometime before to keep in the rear of the cavalry division. Their advance 
was much delayed, resulting in frequent halts, presumably to drop their 
blanket rolls, and due to the natural delay in fording the stream. These 
delays under such a hot fire grew exceedingly irksome and I therefore 
pushed the head of my division as quickly as I could towards the river in 
column of files of twos, paralleled in the narrow way by the cavalry. This 
quickened the forward movement and enabled me to get into position as 
speedily as possible for the attack. Owing to the congested condition of 
the road the progress of the narrow columns was, liowever, painfully slow. 
I again sent a staff officer at a gallop to urge forward the troops in rear. 
The head of Wickoff's brigade reached th,' forks at 12.20 p.m., and hurried 
on the left, stepping over prostrate forms of men of the Seventy-first. Tliis 
heroic brigade (consisting of the Thirteenth, Ninth, and Twenty-fourth 



m. 



o < 

3 C 



12 

c — ' 



% 7: 



% 




A TERRIBLE ORDEAL 405 

United States Infantry) speedily crossed the stream and were (juickly 
deploj'ed to the left of the lower ford. While personally superintending 
this movement, Colonel Wickoll was killed, the command of the brigade 
then devolving upon Lieut. -Col. Worth, Thirteenth Infantry, who im- 
mediatclj' fell severely wounded; and then upon Lieut. -Col. Liscum, 
Twenty-fourth Infantry, who, live minutes later, also fell under the 
withering lire of the enemy. The command of tlie brigade now ile- 
volved upon Lieut. -Col. E. P. Ewers, >iinth Infantry. 

It was a trying place for volunteers and even for regu- 
lars. On tlie whole, the JS'ew York soldiers did not flinch, 
though thirty or forty fell in a neck of the woods before they 
had seen a Spaniard, for the cover from which the sharp- 
shooters fired was as dense as a jungle; many of them were 
firing from the rear while the bullets poured in from the in- 
trenchments on the liill. 

The Seventy-first were at a great disadvantage because 
they were fighting with the old Springfield rifles — " old smoke 
guns," as the soldiers called them. Every time they fired a 
volley the Spaniards could easily locate them, and the Mauser 
bullets would pour a perfect torrent upon the Xew York 
boys, doing terrible execution. It was not strange that strong 
hearts grew faint. It is to their credit that with a few excep- 
tions they did not flinch in that terrible ordeal. 

In what was afterwards christened the Bloody Angle, a 
piece of grassless ground at a ford which encompassing trees 
made an ideal hiding-place for sharpshooters, even cool-headed 
officers occasionallv sought a shelterinc: bush. In doint; so 
one of them called out to Colonel Roosevelt : " Colonel, bet- 
ter get down or they'll pot you." To which the acting colonel 
of the Rough Riders, grimly biting the stump of a cigar, re- 
plied : 

" I'm not going t<t lie down foi- any ('onfound('(l Spaniard," 
and he stalked about, foi'tniuitcly uninjui-cd. 

No time was lost in deploying from right and left, but it 
was clear that the advance was confused, and it was inevitable 
in such a country. Looking at San Jnan hill fi-om El Poso, it 
appeared to consist of but one very high hill, whereas it was a 



496 THE EMERGENCY AND THE HERO 

series of hills, steep and difficult and forming a veritable Gib- 
raltar against an assault by infantry. From the first the 
Spanish had every advantage of position. As our men ad- 
vanced they were met by an ever-increasing cross fire poured 
from the wooded eminences on both flanks which could not 
be seen from the road even by the skirmish line. Every little 
mound, every inch of the country was perfectly known to the 
enemy and had been measured and filled with sharpshooters. 
AVhen the Americans had to cross one of the glades or clearings 
it seemed as if the whole Spanish fire was concentrated upon 
it • yet the same thing was happening in different places. The 
Americans were in a continual ambush. Where the volleys 
came from and whv the bullets reached them in such showers 
they could not realize. It was no wonder that in such a deadly 
labyrinth some hearts weakened and commands got nnxed up, 
and orders went astray. 

The division had thus been pushing desperately on tor 
two hours when the word was passed along to halt, and there 
was an impression that it was the intention to go into camp on 
tlie plain below San Juan, and within range of the Spanish 
batteries and even of the trenches. But there were only two 
things to do: to retire or to storm the trenches. A retreat 
would have demoralized the army and postponed the takmg 
of Santiago indefinitely. An advance was again ordered, and 
the troops went doggedly on, driving the Spanish outposts 
■ back and into their trenches. 

At last the little foothill below San Juan was reached and 
the emergencv developed the indispensable hero, in the person 
of General Hawkins, a tall, well-knit old man -^th a white 
moustache and pointed beard. With him were the Sixth and 
the Sixteenth Infantry, the other regiment of his brigade the 
Xew York A^^lunteers, was not yet up. Hawkins rode out m 
front of his regulars, and, drawing his sword pointed to tl.e 
hill, and called upon them in ringing tones to follow him. 

Then he turned and set his face to the enemv who had 
marked him for slaughter and were volleying viciously, ihe 



STORMING THE HILL 407 

regulars dnsliod forwaril with a cheer in which the ohl rebel 
yell could he distinguished. Withering was the fire on them, 
and men reeh'd and dropped in their tracks. There was some 
straggling, as there always is in a charge up a steep slope, 
but the body of men moved on and up. Volley after volley 
was blazed at them. The Spaniards were now in plain sight. 
Oni- men tired as tliov ran forward — fired at Spanish faces, 
j)eering and strained. In a moment it was all over, for the 
enemy serandjled out of the trenches and ran back to San 
Juan without looking liehind. This was at 1.30 v. m. (ial- 
lant old General Hawkins did not get a scratch, bnt his losses 
were heavy. Lieutenant Ord, son of the distinguished gen- 
eral of that name and a lieutenant of the Sixth, had been 
killed by a wounded Spaniard after he had bidden liis men to 
spare the fellow, and Lieutenant Michie of the same regiment 
had also fallen. Before the end of the day the Sixth lost 100 
killed and wounded, and the casualties of the Sixteenth were 
also serious. To General Hawkins belongs the honor of tak- 
ing the key of the position and the heart out of the Spaniards. 

But in the confusion or mixed condition in which the 
troops were, owing to their difficult advance, it appears that 
other regiments of regidars joined in the assault and partici- 
l)ated in the glory of the achievement, particularly the Xinth, 
Thirt(H'nth, and Twenty-fourth, or Ewer's brigade. Li fact, 
in llic ditiicult work lief ore them the brave men did not wait 
for orders. They rushed ahead wherever they could. One 
colonel found himself on a ridge with the fragments of six 
cavalry regiments, and he was the ranking officer. One troop 
of the Tenth Cavalry was found a half mile from the rest of 
the command. 

Under the brow of the hill they had stormed there was a 
place where a large number of men could lie in safety, and it 
was soon bhick with them. During the afternoon the ridges 
to the right and left of this hill were occupied by our regi- 
ments as fast as they could come u]i, the Spaniards ofT(M-ing 
diminished resistance, but steadily retiring to their strong in- 



498 THE ENEMY DEIVEN BACK 

trenchments. Two Gatling gnns were finally brought into 
play on the right of the enemy's second line of defense, and 
Best's battery also moved \^) and opened fire on the enemy. 

At a little before 4 o'clock occurred the second thrilling 
episode of the day. Under the brow of the little hill a council 
of war had been held, the question being whether they should 
push on and take the main hill where the Spanish l)loekhouses 
were. Colonel Roosevelt volunteered to head the charge. It 
seemed a mad rush. A foreign officer standing near the posi- 
tion when the men started out to make the charge was heard 
to say : 

" Men, for Heaven's sake, don't go up that hill. It will 
be impossible for human beings to take that position. You 
can't stand the fire." 

But Avith a terrific yell they rushed up to the enemy's 
works, and the Spaniards, whose courage had fled after the 
first charge, retired, and when night came they had been 
driven back npon the city. But it had been a hard experience 
for our men. They had become drenched not simply from 
fording streams but by a rain which had set in. Xotwith- 
standing their exhausted condition, they labored during the 
night digging trenches, furnishing details to bury the dead 
and to carry the wounded back in improvised litters, often 
being shot down by some dastardly Spanish sharpshooter left 
in the rear. 

As the sun went down the men in Wheeler's and Kent's 
divisions fell to wondering what had become of Lawton's and 
what fighting they had had to capture El Caney. As already 
stated, it had been thought that after Lawton had taken El 
Cane;)' a part of his forces could return and assist the center; 
but Lawton did not advance on San Juan that afternoon be- 
cause he had found that he had all he could attend to in taking 
El Caney. It is no secret that General Lawton expected to 
dispose of El Caney at one blow, and General Chaffee was to 
have the honor of capturing the place and Lawton was to earn 
hi i laurels in an attack on Santiago afterwards. He may have 



PESPKRATE FIGHTING AT EL TANEY AOl 

iudiilgctl in ;i li(jpu of reaching the Spanish defenses ahead of 
Kent and di'i.ving the enemy back on the city. At any rate, 
both Lawton and ( "hatfce tliouglit El Caney woukl he an easy 
nnt to crack. 

The start was made at dawn, and the niarcli was made as 
ra}tidly and ([uickly as possil)le to prevent a hasty exit from 
El Caney, I'nr there would have been no glory in captnring an 
evacuated town. The Sj)aniards, numbering over 1,000, as it 
turned out, had no notion of running away. They did not 
come ont to give battle, l)ut fought mainly in trenches sur- 
rounding the fort and blockhouse and in those buildings. 
P'rom a hill a mile and a quarter from the stone fort, Captain 
Capron opened the attack with shells fired at 6.35 a. m. at a 
body of Spaniards wdio were falling back to the trenches. The 
infantry was distributed as follows: Chaffee's brigade ad- 
vanced from the east; Colonel Miles's brigade attacked from 
the south, and Ludlow^'s was tent around to make the approach 
from the southwest. General Chaffee rode up and down be- 
hind his firing line encouraging his men. " Xow^, boys, do 
something for your country to-day," he frequently said. 
Chaffee did not think the Spaniards would hold out very long. 
Ludlow's men made slow but steady progress through a tract 
of woods running from bush to bush and shooting at a Spaniard 
whenever they could see one. 

The Second !^^assachusetts Volunteers of this command 
.behaved splendidly, exposing themselves freely and display- 
ing fine marksmanship, but, like the Seventy-first Xew York, 
they were at a disadvantage with their " smoke guns." 

The Spaniards, shooting from their trenches and from loop- 
holes, ke]>t up a galling fire u])on our men wlicrcver they 
showed themselves. They fired an immense amount of am- 
munition. It was a continuous fusilade. Tf not the most 
brilliant, it was perhaps the most desperate battle of the San- 
tiago campaign. Tt was demon.strated that the S]ianiards 
were hard fighters in defense. In one little line of intrench- 
ments were fiftv or sixtv with a xouu"- officer constantlv ex- 



502 OUR FLAG FLOATS OVER EL CANEY 

posing himself to our fire as lie commanded his men. Time 
after time, for hour after hour, at his word these Spaniards 
rose and delivered volley after volley into our advancing ranks. 
Time after time our men were thrown against the defenses, al- 
ways gaining ground, but always with terrible losses. So the 
battle went on all day, none of our soldiers flinching and the 
Spaniards fighting like demons. Gradually our lines closed 
in on three sides, driving the Spaniards out of their trenche-. 

Two companies of the colored Twenty-fifth Infantry, led 
by Lieutenant ]\Ioss, had the honor of storming and taking in 
two rushes tlie blockhouse. ]\Iany Spaniards in it were killed 
and the sur^-ivors made a rush for the stone fort in El Caney 
under a hot fire. A company of the Twelfth Infantry, with a 
newspaper corresjiondent in advance of it, ran up and took 
l^ossession of this fort after Capron's shells had made a wreck 
of it and all but three of its defenders had been killed. These, 
bespattered with blood and exhausted by the tremendous strain 
of their defense, were glad to surrender. The Spanish flag 
was hauled down at 5 o'clock and the American colors went up 
and floated out bravely. One hundred and fifteen prisoners 
were taken; wounded were lying about everywhere. The 
Spanish loss at El Caney embraced most of its defenders, and 
among them General Linares; the Americans lost some 
valuable regimental ofiScers and their list of wounded was 
large. 

While the severe fighting had been going on before Sari 
Juan and El Caney, General Duflield and his forces had not 
been idle on the left near the coast. In accordance with the 
plans he made a feint before the Spanish garrison near Agua- 
dores, consisting of 4,000 Spaniards strongly fortified, and the 
Neiv York and a few other war vessels bombarded the fort from 
the sea, but doing little damage. The Spaniards selected Duf- 
field's advancing force as their target, and the first shell they 
fired killed seventeen Cubans on the hill above the railroad. 
Another shot mowed down two files of fours in the Michigan 
Twenty-third, killing two men and wounding several others. 



THE BATTLE RESUMED 



503 



Duffield fired several vollcvs into the fort and accomplished 
his purpose of prevent iui; the Spaniards there from eo-oper- 
atiny,- with the intrenched arniv at San Juan. 

The Cubans with Kent did no fighting, or, rather, the 
situation was sueh that there was no fighting for them to do. 
Lawton was to have had the assistance of several thousand 
Cubans, bnt the truth is that they kept well ont of danger, 
fired their ammnnition into the treetops and called for more. 




MAP OF SANTIAGO AND VICINITY. 

Position of our troops after the battles of El Caiiey and San Juan, and line of 
Spanish rotreat. 

At daylight on the morning of the 2d the enemy resumed 
the battle, and firing continued throughout the day all along 
the line, part of the time in a drenching rain. There were 
many casualties from bullets clearing the crest of our in- 
trenchments and striking men as they were moving up to posi- 
tion or going back and forth with supplies or caring for the 
wounded. At nightfall the firing ceased, but later in the 
evening another vigorous assault was made all along the line. 
This was completely repulsed, and the enemy retinal to his 
trenches, and the almost impregnable nature of his last de- 



504 SUFFERINGS OF THE WOUNDED 

fenses was beginning to dawn upon our men. According to 
the official report of casualties for the three days' fighting 
231 were killed, 1,283 wonnded, and 81 were missing. The 
Spanish loss, especially at El Caney, was much heavier. 

In even a brief history of the fighting before Santiago 
notice must be taken of an unfortunate condition of things 
which became co]ispicuous a little later. Mention has been 
made of the single field hosj)ital which had been brought up 
to the advance lines the day before the battle began. Pos- 
sibly the hospital equipment would have been complete and 
adequate had the Spaniards made little resistance, as our gen- 
erals expected, but with our severe losses the condition of the 
wounded became deplorable. The first of the wounded, most 
of whom had received aid at bandaging stations just back of 
the firing line, began to reach the hospital as early as 9 o'clock. 
As the hot tropical day advanced, the numbers constantly in- 
creased, until at nightfall long rows of wounded were lying 
in the grass in front of small operating tents, without awnings 
or shelter, awaiting examination and treatment. The small 
force of field surgeons worked without either rest or food 
for twenty-one hours, and yet hundreds of seriously wounded 
men lay on the ground for hours. Xo organized provision 
had been made for feeding them or giving them drink. At 
sunset, the five surgeons had operated upon and dressed the 
wounds of 154 men; still long lines of suffering men lay wait- 
ing, and the number brought in constantly increased. A few 
more surgeons arrived and the force worked all night, partly 
by moonlight and partly by the light of flaring candles, which 
occasionally drew a shot from sharpshooters still nesting in the 
treetops not far away. These cold-blooded and merciless 
guerrillas fired all day on the 1st at our ambulances, and it 
was two days before they were finally driven out of the trees. 
After being operated upon, there was no place for the suffer- 
ing but out under the trees, where, weak and shaken from 
agony under the surgeon's knife, they had to lie in the wet 
grass, with no one to look after them, no one to give them food 



A DISCOIKAGINC; OUTLOOK 507 

or -vvatcr, no blankets for them, as only a few had boon brought 
to the front. The scenes of the 2(1 were like those of the pre- 
vious dnv, but worse. Maiiv of the wouiKlcd broiiglit in fi-oni 
El Caney had had nothing to eat or drink lor tweuty-four 
hours, for they had started with but one day's rations, and some 
of the boys had shared that with those who had foolishly 
thrown theirs away so that ihey might advance faster. .Vnd 
yet these brave fellows uttered no complaint; some would yield 
their turn with the surgeon to a comrade who seemed to be 
v>'orse off. Those in charge of the supplies on the transports 
or at the landing places were working night and day to unload 
them and hurry them to the front, but over such a country it 
was slow, ditlicult M'ork. Soon provisions began to run low, 
for a strong sea had set in and it was impossible to take off the 
supplies. The mistake had been made of pushing too rapidly 
to the front with soldiers and articles needed in fighting, pro- 
visions and medical supplies taking second place, and when 
the atteni])t was made to move them uj) the pack trains were 
cut off by the dastardly Spaniards in the trees, who shot the 
nudes. Men were under fire for forty-eight hours, with 
scarcely any food and with but little water. 

As he had been o])timistic before the battle, so now Gen- 
eral Shafter became disheartened at the prospect, lie luid a 
brave army, l)ut improperly supplied; firing at his army con- 
stantly were the Spaniards in defenses such as few armies 
ever faced. He needed heavy guns, but it would be days be- 
fore they could be brought up. lie was suffering from fever 
himself, and at any time it might break out in an army in such 
a trying position, with insufficient food, without shelter, in 
trenches flooded with rain or steaming in the sun. lie had 
heard that Spanish reinforcements had broken j^ast Garcia, 
who had been sent to head them off. On tlie whole, the out- 
look could not have been darker. 

At this critical time it became a serious (piestion whether 

the fleet could not do something to assist the land forces. 

There was the Spanish fleet in the harbor, where it had been 
30 



508 SAMPSON PLANS A COMBINED ATTACK 

for ueai'Iy six weeks, and our forces were in a position where 
they might be liable to a terrific fire from the ships. Even 
if onr army could succeed in storming the city, there was the 
Spanish fieet ready to make the city a desert as soon as it fell 
into American hands. There was Admiral Sampson's fleet, 
which had for two months been longing for a chance to train 
its guns upon Cervera's vessels, and it had lain outside the 
mouth of the harbor for weeks with nothing but a narrow 
channel in tlie w'ny, a channel mined, to be sure, and guarded 
by guns so mounted as to threaten a strong plunging fire. 
But with the army in such a serious position, had not the 
time come when the risk of running the channel must be 
taken ? If Sampson could only run past the forts, which he 
had already partly demolished, and dispose at once of Cervera's 
fleet, the enemy in Santiago could not hold out long. 

Admiral Sampson seems to have faced the requirements 
of the situation somewhat reluctantly at first. ISTaturally, he 
did not wish to subject his ships to such serious dangers. He 
would have welcomed nothing so much as an open contest 
w^ith the Spanish cruisers, and since the army had landed he 
had hoped that the Spaniard would attempt to escape; he had 
expected it and had issued explicit orders as to what the fleet 
should do in case of such an attempt. But as Cervera was 
still entrapped, the probability of his attempting to escape 
steadily dwindled and the hope faded. Admiral Sampson had 
thought of sending in torpedo boats, but this intention had been 
abandoned because of the unsuitable condition of some of the 
small craft, and he then made up his mind that he must force 
an entrance, and this he was planning to do with two battle- 
ships to head the line. He had worked the plan out wnth skill, 
had ordered the Massnchnsetis to Guantanamo to coal up and 
had arranged to meet Shafter and his generals at army head- 
quarters on the morning of Sunday, the 3(1, to secure a perfect 
understanding between the land and naval forces for the com- 
bined attack. 

But neither Shafter nor Sampson dreamed of what was go- 



THE SPANIARDS LOSE COURAGE 509 

ing on over in the Spanish linos, where the desperate condition 
of the Americans was nut nnderstood. The Spaniards them- 
selves were in despair; thej i-ealized that their game was lost; 
their ontcr defenses had been taken by a dash that took their 
hearts away, iilanco had telegraphed Cervera that he must 
make his escape at all hazards, for Santiago could not hold 
(.'lit; he must csc;i[)(' and run to Havana if possible. Other- 
wise he must lose his ships with the fall of Santiago, and that 
would be to lose all. Cervera had not forgiven Blanco for 
the order which six weeks before had placed him in the San- 
tiago trap, but Blanco's purposes were shrewd enough and 
Avould have perplexed us considerably had the news of Cer- 
vera's arrival at Santiago been kept a secret, as Blanco had 
expected. But however much Cervera disliked the orders to 
escape, he must needs obey, and he planned accordingly at the 
very time that Sampson was at last contemplating the prospect 
of running in at all hazards. 



CHAPTEE XLIV 

ADMIRAL CERVERAS ATTEMPTED ESCAPE — ANNIHILA- 
TION OF THE SPANISH FLEET — THRILLING INCIDENTS — 
THE RESCUE AND SURRENDER OF CERVERA AND THE 
REMNANT OF HIS CREWS. 

The Waiting Aniericau Squadron — Admiral Sampson Departs to Consult 
with General Shafter — Watching Suspicious Smoke Beyond tlie Ridge 
— The Enemy Appears — Commodore Schley's Prompt Action — The 
Spanish Cruisers Emerge from the Harbor — Pictures of Smoke and 
Fire — Network of Bursting Shells — Cervera's Tactics — Pouring 
Shells upon the Spanish Cruisers — The Chase Begins — Appearance of 
the Pluton and Furor — Waiuwright's Handling of the Gloucester — 
His Quick and Fearless Advance — Destruction of the Destroyers — 
Admiral Sampson Turns Back from Siboney — The Infanta Maria 
Teresa and the Almirante Oquendo Run Ashore — The Brooklyn and 
Oregon Have a Running Fight with the Vizcaya — Another Spanish 
Cruiser Beached — Gallant Rescue of the Spanish Crews — Chase of the 
Colon — Working the Spaniard into a Trap — The Surrender — Admiral 
Sampson Arrives — Schley's Splendid Command. 

SUXDAY morning dawned bright and warm, with the 
American warships slowly rocking in the swell be- 
fore the harbor of Santiago. During the night the 
Massachusetts had gone to Guantanamo, and shortly before 
9 o'clock the flagship New Yoi^Jc steamed away towards 
Sil)oney, where Admiral Sampson was to hold a consultation 
with General Shafter. The Oregon moved up and took the 
Neiu I'orA-'s place in the blockade line. To the east of her 
stood the Indiana, and between them and a little nearer the 
shore, indeed almost under the guns of Morro, stood the little 
Gloucester. West of the Oregon were the loira, Texas, Brook- 
lyn, flying the pennant of Commodore Schley, and Vixen in 
the order named. The distance of the vessels from the mouth 
of the harl)or was from two and a half to four miles, and the 
arc of the circle formed was about eight miles long. 

At 8 o'clock a signalman on the loiva went on deck as 

usual for signal watch. The night before this sailor lad had 

(510) 



"enemy's ships coming out" 511 

noticed three (li>tin('t lines of smoke beyond the hill> to tlio 
left of the harbor entrance, and had reported it to the officers. 
This luid also been noticed from other ships. 'J'hat it came 
from the lSi)anish fleet there was no doubt, but by this time 
little hoj>e that the shi])s woidd come out remaine(l. As this 
siiiiialnian canie on deck in the morniiiii-, he observed the 
smoke again and kept his eyes intently on it, watchiiiii,- everv 
feature of it as it rolled up. At U o'clock he reported that the 
smoke seemed to be coming up nearer the entrance. He had 
a belief that the enemy's ships were moving out, improbable 
though it seemed, in broad daylight. iVs he watched he saw 
the smoke work nearei* and nearer the entrance, and at 9.15 
of his own accord, he bent on the signal, " Enemy's ships 
coming out," and laid it on the bridge ready to hoist at the 
very instant it was beyond doubt. AVith his signal ready, he 
watched the smoke as a cat would watch a mouse. Fifteen 
minutes more passed, and then he saw the bow of a cruiser just 
appearing in the entrance; he reported it to the navigator, who 
had just come on deck, and who shouted back, " Bend on the 
signal." Tiefore he had the words out of his mouth, he was 
surprised to see the signal running up to the peak. A warning 
gun was finnl. Then orders came thick and fast. The 
watches on the Oregon, Texas, and BrooMyn had discovered 
the enemy at the same time that he was discovered on the Towa, 
but the latter's signal, being already bent, first fluttered in the 
breeze. 

Commod(,tre !S(dik'y, on whom in Admiral Sampson's ab- 
sence the command fell, acted instantly. From his flagship 
flew the signal : " Close in and attack the enemy." On every 
ship routine discipline showed itself with precision. Orderlies 
and messengers rushed liere and there carrying orders. Men 
cheered as they sprang to their guns. Th(>re was a jingle of 
bells in the engine rooms; fires were spread, the smoke began 
to roll up; soon the Oregon was under way; others began to 
move in slowly; every man was at his post, clear-eyed and 
alert. 



512 WONDERFUL PANORAMA OF WAR 

The Spanish vessels came filing ont of the harbor at a 
speed of about ten knots, the flagship Inftuda Maria Teresa 
leading, and followed by the Vizcaya, Cristobal Colon, and the 
Almirante Oqucndo. The distance between them was about 
800 yards, which means that from the time the first one be- 
came visible in the upper reach of the channel until the lasi 
one w^as out of the harbor an interval of twelve minutes 
elapsed. Following the Oqiiendo at a distance of about 1,200 
yards came the torpedo-boat destroyer Pluton, and after her 
the Furor. l"he Spanish cruisers, as rapidly as they could 
bring their guns to bear, opened a vigorous fire upon the 
American vessels, which had got under way and w^ere closing 
in, but chiefly on the BrooTxlyn. They emerged from the 
channel shrouded in the smoke of their guns, while above them 
thundered the guns of the forts. Then they turned west- 
ward in column, increasing their speed to the full power of 
their engines, and in a storm of fire which had opened from 
the American vessels. 

What followed is not easily described. Of the thousands 
of men who took part in the action or ^vitnessed parts of it, 
few agree as to details. It is doubtful if a complete story of 
that momentous morning will ever be written. There had 
never been anythii^g like it in the world before, and, where 
such great fighting machines and so many guns are brought 
into their fearful play, even one so fortunate as to have been 
a witness from the distance fails to appreciate what he saw, 
much less to secure any adequate idea of the fierceness and 
the glory of the details. 

This remarkable panorama of modern warfare had for its 
background the high green hills which skirt the shore of Cuba; 
in the foreground was the Caribbean shimmering in a sum- 
mer sum. Out from the little crevice in the hills crept the 
line of Spanish battleships, forming a great w^all of smoke 
from under M-hich angry streaks of fire shot out towards the 
American ships, from the prows of which the sea was rolling 
in foaming folds; another line of foam followed in their wake. 



GUNS ANSWERING tJUNS 513 

aiul (>\('v tliciii limiii llic Mack floiids thrown up from tlic 
furnaces. 'J licii their iiiiiis answered the terrific thunder of 
the Spanish guns, and uical masses of white smoke rolled away 
and mingled with the black above. Across the sea there 
arose a lattice work of water cohnnns raised by splashing- shells. 
Innumerable, they s[>rang uj) and fell slowly ba(d<, while more 
slowly there drifted away from each a little spurt of smoke, 
and these, gradually a(,'eumidating, formed a haze on the water 
in which the flashes of the guns assumed a deeper red while 
the location of the ships hcn-ame more and nnn-e indistinct. 
At the eastern end of this fearful picture of smoke and fire, as 
it moved westward, came the smaller streams of smoke from 
the torpedo-boat destroyers, their low black forms more dis- 
tinctly seen than those of the cruisers ahead, ^[ore distinct, 
too, were the columns of water made by the shells landing near 
them, nearer and nearer, till the miniature flashes of their. own 
guns was joined by the deejx'r glare of shells exploding right 
upon them. .Vnd over all steadily deepened the dark over- 
hanging canopy of smoke. 

Cervera's scouts on the hilltoj) that morning notified him 
of the absence of the ^fassac]^use{fs aud the departure of the 
New Yorl-, and so he concluded that his chance to escape had 
come. Tt was impossible, as he stated that same day on board 
the (jloncr.<ile)\ to leave the harbor at night, as the searchlight 
was continuously maintained and shone straight uj) the chan- 
nel, and they could not navigate in its direct beam. He gave 
orders to destroy the B rookJ ij n , ram her if possible, and sail 
Avestward at the highest speed. 

The reader will understand that as the blockading line of 
American ships formed an arc before the harbor eight miles 
long, and as the Spanish vessels turned westward, the Amer- 
ican vessels were not all at eipud ])oints of advantage. The 
escaping vessels turned directly away from the Orrgnn and 
Indiana, which were ofl" to eastward of the entrance, but on 
the other hand turned in the direction of the Texas; and 
Brooklyn, which was standinu' to westward. The Joira was 



514 



POSITION OF OPPOSING SHIPS 



almost directly in front of the harbor entrance. Cervera, 
presnmablj, had the hope that by tnrning westward his ves- 
sels, emerging" at full speed, could quicldy run out of the 
range of the heavy battleships Oregon and Indiana, that after 
a time he could shake off the Iowa and Texas, and, though the 
Brooklyn's speed equaled that of any of his cruisers, he could 

dispose of her easily when 



out of reach of the block- 
ading vessels left behind. 
In theory this was all pos- 
sible, for every one of Cer- 
vera's vessels were capable 
of steaming 20 knots, and 
oidy Schley's flagship was 
credited with any such 
s})ced. Cervera hoped to 
v^Xr surprise the American ves- 
sels, and to find them im- 
prepared for pursuit, but 
he was mistaken. As Cap- 
tain (now Eear Admiral) 
Philip of the Texas said : 
'' We were ready — ready 
with our men, with our 
gnus, and ivith our en- 
gines:' The Texas, 
wathin three minutes after 
the alarm was given, was 
APPROXIMATE POSITIONS OF THE oppos- i^j^der wav at full speed 

ING VESSELS SOON AFTER THE SPAN- i j2 • " • J.^ 

and nring, witli every man 

ISH CRUISERS HAD EMERGED FROM "' '' 

THE HARBOR. at his placc. Before the 

third ship emerged, every 
one of the American ships was under way closing in, and their 
projectiles, great and small, were flying at the Spanish admiral 
from east, south, and west. The Indiana, Gloucester, and 
Oregon, which had been off to the eastward, headed westward, 




Gioucesier! 



ATTACKING THE CRUISERS olo 

pointing in towards the entrance; the luica started straight 
north, while the BrooMyn, in pointing for the entrance, took 
a course northeast, using her port l»attery. In (»ther wurds, the 
shij)s simply converged wyiow the leading Spanish ships so far 
as possible, and by the time they were in close range the three 
leading Spanish cruisers were steaming along close to the shore 
and the fourth was emerging from the harbor. 

While all of these cruisers were subjected to the fire of the 
American vessels, the first fury of the American shells natur- 
ally fell upon the Min-'ia Teirsa, wliirh was in the lead. The 
Bvookhjn, after firing from her port batteries for about ten 
minutes, wore around, and, taking a course alongside the 
Teresa, emptied her starboard batteries as the vessels plowed 
along. Commodore Schley stood coolly on the bridge, and his 
men were encouraged to their best efforts by his cheery 
words : " Fire steady, boys, and give it to them." The 
Texas, which had rushed in from her position east of the 
BrooMyn, (juicldy became engaged first willi the Yizcaya, and 
then with the Colon. The Iowa, which had begun firing at 
the Teresa at a range of G,000 yards, speedily diminished this 
as she rushed straight for the harbor entrance, until the range 
was considerably less than a half mile; but when it was certain 
that the Teresa would pass ahead of her and that the BrooMyn 
was to engage her at close range, the Iowa turned and de- 
livered her starboard batteries at the Teresa, then turned to 
head off the Vizcaya and fire<l her port batteries, joining with 
the Texas. As the Vizcaya drew ahead, the Iowa turned 
again and gave her a broadside from the starboard; after a 
few minutes of this, she executed similar tactics on the third 
Spanish ship, while her secondary batteries were turned on 
the Pinion and Furor, which had by this time emerged and 
were at once in a circle of terrific fire. 

Tn the chase which had now developed at the head of the 
fleeing line, the loira and Texas Avere dropping a'^torn a little, 
and the fire of the thi-ee Spaniards was concentrat((l on the 
Brool-hjn. V>n\ meantime the battleship Oregon, coming in 



516 THE GALLANT " OREGON " 

from her position to the southeast, had adopted different tactics. 
Quickly getting under rapid headway, she steamed directly 
west, pouring in a lire from her guns upon one ship after an- 
other as she came up in the most glorious and gallant style, 
outstripping all her sister battleships. She was an inspiring 
spectacle, with a large wliite wave before her bow, her smoke- 
stacks belching forth great pnifs of smoke from her forced 
draft, her guns thundering at the escaping ships ahead. She 
quickly passed the Iowa, while her secondary batteries took a 
share in the fire on the torpedo-boat destroyers, and, gaining 
every moment on the Texas, pushed on to the assistance of the 
Brooldyn. 

But while the chase was at this point, or about forty 
minutes after the alarm had been given, one of the most ex- 
citing and glorious features of the engagement was taking 
place at the rear of the escaping line near the mouth of the 
harlior. The destroyers Phdon and Furor were among the 
finest vessels of their class in the world, and were considered 
particularly dangerous because of their high speed and their 
torpedo equipments. Cervera's plan had lieen to have the fire 
of his large ships concentrated upon the Brool'Jyii as the only 
vessel supposed to be able to keep abreast of him, while the 
Pinion and Furor were to take advantage of the confusion and 
the nearness of the attacking vessels to launch their torpedoes. 
But while the cruisers were concentrating their fire on the 
BrooMyn, now over a mile west of the entrance, the torpedo- 
boats became the center of a fire from other American ships, 
which made it impossible for their crews to work their tor- 
pedoes, and very quickly destroyed them completely. 

Commanding the entirely unprotected Gloucester was 
Lieutenant-Commander Kichard Wainwright, who had been 
executive officer of the Maine, nnd who had pleadc^l so well 
for active service against the Spaniards that the do]iartment 
had put him in command of the converted yacht. But the 
moment he saw that the Spanish vessels were escaping, AYain- 
wright determined to make a spirited attack upon the Span- 



DARING OF THE "GLOUCESTER" 517 

isli torjUMJo craft wlicii they .slidiild aiijx-ar. liiishiiig" in at 
lull s|)C(m1, tlic little Gloucester poured an accurate and deadly- 
tire from all her guns upon the destroyers. Her advances 
were straight, quick, and fearlessly undertaken. The little 
vessel was a target for every gun mounted on shore, and for 
the broadsides of the Colon, Oquendo, Pluton, and Furor, all 
at easy range, and the shells flew around her on all sides, but 
she was not hit. Her skillful handling and gallant fighting 
excited the wonder and admiration of all who witnessed it, for 
while other ships were firing their secondary batteries at the 
destroyers, the Gloucester, pushing inside the course of the 
cruisers, at much closer range, practically rendered the de- 
stroyers unmanageable; her gunners could not remain at their 
posts; they fell in bloody groups about the decks, which were 
riddled by the Gloucester's rapid fire. Seeing the terrible 
plight of the destroyers, the batteries on Socapa opened fire on 
the Gloucester, but she kept her guns hot regardless of danger. 
Within twenty nnnutes from the time they emerged the 
careers of the Pluton and Furor were ended, and two-thirds 
of their crews killed. Both destroyers were total wrecks. 
Rough-edged wounds of all sizes showed on the low dark hulls 
and superstructure. Two of the most powerful torpedo-boat 
destroyers in the world, of supposedly twenty-eight or thirty 
knots speed, were cut down, riddled, and wholly disabli'd in 
a run of less than three miles, and while they had been fired 
upon by the battleships as they pushed by after the Spanish 
cruisers, their destruction was largely due to the terrible, rapid, 
and accni-ate fire i)oiii-e(l in at close range by an unprotected 
yacht. Jjoth had struck their colors, and those of the Pluton 
had been secured by Commander Wainwright. He was en- 
gaged in saving the Sj^anish crews when the New Yorl- came 
steaming in at her highest speed from the east. 

At the time the Spanish cruisers came out of the harbor, 
the flagship Neiv Yorl-, bearing Admiral Sampson, was about 
to ])iit in at Siboney. At the first boom of a gun every one 
knew that the long-expected was hajtjK'ning at the entrance; 



518 ADMIRAL SAMPSON ARRIVES 

orders were at once given to bring the ship about, and she was 
started back with all the speed she could muster from the two 
sets of engines which were in readiness. As she flew along, 
her disappointed sailors could see the ships come out, watch 
the sharp attack of the American fleet under Commodore 
Sclilej, and by the time she arrived at the mouth of the harbor 
shortly after 10 o'clock, where the gallant Gloucester was 
engaged, the chase of the cruisers had set far to the eastward. 
The New York went on, taking a few shots at the torpedo boats 
and joining in the pursuit of the Colon. As the New York 
passed the Iowa, cheer after cheer was given for Sampson. 
Savs Captain Evans, " I shall never forget the yell that came 
from her deck, as, in reply to the commander-in-chief's hail, 
'How many men have you lost?' I answered, ' Xot a man 
hurt aboard the ship.' 

As already stated, the first rush of the Spanish squadron 
had carried it past the Joiva and Texas before they could work 
up to their best speed, but the Spaniards suffered heavily in 
passing and the first in line, the Maria Teresa, and the last, the 
Oquendo, were set on fire by shells during the first fifteen 
minutes of the engagement. The very first shot had cut the 
main water supply pipe of the Teresa, and the second that 
landed set her afire astern. Several large shells swept through 
her, and countless others of smaller caliber burst within her. 
As the Oquendo was the last to come out of the harbor, and 
the other vessels had run ahead of some of our battleships, she 
at once received their conrentrated fire. One of the first shots 
exploded in her after torpedo apartment, setting a raging fire, 
and the guns' crews were driven from their guns by the Amer- 
ican shells. 

During the fight with the destroyers, the Teresa had fallen 
behind with the Oquendo, and the Vizcaya was leading, fol- 
lowed by the Colon, the fire of the Brooklyn, Oregon, and 
Texas being largely concentrated upon the former. The 
Iowa was still in the chase and still firing at long range, but 
was dropping behind. The Texas was gaining speed, but the 



SPANISH CRUISERS BEACHED ol!» 

Oregon was coming np with a mighty rush. With Haines 
arising from tlie after-decks of the Teresa and the Oquendo, 
hotli vessels gave up the fight; the fornier, about twenty 
minutes after tliey had cleared the entrance to the harbor, 
grounded on the beach about six miles west of the Morro; the 
latter a few minutes later was beached half a mile beyond. 
The Colon had now forged ahead of the Vizcaija, towards 
which the Oregoii and Brookhjn were now aiming their guns 
with destructive results. The Oquendo having been Ijeached, 
the Tex-as also turned her guns at long range on the Vizcaga. 
So the chase continued for about a half hour, when the Vizcaya 
was seen to be in flames, and she ran on the beach at Aserra- 
deros, fifteen miles from Santiago, at about 11 o'clock, torn 
by terrific explosions as she sank. She was still flying the 
Spanish flag from the gaff, and it was not hauled down till 
almost burned down by the flames mounting up from the riven 
hull. Some idea of the storm of iron may be gathered from 
the fact that the Brooldyn alone fired nearly 2,000 shots dur- 
ing the engagement. 

Meanwhile, the Harvard and little Gloucester, having set- 
tled the fate of the destroyers, had run up and were engaged 
in the work of rescue about the wrecks of the Teresa and 
Oquendo. Some were rescued as they swam; a few were 
taken directly off the burning Pluion, and some from the 
beach. Xearly all the prisoners were clad only in their under- 
clothes. Such was the case with Admiral Cervera, who, with 
a small party, had reached the beach near the stranded Ttresa. 
The admiral surrendered himself willingly, and Avas trans- 
ferred to the Jnxui. On a signal from the New Yorl\ which 
was now coming up, the Iowa proceeded to the same work near 
the Vizc^aya. ^lany of the crcAv of the Vizcaya took refuge 
upon a sand-spit, the water being up to their breasts. From 
the shore a band of insurgents were firing u]ion tlnnn, while 
from the other side ravenous sharks were attacking them. 
IMany of the wounded were upon the deck, the fhnues ndling 
nearer and nearer them. Tlie rescued were taken on boai'tl 



520 



RESCUE OF THE SURVIVORS 




POSITIONS OP THK OPPOSING VESSELS 
AT THE CLOSE OF THE BATTLE. 



the American ships and 
treated with the utmost 
consideration and kindness. 
This rescue of prisoners 
was the occasion of some of 
the most noble and heroic 
deeds of the day, for the 
ships were burning fore 
and aft; some of their guns 
and reserve ammunition 
were exploding, and it was 
not known at what moment 
the fire might reach the 
main magazines. In addi- 
tion to this, a heavy surf 
was running just outside 
the Spanish ships, but no 
risk deterred our officers 
and men; the work of res- 
cue was complete. The 
Iowa picked up 38 officers 
and 238 men from the Yiz- 
caya. The Harvard i-es- 
cued 35 officers and 637 
men. The //((i/ana was or- 
dered back to the blockade 
line, and on her way res- 
cued over 200 men from 
the wrecks of the Oquendo 
and Teresa. 

Shortly after the chase 
there was a terrific explo- 
sion in rlie forward part of 
the Ocjuejido, caused by the 
fire reaching the magazine. 
It bulged out the plates in 



CHASE OF THE '' COLON" 521 

every direction. The results were altogether diiierent iroiii 
those on the Maine, and the Oquendo lay there as mute evi- 
dence of the Spiiiiish tr(>:u'herv in Havana harbor five months 
before. The wrecks were pitiful sights. As fine armored 
cruisers as there had been in the world lay shattered and 
bhizing'. Charred linnian bodies lying about t<dd the story 
of the fierce fight. 

Of the S})anish ships only the Cristobal Colon remained, 
and she was their fastest ship: She had been so fortunate as 
to escape the concentration of fire which had riddled the other 
vessels, and by the time the Vizcaya was beached she was at 
least six miles ahead of the BrooMyn and the Oregon. Being 
thus far out of effective range, it looked as if she might 
escape. Her funnels belched out great columns of smoke and 
her forced draft even carried flames at times from her stacks. 
The BrooMyn was hot on the chase, standing well out, the 
Oregon a little astern but inside and gaining fast; the Texas 
was some distance behind but running nobly with the little 
Vixen abreast. The guns were still now and the interest had 
centered entirely in the contest of speed. If the Colon could 
maintain her superior lead she might escape. But she was 
forced by the situation to hug the shore; if she pointed out 
the American vessels would come up into firing range before 
she could get out to sea. Far ahead the dim blue outlines 
of Cape Cruz were growing more and more distinct on the 
horizon, and straight towards this steered the BrooMyn and 
Oregon, while the Cristobal Colon was running in close. It 
was evident by noon that she could not make the point without 
passing the bows of her pursuers, which were steadily gaining. 

After 12 o'clock Commodore Schley saw that the Spaniard 
was in a trap and could not get out, but the chase continued 
till ten minutes before 1, when the BrooMyn and Oregon wove 
alongside, and the latter dropped a large shell beyoiul the 
Colon. A moment later one from the BrooMyn struck close 
to her bow. The Spanish commander saw that his game was 
up, and he began to hunt for a convenient place to beach. Ke 



522 THE "colon" runs ashore 

evidently bad no heart for fighting, thongli bnt one man had 
been killed on board and no tire had been started on the ship. 
The only object of the Spaniards now was to destroy their ship. 
The breechblocks of the guns were torn out and thrown over- 
board, and every possible inlet for water was opened. Ar, 
1.15 she hauled down her colors and ran ashore at Rio Tor- 
quino, about forty-eight miles from Santiago. The crews of 
the Brooldyn and Oregon Avere wild with joy, and congratu- 
lated each other with ringing cheers. A boat from Commo- 
dore Schley's flagship went alongside to receive the surrender, 
while the gallant commodore ordered the signal to the Oregon : 
" Cease firing. Congi-atulations for the grand victory. Thanks 
for your splendid assistance." The commander of the Colon 
was greatly depressed, and siu-rendered unconditionally to Cap- 
tain Cook, who remained on board about fifteen minutes, ob- 
serving the condition of the ship. As he was returning, Ad- 
miral Sampson came up in the New YorJi, took charge of mat- 
ters and ordered the vessels to report their casualties. But 
there was only one to report. A man on the Braohlyn had 
been killed and another wounded. Acting on Cervera's or- 
ders, the Spanish ships had concentrated their fire on Schley's 
flagship, fully expecting to sink her and then run away from 
the remaining ships. The marks and scars show that the 
Brooldyn was hit twenty-five times, and the ensign at the main 
was so shattered that when it was hauled down it fell in pieces. 

Soon after the Neic Yorl- came up, the Yixen reported to 
the admiral that a Spanish battleship Avas approaching from 
the eastward, in the distance. The Indiana gave chase, with 
guns trained upon the stranger, Avhich proved to be an Aus- 
trian, seeking permission to pass tlie blockade and bring out 
from Santiago Austrian re'^idents desiring to leave the town. 

After sinking six ships, killing and wounding over 600 
men, and making hundreds of prisoners without the loss or 
serious injury to a single vessel, and Avith casualties limited 
to one man killed and tAvo men wounded, and having dis- 
patched the Avhole business Avithin five hours after the Spanish 



SPLKXDII) SEAMANSHIP ^'23 

ri;ii>ship had pushed hor bow out of the entrauce, the ^\jnericaus 
took a well-eanied rest, aud on the next uiorning- awoke the 
C^iban eelioes with such a (•c'U'l)i'ali(>ii of ilic l-'ourth of July 
as history had never before recorded. 

Coniniodore Schley's instant action, the dash and vigor 
with which he met the emergency, and the eplendid seamanship 
\\'itli which he headed off and eani;ht the Cdlnn, will be famous 
as long as naval history endures. His is the honor of leading 
the battle which crushed the power of Spain upon the seas. 

The order of Admiral Sann)son was: " If the enemy tries 
to escape, the ships must close and engage as soon as possible, 
and endeavor to sink his vessels or force them to run ashore." 
His instructions were understood by all, and officers and men 
were prepared to cany them out by night or day. The absence 
of the commander-in-chief, in pursuance of duty, altered no 
plans, delayed not the moment of victory. From the gallant 
second in command down to the lowest apprentice each man 
knew his duty, and each jx-rformed it with intelligence, cour- 
age, and enthusiasm. And when the sustaining excitement 
of the fight was over, the men took up the hazardous work of 
life saving with still more heroism, and with a wonderful de- 
gree of tenderness and sympathy. 

A few days after the battle the Spanish prisoners, num- 
bering 746 and including 54 officers, were sent to Portsmouth, 
X. H., on the cruiser St. Louis. They were dressed in cloth- 
ing of every deseri]ition, having come on board practically 
without clothing of any kind. Admiral Cervera showed signs 
of the terrible mental strain under whieli he had been for 
weeks. The S])anis]i seamen frankly declared that they had 
no further desire to fight with Yankees. Every provisioi; 
was made for their comfort, and Admiral Cervera became 
(piite a ]"»opulnr hero with the people, because of the nobility 
of his conduct as shown in his treatment of Lieutenant ITol)- 
son, and the many evidences of his appreciation of the kind- 
ness shown him and his officers. 
31 



CHAPTER XLV 

THE SURRENDER OF SANTIAGO -TRYING POSITION OF 
THE ARMY — RELEASE OF HOBSON AND HIS CREW — 
THE PUERTO RICAN CAMPAIGN. 

General Shafter Calls upon Gen. Toral to Surrender — Refusal of the Span- 
ish Commander -Refugees from the City - Fruitless Negotiations - 
The Exchange of Hobson and His Crew— Their Warm Welcome — 
American Lines Advanced - Strengthening the American Position - 
The Truce Ends -Bombardment of the City -Another Demand for 
Surrender - A Council of Officers — Arrival of General Miles - Alarm- 
mg Condition of Our Army — Insufficient Provisions — Suffering of 
the Sick and Wounded - Toral Asks for ]\Iore Time - An Agreement 
Reached - Conditions of the Capitulation - The President's Messa-e to 
General Shafter - Occupation of the City -Looking over the Spanish 
Defenses — "Yellow Jack" Appears - Obstacles Which Our Army 
Overcame -Shafter and Garcia -The Campaign in Puerto Rico- 
General Miles's Easy and Triumphal Advance - Ponce Welcomes 
American Troops — Last of the Fighting. 

THE news of the great victory soon reached Siboney and 
was carried along the lines, occasioning great enthu- 
siasm among the soldiers whose position, as they lay 
in their wet trenches in constant danger of Spanish bullets, 
was anything but pleasant. The lines were being gradually 
extended, Kent M'orking his division northward, and Wheeler's 
cavalry moving southward, and this made the formation some- 
wdiat thin. But the fortitude of our army in its difficult po- 
sition and the willingness and enthusiasm with which it joined 
m the work of hemming in the Spaniards was the admiration 
of every spectator of the campaign. 

On the day following the destruction of Cervera's ships. 
General Shafter summoned the city to surrender under threat 
of bombardment, but he received a curt refusal from the 
Spanish commander, with a request that the bombardment be 
postponed till the foreigners and the women and children 
could leave the city. Action was, therefore, deferred till 

(524) 




A-D-WOP"-;; 




••.VELCOME TO HOBSON AND HIS MEN 527 

noon of tlic next day, and thousands of people took advantage 
of the situation to come out of the city, where the food situa- 
tion had become desperate. While General Shafter could not 
object to such a step, it increased the difficulties of his situa- 
tion, even more seriously than was at first realized. Within a 
few hours it was estimated that 15,000 people from the city 
became dependent upon the Americans for food, when the 
subsistence department was by no means in shape to provide 
rations at the front sufficient to meet the wants of the army 
alone. But the soldiers in many cases shared their meager 
rations with half-starved refugees, who came into our camp 
not simply destitute but bearing germs from a disease-stricken 
city. This reception of refugees proved to be the worst blow 
which our Ijrave army received before Santiago. 

Before the time allowed by (Jeneral Shafter for this pur- 
pose had elapsed. General Toral, who had succeeded Linares, 
wounded at El Caney, in command of the city, recpiested an- 
other postponement of the bombardment in order that he 
might communicate with the authorities at Madrid, and to do 
this he was obliged to ask permission to use cable in American 
hands. T^jion one excuse or another the truce was extended 
from day to day till the Otli of July. 

During these negotiations one of the interesting events 
of the war took place. On the 7th the Spanish agreed to 
effect an exchange of prisoners, the only Americans they held 
being Lieutenant ITobson and his crew. The scene of the 
exchange was a majestic ceiba-tree between the lines. Hob- 
son and his men were accompanied by the Spanish Major Yrles 
and a guard, and were met by Lieutenants jMiley and Noble, 
aides of General Shafter, with a few prisoners captured at p]l 
Caney. A Spanish officer was given for TTobson and fourteen 
Spanish privates for his seven men. .\s Ilobson and his men 
neared the American lines they were welcomed with cheer 
upon cheer. Ranks were broken, officers' orders passed un- 
heeded, and the men were sim]ily borne from one part of the 
line to another. Even more enthusiastic, if possible, was their 



528 DEMAND FOR UNCONDITIONAL SURRENDER 

reception by the fleet on board the New York. They told of 
the kind treatment of their captors, and said they had suffered 
no real hardship. Lieutenant Hobson modestly protested 
against the warmth of his reception, both in the field and on 
the New York, declaring again and again that the men who 
were greeting him would have done the same thing in his 
place. lie was the idol of the hour, and the contagious enthu- 
siasm wdiicli greeted him was a striking expression of that 
genuine admiration for the heroism so characteristic of the 
American soldier and sailor in this war. 

Shortly before the expiration of another truce on the 9th, 
Toral sent to Shafter a letter offering to evacuate the city if 
allowed to march out with all his troops. This would have 
meant simply a withdrawal to join the Spanish army further 
west, ultimately to help Havana, and the offer was promptly 
rejected by Shafter, who demanded an unconditional sur- 
render. 

General Toral then asked that the terms of evacuation he 
had offered be submitted to the authorities at "Washington, 
and Shafter complied with the request, again postponing hos- 
tilities a day, or until a reply could be received from the 
President. It came at noon of the 9th and was an unqualified 
approval of Shafter's demand, with instructions to accept no 
terms but unconditional surrender of the city, the fortifica- 
tions, and the Spanish forces. As a matter of fact, the Span- 
ish commander was anxious to make the best terms possible, 
but his government was unwilling to allow him any discretion, 
and was determined to insist upon the defense of the city to the 
last extremity. From the standpoint of the Spanish govern- 
ment, the situation had become desperate, for if the fall of 
Santiago followed swiftly after the destruction of the navy it 
might mean disaster to the government. Some resistance was 
essential to the dynasty. 

Meantime, Shafter had taken advantage of the delay to 
strengthen the American position, dig new trenches, and to 
advance the American lines to within 400 yards of the Spanish 



THE SPANISH GENERAL DELAYS 529 

lines. Streams were bridged over, roads were i)nt in (-(mdi- 
tion, reinforcements were landed and bronglit np, and the 
heavy siege guns were at last woi'ked to the front and i»nt in 
position. On the 10th, the trnee having expired, the S[)an- 
iards again opened fire, but it was soon silenced. Another 
retpiest foi- time lia\ing been askcnl by Toral and refused, 
Shafter began an attac i< at .") o'clock (A' tlic afternoon of the 
lltli, and, though continued less than an hour, it was suffi- 
cient to demonstrate to Toral the futility of holding out much 
longer. Not only did heavy guns and iiKtrtars ponr in shells 
from the field, but the fleet outside threw destructive shells 
over the ridge into the city and bay. The Spanish reply was 
spiritless and weak, 'i'he reinforcements had enabled General 
Shafter to stretch his lines entirely about the city, and its in- 
vestment was complete. After the bond)ardnient and when 
the town was on fire in several |)laces (^icneral Shafter sent 
another note to Toral, again demanding unconditional sur- 
render, but no reply was made to it till the following morning, 
the 12th, when Toral wrote a terse reply, saying that he had 
communicated the demand to his " superior government." 

(icneral Sliaftci' then decided to call a council of otficers 
to determine what should be done. General Miles had arrived 
the day before, not to supersede Shafter in immediate com- 
niand. but .to observe the conditions before the city. The 
severe losses in the battle of the 1st had made the governnuMit 
anxious, and ]\riles had been hurried to the scene in conse- 
quence. He attended the council, and so also did Lieutenant 
Hobson, representing Admiral Sampson. ^lany of the army 
men had declared that it was now the duty of the navy to 
force its way into the harbor, and it was agreed that such an 
act would lu'ing the Spaniards to terms at once. But Samp- 
son believed that, on account of the mines, it could ]i<^t be 
done without the loss of some of the ships. Tt was agreed by 
the army officers that the city could be taken in thre(> hours 
by an assault, bnt it wonld cost, possibly, a thousand men, and, 
naturally, all desired to avoid losses whether of ships or men. 



530 DEPLORABLE CONDITION OF OUR MEN 

The troops were l)ecoming impatient over the delays, and 
argued that if the slow process of starving the city into sub- 
jection was adopted, more men would be lost in sickness than 
in storming the place. The officers were much worried over 
the condition of the army, for the heavy rains on the 11th and 
12th had resulted in much sickness, and this was being aggra- 
vated by the intense heat which followed. Besides this, the 
landing of supplies had become so difHcult at times that only 
half-rations could be served at the front, and if a storm came 
up so as to prevent the landing of supplies for any length of 
time the situation would become terrible. The condition of 
the sick and wounded was already deplorable. The hospital 
service had broken down completely under the strain put upon 
it. Wounded soldiers were lying about on the grass with in- 
sufficient attendance, and often they had to be carried to the 
rear over rough roads in jolting ammunition wagons. They 
endured it bravely, but their sufferings were terrible. 

Any great delay in taking the city was, therefore, out of 
consideration. On the 13tli an interview was arranged be- 
tween vShaftcr and Toral, and the former again impressed 
upon the Spanish commander that longer delay on his part 
could only result in the further slaughter of Spanish troops. 
He must surrender, or a continued bombardment would be 
begun from all sides, while the fleet would make an attack 
from the sea. Toral declared that, whatever his personal 
wishes might be, he would be unable to give up the city till 
so instructed by his superiors. He asked for more time in 
which to connnunicate with Blanco. After consideration, 
Shaffer granted him till noon of the 14th. But, on the morn- 
ing of that day, an actual agreement for surrender was ac- 
complished, Shafter modifying the terms in some small par- 
ticulars. Toral was inclined to haggle further, desired his 
soldiers to keep their arms, and to have the action considered 
more like an evacuation ; but the American generals informed 
him that he must accept the terms or there w^ould be a general 
attack, to end only in an unconditional surrender. 




I'KOMIXICNT AMIIRICAX (IKXERALS IN OUR WAR WITH SPAIN. 



(jeiieral Jos. K. Wheeler. 
General Adiia R. Chaffee. 



General John R. Brooke. 
General H. C. Corbin. 



TERMS OF SURRENDER 



533 



The conditions of capitulation included all forces and war 
material in the territory east of a line from Aserraderos, on 
the south, to Sagua de I'ananio on the north, General Luque's 
force of 10,000 men at llolguin, being a little outside the 
territory. For the United States, General Shafter agreed to 
transport, with as little delay as possible, all the Spanish troops 
in the district to Spain, the end)arkation being near the points 




EASTERN PART OF 

CUBA 



'^^j 

* \^-^^ 



Gibara "^ jul3 o^y 



^ 'nnlg 
Boyo/*^ jf<OIaiV.anillp ^ 

~ C* lu 2U 3U iU 5U 



,/- 






l;.u> 



Pico 



EASTKKN PART OF CUBA. 

Showing portion surrendered to the United States at the fall of Santiago. 

occupied. Officers were to keep their side arms, and both 
officers and men were to retain their personal property. The 
Spanish were authorized to take the military archives belong- 
ing to the surrendered district, and all Spanish forces who 
wished to remain in Cuba might do so under parole, giving up 
their arms. The Spanish forces were to march out of San- 
tiago Avith honors of war, depositing their arms at a point 
agreed upon, to await the disposition of the Fnited States gov- 
ernment. This left the question of the return of the arms 
entirely in the hands of the government. This surrender 
affected about 12,000 soldiers, against whom not an American 
shot had been fired, and the troops in the whole district were 
estimated at about 25,000. 

President McKinley gave expressiou to the fueling of the 
whole people over the event when he cabled General Shafter: 

"The President of llie United States sends to you and j'onr army tlie 
profound tlianks of the American ]ico]il(' for t]ie brilliant arliievcnients at 
Santiago, resulting in the surrender of the city and all of tlie Spanish troops 



534 IN POSSESSION OF SANTIAGO 

and territory under General Toral. Your splendid command has endured 
not only the hardships and sacrifices incident to the campaign and battle, 
but in stress of heat and weather has triumphed over obstacles which would 
have overcome men less brave and determined. One and all have displayed 
the most conspicuous gallantry and earned the gratitude of the nation. 
The hearts of the people turn with tender sympathy to the sick and 
wounded. May the Father of Mercies protect and comfort them." 

Formal possession of the city was taken on the 17th, an 
immense conconrse of people being present. As the chimes 
of the old Cathedral rang ont the hour of twelve, the infantry 
and cavalry presented arms. Every American uncovered, 
and Captain McKittrick hoisted the Stars and Stripes. As the 
brilliant folds unfurled in a gentle breeze, against a ileckless 
sky, the cavalry band played " The Star Spangled Banner," 
At the same instant the sound of the distant booming of Cap- 
tain Capron's battery, firing a salute of twenty-one guns, 
drifted in. When the salute ceased, from all directions along 
the line came floating in across the Plaza the strains of regi- 
mental bands and the cheers of the troops. 

When the American officers had an opportunity to observe 
the nature of the entanglement of defenses of the city, they 
were convinced that General Shafter's patience and modera- 
tion in dealing with General Toral's exasperating delays and 
excuses were wise. Fighting as the Spaniards did the first 
day, it would have required a loss of 5,000 men to have taken 
the city. Indeed, in the face of a determined and well-drilled 
enemy, it is doubtful if the city could have been taken by 
assault. 

But if the strength of these defenses furnished a sufficient 
reason for putting up with some delays, there Avas another 
development of the case which provided abundant reasons, 
not simply for declining to haggle further, but for making 
some apparent concessions to soothe the Spanish pride. 
Towards the latter end of the truce the dreaded " yellow jack " 
began to make its appearance in the American camps, and 
while our soldiers had not quailed before Spanish bullets, they 
feared the prospect of such a contagion in the ranks. The 



PRAISE FOR SHAFTER AND HIS MEN 535 

conditions nndcr ^vlliell tlio soldiers fought, lying in wet 
trenches, exposed to a tierce heat or to the deluges of the rainy 
season of a tropical cliinat(% made the appearance of fevers 
almost a certainty. Toi-al, undoubtedly, kei)t hanging off in 
the hopes that yellow fever would appear in the American 
camp and cuaMe liim to secure better terms. Santiago itself 
was in a dirty condition; typical Spanish indolence and dis- 
regard of common sense in time of peace had left the city un- 
defended against disease, and when the refugees left the city 
and mingled with the Americans, Toral felt certain tliat the 
contagion would be introduced among them. But when he 
saw no indications of it and he was completely hemmed in, he 
had no recourse but to yield. 

Xeither in the Spanish lines nor in the United States was 
there a realization of the discouraging condition in which our 
army was placed. It was extremely difficult to get food and 
medicine. Xot only were the facilities for liglitering su[)plies 
from the transports inadequate, but the road to the front was 
almost impassabh', the mud at times being two feet deep, 
although Shafter had 1,000 men constantly at work on it. 
The difficulties almost baffled description. It is doubtful if 
ever in history an army has encountered such obstacles and 
accomplished so much. Ft seemed to some in this country 
that Shafter was making a mistake in t(Mnporizing with I'oral, 
but. in reality, he is eiititle(l to the greatest credit for the 
numiier in which lie met the terrible obstacles and won one of 
the three great victories of the war, the victory which really 
decided the issue and comjielled Spain to hasten a suit for 
peace. Less than four weeks liad elapsed since the first soldier 
of Shafter's army set foot on Cuban soil, and he had secured 
the surrender of a city, a large part of the province, and an 
army of 25,000 men. It would be hard to name a siege of a 
strongly-defended city carried out more (piickly to a con- 
clusive issue. Despite the sufferings of our men, they had 
shown the highest soldierly (qualities — courage, tenacity, 
cheerfulness, patience. 



53G CONTINUED NAVAL SUCCESSES 

General McKibben was given the temporary command of 
the city, and for a few days the surrender of arms and am- 
munition, the clearing the harbor of obstructions, and the list- 
ing of prisoners went rapidly on. Soon the Red Cross steamer 
entered the harbor and relieved the conditions as to food. 
American rule was accepted quietly by the people. General 
Wood of the Rough Riders succeeded to the military com- 
mand in a few days and carefully looked after the health of 
the city. Meantime, Spanish commanders from other parts 
of the district came in and surrendered, the prisoners eagerly 
awaiting their return to Spain. 

Soon after the fall of Santiago, two naval victories were 
gained — minor actions as compared with ]\Ianila and San- 
tiago, but both accomplished with the thoroughness which 
marked those events. On July 18th, at Manzanillo, Com- 
mander Todd, in command of a squadron of seven vessels, the 
Wilmington, Helena, Scorpion, Hist, Hornet, Wampatuck, 
and Osceola, approached the harbor, remaining beyond the 
range of the shore batteries, and after three hours' engage- 
ment, burned three Spanish gunboats, drove two others ashore, 
destroyed three transports, and blew up a store ship and a 
pontoon. All this was accomplished without a man being 
wounded or a ship damaged on our side. The same day the 
little gunboat Hist, Commander Lucien Young, entered an- 
other Cuban bay, attacked and sunk a gunboat, and subjected 
a Spanish ship to a lively chase. This left ^lanzanillo in a 
condition to be easily taken if the campaign should require it. 

Equally complete was the work of our ships at Nipe, a port 
on the northeast coast of Cuba. It was proposed to take this 
place as a convenient liarbor for use in the expedition to 
Puerto Rico, and our naval forces consisted of four gunboats 
— the Topel-a, Annapolis, ^Yasp, and Leijden. In about an 
hour after they entered the harbor on the "2 1st the batteries 
of three forts had been silenced, the Spanish troops driven 
out, a Spanish gunboat larger than any of the attacking ships 
sunk, and the harbor occupied, 



garcia's grievances .537 

The relations Letwccn the Cuban officers and our generals 
came to a crisis with the occupation of Santiago, and the ex- 
aggerated notion the ( 'iil>an leaders had of the part they were 
playing was ai)})arent. A letter alleged to have been written 
bv Garcia was pid)lislied, in which he complained of not being 
invited to take [)art in the ceremonies of the surrender, iliat 
his army was fori)i(l(len to enter the place, and that the Cuban 
leaders had be(Mi ignored in every way by General Shafter. 
lie protested against leaving the Spanish civil authorities in 
the city, and said the officials should be elected by the Cuban 
people. At the same time he withdrew his forces from the 
vicinity of Santiago. General Shafter replied in a courteous 
note, reminding Garcia that he had been invited to witness 
the surrender, which was made to the American army alone, 
and he referred him to President McKinley's proclamation as 
the law for the provisional government of Santiago. This 
proclamation continued in operation the municipal officers and 
regulations guaranteeing private and property rights. 

In a later dispatch to the government General Shafter said 
that Garcia had refused to have anything to do with the sur- 
render if the Spanish authorities were left in power, in spite 
of the fact that he was assured it was but a temporary arrange- 
ment. General Shafter then added : 

" The trouble with General Garcia was that he expected to be placed in 
command at this place , in oilier words, that we would turn the city over 
to him. I explained to him fully that we were at war witli Spain, and tliat 
the question of Cuban independence could not be considered by me An- 
other grievance was that, finding that several thousand men marched in 
witliout opposition from General Garcia, I extended my own lines in front 
of liim and closed up tlie gap, as I saw that I had to depend upon my own 
men for any ellcctive investment of the place." 

The Cuban Junta in this eoinitry seemed content to leave 
the future of Cuba to the American sense of justice and fair 
dealing, and Garcia's action receixcd no endorsement. 

A campaign to Puerto Pico lia<l from the first been a part 
of the government's program, ami it wonld have been begun 
long befori', had not the War Department been seriously over- 



538 THE PUERTO RICAN EXPEDITION 

taxed to provide for the expedition to the Philippines, and for 
the operations about Santiago. The destrnction of (*ervera's 
fleet made it possible for the navy to co-operate in Puerto 
Kico, and preparations were at once made for a prompt and 
energetic movement. There was the further reason for haste 
in the fact that Spain was showing a disposition to sue for 
peace, and our government wished to establish its authority 
in Puerto Rico before any armistice came, as it proposed to 
take that island among others in lieu of an indemnity which 
it was well known Spain would not be able to pay. 

Profiting by the experience in the Cuban campaign, the 
military authorities decided to send a much larger army to 
Puerto Pico than was used before Santiago; but this was after- 
wards shown to have been bad judgment, for, while a large 
army was seriously needed before Santiago, it was not needed 
in Puerto Pico, whose people Avere ready to welcome Ameri- 
can control. It would have been better if a part of the Puerto 
Pican force had been sent to Santiago to relieve those who 
had endured that campaign, and were soon to show the serious 
results of it. There was bnt a comparatively small Spanish 
force in Puerto Rico, and yet it was proposed to send there 
about thirty thousand troops under the command of General 
Miles himself. To Puerto Rico, where less resistance was to 
be expected and where less than expected was really en- 
countered, was sent a v\'ell-equipped army; to Santiago was 
sent a force inferior in nundiers, and yet too large for the 
commissary arrangements which accompanied it. General 
Shafter had been compelled to meet difficulties without a 
parallel in warfare, without that support which was sent to 
Puerto Rico, where Miles simply led a triumphal nuirch in a 
healthy country and without any serious resistance. 

The Puerto Rican expedition, with the Massarliui^rft.^, 
Columbia, (Hoiiresier, Dixie, Yale, and eight transjwrts, 
left CJuantananio Pay July 21st. There were about 3,500 
troops in the tirst detachment. The second expedition sailed 
from Tampa on the 2od, and the third, under command of 




A.D.WORTKI 



HARTFOKD. CONN- 



/ 




WELCOMED AT PONCE 



541 



General Brooke, embarking- in the next three (hiys from 
Tampa, Newport Xews, and Charleston. General Miles 







TKT 







THE ISLAXT) OF ri'KKTO RICO. 
Showini; routes and ili:^t;iiico>' to olhor point!; 



landed on the 25th at Gnnnioa, a small town on the sonth eoast 
not far from Ponce, and advanced eastward, meetinc; with no 
resistance, except a slight Spanish force at a place called 



542 A TRIUMPHAL MARCH 

Yiiaco. Meanwhile, the Dixie, which had been sent to Ponce, 
w^as welcomed effusively by the people of that place. The 
ci\'il authorities showed no antagonism, and the military com- 
mander quickly withdrew his troops towards San Juan. 
AVhen the leading detachment of General Miles's army 
reached Ponce, therefore, it found the Stars and Stripes al- 
ready floating and the people cheering them. His troops were 
received with an enthusiasm which made the extensive prep- 
arations to take the island almost ridiculous. The natives 
fraternized with our soldiers, loading them down with presents, 
and thousands of them expressed a wish to enlist against the 
Spaniards. General Miles issued a proclamation promising 
the continuance of public security and property rights. 

Before the aruiistice had been declared General Schwan 
had gained possession of the town of Mayagiiez, on the western 
coast of Puerto Rico; about twelve hundred Spanish troops 
were in the vicinity, and were driven back after brisk fighting, 
in which we had two men killed and fourteen wounded. The 
main advance of the army under General Wilson continued 
on the road to San Juan, beyond Coama toward Aibonito, 
while General Brooke advanced northward from Guayama. 
A demand for the surrender of Aibonito had been refused, 
and both General Wilson and General Brooke were about to 
begin a vigorous attack, when the order came from Wash- 
ington to suspend hostilities. 

The military operations of the last week of the war were 
of a character to convince Spain that delay in agreeing to our 
terms of an armistice w^ould be foolish. In Cuba, the cruiser 
Neivarlx, with four gunboats, began the bombardment of Man- 
zanillo. A demand for the surrender of the place was refused 
and the bombardment woidd have been renewed had not news 
reached the commander of the NewarJc that an armistice had 
been declared. 

But news of the armistice could not be so promptly sent 
to the far-off Philippines, which continued without direct cable 
communication. 



CHAPTER XLVr 

THE SITUATION IN THE PHILIPPINES — PHILIPPINE EXPE- 
DITIONS—ANNEXATION OF THE HAWAIIAN ISLANDS — 
AGUINALDO, THE INSURGENT LEADER. 

The Philippine Question at Home — Policy of Expansion — A Complicated 
Situation — General ^lerritt Designated to Lead the Expeditious — 
Apprehension of Trouhle with Germany — Dewey's Tactful Manage- 
ment — The Archbishop's Proclamation — Circulating False Reports 
and Sensational Stories — The Insurgents Threaten Trouble — The 
First Expedition under Way — Annexation of the Hawaiian Islands 
— General Merritt Takes Possession of the Ladrone Islands — The 
Irene Incident — A Plain Statement from Admiral Dewey — Reports 
and Rumors — Aguinaldo, the Young Insurgent — His Education and 
Cliaracter — A Clever and Automatic Campaign. 

IK pnrsniuii' tlic course of events in Cuban waters, the 
reader's attention has necessarily been diverted from the 
state of aflairs |)revailing at Manihi after Dewey's bril- 
liant victory, and it will be essential to return to the time when 
the smoke of that engagement was clearing away and notice 
the development of a situation possessing somewhat of the 
fascination of novelty to the people of the United States. An 
exceedingly lively discussion at once arose as ti» what we 
should do with the Philip])ines, although, as a matter of fact, 
we, as yet, held none of the soil of the islands except at Cavitc. 
But with unerring intuition our people at once realized that 
a new (question and one of transcending imixiiinncc had en- 
tered into the war and that in the end, whenever it came, a 
responsibility for the future of the islands wouhl rest upon 
this government. Two parties naturally arose, the so-called 
expansionists, who afgncd that wo should kccji flic islands, 
that we could not droj) them if we would. To leave the op- 

(543) 



544 ADMIRAL DEWEY's POSITION 

pressed and reLellioiis islands to Spain seemed out of the 
question; to s^ell them to Great Britain or any other power 
would raise perilous complications; to divide them up would 
be equally dangerous; to establish a stable and peaceful native 
government hardly seemed possible, and to keep them might 
embroil us in an Asiatic question with jealous powers and cer- 
tainly would mark a decided change in the policy of the 
government. We need not enter into a more extended notice 
of this discussion, for wholly outside of that the situation was 
such as to give the government some concern and immediate 
opportunity for action. 

Manila still remained in the control of the Spanish gov- 
ernor-general, while camped about it, and gradually increasing 
their advantage, Avere the insurgents under Aguinaldo. It 
was perfectly true, as Dew ey ha d_reported, that he could take 
the city at any time, but it would be useless to do so until 
troops could be sent as an occupying force, sufficient to assume 
control and jurisdiction. A bombardment simply would have 
only complicated Dewey's position, which was perfectly safe 
as far as it went. 

Although it had been perfectly understood at Washing- 
ton from the day when war and operations in the Philippines 
became inevitable, that Dewey's little tieet, even if successful 
over Montojo's, coidd spare no men for the occupation and 
administration of a country so large as the Philippines, and 
although plans for sending a force to co-operate with Dewey 
had been early discuss^ed, it was not till the reports of Dewey's 
prompt victory came that active steps were taken to send as- 
sistance. The possibilities of complications in the far-off 
islands, in the ver}^ region which was the cause of so much 
concern and jealousy among the European powers, was at once 
appreciated and the government determined to advance in that 
direction with as much discretion as energy. In designating 
General IJerritt, who had before been spoken of as the prob- 
able leader of the important military operations in Cuba, to 
take commaud of the proposed expedition, the government 



THE ATTITUDE OF GERMANY 545 

revealed its desire and purpose to deal with the new problem 
ably and to send suflicient forces to reduce to a niiuiniuni the 
possibility that some European power might lind an excuse 
for attcm[)ting to take our new obligations and (ij)p<irtiiiiities 
in the Orient off our hands. 

From the very first some concern was felt as to the attitude 
of Germany. Simultaneously with the sending of the ulti- 
matum to Spain in April, and before any power had signified 
an intention to declare its neutrality, the State Department 
''received information that Spain had made a proposition to 
Germany, under which the latter would furnish troops for 
the suppression of the Philippine rebels in consideration of 
large concessions in the islands. The advantages thus offered 
to Germany were very tempting in view of the conditions in 
the I'last, and there was a fear that the Kaiser might not pass 
them by, and that complications of a serious nature might 
arise. Immediately after Dewey's victory all the European 
powers sent warships to Manila, and Germany seemed inclined 
to keep a much larger naval force there than her commercial 
interests warranted. 

Admiral Dewey's tact and ability as an administrator 
under difficult circumstances were quickly demonstrated. 
While maintaining a vigorous blockade he willingly gave per- 
mission to a delegation of British and German merchants; to 
remove their families to Cavite, where he plac(Hl Ignited States 
Consul AVilliams in charge. TFc made himself popular among 
the foreign shipmasters, and aided and facilitated them in 
carrying on their business so far as it did not interfere with 
his duties. His praise was in every port in the East. 

The Spanish ]iapers and clergy did all they could to under- 
mine his influence by false reports and sensational stories. 
The Archbishop, late in May, issued a proclamation, in which 
he said that four Spanish battleships were hurrying on their 
Avay to Manila, and stated that God had informed him that in 
the next engagement the armies of the most Ghristian Spain 

would be victorious. To read it, one would have thought the 
32 



546 AN ARMY FOR THE ORIENT 

world had gone back three centin-ies, and that we were living 
in the time of the bloody Philip II., after whom these unfor- 
tunate islands were named. 

Fully three weeks elapsed after Dewey's victory before 
troops for his support were actually embarked, and as time 
went on the more apparent it became that the government had 
entered upon a difficult undertaking. The number of men 
to be sent was gradually increased; the number of regulars 
was augmented, for General Merritt was too wise to endanger 
the expedition by hastily dispatching only an army of un- 
trained volunteers, such as were recruited in the militia of 
some of the AVestern states. 

The first expedition sailed from San Francisco with the 
cruiser Charleston on May 25tli, and it was followed a few 
days later by the City of Peking with two transports. In all 
the first detachment consisting of about 2,500 men under the 
command of General Thomas M. Anderson. The monitor 
Monterey was also ordered to make ready to proceed to the 
Orient, a fact which indicated a desire to strengthen Admiral 
Dewey's fieet for possible contact with those of other powers. 

That the sitnation of the Spaniards in Manila was desper- 
ate was indicated by the published dispatches of Captain-Gen- 
eral Augusti. Aguinaldo had aroused insurgents all over the 
island and was winning, in niany skirmishes with the Spanish 
forces. In a despairing dispatch early in June the Captain- 
General said : " The capital is besieged by land and sea. I 
shall try to resist to tlie last, but I have no confidence in the 
result. Xumbers of volunteers and native soldiers are desert- 
ing to the rebels." ,, 

One of the important questions Mdiich Congress had taken 
up after the disposition of necessary war measnres was that 
of the annexation of the Hawaiian Islands. The question 
had not for a moment lost its importance since Queen Liliuo- 
kalani had been deposed early in 1893, and the provisional 
government had offered to cede the sovereignty of the islands 
to the United States. The leading men of the island strongly 



OUK NEW POSSESSIONS 



547 




THE HAWAHAN ISLANDS. 
Showing routes and distances to important points. 



54:8 REINFORCEMENTS FOR DEWEY 

desired annexation, and resolutions had been introduced in 
Congress to bring it about. The islands assumed a new im- 
portance immediately after the battle at Manihi, and when 
preparations were being made for sending expeditions to the 
Philippines. That the sympathy of the people was strongly 
American was shown by the enthusiastic and generous wel- 
come that was given the first expedition when it arrived at 
Honolulu, a welcome which was repeated as other expeditions 
touched at that point. The debate in Congress was prolonged 
by a minority opposition, but the resolutions were finally 
passed early in June, and five commissioners were appointed 
to arrange for the future administration of the islands. This 
step was important in many ways; it established a precedent 
in the manner of arranging our interests outside of the ordi- 
nary boundaries of the United States, and, in case it should 
become our lot to administer affairs in the Philippines, the 
sovereignty over Hawaii, as a stopping place in the Pacific, 
could not fail to be of great advantage. 

On June 15th the second expedition to the Philippines 
departed from San Francisco, 4,200 men being taken in four 
vessels, in command of Major-General Francis Y. Greene. It 
included three volunteer regiments, one each from Pennsyl- 
vania, Colorado, and ^Nebraska, two battalions of regular in- 
fantry, tw^o batteries, engineers, and hospital corps, in all about 
3,500 men. The third expedition got away the last of June 
on six vessels, and with it ■went General Merritt and his staff. 
It had thus taken two months to dispatch the force which was 
deemed necessary to support Admiral Dewey in the future 
exigencies of the islands, and another month was to elapse 
before General Merritt could be on the spot. This third ex- 
pedition numbered about 5,000 men, making a total of some 
11,000 troops sent to the Orient up to that time. Prepara- 
tions for other expeditions were also made, and upon further 
secret advices from Admiral Hewey, the monitor Monadnock 
was ordered to the Philippines. 

On the day General ]\Ierritt set out with the third expedi- 



TAKING POSSESSION OP THE LADRONES 



549 



tion, tlie first arrived at Cavite, having stopped on the way tO' 
take possession of the Ladrone Ishinds, whicli arc about 1,200 
miles east of the IMiilippincs, ami had heen in Spanish posses- 
sion ever since the days of Mauellan. The Charleston en- 
tered the harbor of San Luis Dapia in these islands on the 20th, 
shelled the fort, and, meeting with no resistance, received the 
surrender of the town on the following day, taking off fifty- 
two officers of the S])anish army and ninety-four men. Im- 
mediately on the arrival at Cavite a conference took place 
between the admiral, General Anderson, and Aguinaldo, as to 
future proceedings. 




Map showing routes and distances between the United States, Hawaiian Islands, 
IHiilippine Islands, China, etc. 



It was reported that one of the results of the arrival of 
American forces at Cavite was the withdrawal of a part of 
the large German squadron which had been assembled to pro- 
tect the persons and property of a very small grou]) of Ger- 
man subjects in the Philipjiines, but it appeared later that the 
German ships had not left the archipelago. The insurgents 
had, meantime, been preparing to seize Grande Island in 
Subig Bay, which the Spaniard^ had been fortifying. The 
German warship Tvouo entered, and her commander refused 
to allow tJie insurgents to attack the place, alleging that as 
Germany had not formally recognized them as belligerents, 



550 DEWEY ASSERTS HIS AUTHORITY 

he could not, from motives of humanity, allow them to attack 
the Spanish, as he feared that a massacre might occur. On 
hearing the situation, Dewey at once sent one of his own 
vessels, the Baleigh, to take the island, and the Irene's com- 
mander could not very well object to this, as, whatever Ger- 
many might think about the insurgents, she had fully recog- 
nized that a state of war existed between Spain and the United 
States. In fact, as soon as the liaJeigli appeared the Irene 
withdrew from the bay, the Spanish surrendered without 
firing a gun, and Dewey handed the prisoners over to the in- 
surgents, with the assurance that they w^ould be humanely 
treated. Dewey made h understood that he was master in the 
island, that interference, active or passive, would not be 
brooked, and that the insurgents could trust to his support so 
long as they deserved it. It was another proof that Dewey 
was cool-headed and quick-witted. What might have grown 
into a European complication was settled by him very 
promptly and without leaving the resemblance of a ground for 
reasonable protest. 

The uncertainty of German intentions in the Philippines 
occasioned much concern and feeling in this country for a 
time. There were many reports, particularly from English 
sources, of Germany's determination to take advantage of the 
situation to gain a foothold in the islands to the extent at least 
of securing a coaling station; there were rumors of an agree- 
ment between Germany, Austria, and Russia in regard to a 
common line of policy to be pursued by the three countries 
in the disposition of the Philippines. On the other hand, 
the official relations of these countries to the govern- 
ment of the United States was all that could be asked for. 
Russia intiiuated quite clearly that she would not interfere 
with us in the islands; Germany continued in every way to 
express its friendship for us, and, while it was doubtless true 
that the appearance of the American navy in the Orient had 
made the European diplomats extremely anxious, none of the 
governments could afford to give offense to this country. 



THE INSURGENT LEADER 551 

But the conduct of the Germans in ]\ranila Bay was not 
the only troublesome feature of the situation. As the Amer- 
ican forces began to arrive, the attitude of Aguinaldo, the 
young insurgent leader, became morc^ and more unsatisfactory; 
and the American commanders quickly found that they had a 
most astonisliing character to deal with. lie had begun active 
life as plain Emilio, the servant boy of a Jesuit priest, and the 
priest had been so treacherous, from a Spanish point of view, 
as to give to the smart native lad the foundations of an educa- 
tion. In course of time the lad went to Hongkong, studied 
medicine, saw men, began to realize the difference between 
Spanish rule and British rule. l-vctiuMiing to his native 
islands, it was not long before the Spanish masters learned 
that he had become an educated Filipino with energy a-nd 
ambition, and tlicrefore a dangerous character. He was ex- 
iled; then he sought his revenge, and during the insurrection 
he had risen to the leadership. Plain Emilio had become Don 
Emilio Aguinaldo y Famy. He was still a very young man, 
and his stature was extremely slight, but he had a cold, im- 
passive face, and all the shrewdness, energy, and dash of a 
born leader; and he had, besides, an ambition as boundless as 
- !N^apoleon's. Dewey was well aware of the character of 
Aguinaldo ami his men; but until an American army should 
arrive the admiral couhl oif(u* no serious objection to the pre- 
tensioDS of the and)itious Filipino, and he discreetly allowed 
him to proceed, harrassing the pent-up Spaniard and thus in- 
directly hastening the fall of the city. Thus it was that while 
the American reinforcements were making their way across 
the Pacific, Aguinaldo was keeping up a desultory war with 
the Spaniards, and by the first of ,[uly the lines of the insur- 
gents were stretched all about the city to the shore front and 
within a short distance of the Spanish intrenchments. A 
constant fire was going on day and night, while Dewey, who 
was, aftci- all, the real master of the situation. k(>pt his ships 
quietly in the harlmr. He knew very well that the Spaniards 
would never surrender to the Filipinos; they would burn the 



553 AN AUTOMATIC CAMPAIGN 

city and die in the flames first; and for this reason he calcu- 
lated that by the time the American forces arrived, the Span- 
iards would be in a mood to surrender to the advance of the 
Stars and Stripes. Thus all the powder the insurgents were 
using, and the spectacular authority which Aguinaldo was 
indulging in were really the operations of a very clever cam- 
paign on the part of Admiral Dewey. It was a sort of auto- 
matic campaign, which Dewey quietly watched, ready to 
interfere if anything went wrong. But Aguinaldo's opinion 
of the part he M'as playing grew into absurd proportions. 



CnAPTER XLVII 

AGUINALDO AND THE AGUINALDIAXS - EQUIPMENT AND 
ARMS OB^ UIS MEN — NOT SOLDIERS BUT BUSHWHACKERS 
— CHARACTERISTICS OF THE FILIPINOS. 

The Young Insurgent Chief — Proud of His IVIilitary Ability — A Council 
of Young Men Only — The Tagals his Only Supporters — An Army c.f 
Boys — "White Cotton Uniforms — Taking Turns at Military Duty — A 
Mauser in One Hand — A White Flag in the Other — No Artillery or 
Cavalry — Fighting in Trenches — Faith in Talismans — Living on a 
Handful of Rice — Intelligent Filipinos Desire the Support of a Strong 
Nation — Uaht to Manage Their Affairs Alone — Dread of Aguinaldos 
Mastery — Mental Characteristics of the Filipinos — Rash and Illog- 
ical — Exaggerated Ideas of their Ability as Fighters — Mistaking 
American Kindness for Fear — Sealing Their Own Fate. 

EMILIO AGUINALDO was under thirty years of age 
when he was elected President of the revohitionary 
party. Prior to the insurrection of 1896 he had been 
a schoohnaster and afterwards gobernadorcillo and municipal 
captain in one of the villages of the province of Cavite. He 
was not devoid of alulity, and he was surrounded by clever 
writers. He was a successful leader of insurgents, had the 
confidence of young men in the country districts, and prided 
himself on his military ability. The Tagals were the only 
people in the Philiii|)ines who supported him, and a large 
number of the more educated and intelligent among them 
were opposed to him. 'i'lie Visayas, who nundier nearly 
2,000,000, took no part in the insurrection of 1896, nor did 
they ever support Aguinaldo's pretensions. 

The assembly which in 1898 framed and adojited a con- 
stitution and elected Aguinaldo President — for neither of 
these propositions was submitted to a vote of the \mh^<\c — • 

[(553) 



554 THE FILIPINO INSURGENTS 

was composed of men equally immature. When men of un- 
ripe judgment, swayed by the passions and impulse of youth, 
both command the army and sit in the council chamber, no 
better result than what has been seen could be expected. This 
absence of mature years in their counsels was not due to a 
wise resolve of the older men to hold aloof from the revolu- 
tionary movement, but to the utter absence of wise old men. 
" Old men fer coimsel and young men for war," is a saw the 
Filipinos were not familiar with. There was among them no 
gray-haired statesman, no "' grand old man," no influential 
adviser rendered conservative by a long life as jurist, legis- 
lator, or executive. All the leaders in the movement for in- 
dependence were young men, many of them scarcely past their 
majority, while the army was made up of boys and men mostly 
without family ties. Scores of their so-called soldiers were 
no taller than the guns they carried. Compared with them, 
our troops seemed like a race of giants. 

Their equipment consisted of a gun, bayonet, and cartridge 
box; their uniform of a straw hat, gingham shirt and trousers, 
and bare feet; their transportation of a few ponies and carts, 
impressed for a day or a week at a time ; for quarters they oc- 
cupied the public building in each village, locally known as 
the Tribunal, and the churches and convents; from these, de- 
tails were sent out to man the trenches. Their food while on 
duty consisted of rice and banana leaves, cooked at the quar- 
ters and sent out to the trenches. After a few days or a 
week of active service they would return to their homes to 
rest or to work on their farms, their places being taken by 
others, to whom they would turn over their guns and car- 
tridges. 

Their arms were obtained from various sources — from 
purchases in Hongkong; from the supply which Admiral 
Dewey found in the arsenal at Cavite; from captures made 
from the Spaniards. They were partly Mausers and partly 
^Remingtons. Their ammunition was obtained in the same 
way. They used it freely, and to replenish it they established 



THEIR SUPERSTITION AND TKKACHEKV 555 

a cartridge fnetory at the villaiic of Iimis, ;ili(»iit ten iiiilos 
south of ( ^avitc', Avlioro 400 people wci-c cni^iiiicd in reloading 
cai'tridgcs with powder tuid k'ad found at Cavite or purchased 
abroad. They had no artillei-v, exce})t a few antique eolum- 
biads obtained from Cavite, and no cavah'v. Their method 
of warfare was to dig a trench in front of the Spanish position, 
cover it with mats as a protection against the sun and rain, 
and during the night put their guns on top of the trench above 
their heads and fire in the general direction of the enemy. 
When their annniinition was exhausted, they wouhl go off in 
a body to get a fresli supply, and then return to the trenches. 

The inherent fighting qualities of the Filipino soldiers 
were augmented by the artitices of their leaders. Their super- 
stitions were played upon by giving them amulets. Some of 
these had tlie likeness of Aguinaklo engraved upon them, and 
all promised innnunity from death to the credulous wearers. 
Tliose who were killed, of course, were past complaining; 
those who escaped death had their faith in the talisman con- 
firmed. They were desperate fighters, after their own fashion, 
and compassed marches on rations insufficient to keep an 
American soldier alive. An occasional handful of rice, sup- 
plemented by a chance frog or a mud fish, amply satisfied their 
hunger, and the incontrollable thirst which tortured European 
soldiers they did not seem to feel. 

There was no way of telling bushwhackers from non-com- 
batants. All were dressed alike in innocent white clothing, 
and all ])ossessed a tiny white flag as a sign of peace. White 
flags fluttered from every native house in the city, and yet the 
male members of the family were nearly all in the trenches. 
Indeed, the Filijnno seemed to fight with a ^Fauser in one 
hand and a white flag in the otlier. AVhen hard pressed lie 
secret(Ml his i-iHe and ammunition and made his appenrance 
waving liis white flag in token of amity and eternal friendsliip. 

This bushwhacking instinct was the chief weakness of the 
Filipino nrmy. Individual fighting never can succeed against 
organized bodies of troops as organizations. 



556 VAGUE IDEAS OF RIGHT AND DUTY 

Aguinaldo's government, or the idea of any entirely inde- 
pendent government, did not command the hearty support of 
the hirge body of the Filipinos, l)oth in Manila and outside, 
who had jtroperty, education, and intelligence. Their hatred 
of Spanish rule was very keen, and they would co-operate with 
Aguinaldo or anyone else to destroy it. But after that was 
done they fully realized that they must have the support of 
some strong nation for many years before they would be in 
a position to manage their own affairs alone. Their ideal was 
a Philippine republic under American protection, such as they 
had heard was to be granted to Cuba. But their ideas of pro- 
tection and the respective rights and duties of each under it — 
what portion of the government was to be administered by 
them and what portion by us; how the revenues were to be 
collected, and in what proportion the expenses were to be 
divided — were not clearly defined; nor is it to be expected 
that they should be, after generations of Spanish rule, without 
any experience in self-government. The educated natives 
with property at stake looked upon tlie prospect of Aguinaldo's 
government and forces entering ^Manila with almost as much 
dread as the foreign merchants or the Spaniards themselves. 

It was generally conceded that the Philippine Islands 
would not remain one year a peaceful, united archipelago 
under an independent native government. There is such 
racial anti])athy that the Yisayas woidd not submit to what 
they would always consider a Tagal repidilic, and the Tagals, 
having procured the overthrow of the Spaniards, w^ould 
naturally resent a preponderance of Visaya influence. As a 
people they have little idea of union. The rivalry for pres- 
tige at the present day between one village and another on 
the same coa-^t is sufficient to prove the tendency to disinte- 
grate. The native likes to localize, to bring everything he re- 
quires or aspires to within his own small circle. If his ambi- 
tion were to be a leader of men he would be content to be a 
king in his ovm town. Xative ideas are not expansive and 
far-reaching. Then the question arises : Who would be the 




1 \i 1 III ) \( ;i ixAi-ix ), 

Leader ot llie l-ilipiiio Itisutjjeiils. 



I Ai.ONCILLO, 
One of Aguiiiaklo's Chief Advisers. 



A BAND OK I'lI.IPIXO IXSrRGEXTS OX THI'; SAX IW AXA ROAD. 



A RUINOUS MISTAKE 



559 



electors ? The masses are decidedly too ignorant to be capable 
of voting intelligently. The votes would be entirely con- 
trolled l>y cliques of hind-owiKMS. 

If the native republic should succeed, it would not be 
strong enough to protect itself against foreign aggression. An 
nnprotected\mited ivpuMic would last only until the novelty 
of the situation had worn off. Then every principal island 
would, in turn, declare its independence. Finally, there 
would be complete chaos, and before that took root, America, 
or some European nation, would probably have interfered; 
therefore it is better to start with protection. 

[Mentally the Filipinos are very deceptive. They give a 
first impression of intellectuality. They are very alert and 
quick of apprehension, even precocious in their childhood and 
youth. AVith rare exceptions the young Filipinos of both 
sexes are very quick to understand, but they are not capable 
of deep cogitation or continued logical thought. They have 
the imitative faculty, but not the inventive. Quick of temper 
and rash of impulse, their mental processes are warped by then- 
varying sentiments, until such a thing as acting upon settled 
conclusions from logical deductions is not possible with them, 
^'o better exanq)le of this could be given than that of their 
foolish attack on the Americans on the night of February 4th. 
Everything was going their way. The President had de- 
eland that he had taken the islands from Spain for the welfare 
of the people of the islands themselves, who were to be aided 
and taught to maintain a government of their OAvn. Senti- 
ment in the United States was crystalizing in favor of permit- 
tinii' them to attempt self-government, under American tute- 
lage and protection. They w^ere assured of all these things, 
but they were not able to grasp the situation nor to restrain 
themselves. Puffed up with their grossly exaggerated opinion 
of their ability as fighters, contemptuous of the fighting quali- 
ties of the Americans, mistaking their courtesy and fair deal- 
ing for fear, they grew more and more arrogant and ag.gressive, 
until they could no longer brook delay but tmdertook, by a 



560 TOSSED OVERBOARD 

sudden attack, not preceded by notice of hostilities, to drive 
the Americans into the sea. It became necessary to prove to 
them that fear was not part of the American character, and 
the results to themselves were most unexpected and disastrous. 
Thus, by their own folly, in one day they sealed the fate of the 
constitution upon which they had labored for three months. 

An incident which illustrates the attitude of the average 
Filipino insurgent to\vard the Americans, at the time; his in- 
ability to comprehend the situation, and his unreasoning inso- 
lence, is the following, told by an eye-witness : 

" A number of insurgent junks and launches were mak- 
ing their aj^pearance in the bay near Cavite, flying Aguin- 
aldo's flag right under the noses of our big warships. For a 
time the admiral ]iaid no more attention to them than as if 
they had been water flies; but so numerous did they become, 
emboldened by the indifference of our ships, that their pres- 
ence soon stirred up the ire of some of our officers, who com- 
plained to the adnnral. Whcreupou he sent around a tug, 
and towed them all to C^ivite, bringing the natives aboard his 
ship. After giving them to understand that the Filipino flag 
was not recognized, and that their presence in the vicinity of 
the warships was not desired, he dismissed them and told 
them to go back and get their junks. One of the natives, 
however, resented the entire proceeding, and, as he turned 
from the presence of Dewey, muttered and shook his head 
menacingly. The admiral noticed the native's attitude, and 
asked his interpreter what the fellow Avas saying. 

" ' He says he will get even with you,' the interpreter re- 
plied. 

" The admiral, without a second's hesitation, turned to an 
orderly, and in his quick, decisive tone, said : 

" ' Throw that man overboard! ' 

" The command was executed instanter by the brawny 
American sailor, and Dewey walked away, never once turning 
his head as the splash greeted his ears; nor did he afterwards 
inquire the fate of the Tagal warrior." 



CHAPTER XLVIII 

ARRIVAL OF GENP^RAL MERRITT AT iMANILA — CONDUCT 
OF THE WILY AGUINALDO— FIGHTING BEFORE MANILA - 
THE CO.MBINEI) ATTACK UPON THE CITY AND ITS FALL. 

Aguitiuldo Proves Troublesome to General Anderson — The Filipino Leader 
Attempts to Dictate to Americans — Arrival of the Second Expedition 

— The Humiliating Situation of the Spaniards — General Anderson's 
Curt Note to Aguinaldo — Obstacles Placed in the Way of the American 
Troops — General Merritt's Narrative of the Situation in which he 
Found Matters — He Holds no Communication with Aguinaldo — 
Working in Front of the Insurgent Lines — The Night Attack of July 
31st — Planning for a Combined Attack ujion the City — The Joint 
Demand for Surrender — Dewey Begins the Bombardment of the City 

— The Position of tlie Fleet — The Advance of the Army — Entering 
the City — Manila in Possession of United States Troops — More than 
Three Hundred Years of Spanish Sovereignty Ended — Manila again 
in Telegraphic Communication with the World. 

THE unsatisfactory attitude of Aguinaldo manifested 
itself as soon as (ilencral Anderson's troops landed at 
(^avite on July 1st. The insurgent was in full pos- 
session beyond tlie navy yard gates. The first unpleasant in- 
dication of his presence was when Lieutenant Clark, General 
Anderson's aid, while walking about C^avite, was told by a 
Fili])ino soldier that Aguinaldo wished t<> sec him at once at 
his headquarters. Clark went there and .Vguinaldo asked 
him what he was doing in Cavite. Clark said he was on Gen- 
eral Anderson's business. Aguinaldo said that was very well, 
but he would have to give him formal permission to go nbout 
the i)lace. 'J'hat night General Anderson wrote to Agui- 
naldo that he was in command at C^ivite and that his men uuist 
not be interfered with. A part of his letter was as follows: 

"In our operations it has become necessary for us to occui)y the town 
of Cavite as a base of operations. In doing thi3, I do not wisii to inter- 
fere with your residence here and the exercise by yourself and other native 
citizens of all functions and privileges not inconsistent witli military rule. 

(561) 



562 THE WILY AGUINALDO 

"I would be pleased to be iuformed ut ouce of iiuy miscouduct of 
soldiers under my command, as it is tlie intention of my Government to 
maintain order, and to treat all citizens with justice, courtesy, and kind- 
ness. 

"I have, therefore, the honor to ask your excellency to instruct your 
officials not to interfere with my officers in the performance of their duties 
and not to assume that they cannot visit C'avite without permission." 

The re]ilj of the insurgent leader was couched in most 
courteous and phiusible terms, and read thus : 

" Brig. Gen Thomas M. Anderson, 

" Commanding the United States Volunteers. 

"General: Interpreting the sentiments of the Philippine people, I 
have the honor to express to your excellency mj' most profound grateful- 
ness for the sympathy and amicable sentiments which the natives of these 
islands inspire the great North American nation and your excellency. 

"I also thank most profoundly your desire of having friendly rela- 
tions with us, and of treating us with justice, courtesy, and kindness, 
which is also our constant wish to prove the same, and special satisfaction 
whenever occasion represents. 

"I have already ordered my people not to interfere in the least with 
your officers and men, orders which I shall reiterate to prevent their being 
unfulfilled ; hoping that you will inform me of whatever misconduct that 
may be done by those in my command, so as to reprimand them and cor- 
respond with your wishes. 

"I beg of your excellency to accept in return the assurance of my 
most respectable consideration. 

"I remain, respectfully, Emilio Aguinaldo." 

Soon after the -Ith Aguinahlo made a formal call on 
General Anderson, who thought Lest to receive him with 
military honors. He was evidently pleased, but he was 
also very cautious and reserved. Finally he asked what 
the Americans intended to do in the Philippines. He 
construed General Anderson's reply to niean that the Amer- 
icans were there only to permit the Filipinos to set up an inde- 
pendent government. But he had hardly returned to his 
headquarters when he received a letter from General Ander- 
son informing him that another American expedition was ex- 
pected, and that Cavite would be needed for these soldiers. 
There was more correspondence, in which Aguinaldo kept 
hinting at the question of American intentions, but he finally 



THE SECOND EXPEDITION ARRIVES 563 

moved t)nt of Cavite to Baker. A little later General Ander- 
son decided to send a battalion of the First California into 
camp near the shore of the bay south of Manila and practi- 
cally between Agninaldo's headquarters and the insurgent 
lines. Aouinaldo did not dare to show a too unfriendly atti- 
tude, but he set about to do all he could to l)lock this move- 
ment of American troops. They were landed at Paranaque, 
about two miles below the proposed camp, and Aguinaldo was 
informed that the Americans needed labor and material for 
transportation of men and supplies to the camp. The natives 
would not work without Aguinaldo's consent, and he did not 
give his consent. AVhen asked for carts he said there were 
none. But the American officers found them and took them 
and finally got into camp. 

This was only the beginning. There were similar inci- 
dents wluMi General Anderson undertook to move more men 
into the camp. Meanwhile, the second expedition under Gen- 
eral Greene arrived on July IGth and l7th, and preparations 
were at once made for the debarkation of the troops. It was 
decided to put all the second expedition, except a few regulars 
and one battery of the Utah Artillery, into the camp with the 
Californians without landing them at Cavite. As the stores 
and ammunition had been loaded into the ships without much 
regard for the probable order in which they would be needed, 
and as the landing had to be done in " cascos," the native 
lighters, through the surf, it was slow and laborious work. 
The American camp was not far from the ohl stone fort at 
Malate, where the Spaniards had some good guns, including 
8-inch Krupps, but the Spaniards simply stood by and 
watched the American army gathering before them, Tliey 
knew that if they trained their guns on the camp, Dewey would 
open his guns on ^rniiila. They had no intention of knocking 
" the chip " off American shoulders. Indeed they seemed to 
regard the gathering of American forces under their guns as 
a hastening of the time Avhen they would gladly make a theatri- 
cal surrender to the I'nited States to save their honor and to 
33 



5G4 PLAIN ENGLISH FOR THE FILIPINO 

save themselves from the tantalizing Filipinos. An enemy 
was never in more humiliating straits. 

They regarded the spectacle with far more complacency 
than did Agninaldo. ^ow that native assistance and carts and 
horses were needed to move the expeditii »n into camp, the chief 
quartermaster decided to have them without any more palaver. 
He called on Aguinaldo, but the insurgent general was 
" indisposed." He waited a while and called again, but Agni- 
naldo was reported asleep. Then the chief quartermaster, 
on July iTtli, wrote him a letter as follows: 

" General Anderson writes nie to say tliat, the second expedition having 
arrived, he expects to encamp in the vicinity of Paraiiaque from 5,000 to 
7,000 men. To do this, suj^ply this army, and shelter it, will require certain 
assistance from the Filipinos in this neighborhood. We shall want horses, 
carts, buffalos, etc., for transportation, wood to cook with, etc. For all this 
we are willing to pay a fair price, hut no more. We find so far that the 
native population are not willing to give us this assistance as promptly as 
required. But we must have it, and if it becomes necessary w^e shall be 
compelled to send out parties to seize what we may need. We should regret 
very much to do this, as we are here to befriend the Filipinos. Our nation 
has spent millions of money to send forces here to expel the Spaniards and 
to give a good government to the whole people, and the return we are ask- 
ing is comparatively slight. 

" General Anderson wishes me to inform your people that Ave are here 
for their good, and that they must supply us with labor and material at the 
current market prices. We are prepared to purchase tive hundred horses at 
a fair price, but cannot undertake to bargain for horses with each indi- 
vidual owner. 

" I regret very much that I am unable to see you personally, as it is of 
the utmost importance that these arrangements should be made as soon as 
possible. 

"I will await your reply." 

The reply did not come, but one of Aguinaldo's aides 
hastened to General Anderson to know^ if the letter had been 
written by authority, (leneral Anderson replied that it was 
not only by his authority but by his order, and said further 
that when an American commander was indisposed or asleep, 
someone was left in antliority to transact business of impor- 
tance. The next day Aguiiialdo replied formally to the letter. 
He was surprised that there should have been any suggestion 



HINDRANCES AND ANNOYANCES 565 

of uiiwilling-iicss on the part of the Filipinos to aid the Ameri- 
cans, for the Filipinos knew that the Americans " did not de- 
sire a colony," and were only there to drive out the Spaniards. 
lie said the Filipinos did not have as much material as the 
Americans asked for, and again asked for a definite statement 
as to Aiiierican iiitcntioiis. General Anderson acknowledged 
the note and said it would be referred to General Merritt when 
he arrived. The next day it was found that Aguinaldo had 
caused to he made a list of all the horses and vehicles in the 
district, and had notified the owners that they were not to 
engage in any service for the Americans wdiich would inter- 
fere with any service for Aguinaldo. They understood, took 
the wheels off their carts and hid them. I'hus our soldiers 
had to work their supplies up from the beach as best they 
could, pushing heavy boxes end over end for a long distance. 
But they succeeded, and Aguinaldo saw what the American 
soldiers were made of. 

In this way matters went on till the 25th, when General 
Merritt arrived, having gone straight through on the Newport. 
The other transports and the monitor Monterey arrived a few 
days later. The lalter was warmly welcomed, much to the 
astonishment of the natives, who, because of her low free- 
board, decided that she was sinking. General ^Nforritt at once 
set to work organizing his forces, and as to his ini]>ression of 
the work before him we can do no better than to quote from 
his report. He says: 

" Iinnifdiately after my arrival I visited General Greene's ramp and 
made a recoiinoissance of the position held by the Spanish, and also the 
opposiiiir lines of the insurgent forces, hereafter to be described. I found 
General Greene's command encamped on a strip of sandy land running 
liarallel to the shore of the bay and not far distant from the beach, but 
owing to the great difficulties in landing supplies the greater portion of the 
force had shelter tents only and were sutTering many discomforts, the camp 
being situated in a low fiat place, without shelter from the heat of the 
tropical sun or adeqiiate protection during the territic downpours of rain so 
fr('(nient at this season. T was at once .struck by the exemplary spirit of 
patient, even cheerful, endurance shown by the officers and men inidcr such 
circumstances, and this feeling of admiration for the manner in which the 



566 GENERAL MERRITT'S REPORT 

American soldier, volunteer and regular alike, accepted the necessary hard- 
ships of the work they have undertaken to do has grown and increased witli 
every phase of the difficult and trying campaign which the troops of the 
Philippine expedition have brought to such a brilliant and successful con- 
clusion. 

"The Filipinos, or insurgent forces at war with Spain, had, prior to 
the arrival of the American land forces, been waging a desultory warfare 
with the Spaniards for several months, and were at the time of my arrival 
in considerable force, variously estimated and never accurately ascertained, 
but probably not far from 12,000 men. These troops, well supplied with 
small arms, with plenty of ammunition and several lield guns, had obtained 
positions of investment opposite to the Spanish line of detached works 
throughout their entire extent, and on tlie particular road called the ' Calle 
Real,' passing along the front of General Greene's brigade camp and running 
through Malate to Manila, the insurgents had established an earthwork of 
trenches within 800 yards of Powder Magazine fort. They also occupied 
as well the road to the right leading from the village of Passay, and the ap- 
proach by the beach was also in their possession. This anomalous state of 
affairs — namely, having a line of quasi hostile native troops between our 
forces and the Spanish position — was, of course, very objectionable, but it 
was difficult to deal with, owing to the peculiar condition of our relations 
with the insurgents. 

"As General Aguinaldo did not visit me on my arrival, nor offer his 
services as a subordinate military leader, and as my instructions from the 
President fully contemplated the occupation of the islands by the American 
land forces, and stated that ' the powers of the military occupants are abso- 
lute and supreme, and immediately operate upon the political condition of 
the inhabitants,' I did not consider it wise to hold any direct communication 
with the insurgent leader until I should be in possession of the city of 
Manila, especially as I would not until then be in a position to issue a 
proclamation and e. force my authority in the event that his pretensions 
should clash with my designs. For these reasons the preparations for the 
attack on the city were pressed, and military operations conducted without 
reference to the situation of the insurgent forces. 

"The Spanish, ol).serving this activity on our part, made a very sharp 
attack with infantry and artillery on the night of July 31st." 

In this engagement the Spaniards, with a considerably 
snperior force, nndertook to surprise onr troops and tnrn their 
right. It appears that there had been a conflict between the 
Spanish party which w^as inclined to surrender without much 
opposition to the Americans and the party which urged the 
most desperate opposition to the last. To the former party 
belonged Captain-General Angusti and to the latter the arch- 



THE SPANISH ATTACK OUR TROOPS 5G7 

bishop and General Jaudencs. Soon after Dewey's victory, 
Augusti had shown a disposition to show the white flag, and 
for a time Jaudenes had assumed the command. Xow he 
came to the front again, was phiccd in command, and the 
Spaniards began fighting vigorously. But our forces gal- 
lantly repelled the attack of the night of the 31st. Not an 
inch of ground was yielded by the Tenth Regiment, Penn- 
sylvania, and the batteries of the Utah Artillery stationed in 
the trenches, while the First California moved forward to their 
support under a galling fire with courage and steadiness. 
Thirteen of our men were killed and several were wounded; 
the Spanish loss was believed to be about 500. The enemy 
was driven back upon the city. 

General Merritt's report continues: 

"Our position was extended and strengthened after this and resisted 
successfully repeated night attacks, our forces sulTering, however, consider- 
able loss in wounded and killed, while the losses of the enemy, owing to tlie 
darkness, could not be ascertained. 

" The strain of the night figliting and tlie heavy details for outj)ost duty 
made it imperative to reinforce General Greene's trooi)s with General 'Slav 
Arthur's brigade, which had arrived in transports on July 31st. Tiie difR- 
cidlies of this operation can hardly be over-estimated. Tlie transports were 
at anchor off Cavite, five miles from a spot on the beach where it was de- 
sired to disembark the men. Sevei'al squalls, accompanied by floods of rain, 
raged day after day, and the only way to get the troops and supplies a.shore 
was to load them from the ship's side into native ligliters (called ' cascos ') 
or small steamboats, move them to a point opposite the camp, and then 
disembark them through the surf in small boats, or ])y running the lighters 
head-on to the beach. The landing was finally accomplished after days of 
hard work and iiardship, and I desire here to express again my admiration 
for the fortitude and cheerful willingness of the men of all commands en- 
gaged in this operation. 

" Upon the assembly of MacArthur's brigade in support of Greene's I 
had about 8,500 men in position to attack, and I deemed the time had come 
for final action. During the time of the night attacks I had communicated 
my desire lo Admiral Dewey that he woidd allow his ships to open fire on 
the right of the Spanish line of intrenchments, believing that such an action 
would stop the niglit firing and loss of life, but the Admiral had declined lo 
order it unless we were in danger of losing our position by tlie assaults of 
the Spanish, for tlie reason that, in his opinion, it would precipitate a gen- 
eral engagement, for which he was not ready." 



568 DEMAND FOR THE SURRENDER OF THE CITY 

render of the city might be secured without a serious risk of 
life, and he had counseled postponing the demand for the 
city till the Spaniards were in the most desperate straits, and 
until the monitor Monad noch arrived, for there seemed to be 
always the possibility that the Germans would interfere when 
the gauntlet was thrown down. Hut the nightly Spanish at- 
tacks on our trenches put a different face on affairs, for it 
occasioned some loss of life. Then too, some intimation that 
peace proposals were under way reached the American com- 
manders at about this time, but the Spaniards apparently were 
ignorant of it. Through the informal assistance of the 
Belgian consul, the American commanders were able to obtain 
a clear idea of the Spanish purposes. They would surrender, 
but there must 1)0 a show of fighting. Spanish honor must 
be satisfied. 

General Merritt says in his report : 

" Under date of Aui^ust 6tli, Admiral Dewey agreed to my suggestion 
that we should send a joint letter to the Captain-General notifying him that 
he should remove from the city all non-comhatants within forty-eight hours, 
and that operations against the defenses at Manila might begin at any time 
after the expiration of that period. This letter was sent August 7tli, and a 
reply was received the same date to the eflFect that the Spanish were Avithout 
places of refuge for the increased numbers of wounded, sick, women, and 
children now lodged within the walls. 

"On the 9th a formal joint demand for the surrender of the city was 
sent in. This demand was based upon the hopelessness of the struggle on 
the part of the Spaniards, and that every consideration of humanity de- 
manded that the city should not be subjected to bombardment imder such 
circumstances. Tlie Captain-General's reply of same date, stated that the 
Council-of-Defense had declared that the demand could not be granted ; but 
the Captain-General offered to consult his government if we would allow 
him the time strictly necessary for the communication by way of Hongkong. 
This was declined on our part, for the reason that it could, in the opinion of 
the Admiral and my.self, lead only to a continuance of the situation, with no 
immediate residt favorable to us, and the necessity was apparent and very 
urgent that decisive action should be taken at once to compel the enemy to 
give up the town in order to relieve our troops from the trenches and from 
the great exposure to unhealthy conditions which were unavoidable in a 
bivouac during the rainy season. 

"The seacoast batteries in defense of Manila are so situated that it is 
impossible for ships to engage them without firing into the town, and as the 
bombardment of a city filled with women and children, sick and wounded, 



PREPARING FOR A COMBINED ATTACK 5G9 

and coutaining a large amount of neutral property could only be justified as 
a last resort, it was agreed between Admiral Dewey and myself that an at- 
tempt should be made to carry tlie extreme right of the Spanish line of in- 
trencliments in front of the positions at that time occupied by our troops, 
whiili, with its Hank on the seashore, was entirely open to the fire of the 
navy. It was not my intention to press the assault at this point, in case tiie 
enemy sho\dtl hoUl it in strong force, until after the navy had made practica- 
ble breaches in tlie works and driven out the troops holding them, wiiich 
could not be done by the army alone, owing to the absence of siege guns. 
It Avas believed, however, as most desirable and in accordance with tlie prin- 
ciples of civilized warfare, that the attempt should be made to drive the 
enemj' out of his intrenchments before resorting to the bombardment of 
the city." 

The nniiy was actively engaged in preparation during the 
12th, or the day on which Secretary Day and Ambassador 
Canibon were signing the peace protocol at Washington, and 
on that day General Merritt issned his order for the combined 
attack. The general })lan was fur the fleet to satisfy '' Spanish 
honor "' with a s})ectacular bombardment till such time as the 
way seemed clear for the army to advance with the least 
amonnt of resistance. The chief concern was not in the work 
of getting in to the city, but in keeping the insurgents out. 

The morning of the 13th was like so many others in the 
Philippines; the wind blew and the rain fell, and a heavy mist 
lay along the shore, giving a false outline to the range-finders 
on the fleet. It was about S :■! 5 when the ships got under way, 
and at about the same time the foreign vessels began to move 
in behind to witness the fall of the oldest Spanish city in the 
Orient. 

At about 9:30 the Ohjuiput opened on the Malate fort 
with her 5-inch guns, and the other ships quickly joined in, 
l)ut tlie shots fell far short — altogether too short to satisfy 
Spanish honor. The little Cdllao, a S])anish guid)oat wliidi 
had steamed into 3Ianila Bay a few days after Dewey's great 
victory, unaware of what had taken ]dace, and which was 
quickly surrendered and been convertetl into a more service- 
able American gunboat;, stood in nearer the shore line, and, 
unaffected by the mist, did some accurate shooting with her 



570 dewey's guns speak again 

small gims. The bombardment had continued but a few 
minutes when the shots began to fall in the forts and the 
Spanish lines, and at 10 :25 Dewey ceased firing. At this 
point we may well take up again the narrative of General 
Merritt's report. 

" At 10.25, on a prearranged signal from our trenches that it was be- 
lieved our troops could advance, the navy ceased tiring, and immediately a 
light line of sliirmishers from the Colorado regiment of Greene's brigade 
passed over our trenches and deployed rapidly forward, another line from 
the same. regiment from the left flank of our earthworks advancing swiftly 
up the beach in open order. Both these lines found the powder magazine, 
fort, and trenches flanking it, deserted, but as they passed over the Spanish 
works they were met by a sharp tire from a second line situated in the streets 
of Malate, by which a number of men were killed and wounded, among 
others, the soldier who pulled down the Spanish colors still flying on the 
fort and raised our own. The works of the second line soon gave way to 
the determined advance of Greene's troops, and that ofiicer pushed his brig- 
ade rapidly through Malate and over the bridges to occupy Binoudo and 
San Migueka, as contemplated in his instructions. 

" In the meantime the brigade of General MacArthur, advancing simul- 
taneously on the Passay road, encountered a very sharp fire coming from 
the blockhouses, trenches, and woods in his front, positions which it was 
very difficult to carry, owing to the swampy condition of the ground on 
both sides of the road and the heavy undergrowth concealing the enemy. 
With much gallantry and excellent judgment on the part of the brigade 
commander and the troops engaged, these difficulties were overcome with a 
minimum loss, and MacArthur advanced and held the bridges and the town 
of Malate, as was contemplated in his instructions. The city of Manila was 
now in our possession, excepting tlie walled town, but shortly after the 
entry of our troops into Malate, a white flag was displayed on the walls, 
whereupon Lieut. -Col. C. A. Whittier, United States Volunteers of my staff, 
and Lieut. Brumby, United States Navy, representing Admiral Dewey, were 
sent ashore to communicate with the Captain-General. I soon personally 
followed these officers into the town, going at once to the palace of the Gov- 
ernor-General, and there, after a conversation with the Spanish authorities, 
a preliminary agreement of the terms of capitulation was signed by the 
Captain -General and myself. This agreement was subsequently incor- 
porated into the formal terms of capitulation as arranged by the officers 
representing the two forces. Immediately after the surrender the Spanish 
colors on the sea front were hauled down and the American flag displayed 
and saluted by the guns of the navy. The Second Oregon Regiment, which 
had proceeded by sea from Cavite, was disembarked and entered the walled 
town as a provost guard, and the Colonel was directed to receive the Span- 
ish arms and deposit them in places of security. The town was filled with 
the troops of the enemy, driven in from the intrenchments, regiments formed 



THE SPANISH FLAG HAULED DOWN 573 

aud standing in the streets, Imt the work of disarming proceeded (inietly 
aud nothing unpleusuut occurred." 

Thus the 350 years of Spanish sovereignty in ^Fanila was 
ended. 

Ilic insui'iicnts niacU' every effort, tlouhtlcss by Agui- 
naldd's oi'tlers, to get into the city, and onee or twice sharp 
(•(intlicts were narrowly averted. Small l)ands of 100 or 200 
worked their way in behind some of the American troops in 
the lead, Init \\'ere caugiit and disai'med. A few g"t into the 
suburbs with arms and did some looting. That night Gen- 
eral Anderson sent to Aguinaldo a peremptory order to remove 
all his men from the city, and for an answer Aguinaldo sent 
forward one of his generals with 1,000 men. They were sur- 
rounded and disarmed, and ^Vguinaldo protested. He asserted 
that the American troops had landed by his permission, and, 
therefore, he was entitled to some of the spoils. Such was 
the situation when General Merritt left to confer with the 
peace commission. The cable which Dewey had cut when he 
destroyed ]\Iontojo's fleet was reunited and Manila was again 
in communication with the world. 



CHAPTER XLIX 

SPAIN SUES FOR PEACE — SIGNING OF THE PROTOCOL — 
STORY OF THE PARIS PEACE COMMISSION AND ITS 
LABORS — THE FINAL TREATY OF PEACE. 

Spain's Reluctance to Yield — Her Embarrassed Condition — Don Carlos 
and Weyler — Cortes Dissolved in Disorder — Overtures through the 
French Minister —Reply of the United States — Terms of the Protocol 
— A Swiftly Decisive War — Condition of Our Army in Cuba — 
Commissions for the Evacuation of Cuba and Puerto Rico — Evacua- 
tion of Havana — A Day to be Long Remembered — The Stars and 
Stripes Everywhere — Simple but Imposing Ceremony — The Flag of 
Spain Lowered — Grief of the Captain-General — " W Aere no Longer 
Enemies" — Cubans Beside Themselves with Joy — General Brooke 
Becomes Governor of Cuba — The Peace Commission and its Work — 
Spain Wishes the United States to Assume the Cuban Debt- — Dispute 
as to the Disposition of the Philippines — The Treaty Signed. 



M 



UCH of the time since the war hegan Spain had l)eon 
passing through a ministerial crisis. The defeat at 
Manila had been followed bv symptoms of revoliirion 
and anarchy. In the long debates in the C^ortes the most bitter 
attacks had been made on the ministry for its failnre to meet 
the situation. Several provinces were placed under martial 
law. The premium on gold rai)idly advanced and the Panl; of 
Spain was becoming seriously crippled in its efforts to iiuaucier 
the government. The ministry held together because every 
one feared the result of its disappearance. It became no longer 
possible to secure credence in reports of Spanish victories or 
to conceal Spanish defeats. r>y the first of July the Spanish 
people were beginning to face the facts. There were petitions 
for peace from several sections. Ijiit Don Carlos was threaten- 
ing trouble, and Weyler, with characteristic perversity, was 
inflaming the military spirits. The Cortes was dissolved the 
last week in June amid great disorder and with outspoken 

(574) 



OVERTURES FOR PEACE 575 

attacks ii])oii tlio dynasty. To have sued for peace then, 
while it would have heen l)elter for Sj)aiii, inii^lit liavc en- 
dai)^erod the Queen, so Sagasta hehl off with nothing to gain, 
lie was re([nirod to wait till the Spanish mind was prepared 
for })(';!('('. The i)ressnre of the war was felt more and more, 
and after the fall of Santiago peace proposals were daily ex- 
pected. 

The overtures finally eaine on .Inly L'<Jth, or three days 
after (Jeneral Miles landed in Puerto liico. The French 
]\Iinister at Washington, M. Canibon, called upon the Presi- 
dent and presented a letter from the Spanish minister of For- 
eign Affairs, asking upon what terms the United States would 
he willing to make peace. President ]\rcKinley at once called 
his cabinet into consultation for the purpose of framing a 
reply. The result was that on the 30th a reply was sent to 
Madrid to the general effect that this country would enter into 
negotiations for peace ju'ovided S{)ain agreed to certain condi- 
tions. This answer Spain received on the 31st. On the fol- 
lowing day some explanation was asked as to some of its terms, 
and the Spanish ealiinet linally accepted the conditions on Au- 
gust Tth. AVith the signing on the 12th by Cambon on the 
part of S])ain, and Secretary Day on the part of the United 
States, of a formal protocol as a basis for peace, the war be- 
gun on A])ril 21st was brought to a ch^se. The protocol, cm- 
bodying the conditions above mentioned, was as follows: 

PROTOCOL OF agree:\[ent between the I'xited states 

AND SPAIN, SIGNED AT WASHINGTON, AUGUST 12, 1898. 

Protocol. 

William R. Day, Secretary of State of the United States, and His Ex- 
cellencj' Jules Cambon, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of 
the Republic of France at Washington, respectively possessing for tliis 
purpose full authority from the Government of the United States and the 
Government of Spain, have concluded and signed the following articles, 
emboflying the terms on which the two Governments have agreed in respect 
to the matters hereinafter set forth, having in view the establishment of 
peace between the two countries, that is to s;iy : 

AiiTiri.K T. 

Spain will nlin<|uisli all claim of sovereignty over and title to Cuba. 



576 SPAIN PLEDGED TO YIELD 

Article II. 

Spain will cede to the United States the island of Puerto Rico and 
other islands now under Spanish sovereignty in the West Indies, and also 
an island in the Ladrones to be selected by the United States. 

Article III. 

The United States will occupy and hold the city, bay, and harbor of 
Manila, pending the conclusion of a treaty of peace which shall determine 
the control, disposition, and government of the Philippines. 

Article IV. 

Spain will immediately evacuate Cuba, Puerto Rico, and other islands 
now under Spanish sovereignty in the West Indies ; and to this end each 
Government will, within ten days after the signing of this protocol, appoint 
Commissioners, and the Commissioners so appointed shall, within thirty 
days after the signing of this protocol, meet at Havana for the purpose of 
arranging and carrying out the details of the aforesaid evacuation of Cuba 
and the adjacent Spanish islands ; and each Government will, within ten 
days after the signing of this protocol, also appoint other Commissioners, 
who shall, witliin thirty days after the signing of this protocol, meet at San 
Juan, in Porto Rico, for the purpose of arranging and carrying out the 
detail of the aforesaid evacuation of Puerto Rico and other islands now 
under Spanish sovereignty in the West Indies. 

Article V. 

The United States and Spain will each appoint not more than five Com- 
missioners to treat of peace, and the Commissioners so appointed shall meet 
at Paris not later than October 1, 1898, and proceed to the negotiation and 
conclusion of a treaty of peace, which treaty shall be subject to ratification 
according to the respective constitutional forms of the two countries. 

Article VI. 

Upon the conclusion and signing of this protocol, hostilities between 
the two countries shall be suspended, and notice to that effect shall be given 
as soon as possible by each Government to the commanders of its military 
and naval forces. 

Done at Washington in duplicate, in English and in French, by the 
undersigned, who have hereunto set their hands and seals, the 12th day of 
August, 1898. 

[seal] William R. Day. 
[seal] Jules Cambon. 

Thus, in all points but one or two, Spain was absolutely 
pledged in advance to yield to the demands of the United 
States. It left the formulating of instructions to the peace 
commissioners in regard to the Philippine question, the most 
important matter before the two governments. 

Thus, after less than four months of warfare, ended a con- 
flict which drove Spain from the last of her once great posses- 



A SHORT AND DECISIVE WAR 579 

sioiis in the Eastern world, wliicli gave the })romise of inde- 
pendence to the strnggling Cuban, which established the 
United States as a world-power of the first magnitude and 
eidarged its territory in both hemispheres, which opened to 
the American people new opportimities and new responsi- 
bilities. An English pa])er called it " one of the most swiftly 
decisive wars in history." It is true that when the protocol 
was signed, Spain was still in possession of Havana, Manila, 
and San duan. But Manila, as we have seen, fell the day 
after, San Juan would have been taken in a few days, and 
Havana, Spain well knew, must snrely fall into our hands in 
the end. It was, however, one of the peculiar features of the 
war that the Cuban capital, to which all eyes were directed 
when war was declared, in which was the main strength of 
the Spainsh army, around which it was supposed our armies 
would at once gather, and into which our navy would first 
throw its shells, escaped all actual hostilities. The blockade 
had been continued from the beginning, and the condition of 
the people had become more and more desjierate. Relief 
from the sufferings of the blockade mitigated the bitterness of 
defeat among the Spaniards, who had once been so boastful 
and had treated our interests so contemptuously. As they 
looked upon the wreck of the battleship J\faine in the harbor, 
they must have felt that the penalty for that treachery had 
been swift and harsh. 

As was the case after the Mexican and civil conflicts, the 
cessation of hostilities was followed by severe criticisms of the 
management of the Mar. There seemed to be provocation for 
this in the condition in which the army in Cuba found itself 
soon after the taking of Santiago, though it is a question if such 
a fpiick and severe campaign could have been carried out in 
such a coimtry in such a time without the epidemic of sickness 
which followed, and it is not strange that in such an emergency 
the provisions for the troops Avere not all to which they were 
entitled. The truth was that the governuicTit had been hur- 
ried without preparation into a war the very nature of which 



580 CUBA AND PUERTO RICO EVACUATED 

comjicllcJ prompt and aggressive action at two points on op- 
posite sides of the world. Bnt the state of being unprepared 
'' is one of the penalties which republics pay, more than any 
other form of government, for the want of precedent military 
organization sufficiently large to embrace all the purposes and 
cover all the requirements of war." Late in August the 
greater part of Shafter's command was brought nortli to Camp 
Wikoff on Long Island, and the persistence of the demand 
from some quarters for an investigation into the management 
of the campaign led the President to appoint a commission of 
well-known and responsible men from loth parties for such an 
investigation. The agitation could not fail to make the w^ork 
of the Peace Commission more difficult. 

In accordance with the provisions of the protocol, the joint 
commissions for the Spanish evacuation of the West Indies 
were appointed within ten days. As members of the Cuban 
Commission, President McKinley appointed General James 
F. Wade, who had been in command of the great encampment 
at Tampa, Admiral Sampson, and General M. C. Butler. The 
Spaniards had sought the service of General Blanco as the 
head of their commissioners, but he refused to serve, being 
indignant at the surrender his government had made, and so 
General Parrado was appointed in his place. The other mem- 
bers were Captain Landera and the Marquis Montoro. The 
American members of the Puerto Pico Commission were Gen- 
eral Brooke, who accompanied General Miles to the island next 
in command. Admiral Schley, and General Gordon; the Span- 
ish members were General Ortega, Captain Vallarino, com- 
mander of the naval station of Puerto Rico, and Senor Sanches 
Anguilla. 

Our commissioners met with few difficulties in Puerto 
Pico. The Spanish associates were sensible and business-like, 
and the Spanish soldiers were repatriated as fast as transporta- 
tion could be secured. On October IStli General Brooke took 
f,l->oolntp commanrl of the i«lnTid. The evacuation of Cuba 
was beset with more obstacles. The Spanish commissioners 



HAVANA CELEBRATES 581 

cluijued that it would be iinpossiblc fur them to remove the 
soldiers before the first of February, and the American com- 
missioners were instructed to insist upon the occupation by 
our troops by December 1st, and that the Spanish evacuation 
should be com]dotcd by the end of the year. In spite of Span- 
ish delays, the American commissioners succeeded in carrying 
out their plans. 

After four centuries of misrule in Cuba, Spain relin- 
quished her claim to sovereignty in the island on the first day 
of January, liS!»I>. 'Ilio hauling down of the Spanish flag 
and the raising of the Stars and Stripes over the public build- 
ings of Ilavaiui was a simple ceremony in itself, but it meant 
that Spain had lo^t the last mile of all her vast territories in 
the western hemisphere. 

The day of the final evacuation and surrender had been 
looked forward to Dy the people of the island with both interest 
and anxiety. Those whose loyalty had remained with the 
Spanish government throughout the struggle for supremacy 
looked upon it as a day of humiliation ; the Cubans as the day 
upon which would be born the independence of Cuba and the 
beginning of its history as one of the nations of the earth. 
For days the city had worn a gala ap])earance. Upon the 
roof-tops, nearly without exception, floated from the flagstaff s 
either the Stars and Stripes or the lone star of Cuba. 

Thousands of people from the many cities of the island 
had come to Havana to be present at the celebration of the 
evacuation. Many Americans had also arrived from the 
United States. The increase of the city's population was par- 
ticularly noticeable on Xew Year's morning. Places of van- 
tage from which to view the triumphal entry of the United 
States soldiers, coming from their camp a few miles to the 
M'cstwai'd of the city, were occupied early, and it seomod to the 
spectator that the chivalry and beauty of Cuba had congre- 
gated from its furthermost ends to assist in making memor- 
able the greatest day in Cuba's history. 

There was oulv as much ceremonv as the necessities of 



582 FLAG OF SPAIN LOWERED 

the case required. Captain-General Castellanos, at noon, in 
the hall of the Palace at Havana, in the names of the King and 
the Queen Regent, formally delivered possession of Cuba to 
General Wade as tlie head of the American Evacuation Com- 
mission under the terms of the protocol. General Wade in 
turn delivered the control of the island to General Brooke, 
lately appointed by the President to become Military Governor 
of the Division of Cuba. The red and yellow flag of Spain, 
symbol of tyranny and cruelty, was lowered from the Palace, 
Morro Castle, the Cabana Fortress, and the public buildings, 
and instantly replaced by the Stars and Stripes. Brief but 
affecting was the ceremony, and then booming cannon from 
the ships in the harbor and from the forts surrounding the city 
told the world that a new era was beginning in Cuba. 

At the moment of the change of national flags, the Cap- 
tain-General, a strong and dignified man, showed sincere and 
natural sorrow. With tears rolling down his cheeks, he said : 

" Gentlemen, I have been in many battles, and have been 
near death many times, but never before have I lost my self- 
possession; never before have I felt such deep emotion as I 
am feeling now." 

And afterwards, when he heard the twenty-one guns sa- 
lute the Stars and Stripes waving over Havana, the Captain- 
General's voice shook with sobs as he exclaimed : " This is 
the bitterest moment of my life. I hope none of you will ever 
suffer what I am suffering now." 

Thus did a loyal Spaniard express grief at Spain's humilia- 
tion. The Americans, on the other hand, were elated, but 
scrupulously courteous, as became them as victors, and the 
solemn transfer of sovereignty. An informal incident oc- 
curred at this time, pleasant in itself and of hopeful meaning : 
Three Cuban generals were present, and on being presented to 
them at his own request, General Castellano said, " I am sorry, 
gentlemen, that we are enemies, being of the same blood." 
General Menocal responded, " We fought only for Cuba, and 
now that she is free, we are no longer enemies." After the ex- 



THE CUBANS DELIGHTED 583 

Captaiii-Cjeneral had left the i'ahice, with the American band 
phiyiiig the royal Spanish march out of compliment to him, 
and the American national livnm had been ])la'ved amid tre- 
mendous cheering in the streets, ]\Iaj()r-( Jeneral Brooke, the 
military (Jovernor of Cuba, at once held a rece])tion in the 
throne-room of the Palace. lie was snrnmndcd l)y Generals 
Chaffee, Ludlow, Lee, AVade, Butler, and Clous, Senator Dan- 
iel of Vermont, and others. The commission next proceeded 
to the (*entral Park and the Hotel de Inglaterra, where Gen- 
eral Fitzhugh Lee, the military Governor of the province, held 
a review of the troops under (^lenerals Keifer, Williston, Ilas- 
brouck, and Colonel Armfield, consisting of the Second Louis- 
iana, First Texas, Eighth Regulars, Fourth Virginia, Sixth 
Missouri, Forty-ninth Iowa, Second Illinois, and One Hun- 
dred and Sixty-first Indiana. 

There was no disturbance in Havana; the crowds in the 
streets were reasonably orderly, although intensely enthusi- 
astic. The chief celebrators throughout the city were the 
Cubans. They were beside themselves with joy, for in the 
American flag floating over the public buildings they saw the 
realization of their dream of Cuba freed from the yoke of 
Spain. Their own flag was everywhere, even over ^forro 
Castle, suspended on the string of a kite, where it waved all 
day high above all else. Taking it all in all, January 1st, 1899, 
in Havana was a proud day for the United States, a joyful day 
for Cuba, and for Spain a day of gloom and humiliation. 

General Brooke at once issued a proclamation assuring 
protection to the persons and property of all the inhabitants, 
and encouraging the resumption of agriculture, traffic, and 
commerce. The organization of the Havana police and sani- 
tary forces Avas pushed rapidly forward, and the military 
organization perfected in detail. 

Meantime, the commissioners ap]")ointed to arrange the 
terms of peace assend)led at Paris and began their sittings on 
October 1st. The American members consisted of "William 

R. Dav, who resigned his office of Secretary of State, 
34 



584 THE PEACE COMMISSION 

Senators Cushman K. Davis, William P. Frye, and 
George Gray, and Whitelaw Eeid, editor of the ^ew York 
Trihurm. 

In Mr. Day, the head of this important commission, the 
President had the confidence derived not simply from a long 
acquaintance at home, but from the able and judicious man- 
ner in which the difficult affairs of the State Department had 
been managed throughout the preliminary diplomacy and sub- 
sequent struggle with Spain. As chairman of the Senate Com- 
mittee on Foreign Relations, Mr. Davis was also well-equipped 
with knowledge and experience for the work of the commission. 
Senator Frye, who is a good example of New England enter- 
prise and trustworthiness, had taken a progressive attitude in 
reference to the questions raised by the war during the 
struggle in the Senate, and he became a natural exponent of 
the President's ideas. Senator Gray, the Democratic mem- 
ber, was naturally inclined to hold a less progressive policy 
than Senator Frye, while Whitelaw Reid was credited with 
holding a middle position. But whatever their individual 
views, they cheerfully followed the instructions of President 
McKinley as given from time to time during the negotiations, 
on the nature of which Mr. Day reported. 

The Spanish commissioners were among the ablest men in 
the kingdom. Don Eugenio Montero Rios, the president, held 
the exalted position of president of the Spanish Senate, and 
was one of the most eminent jurists in Spain. He had been 
an advocate of reforms in the Spanish colonies for a long time, 
seeing with a clearer eye than most of his countrymen the in- 
evitable result of the policy Spain was pursuing. General 
Rafael Cerero was also a progressive Spaniard who had charge 
of the coast defenses of his country. Don Buenaventura de 
Abarzuza had served his country in various capacities, among 
thorn as Ambassador to France. Don Wenceslao Ramirez de 
Villa Urrutia, the youngest member of the Spanish commis- 
sion, was the ^linister to Belgium, and was held in high esteem 
as a diplomat. Perhaps the strongest member of the commis- 



THE SPANISH C'OMMLSSIONEKS 585 

sion next to Sefior Rios, was Don Jose dc Garniea, who en- 
joyed a wide reputation as a political economist and as a master 
of international law. 

The secretary of the Spanish commission was Don Emilio 
Ojeda, ^Minister to Morocco, and of the American commission 
Professor J. B. Moore of Colnmbia University, who had had 
a hmg traiuiiii;' in iiitcniational law and had liclil the position 
of First Assistant Secretary of State during the war. Both 
commissions employed several clerks, messengers, and other 
assistants. 

Through the courtesy of M. Delcasse, the French Foreign 
Minister, the commissioners were permitted to hold their joint 
sessions at the Ministry of Foreign Afl"airs. They occupied 
two salons in what is known as the Galerie des Fetes, which 
are nationally and internationally historic. At a large table in 
the center of one of these rooms sat the peacemakers, the 
American president at one end and the Spanish president at 
the other. i\.ll communication with the rest of the Palace 
was cut off and the doings of the sessions were kept absolutely 
secret. The record of the various propositions and the papers 
submitted during the long negotiations would alone make a 
volume, embracing, as they do, all the various arguments, some 
of them of great diplomatic subtlety. 

It at once appeared that the Spanish connnissioners were 
disposed to insist upon an interpretation of the protocol pecu- 
liai'ly their own. While that dneninent apjiarently left little 
more than a setth'mcnt of the Philippine question to be deter- 
mined, the S])anish commissioners took the vie\v that, in re- 
nouncing all claims to sovereignty and all rights in the island 
of Cuba, Spain renounced them to the United States, which, 
therefore, became liable for the Cuban debt of nearly $500,- 
000,000. That the victor, naturally seeking an indemnity 
fi'oni the vancpiished, should be coolly asked to shoulder a 
debt which had been contracted largely in behalf of Sjiain, 
and which amounted to more than the island was worth in its 
ruined condition, seemed a preposterous proposition, but the 



58G PREPOSTEROUS CI.AIMS OF THE SPANIARDS 

Spanisli commissioners insisted on it for a long time, even 
going so far as to assert that an indemnity could not be claimed 
from Spain because she had not initiated the war. The Amer- 
ican commissioners bore patiently with these representations, 
arguing in opposition that the United States had taken to arms 
because Spain would not surrender her sovereignty to the 
Cubans to secure peace, and that now the United States did 
not propose to assume permanent sovereignt}^ in the island, 
but as soon as possible to turn it over to the Cubans, and that 
the United States government would not bind either itself or 
the Cubans to the payment of a debt which in all justice ought 
not to be charged against the islands. As a large part of this 
so-called Cuban debt was held in France, the press at Paris 
naturally supported the Spanish contention. The Spanish 
commissioners endeavored to secure some admission from the 
Americans that the United States would actually assume 
sovereignty over Cuba, in the hope that they might thus estab- 
lish a legal responsibility for the debt. But after long dis- 
cussion and delay, the American commissioners ceased arguing 
and asserted earnestly that their government did not propose 
to assume nor in any way to guarantee the Cuban debt. Then 
the Spanish commissioners quietly accepted the inevitable, pre- 
tending to be comforted by the forlorn hope that the debt 
would still be assumed by whatever sovereignty ultimately pre- 
vailed in the island. 

The question of the disposition of the Philippines, which 
was reached about ISTovember 1st, also led to a long struggle. 
After a careful consideration of the problem as set forth in the 
reports of Admiral Dewey and General Merritt, who had 
meantime reached Paris from Manila, the administration at 
Washington became convinced that the islands must be taken 
under the sovereignty of the United States. The cession of 
Puerto Pico alone Avas not considered a sufficient indemnity; 
Spanish authority in the Philippines was well-nigh extin- 
guished; the islands were naturally fertile and fruitful, and in 
an advantageous position for Oriental trade, and it was out of 



THE DISPOSITION OF THE PHILIPPINES 587 

the iiuestiuu to leave the islands to the iiicrcies of S])ain with 
every prospect that tlicj would become a disturbing element 
in the East. But the Sj)anish commissioners took the position 
that the United States could not lav claim to the sovereiiiutv 
of the islands under the protocol. It was apparent, however, 
that thev were chiefly concerned over the financial side of the 
question, and it was intimated that Spain would cede the 
islands provided the United States would assume the indebted- 
ness of $40,000,000 and in addition give Spain a substantial 
money consideration. This was another preposterous claim, 
and the Spanish commissioners were plainly informed that the 
United States and not Spain were entitled to indemnity as a 
result of the war. Following tactics employed earlier in the 
session, the Spanish authorities inspired the report that if the 
United States did not agree to the Spanish conditions, Spain 
woidd withdraw from the conference, declare to Europe that 
she lay helpless at the feet of a greedy and unjust victor, and 
implore the powers to come to her rescue. This was her last 
desperate effort to arouse Europe against us, but it failed. The 
American commissioners calmly declared that it was the pur- 
pose of the United States to take the entire group of the islands, 
assuming only such proportion of the debt as had been ex- 
pended for the material improvement. A deadlock of several 
days followed, in which the Spanish government sought in 
vain to secure European support against the United States. 
She asked that the meaning of the ]>rotocol be arbitrated, her 
claim being that Spanish sovereignty in the Philippines w^as 
recognized as the basis of the peace negotiations. 

Finally, the American commissioners, imder instructions 
from Washing-ton, presented a formal statement of terms in 
which a definite answer from Spain was recpiestcd by ^NTovem- 
ber 2Stli. According to these terms the projiosition for arbi- 
trating the meaning of the protocol was rejected, the demand 
for the cession of all the Philippines was renewed, the sum of 
$20,000,000 was offered as a partial compensation in lieu of 
assuming the so-called Philippine debt, and explicit avowal 



588 RESIGNING TO THE VICTOR 

was made of the purpose of the United States to maintain " an 
open door " to commerce at the ports of the islands. It was 
also announced that the United States wished to treat for the 
religious freedom of the Cai'oline Islands, of the acquisition of 
one of them for a naval station, and also of some other mat- 
ters not named in the protocol. Spain was informed that if 
these new terms were accepted it was proposed that there 
should be a mutual waiving of all claims for indemnity, 
national and personal, between the two countries, the release 
dating back to the beginning of the Cuban insurrection. At 
first the Spanish commissioners gave the public to believe that 
they would never accept such terms. But by December 1st, 
despairing of all help from Europe, they completely yielded, 
President Rios saying that, while the American propo- 
sitions were, in Spain's opinion, inadmissible on legal grounds, 
still Spain for " reasons of patriotism and humanity and to 
avoid the horrors of war resigned herself to the power of the 
victor." 

This ]')ractically settled all matters mentioned in the pro- 
tocol, and after some discussion of minor points a treaty was 
drawn up and formally signed on the e^^ening of December 
10th, after more than two months of constant negotiation. It 
was a historic occasion. To the Americans it was the happy 
ending of wnr; to the Spaniards it was evidently a bitter 
tragedy, marking another step in Spain's long national decline. 



CHAPTER L 

THE TREATY OF PEACE — SPAIN RELINQUISHES ALL TITLE 
TO CUBA — IMPORTANT AND VALUABLE TERKITURY 
CEDED TO THE UNITED STATES— THE FINAL ACT — 
END OF OUR WAR WITH SPAIN. 

Articles of the Treaty — Our New and Rich Possessions — Islands in Both 
Eastern and Western Hemispheres — Twentj' JMilliou Dollars to be 
Paid to Spain — Spanish Troops to be Sent Home — Prisoners of War 
and Political Prisoners to be Released — Civil Rights to be Determined 
by Congress — The Treaty Ratified — Exchange of Documents at the 
White House — Impressive Ceremony — Message of President McKin- 
ley — An Eventful Year — Genuine Heroism of our Soldiers and 
Sailors — What the War Brought to this Nation — A Lesson to Spain 
— Patriotic and Prudent Policy of the President — A Rich Legacy for 
the Future. 

THE Treaty of Peace was prepared by Secretary Moore 
in behalf of the United States commissioners, and by 
Sefior Vilhi Urriitia for the Spanish commission. 
Each copy contained the English and S])anish te.xts in parallel 
colnmns. The docnment is as follows : 

A TREATY OF PEACE BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND 
SPAIN, DECEMBER 10, 1898. 

The United States of America and her Majesty, the Queen Regent of 
Spain, in the name of her august son, Don Alfonso XIII, desiring to end 
tiie state of war now existing ])etween the two countries, have, for that pur- 
pose apjiointed as i)lenipoteiitiaries : 

The President of the I'liited States, 

William R. Day, Cushman K. Davis, William P. Frye, George Gray, 
and Whitelaw Reid, citizens of the United States ; 

And Her Majesty, the Queen Regent of Spain, 

Don Eugenio Montero Rios, president of the senate, Don Buenaventura 
de Abarzuza, senator of the Kingdom and ex-minister of the Crown ; Don 
Jose deGarnica, deputy to the Cortes and associate justice of the Supreme 
Court ; Don Wenceslao Ramirez de Villa-Urrutia. envoy extraordinary 

(589) 



590 THE TREATY OF PEACE 

and minister plenipotentiary at Brussels, and Don Rafael Cerero, general of 
division ; 

"Who, having assembled in Paris, and having exchanged their full 
powers, which were found to be in due and proper form, have, after dis- 
cussion of the matters before them, agreed upon the following articles : 

Article I. 

Spain relinquislies all claim of sovereignty over and title to Cuba. 

And as the island is, upon its evacuation by Spain, to be occupied by 
the United States, the United States will, so long as such occupation shall 
last, assume and discharge the obligations that may, under international 
law, result from the fact of its occupation, for the protection of life and 
property. 

Article II. 

Spain cedes to the United States the island of Porto Rico and other 
islands now under Spanish sovereignty in the West Indies, and the island of 
Guam in the Marianas or Ladrones. 



Article III. 

Spain cedes to the United States the archipelago known as the Philip- 
pine Islands, and comprehending the islands lying witliin tlie following 
line: 

A line running from west to east along or near the twentieth parallel 
of north latitude, and through the middle of the navigable channel of 
Bachi, from the one hundred and eighteenth (118th) to the one hundred 
and twenty-seventh (137th) degree meridian of longitude east of Greenwich, 
thence along the one hundred and twenty-seventh (127th) degree meridian 
of longitude east of Greenwich to the parallel of four degrees and forty- 
five minutes (4° 45') north latitude, thence along the parallel of four degrees 
and forty-five minutes (4° 45') north latitude to its intersection with the 
meridian of longitude one hundred and nineteen degrees and thirty-five 
minutes (119° 85) east of Greenwich, thence along tiie meridian of longitude 
one hundred and nineteen degrees and thirty-five minutes (119° 85) east of 
Greenwicli to the parallel of latitude seven degrees and forty minutes 
(7° 40') north, thence along the parallel of hititude of seven degrees and 
forty minutes (7° 40) north to its intersection with tlie one hundred and 
sixteenth (116th) degree meridian of longitude east of Greenwich, thence by 
a direct line to the intersection of the tenth (lOtli) degree parallel of north 
latitude with the one hundred and eighteenth (llSth) degree meridian of 
longitude east of Greenwicli, and thence along tlie one hundred and eight- 
eenth (118th) degree meridian of longitude east of Greenwich to the point 
of beginning. 

The United States will pay to Spain the sum of twenty million dollars 
($20,000,000) within three months after the exchange of the ratifications of 
the present treaty. 



THE TREATY OF PEACE 591 

Akticle IV. 

The United States will, for the term of ten years from the date of the 
exchange of tiie ratifications of the present treaty, admit Spanisli ships and 
merchandise to the ports of the Pliilippine Islands on the same terms as 
ships and merchandise of the United States. 



Akticlk V. 

The United States will, upon tlie signature of the present treaty, send 
back to Spain, at its own cost, the Spanish soldiers taken as jirisoners of 
war on the capture of ilanila by the American forces. The arms of the 
soldiers in question shall be restored to them. 

Spain will, upon the exchange of the ratitications of the present treaty, 
proceed to evacuate the Philippines, as well as the island of Guam, on 
terms similar to those agreed upon l)y the commissioners appointed to 
arrange for the evacuation of Porto Rico and other islands in the West 
Indies, under the Protocol of August 12, 1898, which is to continue in force 
till its provisions are completely executed. 

The time within which the evacuation of the Philippine Islands and 
Guam shall be completed shall be fixed by the two governments. Stands 
of colors, uncaptured war vessels, small arms, guns of all calibres, with 
their carriages and accessories, powder, ammunition, livestock, and mate- 
rials and supjilies of all kinds, belonging to the land and naval forces of 
Spain in the Philippines and Guam, remain the property of Spain. Pieces 
of heavy ordnance, exclusive of field artillery, in the fortifications and 
co:ist defences, shall remain in theii* emplacements for the term of six 
months, to be reckoned from the exchange of ratifications of the treaty ; 
and the United States may, in the meantime, purchase such material from 
Spain, if a satisfactory agreement between the two Governments on the 
subject shall be reached. 

Article VI. 

Spain will, apon the signature of the present treaty, release all prison- 
ers of war, and all persons detained or imprisoned for i)olitical offenses, in 
connection with the insurrections in Cuba and the Philippines and the 
war with the United States. 

Reciprocally, the United States will release all persons made prisoners 
of war by the American forces, and will undertake to obtain the release of 
all Spanish prisoners in the hands of the insurgents in Cuba and the 
Pliilippines. 

The Government of the United States will, at its own co,st, return to 
Sj)ain, and the Government of S])ain will, at its own cost, return to the 
United States. Cuba. Porto Rico, and the Pliilii)i)ines, according to the sit- 
uation of their resjjective homes, prisoners released or caused to be relea.scd 
by them, respectively, under this article. 



593 THE TREATY OF PEACE 

Article VII. 

The United States and Spain mutually relinquish all claims f(ir indem- 
nity, national and individual, of every kind, of either Government, or of 
its citizens or subjects, against the other government, that may have 
arisen since the beginning of the late insurrection in Cuba and prior to the 
excliange of ratifications of the present treaty, including all claims for in- 
denmity for the cost of the war. 

The United States will adjudicate and settle the claims of its citizens 
against Spain relinquished in this article. 

Article VIII. 

In conformity with the provisions of Articles I, II, and III of this 
treaty, Spain relinquishes in Cuba, and cedes in Porto Rico and other 
islands in the West Indies, in the Island of Guam, and in the Philippine 
Archipelago, all the buildings, wharves, barracks, forts, structures, pub- 
lic highways, and other immovable property, which, in conformity with 
law, belong to the public domain, and as such belong to the Crown of 
Spain. 

And it is liereby declared that the relincjuishment or cession, as the 
case may be, to which the preceding paragraph refers, cannot in any 
respect impair the property or rights which by law belong to the peaceful 
possession of property of all kinds, of provinces, municipalities, public or 
private establishments, ecclesiastical or civic bodies, or any other associa- 
tions having legal capacity to acquire and possess property in the afore- 
said territories renounced or ceded, or of private individuals, of whatsoever 
nationality such individuals may be. 

The aforesaid relinquisliment or cession, as the case may be, includes 
all documents exclusively referring to the sovereignty relinquished or 
ceded that may exist in the archives of the Peninsula. Where any docu- 
ment in such archives only in part relates to said sovereignty, a copy of 
such part will be furnished whenever it shall be requested. Like rules 
shall be reciprocally observed in favor of Spain in respect of documents in 
the archives of the islands above referred to. 

In the aforesaid relinquishment or cession, as the case may be, are 
also included such rights as the Crown of Spain and its authorities possess 
in respect of tiie official archives and records, executive as well as judicial, 
in the islands above referred to, which relate to said islands or the rights 
and property of their inhabitants. Sucli archives and records sliall be 
carefully preserved, and private persons shall without distinction have the 
right to require, in accordance with law, authenticated copies of tlie con- 
tracts, wills, and other instruments forming part of notarial protocols or 
files, or which may be contained in the executive or judicial archives, be 
the latter in Spain or in the Islands aforesaid. 

Article IX. 

Spanish subjects, natives of the Peninsula, residing in the territory 
over which Spain by the present treaty relinquishes or cedes her sover- 



THE TREATY OF PEACE 593 

eiguty, may remain in siuli territory or may remove tiierefrom, retaining 
in either event all their rights of property, inekuling the right to sell or 
dispose of such property or of its proceetls ; and they shall also have the 
right to carry on their industry, commerce, and professions, being subject 
in respect thereof to such laws as arc applicable toother foreigners. In 
case they remain in the territory they may preserve their allegiance to the 
Crown of Spain by making, before a court of record, within a year from 
the date of the exchange of ratifications of this treaty, a declaration of 
their decision to preserve such allegiance ; in default of which declaratioa 
they shall be held to have renounced it and to have adopted the nationality 
of the territory in which they may reside. 

The civil rights nnd jio itical status of the native inhabitants of the 
territories hereby cetleil to the United States shall be determined by the 
Congress. 

Article X. 

The inhabitants of the territories over which Spain relinquishes or 
cedes her sovereignty shall be secured in the free exercise of their religion. 

Article XI. 
The Spaniards residing in the territories over which Spain by this 
treaty cedes or relinqvushes her sovereignty shall be subject in matters 
civil as well as criminal to the jurisdiction of the courts of the country 
wherein they reside, pursuant to the ordinary laws governing the same ; 
and they shall have the right to appear before such courts, and to pursue 
the same course as citizens of the country to which the courts belong. 

Article XII. 
Judicial proceedings pending at the time of the exchange of ratifica- 
tions of this treaty in the territories over which Spain relinquishes or cedes 
her sovereignty .shall be deternnned according to the following rules : 

1. Judgments rendered either in civil suits between private individ- 
uals, or in criminal matters, before the date mentioned, and with respect 
to which there is no recourse or riglit of review under the Spanish law. 
shall be deemed to be final, and shall be executed in due form bv com- 
petent authority in tile territory within which such judgments should be 
carried out. 

2. Civil suits between private individuals which may on the date 
mentioned be undetermined shall be prosecuted to judgment before the 
court in which they may then be jiending or in the court that may be sub- 
stituted therefor. 

3. Criminal actions pending on the date mentioned before the Sui)reme 
Court of Spain against citizens of the territory which l)y this treaty ceases 
to be Spanish shall continue imder its jurisdiction until final judgment ; 
but such judgment having l)een rendered, the execution thereof shall be 
committed to the competent authority of the plaie in which the case 
arose. 



594 THE TREATY OF PEACE 

Article XIII. 

The rights of property secured by copyrights aud pa4^ents acquired by 

Spaniards in the Island of Cuba aud in Porto Rico, the Pliilippiues, aud 

other ceded territories, at the time of tlie exchauge of tlie ratiticatious of 

this treaty, shall continue to be respected. Spanish scientific, literary, and 

artistic works, not subversive of public order in the territories in question, 

shall continue to be admitted free of duty into such territories, for the 

period of ten years, to be reckoned from the date of the exchange of the 

ratifications of this treaty. 

Article XIV. 

Spain will have the power to establish consular oflilcers in the ports 

and places of the territories, the sovereignty over which has been either 

relinquished or ceded by the present treaty. 

Article XV. 

The Government of each country will, for the term of ten years, 
accord to the merchant vessels of the other country the same treatment in 
respect of all port charges, including entrance and clearance dues, light 
dues, and tonnage duties, as it accords to its own merchant vessels, not 
engaged in the coastwise trade. 

This article may at any time be terminated on six months' notice 
given by either Government to the other. 

Article XVI. 
It is understood that any obligations assumed in this treaty by the 
United States with respect to Cuba are limited to the time of its occupancy 
thereof ; but it will upon the termination of such occupancy, advise any 
Government established in the island to assume the same obligations. 

Article XVII. 

The present treaty shall be ratified by (he President of the United 
States, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate thereof, and by 
Her ISIajesty the Queen Regent of Spain ; and the ratifications shall be 
exchanged at Washington within six months from the date hereof, or 
earlier if possible. 

In faith whereof, we, the respective Plenipotentiaries, have signed this 
treaty and have hereunto aflSxed our seals. 

Done in duplicate at Paris, the tenth day of December, in the year of 
Our Lord one thousand eight hundred and ninety -eight. 

[seal] William R. Day 

[seal] Cush.man K. Davis 

[seal] William P. Frye 

[seal] Geo. Gray 

[seal] Whitelaw Reid 

[seal] Eugenic Montero Rigs 

[seal] B. de Abarzuza 

[seal] J. DE GaRNICA 

[seal] W. R. de Villa Urrutia 
[seal] Rafael Cerero 



THE FINAL ACT oDo 

Tlio Peaco Tronty M'as ratilied bj Congress on the Gtli of 
Fchniarv, ISit'J. ] )uriiig the week immediately preceding the 
final vote there was great uncertainty as to the decision. I'eti- 
tions against the ratification were presented by Senator Hoar, 
the petitioners protesting against the extension of the sover- 
eignty of the United States over the IMiilippine Islands. 
Twenty-eight Senators were opposed to ratification unless it 
should be accompanied by a resolution disclaiming any pur- 
pose on the part of the Government to hold the Philij)pines per- 
manently as a part of the national territory, or (lechii'ing an 
intention to ])ermit the Filipinos to govern tiiemselves. On 
the 4th only fifty-eight votes for ratification could be counted 
upon, but the news of the outbreak at ^lanila, as related in fol- 
lowing chapters, when the Filipinos attacked the American 
forces, only to be driven back with great loss, probably turned 
the scale in favor of ratification. The vote was taken with 
closed doors, and after an hour and ten minutes in executive 
session it was announced that the Treaty was ratified by the 
affirmative votes of fifty-seven Senators. The actual number 
of votes cast w'as fifty-seven ayes and twenty-seven nays. 

The final act in the re-establishment of ]>eace between the 
United States and Spain was performed when the American 
and Spanish ratifications of the peace treaty were exchanged 
at the White House. Secretary of State John Hay and the 
Ambassador of France, M, Cambon, signed the protocol of ex- 
change, and then the duplicate copies of the protocol and of 
the treaty were exchanged by President ]\IcKinley and the Am- 
bassador as the representatives of the two governments. 

The exact time when the Spanish war may be said to have 
legally ended was 3.35 p. m., April 11, 1899, for then :M. Cam- 
bon handed to President ^rcKinley the Spanish draft of the 
treaty l)earing the signature of the Queen Pegent, and the 
President in turn delivered to the Ambassador, who acted as 
Spain's representative, the American draft of the Paris con- 
vention. 

Ambassador Cambon and ^I. Thiebaut, First Secretarv of 



596 EXCHANGING COPIES OF THE TREATY 

the French Embassy, were met at the White House by Secre- 
tary Hay and Sidney Smith, Chief of the Diplomatic Bureau 
of the State Department, who acted as the official representa- 
tive of the department proper in the interchange. The party 
was admitted to President McKinley's office, which is the large 
room on the south side of the Executive mansion, between the 
Cabinet Tvoom and the '" War Hoom," or telegraph office. The 
formal ceremony took place in this room for the reason that the 
Cabinet Ivoom, where the peace protocol was signed December 
10, 1S98, was too small to accommodate comfortably the num- 
ber of witnesses invited to be present. 

The first business was the reading of the protocol, which 
consisted of a memorandum printed in parallel columns in 
French and English. Secretary Hay read the English copy 
and Ambassador Cambon the French. Secretary Thiebault 
then affixed a seal at the foot of each column of one draft of 
the protocol, and Mr. Smith attached similar seals to the other 
copy. As soon as this was done Ambassador Cambon, with a 
pen handed to him by Secretary Hay, attached his signature on 
behalf of the Spanish Foreign Office to the two copies, and 
Secretary Hay signed the papers subsequently with the same 
pen. This completed the preparation of the necessary docu- 
ments for exchange. The two copies of the treaty proper had 
already been signed by the President and by the Queen 
Regent. 

After the signing of the protocol President McKinley 
handed the American draft of the protocol and the American 
copy of the treaty, bearing his signature, to the French Am- 
bassador for delivery to the Madrid Ciovernment, and M. Cam- 
bon promptly handed over the Spanish copies to the President. 
There were no formal speeches. The President merely re- 
marked at the conclusion : 

" Mr. Ambassador, I shall now issue the proclamation of 
peace," and M. Candwn replied, with a bow: 

" Thank you, ^fr. President." 

The protocol is as follows : 



AN ANNIVERSARY MESSAGE 597 

"OutliCL'levenlh day of i lie nioiilh ol' April, one thousand cif,dit hundred 
and ninety-nine, the llou. John Hay, Secretary of State of tiie United States, 
having been authorized for this purpose by tiic President of the United 
States of America, and His Excellency Jules Canibon, Ambassador Extra- 
ordinary and Plenipotentiary of the French Republic at Washington, Com- 
mander of the National Order of the Legion of Honor, Grand Cross of the 
Royal Oriler of Charles HI, etc., having been especially authorized for 
this pur[K)se by Her Majesty the Queen Regent of Spain, met at the White 
House for the purpose of elTecting the exchange of the ratifications by the 
President of the United States of America and by Her Majesty the Queeu 
Regent of Spain, of the treaty of peace concluded at Paris December Id, 
18'J8, between the United States of America and Spain. The two Plenipo- 
tentiaries, having produced their respective full powers, which they have 
found to be in good and due form, read the original instruments of those 
ratifications, which they found to be exact and in conformity with each 
other, and then proceeded to their exchange. 

" In testimony whereof the undersigned have prepared this statement 
and have thereunto atilxed their respective seals. 

"Done in duplicate in English and French at Washington, April 11, 
1899. 

"John H.\y. 
"Jules Cambon." 

Immediately after the exehaiiiie had been effected the 
Pre.si(U'iit i»r()('hiiiiic<l the treaty in a i)roclamation of the regu- 
lar form, coniitersigned by the Secretary of State. The procla- 
mation is as follows : 



" Wheiras, A treaty of peace between tlie United States of America 
and Her Majesty the Queen Itegent of Spain, in the name of her august 
son, Don Alfonso XHI, was concluded and signed by the respective pleni- 
potentiaries at Paris on the 10th day of December, 1898, the original of 
which convention being in the English and Spanish languages is word for 
word as follows: [Here follows the text of the treaty.] 

"Ami ichereas, The said convention has been duly ratified on both 
parts, and the ratifications of the two Governments wore exchanged in tlie 
city of Washington on the eleventh day of April, one tliousand eight 
luindred and ninety-nine ; 

"Now, therefore. Ho it known that I, Williain McKinley, President of 
the United States of America, have caused the .said convention to be made 
public, to the end that the same and every article and clause thereof may 
be observed and fidfilled with good faith in the United States and the 
citizens thereof. 

"In witness whereof I have liereimto set my hand and caused the seal 
of the United States to be affixed. 

"Done at the city of Washington the eleventh day of April, in the 



598 A GREAT AMERICAN STATESMAN 

year of our Lord one thousaud eight hundred and uinety-nine, and of the 
independence of the United States the one hundred and twenty-third. 

' ' William McKinley. 
" By the President. 

"John Hay, Secretary of State." 

At the Cabinet meeting that morning the fact was bronght 
out and discussed with much satisfaction that it was the first 
anniversary of President McKinley's message to Congress de- 
claring the purpose of the United States to intervene in behalf 
of Cuba and presenting to Spain the ultimatum of relinquish- 
ing Cuba or going to war with the United States. 

Thus from the beginning of the war to the re-establishment 
of peace a little less than a year had passed. In the conflict 
our arms suffered no reverse, though the natural advantages 
were seldom on our side; and the loss of life, both from casu- 
alty and disease, was small in comparison with the loss in other 
wars. Our soldiers proved themselves as valiant after battle 
in saving the lives of their foes as they were heroic in battle in 
hazarding their own. It is doubtful if in any war that was 
ever fought could be found so much genuine heroism. 

The war brought to this nation a world-wide renown for 
ability in warfare that cannot fail to be of inestimable value 
to it in the great international struggle for life. It has brought 
to it territory of immeasurable value, military and commer- 
cial, in the West Indies and in the East Indies. To Spain it 
brought the honor of bravery shown in defeat, and the warn- 
ing to stamp upon the dishonor which reduced the nation to 
the decay in which war found it. 

With its heroes the people did not forget to place one man 
whose work began long before war came and was not lessened 
by its close. The President who had united all parties in sup- 
port of his patriotic and prudent policy, whose patient diplo- 
macy deferred war till it could be deferred no longer, whose 
courage carried it through to a successful issue, and whose 
gentle firmness at its close secured a peace on honorable con- 
ditions with a rich legacy for our future, proved himself one 
of the great American statesmen of this generation, and amply 
justified the trust which his people placed in his hands. 



CHAPTER LI 

THE SITUATION IN THE PHILIPPINES — MAJOR-GENERAL 
OTIS IN COMMAND AT MANILA — FIRST SIGNS OF HOS- 
TILITY FROM THE FILIPINOS — SANDICO'S TREACHERY- 
PROCLAMATION BY PRESIDENT McKINLEY — AGUNALDO 
AND HIS FALSE CLAIMS. 

Brief Sketch of the Career of our Commander-in-Chief in the Philippines 
— His Characteristics — Aguiualdo's Pretended Sympathy — He Dis- 
appears from His Headquarters near ]\Ianihi — Sandico and His Secret 
Ciuhs — Discovery of a Reguhir Army Organization of Treacherous 
Filipinos in Manila — Sandico Hastens Away — Size of Our Army — 
Delay in Issuing President's Proclamation — Terms of the Message to 
the Filipinos — Its Effect on the People — The Rebel Chief Issues two 
Manifestoes — Conference at Manila — Aguinaldo's False Claims — 
Never Promised any Assistance — What Admiral Dewey Said — Al- 
lowed to Take Arms and Ammunition — Size of the Filipino Army — 
Attitude of Native Press Hostile. 

WHEX General Merritt left Manila to go to Paris, 
where the peace commission was in session, the 
command of the American array in Manila de- 
volved npon ]\Iajor-Gencral Elwell Stephen Otis, who proved 
to be an ideal coadjutor for Admiral Dewey. General Otis 
went into the war for the Union when he was twenty-four 
years of age. He was twice promoted for gallant conduct, 
once at Spottsylvania and once at the battle of Chapel House 
in the Virginia campaign. 

General Otis was educated for the bar and he had always 
maintained his studies in the law, being also a deep student of 
military affairs. His figure was spare, and lie was always in 
fighting trim; he was wiry and quick of movement. His eyes 
were a piercing gray, ami his face tanned like red leatlier by 
exposure to the sun and wind of the Western plains. During 
the Civil "War a bnllct strn(d< liiin iii tlio no^o and c-imo nut at 
the back of his head, but the scar it left was scarcely notice- 
35 ( 599 ) 



GOO THE MILITARY COMMANDER OF THE ISLAND 

able. In his manner of speaking he was abrupt, sharp, and 
imperative. He was a strict disciplinarian, noted for being 
extremely wary and vigilant, and troops under him were never 
taken by surprise. He proved more than a match for Sitting 
Bull, who was a master of strategy as practiced on the AVestern 
plains. A straightforward, clear-headed, just, discreet, and 
shrewd man was the American military commander in the 
Philippines. He proved himself more than a match for the 
wily Filipinos, both in war and diplomacy. 

It soon became apparent that if the United States, as a re- 
sult of the negotiations at Paris, undertook to retain control of 
the Phili])pine Islands and establish a government there, the 
insurgents under Aguinaldo would offer all the resistance in 
their power. The wily chief of the Tagal rebels — for such 
they were from the time they took measures to resist Spain's 
authority, simply transferring the object of their hostility with 
the transfer of authority over the islands from Spain to the 
United States — at first pretended sympathy with the Ameri- 
cans. But his actions soon aroused suspicion, and measures 
were taken to ascertain just what his opinions were and pre- 
cisely what he was doing, both in and out of Manila, to 
counteract the plans of the United States government. 

About the first of January Aguinaldo disappeared from 
his headquarters. Previous to that time he had been going in 
and out with more or less frankness, frequently meeting 
Americans and being seen by American officials. The insur- 
gent army lay encamped about the city. The policy of this 
government was to avoid a conflict with the Filipinos if pos- 
sible. Every precaution was taken to prevent any occurrence 
that might lead to trouble. Great patience and forbearance 
were exercised, and Aguinaldo, by his annoying tactics, often 
put that patience and forbearance to a severe test. 

An example of the sort of thing the Americans had to en- 
counter may be given here. A young man named Sandico 
had been in the provost marshal's office. He was a clever 
lialf-caste, who, through his knowledge of the people and the 



-■f' 




1 1> 1 uj-i a-. L 




THE DOUBLE-DEALING OF SANDICO G03 

coimtry, was able to render great assistance in tlie adminis- 
tration of the atTairs of the city. To all appearances he was 
an ai'dcnt believer in annexation, and a strong friend of the 
Americans. In order to propagate his views among his people 
he said it was necessary to form societies among them, which 
conld be devoted to the cultivation of annexation sentiment. 
General Hughes, who was in charge of the administration of 
affairs iii the city of Manila, began to suspect that this too 
friendly native might bear watching and investigated the so- 
called clubs. He discovered enough to make it certain that 
they were not for the good of our government. 

An interview between the general and the clever half- 
caste followed. 

"Seiior Sandico, you must stop forming these clubs," said 
the general. 

" But why ? " asked Sandico, innocently. 

" We know what you are about, and you must stop," 
answered the general. 

Soon after this Sandico left ]\ranila to join the new cabinet 
of Aguinaldo, and became one of the most rabid anti- Ameri- 
cans in the Philippines. His work in ]\Ianila had already 
been done; how thoroughly subsequent events proved. 

When Sandico left the city he had laid the foundation for 
an organiz(Ml army in ]\lanila itself. Our generals were in- 
formed of this movement, Init did not interfere^ with it so long 
as the leaders showed no hostile intention. The muster-rolls 
of one regiment of this army were dug up near Tondo church 
by our secret police. The army was called the corps of the 
" Arma Blanca," or Bolo-men. On ]inpor tlie organization 
was perfect — one colonel, one lieutenant-colonel, two majors, 
and twelve companies commanded by three officers each. The 
title of this regiment was the anticipatory one of the " Victo- 
rious Regiment of Arma Blanca." 

It was the desire of our government, however, that if a 
clash had to come it should be between the forces under Agui- 
naldo's immediate command and the troops under General 



604 A SHREWD MOVE 

Otis at Manila. AYlien, therefore, the Tagal leader disap- 
peared, considerable anxiety was caused at American head- 
quarters and at Washington. It was soon learned that he had 
gone to Malolos, where the Filipino parliament was in session. 
It was reported that fears of assassination by some of his own 
men led him to leave his headquarters near Cavito, but the 
fact is that he learned that his plot against the United States 
had been discovered and that he was likely to be put under 
arrest at any time. 

At that time General Otis had at Manila about 19,000 
men, while Aguinaldo Avas reported to have somewhere be- 
tween 25,000 and 30,000 followers. The insurgents lost 
greatly in effective strength through the capture by Admiral 
Dewey of the steamer Ahhy with 4,000 stand of arms and am- 
munition for Aguinaldo on board. In regard to their lack of 
equipment an American official remarked very pertinently: 
" It is pretty hard to tell where the army leaves off and the 
mob begins." 

General Otis delayed the issuing of our government's 
proclamation somewhat because of the Filipino Congress 
which met at Malolos. It was a shrewd move, for the procla- 
mation that the Philippines were under American control and 
government would make those who set up an independent 
government rebels against the United States, and as there were 
many Filipinos who wished to retain the friendship of this 
country, Aguinaldo would find considerable opposition among 
the representatives upon whom he relied to give him authority 
to resist the Americans. It was also thought the provisions 
of the proclamation were so liberal and so moderate that the 
conservative element would be easily won over to the side of 
the Americans. 

The proclamation was as follows: 

Adjutant-General's Office, 
Washington, D. C, December 27, 1898. 
General Otis, Manila : 

By direction of the Secretary of War I have the honor to transmit 



PRESIDENT Mckinley's proclamation 605 

herewith instructions of the President rchitivc to tlic aduiinislration of 
affairs in tlie Philippine Islands : 

"Executive ]VIan8ion, 
" Washington, D. C, December 21, 1898. 
"To tlie Secretarij of War : 

" Sir : — The destruction of the Spanish fleet in the harbor of Manila 
by the United States naval squadron commanded by Rear Admiral Dewey, 
followed by the reduction of the city and the surrender of the Spanish 
forces, practically effected the conijuest of the Philippine Islands, and the 
suspension of Spanish sovereignty therein. 

" Witii the signature of the treaty of peace between the United States 
and Spain by tiicir respective plenipotentiaries at Paris on the 10th inst., 
and as tlie result of victories of American arms, the future control, dispo- 
sition, and government of the Philippine Islands are ceded to the United 
States. In fulfillment of the rights of sovereignty thus acquired, and the 
responsible obligations of government thus assumed, the actual occupation 
and administration of the entire group of the Philippine Islands becomes 
immediately necessary, and the military government heretofore maintained 
by the United States in the city, harbor, and bay of Manila, is to be ex- 
tended with all possible despatch to the whole of the ceded territory. 

" In performing this duty the military commander of the United States 
is enjoined to make known to the inhabitants of the Piulippiiie Islands that 
in succeeding to the sovereignty of Spain, in severing the former political 
relations of the inhabitants, and in establishing a new political power, the 
authority of the United States is to be exerted for the security of the per- 
sons and property of the people of the islands and for the confirmation of 
all their private rights and relations. 

"It will be the duty of the commander of the forces of occupation to 
announce and proclaim in the most public manner that we come not as in- 
vaders or contpierors, but as friends, to protect the natives in their homes, 
in their employments, and in their personal and religious rights. All per- 
sons, who either by active aid or by honest submission, co-operate with the 
government of the United States, to give effect to these beneficent pur- 
poses, will receive the reward of its support and protection. All others 
will be brought within the lawful rule we have assumed, with firmness if 
need be, but without severity so far as may be possible. 

" Within the domain of military authority, which necessarily is and 
must remain supreuie in the ceded territory until the legislation of the 
United States shall otherwise provide, the municipal laws of the territory 
in respect to private rights and property and the repression of crime are to 
be considered continuing in force, and to be administered by the ordinary 
tribunals so far as practicable. The operations of civil ami municipal gov- 
ernment are to be performed by such olhcers as may accept the supremacy 
of the United States by taking tiio oath of allegiance, or by otlicers chosen 
as far as may be practicable from the inhabitants of the islands. 

"While the control of all the public property and the revenue of the 
state passes with the cession, and while the use and management of all 



606 EFFECT OF THE PROCLAMATION 

public means of transportation are necessarily reserved to the authority of 
the United States, private property, whether belonging to individuals or 
corporations, is to be respected, except for cause duly established. The 
taxes and duties heretofore payable by the inhabitants to the late govern- 
ment become payable to the authorities of the United States unless it be 
seen fit to substitute for them other reasonable rates or modes of contribu- 
tion to the expenses of government whether general or local. If private 
property be taken for military use it shall be paid for when possible in cash 
at a fair valuation, and when payment in cash is not practicable receipts 
are to be given. 

"All ports and places in the Philippine Islands in the actual possession 
of land and naval forces of the United States will be opened to the com- 
merce of all friendly nations. All goods and wares, not prohibited for 
military reasons, by due announcement of the military authority will be 
admitted uj)on i)ayment of such duties and other charges as shall be in force 
at the time of their importation. 

"Finally it should be the earnest and paramount aim of the military 
administration to win tlie confidence, respect, and affection of the inhab- 
itants of the Philippines by assuring to them in every possible way that 
full measure of individual rights and liberties which is the heritage of fiea 
peoples, and by proving to them that the mission of the United States is 
one of benevolent assimilation, substituting the mildest way of justice and 
right for arbitrary rule. In the fulfillment of his high mission supporting 
the temperate administration of affairs for the greatest good of the gov- 
erned, there must be sedulously maintained the strong arm of authority to 
repress disturbance and to overcome all obstacles to the bestowal of 
blessings of good and stable government upon the people of the Philippine 
Islands under the free flag of the United States. 

" William McKinley." 

Acknowledge receipt. 

H. C. CoRBiN, Adjutant-General. 

The effect of the procL^mation upon the Filipinos was not 
all that had been hoped. Many accepted it, bnt the majority 
did not. The governors of the various Tagal provinces of 
Lnzon sustained Agninaldo and offered their unconditional 
allegiance to the Filipino republic, declaring that the people 
were willing to give up their lives and property in a struggle 
against the forcing of foreign domination upon them. Sev- 
eral hot-headed Filipino chiefs urged Aguinaldo to fight the 
Americans. The I ndependencia and other insurgent news- 
papers said that America would have a dark road to travel if 
she persisted in claiming sovereignty over the Philippines. 

Aguinaldo also took a hand at issuing proclamations. The 



AGUINALDO ISSUES PROCLAMATIONS 607 

first was published within a few hours of the appearance of the 
American message, and the second appeared on January 9th. 

The first stated that the rebel chieftain had accepted the 
friendship of the Americans solely as a means of gaining the 
independence of the IMiilipjtines. lie claimed that the Amer- 
ican leaders had deceived him by stating that they had come 
to help the Filipinos to overthrow the Spaniards, and had led 
him to believe that when the islands were free the Americans 
wonid rftuni from wlicncc they came and leave the natives 
to enjoy their in(le})endence. lie further declared that the 
Americans saluted the Filipino flag, and recognized the insur- 
gents as a people fighting for their freedom, and not mere 
rebels resisting their government. 

He continued this remarkable proclamation with the state- 
ment that he could prove that he was induced to return to 
Manila by the solemn assurance on the part of the American 
leaders that they would help him to gain the independence he 
desired, if he would only return and lead the natives. He had 
taken refuge in Hongkong after the close of the first re- 
bellion, when the Spaniards agreed to pay the Filipinos a 
certain sum of money to restore peace. 

Having denounced the Americans as faithless, he pro- 
ceeded to call upon all his followers to help overthrow them, 
and begged them never to cease fighting until they secured 
their liberty. 

The second ]U'nclamation was even nuire bitter in tone 
than the first, and made the most violent accusations against 
the United States. A few co])ies of the second proclamation 
were posted about the city of Manila, but they were torn down 
by order of General Otis. In the meantime, Agoneillo, the 
envoy of the Filijuno Junta, was at work at Washington, try- 
ing in vain to secure recognition from the government, and 
doing all he could to stir up anti-annexation sentiment in the 
United States. 

At the instance of Agninaldo, an important conference 
was held at Manila on the evening of -lanuarv 0th, between 



608 FALSITY OF HIS STATEMENTS 

commissioners appointed by himself and General Otis. 
Aguinaldo's representatives were General Felores, Colonel 
Aquilles, and Senor Tores. The American commissioners 
were General Hnghes, Colonel Smith of California, and 
Lieutenant-Colonel Crowder, judge advocate. There was a 
frank discussion of the whole question at issue between the 
United States and the Filipinos, and the intent, purposes, and 
aim of the United States were fully explained. ISTothing came 
of it, however. 

Aguinaldo's claim that he had been promised assistance 
by American officials is not borne out by the facts. The 
records show that as early as June 20, 1898, Secretary of State 
Day issued instructions to United States Consul Pratt at Sing- 
apore to avoid any negotiations with Philippine insurgents, 
and these instructions were repeated to others who came in 
contact with the insurgents from time to time. In spite of all 
attempts on the part of various leaders of the insurgents to 
secure some quasi-alliance with the Americans, no such rela- 
tion was ever entered into. Mr. Wildman, our consul at 
Hongkong, affirms in the most positive terms that he " never 
made pledges or discussed the policy of America with Agui- 
naldo, further than to try and hold him to promises made be- 
fore Dewey took him to Cavite " — promises that he would 
conduct any military campaigns in which he might engage 
humanely and in accordance with the laws of war. Mr. Pratt 
is equally explicit. " I declined," he says, " even to discuss 
with General Aguinaldo the question of the future policy of 
the United States with regard to the Philippines. I held out 
no hopes to him of any kind, and committed the government 
in no way whatever, and in the course of our conferences never 
acted on the assumption that the government would co-operate 
'.vith him — General Aguinaldo — for the furtherance of any 
plan of his own, nor that in accepting his said co-operation it 
would consider itself pledged to recognize any political claims 
that he might put forward." 

The reports of relations between the rebel chieftain and 



AN ALLEGED BREACH OF FAITH 609 

the United States officers at Manila are equally explicit. Sec- 
retary Long instructed Admiral Dewey that "it is desirable, 
as far as possible and consistent for your success and safety, 
not to have political alliances with the insurgents or any 
faction in the islands that would incur liability to maintain 
their cause in the future," and received in reply from Dewey 
the assurance: "Have acted according to the spirit of the 
department's instructions tliercin from the beginning, and I 
have entered into no alliance with the insurgents, or with any 
faction." 

Whatever obligations the United States might be under 
to Aguinaldo and his forces were due not to any pledges ex- 
pressed or implied, but to the course of events and the condi- 
tion of affairs. The total of the relationship between Agui- 
naldo and the United States government is summed up in the 
two facts that Aguinaldo Avas allowed passage from Hong- 
kong to the island of Luzon on one of the Aiiioriean ships, 
that after his arrival at Luzon he was allowed by the admiral 
to take such Spanish arms and ammunition from the arsenal 
captured at Cavite as he desired, and that he informed Admiral 
Dewey of his military progress from time to time. That is a 
small basis upon which to rest such claims as the Filipino in- 
surgents and their sympathizers in this country made in order 
to allege a breach of fnitli on ihe part of the T'nitod States. 

"When the rebel chief was landed by Dewey once more 
upon his native soil, neither the illustrious admiral nor Consul 
General AVildman considered him other than an ally, a native 
scout, avaihiblc to abet the American cause and tell his coun- 
trymen that our war was with Spain, not with the native races, 
their vassals. But, hidden from the discernment of our diplo- 
mats, burned the latent spark of a towering ambition, fanned 
into life by the force of apparent possibilities. So the little 
Aguinaldo, who was })rolific in protestations of allegiance to 
the " great Xorth American nation," became the big Agui- 
naldo, who aspired to be " the George "Washington of his 
people." 



610 THE TOOL OF THE UNSCRUPULOUS 

To one who had seen this little Tagal stripling the assump- 
tion seemed ridiculous. The bombastic utterances that were 
issued over his name were so foreign to what must have ema- 
nated from his brain that they were absurd. But Aguinaldo 
himself was not without genius. In a less important role and 
free from the ill-advice of his associates he could have played 
his part with honor and credit to his race. He had been the 
victim of unscrupulous natives and — let it be said with a 
blush — of culpable and unworthy Americans and English- 
men, undeserving of the name, who whispered lies into his 
ear and encouraged him to stand as the figure-head to an up- 
rising that blasted the fair reputation he had earned and 
plunged his people into a desperate and ill-starred struggle. 



CHAPTER LII 

FILIPINOS THROW OFF THE .MASK AND ATTACK OUR FORCES 
AT MANILA — SIGNAL VICTORY WON BY THE AMERICANS 
— HEAVY LOSSES OF THE INSURGENTS. 

A Scntrj-'s Orders Disobeyed — Signal Gun Fired — Outposts all Along the 
Line Engaged — Americans not Taken Unawares — Rebels Fought 
Bravely but Were Repulsed With Awful Slaughter — Intense Excite- 
ment in the City — Street Cars Stopped and Carriages Vanished — 
Native Troops Well Armed — Driven into the Pasig River — Fight 
Renewed Early Sunday Morning — Several Villages Captured — The 
Charleston and tiie Callao Shelled — The Monadnock also at Work — 
Rout of the Rebels — Oiis Expected the Outbreak — Aguinaldo's Spies 
Deceived — Insurgents Penned in a Church — The Callao a Terror — 
Dewey's Fine Strategy — Rebels Fled to Caloocan — Fight over the 
Approaches to the Reservoir — How Our Troops Were Disposed — 
Sandico's Army Failed — Total Losses — The Official Despatch — 
Aguinaldo's Proclamation — Our Troops Take the Water Works. 



M 



KXS WHILE, peace between the Americans and the 
Filipinos was maintained, altliongli the natives gave 
onr forces plenty of opportunities of beginning hos- 
tilities, had they been so disposed. The long discussion in the 
United States Senate over the ratification of the treaty of 
peace Avas about to close, the day wIkmi the vote should be 
taken having been fixed for Monday, February 6th. It was 
known that the vote would be close, and it was the opinion 
of many that the treaty would fail. The agents of the Fili- 
pinos in Washington kept the insurgent leaders at Malolos and 
around ^Tanihi constantly informed as to the progress of the 
debate and the state of pul)lic opinion in the United States, 
and tliere is no doid)t that the attitude of Senators Hoar and 
Hale and others who opposed ratification greatly encouraged 
Aguinaldo to strengthen his army and prepare for hostilities 
against the Americans. 

Suddenly, on the Saturday evening preceding the Monday 

(611) 



G12 THE INEVITABLE CONFLICT 

on which the vote on ratification was taken — the 4th of Feb- 
ruary — came the long-delayed, inevitable conflict. Two 
native soldiers refused to obey the order of a sentry belonging 
to the First Nebraska Regiment, which was stationed to the 
northwest of Manila. The sentry ordered the natives to halt, 
bnt they obstinately refused to do so, and insolently continued 
to advance. Their action was undoubtedly a part of a pre- 
concerted plan, as it seems likely that Aguinaldo expected to 
win a decisive victory and thus convince the United States 
Senate that it would be folly for this country to try to keep the 
Philippines. As the soldiers paid no attention to the sentry's 
orders, he leveled his rifle and fired upon them. 

Instantly a battle began. The Filipinos were ready for 
action. As soon as the sentry fired on the natives who refused 
to respect his authority, the rebels who were occupying block- 
house Iso. 7 fired a gun, which was evidently a prearranged 
signal for a general attack. The IS'^ebraska regiment was en- 
camped in the vicinity of the outpost where the shooting oc- 
curred, and it was upon this regiment that the first assault of 
the enemy Avas made. The insurgents rushed upon the Amer- 
icans, evidently expecting to overwhelm them by this sudden 
night attack and surprise them into a panic. The firing spread 
on both sides, and soon the conflict became general, all the 
outposts being engaged in a spirited defense, and pouring hot 
shot into the enemy wherever he could be found in the dark- 
ness of the night. The Filipinos occupied trenches which 
they had been digging for some time in plain view of the 
Americans, much to the disgust of the latter. As their inso- 
lence had been intolerable, our forces were only too glad to 
square accounts with the natives, and in no case was an Amer- 
ican regiment taken by surprise. 

In order to get a clear idea of the battle on the night of 
February 4th, and the subsequent engagements, it should be 
remembered that the Pasig River divides IManila from Old 
Manila, running almost directly east and west. It was to the 
northeast of the city, along the road to Caloocan, that the fight 



THE INSURGENTS REPULSED 



615 



occurred, all the outposts in that direction taking part in the 
engagement. The natives outnumbered our forces largely, 
and fought bravely, but were everywhere repulsed and driven 
back with awful slaughter. The men of the Eighth Army 




MAXILA AND VICIXITY. 
Showing important points, line of railway, and operations of American forces. 



Corps under General Otis, who participated in the fighting, 
numbered about 13,000. The total strength of the Filipinos 
under arms in the neighborhood of Manila was about 30,000, 
of whom 20,000 are supposed to have engaged in the battle. 
The American troops were made up of the following organiza- 



616 EXCITEMENT IN MANILA 

tioES : Fourteenth Infantry (regulars), the Third and Sixth 
Artillery, the Utah Light Artillery (volnnteers), the First 
Washington, First ]^ebraska, First Idaho, First South Dakota, 
First Colorado, First California, First Tennessee, First Wyo- 
ming, First Montana, and Tenth Pennsylvania Volunteer In- 
fantry. 

These forces inflicted heavy losses on the enemy. While 
the fighting was proceeding there was great excitement among 
the residents of the city. The natives were wildly excited, 
and had it not been for the splendid police system established 
by the Americans there would have been a general outbreak 
and looting. The xVmerican soldiers in the theaters and at 
the circus were called out and the performances were stopped. 
Filipinos scurried everj-^vhere, and the rattle of musketry and 
the booming of cannon outside the city was plainly heard. 
The residents of the outskirts of Manila flocked into the walled 
city with their arms full of household effects. All the car- 
riages disappeared as if by magic, the street cars were stopped, 
the telegraph lines were cut, and the soldiers hurriedly but 
silently marched out of the city to the stations assigned to 
them. The stores were closed almost instantly, foreign flags 
were to be seen flying from many windows, and a number of 
white rags were hung out from the Filipino huts and houses. 
The police kept a strong hand on the natives and prevented 
any very serious trouble. There were several cases of natives 
attacking American soldiers in the streets. Three Tagals who 
tried this game were shot and killed. 

The native troops were well armed with Mauser and Rem- 
ington rifles, but their shooting as a rule was ridiculously bad, 
while on the American side it was excellent. General King's 
brigade charged upon a numerically strong force of the 
enemy, and, yelling wildly, drove them belter skelter into the 
Pasig River, where in the frenzy of terror, they were drowned 
like rats. 

The fighting during the night was necessarily somewhat 
desultory. The Americans were on. the defensive, but no 



THE WARSHIPS OPEN FIRE 617 

wavering occurred in the line. Tlifv simply stood their 
ground, returned the tire of the rebels, and pressed forward 
whenever possible. During the night the attack was renewed 
several times. At 4 o'clock in the morning, however, when 
daylight made it possible to engage in anything like a con- 
tinuous warfare, the entire line of our outposts was engaged. 
The Americans moved out of the city to the east and north, 
driving the enemy beyond the lines they formerly occupied, 
and capturing several villages and their defense work. These 
villages included San Juan dv\ ^lonte, Santa Ana, San Pedro, 
Macati, Santa Mesa, and Lorma. 

In the meantime. Admiral Dewey had not been idle. 
During the night it was impossible for him to use shells, as 
his fire would have been as dangerous to the Americans as to 
the natives. lie gave orders, however, that as soon as it was 
light enough to allow the positions of the enemy to be deter- 
mined with accuracy, the crmscr Cliarleston and the captunnl 
gunboat Callao should take a hand in the game. At daylight 
these two warships took up positions and opened fire on the 
enemy north of the city. Later the monitor Monad nock was 
ordered to attend to the Filipinos to the south of ]\laiiila. The 
positions of the enemy were accurately located and the war- 
ships poured a heavy fire into them. The losses of the natives 
by this bombardment were very heavy. 

To the north and south of the city the slaughter was sick- 
ening. Filipinos were literally torn into shreds by the fire 
from the warships. In some places the shells tore great holes 
in the earth and around these were scattered the dead bodies. 
The great number of dead that were afterward found every- 
where showed that the natives were not lacking in courage, 
but no courage could withstand the terrible rain of death that 
fell n])on them as the Amci-icans ap])ro:i('h(Ml their ]iositions. 
When the enemy retreated it was to get out of tlie range of the 
American guns as rapidly as possilde. 

It is well nigh incomprehensible that Agniiiahlo i-cally be- 
lieved that he could catch the Americans napping and win a 



618 THE OUTBREAK ANTICIPATED 

victory by surprising them. For some time General Otis had 
been expecting just such an outbreak and he was not the kind 
of a man to be caught unawares. Every precaution had been 
taken to guard against treachery, and General Otis had enough 
information of the enemy's plans to enable him to block any 
move they might make against our forces. It was not known 
from what direction the blow would be dealt, and consequently 
measures were taken to defend every part of the American 
lines. These measures were carried out in such a quiet and 
unostentatious manner that Aguinaldo's spies, of whom he 
had many in the American lines, were completely deceived as 
to the real strength of the American positions, and their re- 
ports to their chief led him to make a fatal blunder at a time 
when he thought to influence the action of the American 
Senate by a great victory. 

Aguinaldo himself did not participate in the fighting. 
He was a cautious general. 

Of tlie American forces in the battle, the Fourteenth 
Regular Infantry, the old command of Brigadier-General J. 
M. Anderson, from Vancouver Barracks, suffered the greatest 
losses. The regiment was quartered at Malate, under com- 
mand of ]\rajor Bobe, and was assigned to the task of carrying 
the rebel position south of that suburb. The men fought 
through a country covered wdth a dense undergrowth, and 
made slow progress at first. The natives took refuge in nipa- 
covered huts, and until they were dislodged and driven back 
inflicted considerable damage on our men. The Fourteenth 
was armed Avitli Krag-Jorgenson rifles, and these weapons 
proved most effective. For every life that the gallant old 
regiment gave it took a score in revenge. 

The First Washington Volunteers and Third Bcgular 
Artillery also saw severe fighting and sustained material 
losses. The Utah Light Artillery and the Sixth Eegular Ar- 
tillery did splendidly effective service, and the latter helped to 
save the First California Beginient from being badly cut up. 
The guns were posted east of the city and during the early 



PACO CHURCH BATTERED DOWN 621 

hours of Sunday poured a deadly fire into the insurgent 
trenches. The Utah batterynien were seasoned by their ex- 
perience at Malate in August and conducted themselves like 
veterans. 

During the engagement a hundred insurgents took pos- 
session of Pacho church and, barricading the doors, opened tire 
on the First California Kegiment. They also fired on the 
ambulances that were carrying wounded Americans to the 
rear. I'lie Calif ornians sent volley after volley against the 
sturdy stone structure, but they were ineffective. The men 
wanted to rush in and storm the building, but Colonel Smith 
restrained them. Word was sent to the Sixth xirtillery and 
the guns were ordered trained on the church. The gunners 
found the range very quickly, and in twenty minutes the old 
church was a wreck and half its murderous tenants were dead. 
The First California Regiment was also attacked by Filipinos, 
who were concealed in huts beside the road along which the 
Americans were advancing. To put an end to the danger, 
Colonel Smith gave orders to burn the village, which was done 
in a very short time. 

In the district between Tondo and Malabon to the north 
of the city, great slaughter was done by the gunboat Callao, 
Lieutenant Benjamin Tappan, which Admiral Dewey cap- 
tured from the Spaniards, as already referred to. This little 
vessel ])rov('d herself a terror. She mounted more gims in 
proportion to her size than any other vessel in the American 
navy, being full of one, two, and three-pounders and machine 
guns. She duplicated her performance of August 13th, when 
she covered General Mcrritt's advance on ^lanila, running in 
close to the l)o:ich :ni<l s])itting fire from her bow guns. The 
ConcorcVs n-inch and the C}iarlef<tou\^ S-inch guns also did 
great execution. General Otis's brigade liad driven a large 
body of the enemy from their jiositions and the Filipinos ran 
a1 a breakneck speed for the beach, a discouraged and panic- 
stricken mob. When they reached the shore tliev were met 
by a devastating fire from the warships and mowed down by 
36 



632 RETREAT OF THE INSURGENTS 

the hundreds. The sight was sickening. On Sunday after- 
noon the Charleston joined the monitor Monadnock off 
Malate, which was the scene of the heaviest fighting with the 
Spaniards in August, and both vessels delivered their shells 
with telling effect. The enemy were retiring before the 
steady advance of the Fourteenth Infantry and had compara- 
tively little shelter. They furnished excellent targets for the 
marksmanship of the Yankee gunners, whose reputation suf- 
fered not at all from this engagement. 

The Olympia, Admiral Dewey's flagship, took no part in 
the bombardment. With the fine strategy for which this 
American naval commander is noted, he placed his vessel di- 
rectly in front of the city, between the Spanish gunboat Gen- 
eral Alava and the German cruiser Irene and the troops 
ashore. The significance of this move will be at once per- 
ceived. The admiral was in a place where he could enforce 
the rule " hands off," if it became necessary. 

The Filipinos retreated, quickly followed by the Ameri- 
cans, as far as Caloocan, on the Dagupan railway on the north, 
and on the south to Pasay, south of Malate. The burial of the 
dead Filipinos by our soldiers began on Monday. In one place 
180 bodies were found, in another 60. ISTearly every Ameri- 
can regiment engaged reported finding fifty or more of the 
enemy dead. 

Aguinaldo had his* lines strengthened, especially at Santa 
Mesa and San Juan del Monte, which commanded the ap- 
proaches to the reservoir that supplies Manila with drinking 
water. It was at that point, near Santa Mesa, that the battle 
started, and it was there that the fighting was fiercest. The 
Americans, on defeating tlie enemy in that quarter, marched 
on towards the waterworks with the object of gaining posses- 
sion of them and thus preventing the insurgents from cutting 
off the water supply. 

The Americans, while the fighting was going on, were dis- 
posed in the following manner from the bay on the north 
around the city to the bay on the south. The Twentieth 



HIDDEN DANGERS (o2'd 

Kansas Infantry and the Tenth Pennsylvania Infantry under 
coniniand of Brigadier-General Otis; the First South Dakota 
Infantry, First Colorado Infantry, and First Nebraska In- 
fantry, commanded by Brigadier-General Hale, both brigades 
being sui)ported by Batteries A and B of the Utah Light Ar- 
lillcry under oonunand of General MacArthur; the First Cali- 
fornia Infantry, First Idaho Infantry, under Brigadier-Gen- 
eral King; the Fourth Cavalry, Fourteenth Infantry, and First 
North Dakota Infantry, commanded by Brigadier-General 
Ovenshine, both brigades supported by the Sixth Artillery 
Division, eonnnanded by General Anderson. 

In all probability there was a hitch in the arrangements of 
the insurgents in this their first encounter with the Americans. 
They had been organizing a secret army in Manila, through 
the agency of Sandico, the spy, of whom mention has already 
been made, and it was expected that an attack from within 
and from without would be made upon our forces. But they 
were not quite prepared for the attack from within, and so 
that part of it fell through. Of course there was no possible 
chance for the insurgents to hold Manila against our fleet. 
The whole purpose of their campaign must therefore have 
been to annihilate the American forces on land. It is easy 
enough to deal with an enemy in front, but when you have to 
deal with an enemy in your own camp, where every servant, 
every cab-driver, every innocent-looking native who glides 
barefooted along the streets, is a member of this army, the 
danger seems almost beyond control. Such a problem faced 
General Hughes. No better man could have been found for 
the position — cool when everyone else had lost his head, a 
keen judge of human nature, firm though kindly, he brought 
to the task an unlimited capacity for hard work. Under his 
command he had the provost guard, consisting of the 'i'wcnty- 
third Ignited States Infantry, the Second Oregon, and the 
Thirteenth Minnesota. The number of the enemy was to all 
practical purposes limited only by the number of natives in 
Manila. Knives they could get in spite of all vigilance, and 



024 INTERVIEW VVllH A REBEL COLONEL 

how many rifles they had buried about the town, according to 
their custom, it was impossible to tell. 

The provost marshal succeeded, up to February 2d, in 
confining the organized movement in Manila to a few shoot- 
ing affrays. His methods were those that befit an American 
gentleman. As an instance, he called up the colonel of one 
regiment of Arma Blanca, and said to him : 

" I know your organization and your plans. Over there 
on the wall is a map of our lines. Look at it. Study it as 
long as you please. If you can do anything against us, go 
ahead and do it; but I warn you that if you rise I will shoot 
you all down like dogs, because what you intend is murder 
and arson." 

Tlie insurgent colonel, seeing his identity discovered, made 
the best of it. He walked up to the map on the wall and ex- 
amined it carefully. 

" You are right; we can do nothing against your lines," 
he acknowledged. 

" Then go and tell your people so," said General Hughes. 

The total losses of the Americans in the opening encounter 
with the enemy were as follows : Ivilled, 49 officers and men; 
wounded, 148; total casualties, 197. The insurgent loss in 
killed, wounded, and prisoners was estimated by General Otis 
to be about 4,000. 

The following official dispatches give the story of the 
events of Sunday and the three following days: 

"Manila, Feb. 5. 
" To the Secretary of the Nary, Wnshinrffon : 

" Insurgents here inaugurated general engagement last night, which 
was continued to-day 

"The American army and navv is genernllv successful. Insurgents 
have been driven back and our line advanced. No casualties to navy. 

(Signed) "Dewey." 

Manila, Feb. 5. 
" To Adjiifant-Geiieral . 

"Fifth Feb. — Insurgents in large force opened attack on our outer 



OFFICIAL DISPATCHES 025 

lines at 8.45 last evening ; renewed attack several times during night ; at 
4 o'clock this morning entire line engaged; all attacks repulsed; at daybreak 
advanced against insurgents and have driven thcni beyond the lines they 
formerly occupied, capturing several villages and their defense works; 
insurgents, loss in dead and wounded large ; our own casualties thus far 
estimated at IT;"), very few fatal. Troops entluisiastic and acting fear- 
lessly. Navy did splendid execution on flanks of enemy ; city held in 
ciu'ck and absolute quiet prevails ; insurgents have secured good many 
Mauser rilles, a few held pieces and quick-tiring guns, with ammunition, 
during last montii. (Signed) Otis." 

"Manil.v, Feb. 6. 

"Adjutant General, Wasliuif/fon : 

"Have establMied our i)ermMnent lines well out and have driven off 
the insurgents. The troops iiave conducted themselves witli great hero- 
ism. The country about Manila is peaceful and the city perfectly quiet. 
List of casualties to-morrow. Otis." 

"Manila, Feb. 7. 

" Adjutant-General, Washington : 

"The insurgent army concentrated around Manila from Liizon prov- 
inces, numbering over 20,00J, possessing several quick-tiring and Krupp 
field guns. Good portion of enemy armed with Mausers, latest pattern. 
Two Krupp and great many ritles captured. Insurgents tired great quan- 
tity of ammunition. Quite a number of Spanish soldiers in insurgent ser- 
vice who served artillery. Insurgents constructed strong intrenchments 
near our lines, mostly in bamboo thickets. Tliese our men cliarged, kill- 
ing or cai)turing many of the enemy. Our casualties probably aggregate 
250. Full reports to-day. Casualties of insurgents very heavy. Have 
buried some 500 of their dead, and hold 50 ) prisoners. Their lo.ss killed, 
wounded, and prisoners, probably 4,000. Took waterworks pumping sta- 
tion yesterday .si.x miles out. Considerable skirmish with enemy which 
made no stand. Pumps damaged; will be working in a week. Have 
number of condensers set up in the city which furnish good water. Troops 
in e.xcelicnt spirits. Quiet prevails. Otis." 

"Manila, Feb. 8. 

" Situation rapidly improving. Reconnoisance yesterday to south sev- 
eral miles to Laguna de Bay, to .southeast eight miles, driving straggling 
insurgent troops in various directions, encountering no decidfd oiqiosition, 
army disintegrated and natives returning to villages displaying white Hag. 
Near Caloocan, six miles north, enemy made a stand behind entrench- 
ments ; charged by Kansas troops, led by Colonel Funston. Close en- 
counter, resulting in rout of the enemy, with lieavy loss. Loss to Kansas, 
Lieutenant Alford killed, six men wounded. 

"On the 4th Aguinaldo issued flying proclamation, charging Ameri- 
cans with initiative, and declared war; on Sunday issued another, calling 



626 IN CONTROL OF THE SITUATION 

all to resist foreign invasion; his influence throughout this section destroyed; 
now applies for a cessation of hostilities and conference; have declined to 
answer. Insurgent expectation of rising in city on night of 4th unrealized. 
Provost Marshal General, with admirable disposition of troops, defeated 
every attempt. City quiet, business resumed, natives respectful and cheer- 
ful. Fighting qualities of American troops a revelation to all inhabitants. 
(Signed) "Otis." 



Bj Tuesday evening the Americans were in complete con- 
trol of the situation within a radius of nine miles from Manila, 
their lines extending to Malabon on the north and Paranaque 
on the south, a distance of fully twenty-hve miles. The main 
body of the rebels was in full retreat and utterly routed. 
Some members of the hospital corps made the discovery that 
there were women, in masculine uniform, with hair closely 
cropped, among the insurgent dead. 

General Hale's brigade advanced Tuesday morning and 
captured the water-works at Singalon. Four companies of 
the iSTebraska regiment and a part of the Utah Battery, with 
two field guns and two Hotchkiss guns, met the enemy on the 
hill half a mile out, and a sharp engagement took place, in 
which tlie Nebraskans lost one dead and three wounded. Dr. 
Young, formerly quartermaster-sergeant in the Third Artil- 
lery, was wounded, captured, and brutally murdered, and his 
body when discovered was found to have been horribly mu- 
tilated. The Filipinos were driven back, retiring in bad order 
and carrying with them the valves and heads of the steam chest 
and cylinder of the pumping machinery. 

General Ovenshine's brigade advanced and took Para- 
naque, capturing two field guns. They met with no opposi- 
tion. General ]\Iac Arthur's division advanced beyond Gaga- 
langin without loss, the enemy retreating upon Caloocan, 
The Americans gained control of the steam line to Malabon 
and 600 marines wdth four Maxim guns were landed from the 
fleet on the beach north of the city. The Third Artillery, on 
the main road, and tlie Utah Battery, in a cemetery, covered 
the advance of the Kansas troops. 










'm 



-i^:^- 




FIRING ON A FLAG OF TRUCE 



629 



Among the important points captured was a strong em- 
brasured earthwork within sight of Caloocan. The Signal 
Corps were compelled to run their lines along the firmg line 
during the tii-htiug, and conscMpicntly there were fiv,,u.M,t 
int.Trupti..ns of c(mimunication, owing to the cutting ot the 
wires- and the signal men were ordered to kill without any 
hesitancy anvoue who attempted to interfere with tlu^ Imes. 

A Fnii)iuo c.-loncl came out Tuesday morning from Caloo- 
can under a flag of truce. Several American officers 
promptly went to meet him, but when the two parties met the 
Tilipinos opened fire. The Filipino colonel thereupon apolo- 
o-ized for the l.a.-harous conduct of his troops and returned to 

his lines under fire. 

The first encounter between the Filipinos and the Ameri- 
cans was a complete victory for our forces. The effect of the 
battle upon the TTnited States Senate was not what Agumaldo 
hoped. The peace treaty was ratified by a vote of 57 to 2 < . 



CHAPTEE LIII 

THE CAPTTURE OF ILOILO— AN EASY VICTORY — THE 
INSURGENTS SET FIRE TO THE TOWN — DISPLAYING 
THE WHITE FLAG. 

Sceond Encounter with the Pliilipino Rebels — Importance of the Place — 
Its Location and Industries — City Turned Over to the Insurgents by 
the Spaniards — Our Expedition Starts from Manila — Delay in Move- 
ment to Take the Place — Insurgents Try to Obstruct the Channel — 
Gen. Miller's Ultimatum — Threatens to Burn their Villages if they Set 
Fire to Iloilo — Our Warships Get into Position — The Day Appointed 
for the Battle — The Enemy Defies Our Forces and Continues to 
Throw up Entrenchments — The Boston's Signal — Boston and Petrel 
Open Fire — A Shell Dropped into the Filipino Headquarters — Rebel 
General Runs Away — Insurgents Fire the City — Foreign Consulates 
Burned — The Ships Cease Firing — Gen. Miller's Delay in Landing 
his i\Ien — Insurgents Flee to Molo and Jaro — Filipinos with White 
Flags Everywhere. 

THE second encounter of moment between the American 
forces and the rebels in the Philippines took place at 
Iloilo, the second city in importance in the islands. 
It is a seaport town, located on the southeast shore of the island 
of Panay, about thirty-six hours sail from ^Manila. The native 
population is composed mainly of Visayans. In all there are 
about 10,000 inhabitants. In the broad and beautiful port of 
Iloilo all the tratling-ships of all the nations come to take their 
cargoes of sugar, tol)acco, and precious woods. A large arm 
of the sea separates Iloilo from Jaro, an outlying district, and 
this arm is crossed by a bridge of very original construction and 
mostly made of bamboo. It is of great length and of remark- 
able solidity. Iloilo is one of the three commercial ports of 
the Philippines, Manila and Cebu being the others. It is a 
place of great strategical importance. The city contains an 
ayuntamienfo, or palace, large banks, a government house, 
large churches, convents, prisons, and well-constructed stores 

(630) 



THE EXPEDITION TO ILOILO G31 

and residences, miu'li of which property is o\vned by foreigners. 
The people are naturally industrious, and raise large quantities 
of sugar-cane, rice, abaca, corn, coffee, cacao, and tobacco. 
!Mnch uf the pina and jusi cloth, fine fabrics made from pine- 
apple leaves for dresses and haiKlkcrcliicfs, is made at lloilo, 
there being over 40,000 looms engaged in the industry. The 
exports amount to 18,000,000 pesos annually. It was, there- 
fore, important to take the town with as little bombardment 
as passible. 

The Spanish evacuation to the insurgents was to all ap- 
pearances a somewhat shady transaction, but when the news 
of it reached Manila, which was about the 23d of December, 
it was promptly decided to send an expedition to occupy the 
place. This expedition sailed from Manila at midnight, De- 
cember 2(>th. It consisted of the Eighteenth Infantry on 
board the Arizona, the Fifty-first Iowa on board the Pennsyl- 
vania, and a battery of the Sixth Artillery on board the New- 
port, convoyed by the cruiser Baltimore. Brigadier-General 
]\rarciis P. Miller was in command. The expedition reached 
Iloilo in the morning of the 28th, and preparations were made 
for landing our forces. Some delay occurred, however. The 
insurgents informed the Americans that if the latter made any 
attempt to land, the native troops, who were present in large 
numbers and were flushed with ]u-ido over their possession of 
the city, would make a determined stand against them. They 
threatened to burn the city before surrendering to our author- 
ities, and to continue the guerrilla warfare as long as their 
munitions and supplies held out. As the orders to the expedi- 
tion did not contemplate such a condition of affairs, the landing 
was postponed until further instructions could be obtained 
from Manila. 

When this news reached ^fanila, the Petrel was sent to 
Iloilo, arriving on the morning of January Oth. However, 
nothing was done about taking the place. Orders had come 
from \Yashington to do notliing to bring on a ru]>ture with the 
insurgents, pending the ratification of the treaty of peace. 



632 AN ORDER TO SURRENDER 

The ships simply lay there in the harbor menacing the town. 
The insurgents were gracious enough to allow our officers to 
land, thus giving them an opportunity to obtain information 
as to the number of men and the defenses of the city. About 
the lOtli of January the insurgents sunk three lighters in the 
entrance to the river, thus partially obstructing the channel, 
in such a way as to allow only small steamers to pass. During 
the last week in January the Pennsylvania was sent back to 
Manila, as the Iowa regiment had not been on land since it left 
San Francisco some three months before. 

On February 8th the Boston arrived from Manila to re- 
lieve the Baltitnore, which left the same afternoon for Manila. 
The Boston had left Manila on the 6th, the day after the battle 
of Manila, bringing the first news of the rupture with the in- 
surgents. 

The delay chafed the men considerably. It was dreary 
work waiting in crowded transports, rocking lazily in the har- 
bor. The insurgents could be seen strengthening their de- 
fenses, and it was rumored that they were making preparations 
to burn the town the moment our forces made the attack. 

It was on Friday morning, February 10, that the army 
despatch boat Putnam arrived with the welcome news that 
the St. Paul, with the Tennessee regiment on board, was on 
the way, and that as soon as she arrived our forces were to take 
the town. After a conference with other officers, Brigadier- 
General Miller, about 4 o'clock in the afternoon, sent a notice 
to the insurgents that they must surrender within 24 hours, or 
he would land troops to occupy the town, and if the insurgents 
offered any opposition the town would be bombarded. They 
were also informed that if they burned the town he would 
burn Molo and Jaro, two native villages; also, if they attempted 
to further obstruct the entrance to the river, or add to their de- 
fenses, we would open fire at once. 

That afternoon the Boston moved to an anchorage eight 
hundred yards east, southeast of the fort, and the Petrel an- 
chored four hundred yards southeast of it, positions which en- 



TLOILO BOMBARDED 633 

abled our ships to command the entrance to the river, the fort, 
and the trenches. The St. Paul arrived that night about 10 
o'clock, and the Flora, a Britisli man-of-war, came in a few 
hours hiter. Again it happened that the day appointed for 
the battle was Sunday, apparently a fortunate day for Ameri- 
can naval engagements. 

On Saturday morning the Petrel signaled the Boston: 
" Enemy throwing up more trenches in our front." The 
Boston replied : " If you are sure this is so, give them a shot." 
She fired two three-pounders at 9.30, and soon afterward 
signaled : " Enemy is firing on us." At the same time the 
enemy was seen to bring down a field gun to the beach on the 
Boston''^ side. The Boston told the Petrel to crack ahead, 
and both opened fire. The Boston fired two trial shots, and 
then dropped a six-inch shell into a house in front of which 
the insurgents had stationed their field-piece. It was after- 
ward found out that this house was their headquarters. Five 
minutes before this shell struck the house, an officer on horse- 
back had galloped down and sent his horse into the compound 
of the house. AVhen the Boston'' s shell dropped the people on 
board could see him — horseless — running away. 

As soon as our forces opened fire the insurgents began 
setting fire to the town. The first house fired was an Amer- 
ican storehouse. Tn a few minutes the town was on fire in five 
or six places, and it burnt all that day and night, destroying 
the English, American, and German consulates, several resi- 
dences and warehouses, a large portion of the business part, 
and the native and Chinese quarters. The next day, after the 
army had occupie<l the jdace, the custom house and a large 
warehouse were burnt. Most of the foreign residence part was 
untouched. 

The ships ceased firing at 10.20 a. m., and as the army had 
as yet made no motion towards landing, the Boston signaled 
General Miller: '' "Why don't you land troops? " This was 
answered by, " If yon wish troops landed, send a steam-launch 
to tow boats ashore." The Bosti)n then signaled the Petrel 



G34 AMERICANS OCCUPY THE CITY 

to land men, and prepared her own landing-party for going 
ashore. The Boston sent forty-eight men and a Gatling gun, 
while the Petrel sent thirty men. 

The Bosion''s party was the first to land, at 11.20, the 
PetreVs party landing two minutes later. The party from the 
Boston immediately took the fort, hauling down the Filipino 
flag, which was still flying, and hoisting the stars and stripes 
at 11.25, amid the cheers from the ships. The landing parties 
immediately advanced towards the town, the Bosioii's party 
occupying it and hoisting the American flag over the city at 
half past twelve. 

During this time the St. Paul had moved close in to the 
fort, and at noon the first troops from the Tennessee regiment 
were landed in the ship's hoats. The Arizona then moved in, 
and by six that afternoon all the troops had been landed. The 
army immediately after landing marched into the town, and 
as far as the Molo and Jaro bridges, the insurgents having re- 
tired to these villages. 

When our men landed they met many Filipinos, all with 
white flags and very respectful. The natives retreated to Jaro, 
a town of 12,000 inhabitants, but on the following day were 
driven from Jaro and Molo, and sent flying toward the foot- 
hills. 

It was said that the action was brought on prematurely by 
the navy, but the Americans had threatened that if they found 
the insurgents adding to their defenses, they w^ould open fire 
at once, and the threat had to be kept. There is no doubt that 
it was the best as it happened, for one of the English captains is 
authority for the statement that the insurgents were perfecting 
arrangements for burning the whole town when we opened fire. 
The only thing to be regretted is that the foreigners and the 
women and children did not have time enough to get out of the 
town, thougli most of the foreigners had left the night before, 
going aboard the ships in the harbor; but, so far as can be 
learned, none of those remaining in the town were hurt, though 
they were thoroughly frightened. 



CHAPTER LIV 

MORE VICTORIES FOR THE AMERICAN FORCES — STRAG- 
GLING BANDS OF REBELS DRIVEN INTO THE JUNGLE 
— THE BATTLE OF CALOOCAN. 

Gen. Otis Given a Free Reiu — Petty Warfare of the Natives — Small 
Villages Burned — Attempts to Cripple Manila Water Works— Ne- 
braska and Colorado Troops in a Short Engagement — Col. Funston's 
Gallant Sortie — Reconnoissance to Laguna de Bay — Natives with 
Flags of Truce — Insurgent Leaders call on Gen. Otis — No Message 
for Aguinaldo — Dewey Clears out San Roque — Aguinaldo Masses 
his Forces at Caloocan — MacArthur's Division — Warships Begin the 
Attack— Si.xth Artillery and Utah Battery at Work — Bravery of 
Western Volunteers — Natives Flee from the Trenches — Flank ^Slove- 
ment Executed by IVIajor Bell — Movement of Filipinos a Rout — 
Fortified Church Abandoned — Deadly Work of the Shrapnel — 
Warfare Follows Withdrawal of our Troops from Three Places. 

SEVERAL days elapsed before tlie troops under ]\Iajor- 
(leneral Otis followed up tlieir victories of February 
5tb and Gtli, at ]\Ianila, by an aggressive movement 
upon any of the rebel strongholds. Preparations for sending 
reinforcements to ]\Ianila went rapidly forward, but so great 
was our government's confidence in General Otis that it left 
bini absolutely unhamjiered to pursue his own jdan of cam- 
paign; to wait until reinforcements came before extending his 
lines, or to secure all the advantage of the demoralized condi- 
tion of the enemy by immediate attacks upon the insurgents 
wherever found. 

One thing is certain, the enemy was numerically strong. 
Tliough many wore killed or imprisoned or sent to the hospitals 
in the opening encounter, and many more betook themselves 
to other rpinrter-, the " woods were full of tlioni " all about 
"^r.'inila. As a result of the first fiuhtiiig. our lin(>s were ex- 
tended from two to six miles in all directions around the city, 

(635) 



g;J6 burning the bamboo huts 

but chiefly in the north and east. Our troops were brought 
directly in contact with the insurgents who occupied those little 
villages that were everywhere about the city, groups of rude 
grass-thatched huts in which the poorest natives miserably 
exist. These villages were the source of considerable annoy- 
ance and danger, as the rebels used them as places of refuge 
from whence they could pour a rain of cold lead upon the 
Americans. It soon became necessary to destroy a number 
of these wretched little villages, and the torch was applied to 
them, the natives fleeing in all directions as the flames reached 
their houses. Several thousand Filipinos were thus rendered 
homeless. Their huts, however, were extremely simple, and 
easily built. Unfortunately, the country for miles around 
Manila is studded with bamboo jungles, and open spaces are 
few and far between. This fact afforded the natives, who fight 
best under cover, a distinct advantage. In many places the 
jungle is so dense that the eye cannot penetrate it, and only by 
the flashes of their rifles could the position of the enemy be 
located. 

General Otis determined to make sure that the water 
supply of Manila was not cut off by the insurgents, who cap- 
tured the reservoirs five miles northeast of the city some time 
before the Spaniards capitulated to the Americans. The First 
Nebraska Regiment, two companies of the First Colorado Regi- 
ment, and a battalion of the First Tennessee Infantry were dis- 
patched for this purpose. They found that the natives had 
retreated, but had attempted to cripple the water supply by 
carrying off parts of the machinery. The missing parts were 
soon found, however, and a temporary famine averted. On 
the way to the pumping station the Nebraskans met with a 
body of Filipino troops, and a short but sharp engagement oc- 
curred. The Americans lost two killed and three wounded. 

On Tuesday, Colonel Funston, the intrepid Kansas volun- 
teer officer, led three companies of his regiment to a brilliant 
charge upon a company of insurgents who were harassing a 
reconnoitering party, which was doing duty not far from 



AGUINALDO INTERVIEWS GENERAL OTIS Co? 

Caloocan. The Americans fought against heavy odds, and the 
roconnoitcring party would pnthahly have been cut to pieces 
had it not been for the opportune arrival of the Kansas troops. 
After a desperate conliiet, in which two Americans were killed 
and five wounded, the enemy was' driven back to Caloocan. 
As the Americans withdrew^ they counted thirty dead Filipinos 
and a large number of wounded on the field of battle. 

On the same day General Otis made a reconnoissance to the 
southeast as far as Laguna de Bay, and to the northeast a dis- 
tance of eight miles, driving straggling parties of insurgents 
ill various directions, but without meeting any decided opposi- 
tion. In many cases natives who had gone out to fight re- 
turned, bearing the white flag of truce. 

The leaders of the Filipinos, including Aguinaldo, evi- 
dently took to heart the lesson of the severe drubbing they 
received, as they took refuge early in attempts to settle matters 
by diplomacy. A number of them visited General Otis at 
^Manila at this time, for the purpose of making overtures look- 
ing to a settlement of the dispute, but they did not find the 
American commander at all responsive to their importunities. 
His manner toward them was chilling and he listened to their 
explanations of their coiulitioii without sliowiug any syiii])atliy 
for them. The Fili])inos earnestly pressed him for a declara- 
tion of some sort as to what they must do to s(>cure ])eace, but 
his answer daslied tlieir hopes of obtaiuing any terms that 
would prove beneficial to their army. 

" Tell Aguinaldo," General Otis said to them, " that I 
have no message for him." That ended the interview. It 
was ])laiii that if Aguinaldo wished to end llie wiw for which 
he alone was responsible, he would have to treat with (Jeneral 
Otis personally, and make complete submission. The recog- 
nition of Aguinaldo as the head of the so-called Philippine re- 
public was (Hit of the question. All that .Vguinaldo could 
do was to submit, siui])ly as an armed rebel. 

^[ean\vhil(> Admiral Dewey was at work establishing a well- 
equipped navy yard and naval hospital :it Gavite, and repairing 



638 THE ATTACK ON CALOOCAN 

and fitting up some of tlie vessels he liad captured. The armed 
insurgents at San Roque, near Cavite, annoyed his workmen 
considerably, and frequently fired upon them, and on February 
9th he ordered the rebels to leave the place, which they did, 
after setting it on fire. The American troops then took pos- 
session. 

The strongest rebel position in the island of Luzon at this 
time was Caloocan, twelve miles from Manila to the northward, 
on the Manila-Dagupan railroad. The railroad shops, worth 
half a million dollars, are located there. Aguinaldo massed 
his forces there with great energy, and it was determined by 
General Otis to attack it at once. General Mac Arthur's 
division was north of the Pasig River, and his left was wheel- 
ing around toward Galoocan, carrying everything before it. 
The city was within easy range of the guns of the warships, no 
hills, but a wide stretch of marsh land, lying between the 
town and Manila Bay. 

It was planned to have the attack upon Caloocan opened 
with a bombardment by the warships. At half-past 2 o'clock 
on Friday, February 10th, the monitor Monadnoch and the 
gunboat Concord, which had been ordered up the bay by Ad- 
miral Dewey, opened fire on the town. Their shells went 
true and great damage was done, alarming and intimidating 
the rebels. 

At the same time that the warships began shelling, the 
Sixth Artillery and the Utah battery opened fire on the rebel 
entrenchments on the landward sides of the town. The 
country between the American position and Caloocan was 
covered with l)anana groves, bamboo hedges, and paddy fields, 
witli here and there straggling collections of nipa huts, all of 
which afforded excellent shelter for the native soldiers near 
the town, who were not in the trenches. Some of these men 
had the reputation of being sharpshooters; but their work 
did not prove them experts in that line, and the damage done 
by them was trifling. 

The artillery and the warships pounded away until 4 



PANIC-STRICKEN FILIPINOS '^"•^l 

.M.l.K'k, wlu'U or.l.is \viv -ivcu lor (iciirnil ll;,i-ri>un (i. 
Otis's brigade, except the PeiinsvlN ;ini:i n-iiiieiit, which was 
hehl as a reserve, lo iu(.v(> upnn the eiinnv's works. '1 he men 
had been impatiently waiting lor the order, and as the word 
was passed down the line they responded with cheers. The 
movement was made in the f..ll..wiug order from left to right: 
Twentieth Kansas Infantry, First .Montana Infantry and Tliird 
Artillery, the Twentieth Kansas and the First ]\Iontana being 
supported by the First Idaho Infantry, and lli.' Third Artillery 
by the Fonrth Cavalry. 

The Filipinos were awaiting the advance of the troops, re- 
serving their fire with coolness, bnt as the Americans began 
to move forward the rebels started a rattling fire, which made 
considerable noise, bnt did no great damage. The Americans 
' did not retnrn the fire bnt pressed steadily forward, marching 
throngh the woods and banana groves from the left, and from 
the right throngh the paddy fields, which afforded no protec- 
tion Not a single stop was made nntil they reached the en- 
trenchments, from Avhich most of. the natives hastily serandded 
as the Americans drew near. The rebels tried to make tluur 
way to the sludtcr afforded by the town, bnt scores of them 
never reached their goal, being stopped by American bullets. 

Jnst at this time the scnrrying rebels were thrown into 
confnsion by the discovery that they had been flanke.l. A 
company of' the First Montana Infantry, under connnand of 
]yrajor J. Franklin Bell, chief of the Bureau of Military In- 
formation, whose services proved extremely valuable, had 
volunteered to execute the flank movement, and, moving off 
to the east, had, without being detected, arrived on the enemy's 
flank back in the town. The natives saw that they were 
trapped, and, scattering, fled like sheep, many of them drop- 
ping their weapons in their anxiety to escape. 

The Americans had jmni)ed the trenches and yelling and 
cheering, were in fnll pursuit. It was simply a mnt, and 
proved that, even with artificial defenses, \]w Filipinos were 
no match for the Americans wdio were i)ittcd against them. 
87 



642 



A FEARLESS ADVANCE 



ilierc IS in C.'aloocan a large church, which, for all prac- 
tical purposes, M^as really a fort. It was a suhstantial stone 
structure, was strongly defended, and had been occupied by 
a portion of Aguinaldo's army who intended to make a stand 
there. But when our cheering soldiers ran into the town and 
drove before them the rebels who had been in the trenches 
the insurgents who had been in the church sallied forth and 
joined in the general retreat. It was found, also, that barri- 
cades had been erected at the place where the Malabon road 
crosses the line of the Dagupan railway, in the center of the 
town. Ihese had been torn to pieces in many places bv the 
hre from the warships and the land batteries. As the Tavcu- 
tieth Kansas and First Montana regiments entered the town 
f i-om the south, some of the fleeing natives set fire to the huts 
whose roofs were made of nipa grass, thinking doubtless to ' 
start a blaze that would destroy the town, but in this they were 
disappointed, as the Americans extinguished the fires. ^ 

The losses of the enemy were heavy, both in killed and 
wounded. The force Aguinaldo had at that point is estimated 
at from 8,000 to 10,000 men. Most of the casualties to the 
Jnlipinos were due to shrapnel, the screaming and effective- 
ness of which caused terror among the troops. Captain Dyer's 
guns of the Sixth Artillery and Major Young's Utah Light 
Artillery kept pouring shrapnel into the enemy's line at a range 
of 2,200 yards, with great accuracy, almost every shot telling, 
and ceased fire only when the infantry approached close to the 
town. 

The American loss was 3 killed and 82 wounded. The 
ivansas and Montana boys, in their magnificent charge through 
a wooded ravine, differed the principal losses. I^othing 
could surpass the fearlessness of their advance across an open 
field on the right, directly in the face of the enemy's strongest 
entrenchments. 

After tlie Americans were in possession of the town, it 
was found that there was only one house in the place that had 
a flagstaff. This belonged to Mr. Higgins, an Englishman, 



LUNA TAKES COMMAND OF THE REBELS 0-i:j 

Avho is president of the Dagupan railway. He lent the staff 
to General Otis, and at half-past 5 o'clock the American flag 
made its ai>pearance at its top, the signal for enthusiastic cheer- 
ing by the troops. 

After the capture of Caloocan, a Spaniard who had been 
a prisoner there came to the Americans, holding up his hands, 
and said that the Filipinos had offered to release the Spaniards, 
especially the artillerymen, if they would undertake to light 
against the Americans at four dollars a day. Most of the 
Spaniards refused, and even those who accepted the offer did so 
in the hope of effecting an escape. The rebels, according to 
this informant, were discontented, unpaid, unfed, and thor- 
oughly disillusioned, their amulets being of no avail against 
Vv'ounds, hunger, and fatigue. On Friday Aguinaldo visited 
Polo, a few miles northwest of Caloocan, and addressed the 
Filipino troops there, claiming that he had won a victory, and 
asserting that 2,800 Americans had been killed. 

It was reported at this time that Aguinaldo turned over the 
active command of his troops to General Luna, formerly secre- 
tary of war in the Filipino cabinet, and author of nuist of the 
bellicose articles that appeared in the native papers during the 
winter, lie did this iu order to keep out of the reach of the 
Americans who wanted to capture him, and in order to devote 
himself to the work of inciting the natives in Luzon to join his 
standard. Aguinaldo professed to be indifferent to the value 
of American successes and announced that he would soon lure 
our forces into a deadly trap. 

General Otis, while waiting for reinforcements, decided 
not to extend our lines any further about ^Tanila at that time, 
the front bciug thou ucai'ly twenty-five miles long. Poi-tions 
of the California and Washington n\<;'inients. the Fourth 
Cavalry, and Lieutenant Hawthorne's mountain battery, 
which were about to make a concerted attack on the insurgents 
before Pateros, were withdrawn to their former positions along 
the river. The Filipino^; evidently mistook the withdrawal 
of our troops for a retreat, and were emboldened to make an 



C-iJ: SUFFERING FROM INTENSE HEAT 

attack early in the morning. The forces here were under the 
command of General King, and they repulsed the rebels three 
times. The insurgents used Mauser rifles, but throughout 
the engagement, that lasted live hours, they did not hit a 
single American. Our troops were under orders not to pursue 
the enemy, but simply to hold their own ground. Durino- the 
engagement twenty-two Americans were overcome by the heat. 
A similar experience was had by the troops after retiring 
from Guadaloupe. The California volunteers abandoned that 
place and retired to San Pedro Macati. The rebels held the 
country in the vicinity of Guadaloupe, Pasig, and Patero, de- 
spite the efi^orts of the gunboats to dislodge them from the 
jungle on both sides of the river. The heat was intense, and 
increased perceptibly daily. Under prevailing conditions it 
was impossible to provide shade for the troops in certain parts 
of the line, particularly General MacArthur's division. Gen- 
eral King's brigade was also exposed from San Pedro Macati 
to Culiculi, where it joined General Ovenshine's brigade. 

in view of the fact that the rebels were concentrating on 
the American right flank, preparations were made to give 
them a warm reception in the event of attack. General Oven- 
shine's line, consisting originally of the :N^orth Dakota volun- 
teers, the Fourteenth Infantry, and two troops of the Fourth 
Cavalry, stretching from the beach at Camp Dewey to Gen- 
eral King's right, was reinforced by two battalions of Oregon 
volunteers and three troops of the Fourth Cavalry as infantry. 
The Buffalo's searchlight discovering the rebels unusually 
active about ten o'clock one evening, signaled the flagship for 
]-)ermission to fire upon them, and this being granted, bom- 
barded the enemy's trenches for twenty minutes. The only 
apparent effect of the fire was to drive the rebels further inland. 
Beyond a few ineffectual volleys from the trenches, which 
were returned \y\ih iiitorost, the rebels wore undemonstrative^ 
and all was quiet along the rest of the line. 



~"<; 
a ^ 



E — ~ 



5? 



c ^ 




CnAPTEE LV 

A NIGHT OF TERROR IN MANILA— DISCOVERY OF A FIEND- 
ISH PLOT— GENERAL HUGHES PREVENTS THE EXECU- 
TION OF THE ORDER — INSURGENTS BURN LARGE POR- 
TIONS OF THE CITY. 

AVliolesale Assassination Planned by the Filipinos — Discovery of their Plot 

— All Foreigners Were to be Exterminated — Work of Sandico Again 

— "Death to the ""J'yrants" — General Hughes Catches Insurgent 
Chiefs in Council — Foreign Residents Alarmed — Everybody Wen; 
Armed — The Torcii Applied — Filipino Houses First to be Attacked 
— The Escolta Threatened —Malay Killed while Cutting Hose — Brave 
Sailor from the Olympia — Another District Set on Fire — A Crucial 
Test — Tondo District Infested by Native Militia — Arrival of Rein- 
forcements — Shooting in the Dark — Property Loss Upward of Half 
a Million Dollars — The American Loss — Insurgents Driven out of 
Tondo — Warships Shell the Retreating Enemy — Americans Find it 
Necessary to Burn out the Secret Militia — Gen. Otis Orders the Streets 
of Manila Cleared after 7 o'clock P. M. 

AFIKXDlSll plot, woll-iiii;h incrcdililo in its sweeping, 
uncontrolled savagerv, which had for its object the 
extermination of ])ractically all the foreigners in 
-Manihi, men, women, and cdiildren, was frustrated by the 
alertness of the American oificials. By the knowledge of this 
blood-thirsty ])lan, which the Filipino leaders, as well as the 
rank and file of the cut-throats, were eager to carry out, we 
are enabled to get a clear insight into the present standing of 
the Filipinos in the scale of civilization, and an idea of what 
must inevitably hai)pen if the Aguinaldo faction should be 
allowed to administer the government. 

We must go back for a moment to Sandico, the secret 
agent of Aguinaldo, whose work of forming clubs supposed 
to be in the interest of the ["nited States has been referred to 
in a ]trcvi<ins chnplcr. This enterprising gent !eni:iii had his 
forces nearly ready to lead a revolt in ^lanila when the attack 
on our forces on Fel)ruary 4th occurred, but he was not wholly 

(647) 



''"^''^ PLOT OF EXTERMINATION 

prepared at that time to strike a blow. The fact seems to l)e 
that battle was brought on preniatiirelv; those who were to 
attack from without were ready and over-anxious, while those 
who were to pillage, burn, and murder from within the city 
walls were not quite prepared. The blow to the secretly or- 
ganized militia of Sandico was severe, but the territorial 
militia came together on February 15th and Sandico, who was 
then minister of the interior in Aguinaldo's cabine't and com- 
mander of militia in Manila, issued to his officers the order 
which is given below, than which no more fiendish document 
even came from human pen. General Otis secured a copy 
of this document and cabled it to Washington on February 
21st. It is as follows: 

" F1H8T.— You will so dispose that at 8 o'clock at iiigbt the individuals 
of the territorial militia at your order will be found united in all of the 
streets of San Pedro, armed with their bolos and revolvers or guns and 
ammunition if convenient. 

" Second.— Filipino families only will be respected. They should not 
be molested, but all other individualsof whatever race may be exterminated 
without any compassion after the extermination of the army of occupation. 

"Third— The defenders of the Filipinos in your command will 
attack the guard at Bilibid and liberate the prisoners and presidiaries and 
havmg accomplished this they will be armed, saying to them : ' Brothers 
we must avenge ourselves on the Americans and exterminate them that 
we may take our revenge for the infamy and treachery they have com- 
mitted upon us ; have no compassion upon them ; attack with vigor All 
Filipinos m masse will second you. Long live Filipino independence ! ' 

" FouRxn.— The order which will be followed in the attack will be as 
follows : The sharpshooters of Tondo and Santa Ana will begin the attack 
from without, and their shots will be signal for the militia of Trozo, 
Binondo, Quiapo, and Sampaloc to go out into the street and do their duty- 
those of Paco, Ermita, and Malate, Santa Cruz, and San Miguel will not 
start out until 13 o'clock, unless they see that their companions need 
assistance. 

"Fifth.— The militia of Tondo will start out at 3 o'clock in the 
morning; if all do their duty revenge will be complete. Brothers, Europe 
contemplates us; we know how to die as men, shedding our blood in de- 
fense of the liberty of our country. Death to the tyrants. War without 
quarter to the false Americans who have deceived us. Either independ- 
ence or death. (Signed) Sandico." 



A NIGHT OF TEKKOR 649 

rel)ellioii, ordered the murder of all the foreign population of 
Manila. First the American army was to be put to the sword, 
then others, including helpless women, little children, and 
other non-combatants were to be murdered. Extermination 
was the word. Tt was fortunate that the plot was discovered 
in time to ])revent its execution, and that General Hughes 
managed to surprise 125 of the insurgent chiefs in council, 
and later to prevent the threatened outbreak by imprisoning 
some of the leaders and winning others over to more civilized 
ideas. 

'J'his was a trying season for foreign residents of Manila. 
Everybody knew that many secret agents of the rebel leaders 
were in the city hatching nefarious plots and standing ready 
to set fire to the town whenever the order was given. Each 
]ii;in knew that at any moment his coachman might kill him, 
or his waiter murder him while he slept. Everyone was 
armed and lived prepared for the worst at any moment. Fire 
was expected, and everyone realized that when it came the 
houses of dry, inflammable material would go quickly. 

On the night of February 22d the long-dreaded outbreak 
came. A fire broke out in the Santa Cruz district. The 
property destroyed there by tlie torches of the secret militia 
of Sandico was the houses of rich Filipinos who refused to 
array themselves on the side of the insurgents. A strong 
wind was blowing towards the Escolta, the business street of 
Manila, whicli made the work of t\\o fi.re-fighters difficult. 
The regular fire department, manned by the natives, proved 
to be wholly inefiicient, and their places "were taken by Amer- 
ican soldiers. The English and German volunteer engine 
companies did excellent work. V>\\t it was found that the 
hose was constantly being cut, and finally a soldier caught a 
]\ralay in the act of bending over the hose and running a long 
knife into it. The soldier made short work of the offender, 
bringing his gun down over his neck and killing his instantly. 

The scene during the fire was one of groat excitement in 
all parts of the city. Business men watcluMl the progress of 



650 A CITY ON FIRE 

the fire toward their property with anxiety. Platoons of 
soldiers, their arms stacked, stood at street corners ready to 
quell any uprising. At a corner, with the flames blowing 
toward liim from the blazing block of buildings across the 
narrow street, an American tar from tlie Olympla held the 
hose. Sometimes he was helped by a few soldiers, sometimes 
by civiHaus, but nobody except the sailor seemed to be able to 
bear the heat for any length of time. lie stood his ground, de- 
termined that the fire should not cross that narrow street, and 
lie accomplished his purpose. 

Scarcely was the first fire under control when a new one 
broke out, this tiuie in the Tondo district, north of the city 
proper. It is occupied by natives, lies next to the sea, and is 
cut off from the main part of the city by a broad street, the 
Calle Iris. The tall spires and massive walls of Tondo church, 
surrounded by a high wall, and a stone building used by the 
Americans as a police station in that district, are the only 
large buildings in a mass of ni})a huts. The incendiaries had 
l)ecn reinforced in tliat section by about 500 native soldiers 
who had in some manner crept through our lines near the sea, 
jirobably crawling through the swamps on General Mac- 
Arthur's left wing. There was one company of the ]\[innesota 
regiment in the police station at Tondo, and General Hughes 
had placed another in Tondo church to meet any emergency, 
for it was known that the district was a hotbed of Sandico's 
secret militia. 

At the time the fire broke out, an attack was made by the 
native troops on the police station. It was their intention to 
drive the company of ^Minnesota men out of their barracks 
and finish them off in short order. As tlie flames shot up to 
the sky, the insurgent bugles rang out long and loud, as if 
sounding the charge, and the insurgents tried to drive our 
men from the ]iolice station. They were unnbh^ to get by 
the guard at tlie gate, and then tried to scale the wall, l)ut met 
with a sharp fire which prevented their climbing over. The 
walls of that police station are dotted with bullet marks. 



FLEEING FROM THE FLAMES 651 

Kciiiforeoinonts soon arrived — two (•()iii]);uiios of the 
Seeoiul Oregon and two of tlie Twentv-tliii'd I'nited States 
Infantry. Thvy lined nut al(tll^■ tlie Calle Iris in ditches, and 
also at rii;lit an<:les t<» tlic road skii-.tiiii;' the fire. The tire 
h'iij)ed and roared in mountains of lianie, and to add to the 
general hnhhnl) the joints in the band)0o huts Injj-st with sharp 
repoi'ts like those <d" a rille. linllets whistk-d in all directions. 
It was a trying' time for the troops, Lnt they kei)t their heads 
and on few occasions did any of their bullets go astray. Shots 
came toward the Calle Iris from all parts of the burning dis- 
trict, and our soldiers ])ronii)tly returned the tire. The flames 
advancing drove before them a crowd of women and children 
carrying bundles of what they had been able to save from their 
homes. They moaned and chattered in fright, and piteously 
begged to be saved from the flames. Along witli them came a 
nnmber of men, half naked, who probably a few minutes be- 
fore had been firing into the ranks of the Americans. Ko 
d(jul>t, according to their custom, they had thrown away their 
uniforms and now sought protection from the men whom they 
had been trying to kill. They were allow^ed to pass into the 
city. The fire swept fiercely with flaming tongues and hoarse 
roar, driven by the wind. For some time it was doubtful 
where it would stop, but it finally was checked at the Calle 
Iris. 

In the booths of the JJinondo niai'ket, only one hundred 
yards back of the Calle Iris, the lii'e I)r()ke out anew. The 
Chinamen of the district made a hard struggle to put out the 
flames and tore down their booths, though fired upon by the 
crafty insurgents who were concealed in neighboring houses. 
As the Mausers gave no flash at uight, it was impossible to tell 
from whence the shots came, and consequently they inspired 
double terror. Oi-adually the shooting ceased and the insur- 
gents \\itliili-('W to Toiidd lii'idgc, wliich they held until the 
following day. 'I'hc provost guard, whicli had iiohly stood 
on watch, maintaiuci] its vigilance. It was truly a night of 
ten'or. A small force cd' Americans had stt»od up against a 



652 DISLODGING THE INSURGENTS 

large force on the outside, and it was known that the mass of 
the population was opposed to the Americans. It was a crucial 
point in the history of the occupation of the city by our troops. 
Had the insurgents been able to burn the city as they ex- 
pected, had they won a victory over the small American force, 
and got the upper hand, it would have been tenfold more diffi- 
cult for the Americans to have carried on the work of paci- 
fying the island. As it was, thirteen of the Americans were 
wounded and a large number of the incendiaries shot. Be- 
tween 600 and 700 residences and business houses were 
burned, and tlie property loss probably exceeded half a million 
dollars. Hundreds of the natives who liad been burned out 
huddled in the streets for days, making the patrol duty of the 
Americans much harder. 

On the following day General Hughes determined to drive 
the 500 insurgents out of Tondo. They had built barricades 
along the three parallel roads in that district. Tondo bridge 
was their stronghold, and along the road from Tondo to Mala- 
bon the enemy had possession of the houses, occupying the 
windows with their Mausers, and keeping the road clear in 
that way. Three companies of Minnesota, three of Oregon, 
and a battalion of the 23d Infantry, under the command of 
Major Goodale, started out to clear the road between tlie city 
and General Mac Arthur's division. The artillery could not 
be used, for fear of shooting into our lines two miles beyond 
the little insurgent band, and for the same reason our rifle 
fire had to be very guarded. A few skirmishers were thrown 
out in front. They scurried along, hugging the sides of the 
buildings and seeking protection behind walls. The bullets 
came hissing down the street; some struck the walls and went 
ricochetting ^dciously from side to side of the street. The 
forces advanced in three columns down the three streets of 
Tondo. Soon the left of the insurgent line Avas dislodged, and 
the main body near the bridge deserted their barricades and 
ran for the brush towards the shore. 

The insurgents made oft' in the direction of the swamps on 



TONDO BURNE OUT Do,! 

tlie seashore near M;il;ili<>ii, ;ii \\\r Ici'i n|' ( icncral MacArtliiii-'s 
division. Sonic ol (Uir lr(i(i[K |im'>ii(<l llinn. When ihc re- 
mains (if ihe insni'uent forci-s ivaehed the swamps tliev were 
on o[)en gronnil in fnll sig'ht of the Callao, anil she picked them 
off with her machine gnns. Five insurgents stuck in the mud 
gave the gunners aniph' time to get good aim. Further out 
in the hav the M (inn(hiock sent several hirge shells to hasten 
tlie insurgents on their way. How many the enemy lost it is 
impossible to tell. The conservative estimate is 100; the 
highest, 500. Two Englishmen were shot in Tondo. They 
were inside the insurgent lines, and recklessly looking out of 
the window watching the fight. 

An attempt was made to rush through our extreme left 
neai" ( 'aloocan on that same day, hut it was promptly checked 
hy a hot and effective nuisketry and artillery fire. During the 
lighting two of our men were killed and two others were 
wounded. Scores of rebels were arrested in the Tondo dis- 
trict. One band of sixty rebels, having two carloads of arms 
and accoutrements, was captured in a house. P)usiness was 
]U'actically suspended. Tlie remainder of the objectionable 
])art of 'J'ondo was burned by Americans on the day after the 
fire, thus destroying the hotbed of the secret militia of the 
insurgents. Major-General Otis issued a general order di- 
recting all the iidiabitantv'^ of ^Nfauila, until otherwise ordered, 
to confine tluMuselves to their homes after 7 o'clock in the 
evening, \\\\v\\ the streets would be cleared by the police. 
The general also warned incendiaries and suspects tliat they 
would be severely dealt with if discovered in any locality. 
Around our cordon the rebels adopted the han-as-ing methods 
of guerrilla warfare. During the night they fire(l from time 
to time in such a way that tieitlier our soldiers nor our ofticers 
could obtain much sleep, and they managed to kill or wound 
a few of our men everv da v. 



C^HAPTER LVI 

COMING UNDER AMERICAN RULE — THE SURRENDER OF 
CEBU — THE NATIVES OF NEGROS VOLUNTARILY AN- 
NOUNCE THEIR ALLEGIANCE TO THE UNITED STATE?. 

Cebu added to the List of Cities under American Ride — Work of the 
Gunboat Pctirl — The People of Negros Decide to come under the 
Sovereignty of the United States — Their Delegates at Manila — No 
need of a Large Force of Troops — A Tug to Carry Back the News 

— Town Decorated with English and German Flags — Visit from 
British Officers — Tribesmen with Spears — Captain Cornwell Meets 
Native Leaders — His Ultimatum — Report of a Plot to Burn the 
Town — Priests Locked up the Coal Oil — Conference of Natives — 
Military Element Opposed to Surrender, but Finally Won Over — 
The Document Submitted to the Petrel's Commander — American 
Flag Hoisted — Captain Cornwell Assumes Charge of the Government 

— First Island to Yield Allegiance Voluntarily — Delegation from 
Negros — Entertained by General Otis. 

WE will leave the stormy and exciting scenes of turbu- 
lent IManila for a time and jonrney in imagination 
to the comparatively peaceful island of Cebu. 
The island lies near Xegros, which adjoins it on the west, sep- 
arating Panay and Cebu. This group of important islands 
lies to the north of Mindanao and is quite thickly settled. The 
area of Cebu is 2,000 square miles, and its population is more 
than half a million. The capital, Cebu, dignified by the title 
of city, is the oldest settlement in the Philippines, and was the 
seat of government until the founding of Manila. It was the 
first place of any importance visited by ]\Iagellan on his dis- 
covery of the group, and it was upon the little island of Mac- 
tan, which forms the harbor of Cebu, that he met with his 
death on the STtli of April, 1521. Eifty years later Legazpi 
planned and l»uilt tlie city, which nndor the Spanish regime 
was of considerable commercial and political importance. It 

is picturesquely situated and has a fine cathedral and several 

(654) 



THE MISSION OF THE "I'ETREL" 055 

clnirclics, hut the poi)ulati()ii is not large. The island forms 
a province i>f itself, nndev the administi'ation of a military 
governor. 

On Alondav, l"'el)ruai'y lMMIi, just pi'ioi- to the time when 
the rebels in .Manila were about to try to burn and massacre 
and pillage, the United States gunboat Petrel left Iloilo for the 
purpose of taking Cebu. The Petrel undertook the job alone, 
Xo large force of soldiers was taken by transport, as neither 
General ]\Iiller nor General Otis had troops to spare, and it 
was thought that the siege of Cebu would be both short and 
bloodless. 1'lie Petrel was, however, accompanied by a tug, 
as stout as any in her line, and capable of quickly carrying 
back to Iloilo the news of whatever developments there might 
be at the new point of attack by the Americans. 

The daring Petrel arrived at ( 'ebu about 1 1 o\dock, Tues- 
day morning, February 21st, finding the Kaiserinn Augusta 
and Pif/nn/ in the harbor. The whole town, as well as the 
craft in the harbor, was decorated with English and German 
flags, but there was one solitary Filipino flag flying, and that 
was on the flagstafl:' of the foi't. The Petrel dropped anchor 
about 400 yards from the fort, and within 000 yards of the 
whole water front, the beach being circular in form. 

As soon as the Petrel east anchor, the Pigmy's commander, 
Ca])tain Greene, accom])anied by the British consul, Mr. Side- 
bottom, i)aid her a visit and had an interview with her com- 
mander, 0. C. ('ornw(dl. They afterwards went ashore to 
have a talk with the insurgent leaders. During their visit it 
was learned that the insurgents had only one hundred rifles, 
and that when the Americans were seen coining in the insur- 
gent leaders sent for the tribesmen, who are armed with sj^ears. 
They declined to return to the town, though a few hours be- 
fore the place Avas full of them. 

Captain Cornwell hud a visit from eight of the leading 
insurgents who wnnte(l to talk o\-er mattei-s with him. 'Hieir 
great fear seemed to be that the Americans were going to treat 
the natives in the same manner as did the Spaniards, lining 



(i56 A CONFERENCE OF NATIVES 

thein lip and shooting them. Thev were also verv anxi(,»ns to 
keep what few arms they had — doubtless they prized them 
highly. The captain reassured them as well as he could, 
telling them that, so far from harming them, he intended that 
they should remain in charge of the government, only he was 
to have general charge, appointing the collector of customs 
and the captain of the port. They were given until 8 o'clock 
the next morning to decide whether they would give up peace- 
ably or stand a bombardment. 

It was the common belief that the Cebuites would yield 
promptly, as it was only a year before that the Spaniards did 
considerable damage to the town by bond)arding it in order to 
quell an insurrection. There were many foreign residents, 
and they feared that the hill men would enter the town that 
night and set fire to it. The Petrel had a landing party all 
prepared for such an emergency, but it did not arise. Two 
Filipino priests secured all the coal oil in town and placed it 
under lock and key, fearing that it would be used in setting- 
fire to the town. 

The native ofiicials had a conference at night to determine 
what to do. The military oflicers pretended to be very much 
opposed to surrendering, but were finally prevailed upon to 
accept the views of those who wished to yield and accept 
American authority. The next morning, the 2 2d, shortly 
after 8 o'clock, the insurgent repre^sentative, Seiior Megia, 
visited the Petrel with the British vice-consul, bringing a 
formal surrender of the town. The document is given here 
in fidl : 

Filipino Republic, 
Provincial Government, Cebu, P. I. 
In view of the verbal intimation given by the commanding officer of 
the U. S. S. Petrel of the U. S. squadron to this government, demanding 
the surrender of the garrison and city of Cebu, to be accompanied by the 
hoisting of the American flag, in the peremptory time of fourteen hours, 
the Assembly, convened for its consideration, and the members of which 
are representatives of all the vital forces of the country, agreed unani- 
mously to accede to the said demand in view of the superiority of the 
American forces ; but without omitting to point out that neither the gov- 



CEBU SURRENDERS 657 

eniiniuit of this pruviiici' nor any of tlic iiiliahitants Ihercof have the 
power to conclude decisive acts prohibited by the Honorable President of 
the Filipino Ilepublic, Senor Emilio Aguinaldo, our legitimate ruler, recog- 
nized as such by virtue of his indisputable capabilities of just government, 
illustrious generalship, aud universal suffrage. 

Sad and painful is the situation of this city, without means of defense, 
and obliged to act contrary to its own convictions ; in view of which it 
declares before the whole world that the occupation of this town is not 
based on any of the laws wliicli form the code of civilized nations, which 
could hardly expect to behold such scenes at the end of a century called 
the enlightened one. 

We are told of conquests, of protectorates, of cessions made by the 
Spaniards, as if the archipelago, and especially our souls, were merchan- 
dise subject to barter, when a single soul is worth more than a thousand 
worlds of that metal called vile, perhaps for the reason that it fascinates as 
the eyes of a serpent. 

But be that as it may ; of all this the commanding officer must treat, 
as already stated, with Seiior Aguinaldo, without who.se acquiescence the 
act which is demanded from this government cannot be legal. 

A copy of this manifesto will be given to each of the consular agencies 
established in this city, the greatest possible publicity will be given it, and 
we will communicate jvith Senor Aguinaldo, remitting him a copy of this 
document. 

Given in Cebu, this 22d February, 1899. 

(Signed) Luiz Floues, 

The Commander-in-Cliief. 

Tlius this important Philippine city surrendered into onr 
hands, without a shot being fired, rather than risk a b()ni])ard- 
nient by one of onr gunboats. xVs soon as the surrender was 
made formally, a company of blue-jackets was landed, under 
command of Lieutenant Bull, and at 10 o'clock the American 
ilag was hoisted over the fort, the Filipino flag having been 
hauled down that morning. 'J'he Petrel fired a national salute. 

After the surrender everything was quiet, though there 
were fears of trouble from the military heroes, wdio were very 
turbulent and not easily pacified. The chief general was cap- 
tured and confined by the Filipinos, so there was little likeli- 
hood of an uprising. 

"When the Spanish evacuated the town, they turned over 
everything to one man, hut there was only $14 in the treasury, 
and the insurgents had spent that Avhen the Americans took 
charge. On February 25th, fifty men arrived by steamer 



658 NEGROS DECLARES ALLEGIANCE 

from tlie Boston, ho that tlie Americans were amply capable 
of quelling" any disturbance that might arise before the army 
arrived. Shortly afterward a battalion of the Twenty-third 
regulars arrived from Manila on the United States transport 
Pennsylvania. 

Colonel Hanier, of the First Idaho Infantry, was appointed 
military governor of Cebn, and Captain Wood of the Eight- 
eenth Infantry was chosen collector of customs. A provincial 
customs system was enforced, and the matter of internal rev- 
enue, licenses, and interior economy of the island received 
early attention. The purpose of the Americans was to have 
these matters largely conducted by natives who desired citizen- 
ship, and to establish a civil administration within the islands 
under military supervision, tentative in character, but as 
nearly approaching permanency as it could then be organized. 
The desire was that citizens of C^ebu who acknowledge the 
sovereignty of the United States should be enabled to conduct 
their affairs under the guidance of a civil representative gov- 
ernment. 

The first of the Philippine Islands to voluntarily declare 
allegiance to the United States was the island of Xegros. 
That event occurred shortly after the surrender of Uoilo. On 
February 21st, four commissioners representing the inhabi- 
tants of that island arrived at Manila on the Newport from 
Uoilo to offer the allegiance of the inhabitants to the United 
States and to ask for protection. Xegros is situated south of 
Panay, and between that island and ]\[indanao, the second 
largest inland of the Philippines. It is mountainous and its 
coasts are difficult of access. The island is an important one, 
being one of the most prosjierous in the group, producing large 
quantities of rice, coffee, cacao, Indian corn, tobacco, and 
cocoanuts, its exports amounting to over $4,000,000 (Mexi- 
can) annually. It is the richest island in the archipelago for 
the production of sugar. Many Euro]ieans live in Negros, 
and steam-plows, steam-engines, and modern machinery are 
successfullv established. The island is about 150 miles long 



MILITARY RULE ESTABLISHED G59 

and from twoiity to forty in width, niul contnins over 3,000 
S([uare miles. It is divided iiit<» tlie province of Western Ne- 
gros, witli a |)(>|)ulal imi id' i'l^I/.HK"); the |ii'()\ince of I'lastei'n 
Negros, with a i)opnhition of 94,782, and the province of Rom- 
hlom, with 'jS,()3o inliahitnnts. Tt has several cities of over 
10,000 inhabitants. 

Tlu^ oiiicials who came to annonnee the willing'ness of the 
people of A'egros to accejjt American i-nle were fine looking 
men of the mestizo or half-caste type. They were large sngar 
planters. General Otis received the delegation cordially and 
gave tlunn a dinnei- at the palace. 

It was true at the time that the people of Xegros took this 
action, and afterwards as well, that the majority of the islands 
of the Philippines were favorable to American government, 
bnt were prevented from actnal demonstrations by the in- 
vasion of armed Tagals representing the Filipino government. 
The \'isayan gron]"), to the sonth, where hemjvgrowing is the 
chief industi'v, are inhaln'ted by a peacefnl ])eopl(> and entirely 
witliont arms. Agninaldo placed 100 armed Tagals in each 
of the principal towns, and compelled the natives to snbmit to 
his govei'nment. 

American troo]^s wei'c landed on the island of X(>gros on 
]\ larch 4th. 

Early in ^larcli. (Jeneral Otis issned an order establishing 
a Visayan military district com])rising Panay, Cebn, Xegros, 
and other islands to be occupied subsequently under the super- 
vision of Th-igadier-neneral Miller. Colonel James F. Smith 
of the First (\difornia Infantry, commanding the sub-district 
of Xegros, organized an armed natix'e jxilice of 200 men and 
put them under military discipline, with good results. 



38 



CHAPTEK LVII 

GENERAL WHEATON'S FLYING DIVISION — FORWARD MOVE- 
MENT TO LAGUNADE BAY — TOWN OF PASIG CAPTURED 
^ — ARRIVAL OF REINFORCEMENTS AT MANILA — RETREAT 
OF THE ENEMY. 

Firsl Offensive Operations in March — General Hale's Brigade Advances 

— Taken in Ambush — Dastardly Work under a Flag of Truce — 
Transports Bring Troops — On to Laguna de Bay — Guadaloupe Cap- 
tured — Enemy Fled in the Rain — The Attack on Pasig — Firing at 
Long Range — Advance of the Twentieth — Marvelously Accurate 
Fire of Artillery — Over 50,000 People Vanish — Natives Throw Arms 
into the Water — Another Complete Victory — 363 Prisoners Taken by 
Our Forces — Loss of Americans Small — Desperate Fight at Caina 

— Outposts in the Jungle — Charging Across the Rice Fields — An 
Attack by the Rebels Repelled — How they Fled Before Our Army — 
In Command of Laguna de Bay — Operations on the Lake — Our 
Army Reorganized — Generals Lawton and MacArthur Lead the Two 
Divisions. 

THE military operations in the Philippines during the 
month of February resulted in the defeat of the in- 
surgents in every encounter, the extension of our 
lines to include Caloocan and other places north and west of 
Manila, as well as the capture of Iloilo, the surrender of Cebu, 
and the submission of ISTegros. Over 1,500 insurgents were 
captured and held as prisoners of war, while the insurgents did 
not capture a single American prisoner. 

The first offensive operations in the month of March oc- 
curred on the sixth of that month. General Hale's brigade 
advanced on San Tolan and ]\[ariquina, encountering a large 
body of the enemy. The Colorado, Nebraska, and Wyoming 
regiments, with eight guns; the Utah regiment, and the com- 
panies of the Oregon regiment were engaged. A gunboat also 
took part in the fighting, and later General Wheaton's brigade 
of C\ilifornia, Washington, and Idaho volunteer regiments, 
and the Sixth Artillery, participated. The natives retreated. 

(660) 



fW'^^"^^ ■ "' 



■ f:i-i.S^-W.^rMtir:>.^- 



"Vt 






I 



flwft J ti y.iw 







' •t;jAcy-'^R!>tv\Wyi#it>i 



TREACHEROUS METHODS OF THK NATIVES W4 

On the followiug day a patrol Ironi the Second Oregon 
volunteers was taken in ambush near the waterworks. Two 
men were wounded, but the Oregonians held their ground 
under a heavv tin^ until the ri'iiiaindcr of tlii' ronipany, assisted 
by two companies of the l-'ii'st Nebraska regiment, flanked the 
enemy, killing thirty, and wounding many more. The enemy 
in fi'ont of General Ovensliinc's line sent out a flag of truce, 
but retiri'd when a detachment fi'om the American forces ad- 
vanced to meet it. Later, they again showed a white flag, and 
a general, with two officers and an inter})reter, advanced. 
AVhen the Americans were within about '2(K) yards of the rebel 
party the latter drew rifles from behind their backs and opened 
fire upon the Americans, but fortunately without effect. This 
is a fair sample of the treacherous methods of the natives in 
conducting warfare. 

The Twentieth Infantry arrived at Manila on the trans- 
port Scandia, February 2od. On March 5th the Ohio arrived 
with the remainder of the Twenty-second Regular Infantry 
from San Francisco. On the same date the cruiser Baltimore 
and the monitor Monterey arrived at INfanila from Hongkong, 
the former carrying JMessrs. Schunnan, Denln', and Worces- 
ter, the civil members of the Philippine Commission. On 
March 10th the transport Grant arrived at Manila with the 
Fourth Infantry and four companies of the Twentieth In- 
fantry, adding to the troops under command of General Otis 
42 officers and 1,7 IC) enlisted men. Major-General 11. W. 
Lawton arrived on the Grant. 

The arrival of General Lawton with these needed rein- 
forcements made offensive operations possible, and the result 
was soon apparent. General King reiK'wed his former com- 
mand, of which he Avas relieve(l by General Wheaton on ac- 
count of illness, and a new flying brigade was formed for the 
latter, consisting of the Twentieth and Twentv-s(H'oiid Infantry 
regiments, two l)attaHons of the First Washington Infantry, 
seven com]iauics of the Secoud Oregon Tnfantrv, Troo])s F, I, 
and K, Foiu'th Cavalry, mounted, and Scott's battery of the 



004 ADVANCING ON PASIG 

Sixth Artillerj. This brigade, assisted by a gunboat, began 
the advance movement JMarch 13th, starting at San Pedro and 
capturing Guadaloupe, the gunboat shelling the rebels along 
the Pasig River. The j^urpose of this advance was to clear 
the country to Laguna de Bay, the large lake ten miles inland, 
and to cut the rebel forces into two parts, those north of the 
Pasig River being separated from their confederates below the 
stream. 

The advance Avas sounded at 6.30 a. m., the cavalry leading 
the column at a smart trot across the open to the right, even- 
tually reaching a thicket in the rear of Guadaloupe. Sup- 
ported by the Oregons the advance force opened a heavy fire 
on the rebels. The response was feeble and desultory, ap- 
parently coming from small bodies of men in every covert. 
While the right column was swinging towards the t<:)Avn of 
Pasig the left advanced, pouring volleys into the bush. A 
small body of rebels made a determined stand at Guadaloupe 
church, but they were unable to withstand the assault. 

At 7.30 A. M. a river gunboat started towards Pasig. The 
rebels were first encountered by this vessel in the jungle near 
Guadaloupe. Steaming slowly the gunboat poured a terrific 
fire from her Gatling guns into the brush. For all of an hour 
the whirring of the rapid-fire guns alternated with the boom- 
ing of the heavier pieces on board. In the meanwhile Scott's 
battery ashore was shelling the trenches and driving the enemy 
back. The artillery then advanced to the ridge of l)amboo 
and drove a few of the enemy's sharpshooters away with vol- 
leys from their carbines. After this their advance met with 
little opposition. 

In the meantime the infantry had been sent forward in 
extended order, the Washington regiment resting on the bank 
of the river, each regiment deploying on reaching its station 
and furnishing its own supports. The entire column then 
wheeled towards the river, driving tlio enemy towards its sup- 
ports, and then advanced on Guadaloupe. The artillery moved 
to a ridge commanding Pasig and Pateros. By this time the 



BRAVE AND EFFECTIVE WORK GG5 

enemy was in full lli.ulit along- a line over a mile long, and the 
tiring' was disooiitiiiiUMJ t('ni|><»rarily in order to give tlie troops 
a rest hcforc uinking the attack on Pasig. At this stage of 
the engagement it was raining heavily. 

The attack on Pasig began on the morning oi the 15th of 
.March. The two companies of the Oregon regiment on the 
bhitf covered the city with volleys to protect the advance of the 
troops, while two more crossed, as on the previous day, to get 
on the flank and rear of the city on the opposite side of the 
San Mateo. Idie Washington Infantry swung around to the 
right of the city, and the Twentieth was ferried across the 
l^isig to the first island, the city standing on two islands, being 
divided by a creek crossed by a single stone bridge. This 
crossing was covered by the Oregon regiment, who poured vol- 
ley after volley into the intrenchments and the churchyard, 
where the insurgents were stationed behind a stone fence. Al- 
though armed with Spring-fields, and the distance was 1,800 
■yards, the lire was so accurate that the natives were compelled 
to hug their defenses, and the crossing and deployment of the 
Twentieth Infantry were made without a casualty. Had they 
been armed with Krags they could have done even better work 
and could have reaeluMl ^tiil more distant intrenchments. 

The Twentieth Infantry then advanced gallantly into the 
city, and for an hour was heard the steady rattle of musketry 
as the insurgents were forced from house to housi^ ami liarri- 
cade to barricade. Splendid work was done by the artillery 
in demolishing intrenchments in front of the advancing line, 
the fire being marvelously accurate. It was directed with 
reference to the position of our own troops by the flags of the 
signal corps, whose men went with the attacking party and 
exposed themselves recklessly in order to do their important 
work. Ey four o'clock in the afternoon the city was taken, 
and the whole delta between it and Taguna r]o Tlay was cleared 
of insurgents. The "Washington regiment ou the extreme 
right cleared out that district completely, and sent in HTT) 
prisoners. Such of the ]io])ulation as had not escaped to the 



(J6G A COMPLETE VICTORY 

south on the hrst day made their way northward along the 
lake towards the mountains. As the district occupied had no 
less than 50, 000 iuhahitants, not one of whom can now be 
found in it, the stream of fugitives must have been large. 

The captured men were unarmed when taken, but some 
of them were seen to throw arms into the water, and this is 
known to be their practice. They all wear their regular white 
clothing, and when not armed cannot be identified as soldiers. 
It is their custom when hard-pressed to secrete their arms in 
various ways, and on a pinch to throw them into the rivers, 
creeks, and sloughs that abound in this region. Then they 
wave a little white flag and claim to be '^ amigos." This is the 
reason why so few arms have been captured. As to the arms 
of those killed in battle, they are all carried away by those who 
escape. Only two guns were found in a trench with thirty- 
eight dead bodies. However, the identity of the prisoners as 
soldiers was established by the fact that a colonel was among 
them, and when ordered to fall in they did so in the regular 
way, with non-commissioned otheers in the rear, and formed 
colunm of fours at command. The serious problem is not to' 
defeat the insurgents in l:)attle, but to capture their arms. 

The result of the fight at Pasig, where there were over 
4,000 rebels, was important and a complete victory for the 
Americans. About 500 prisoners were captured; large quan- 
tities of provisions and supplies taken, considerable food sup- 
lies not available for the army destroyed; many houses burned, 
including a part of Pasig; and hundreds of Aguinaldo's soldiers 
either killed or wounded. The Americans took 363 prisoners. 
Pour of our men were killed, and :ib( )ut twenty wounded. This 
disparity in the casualties is accounted for by the difference in 
the marksmanship of the two armies. Xearly every Amer- 
ican soldier is a fair shot with a rifle, and is willing to expose 
himself enough to take careful aim when he shoots, while the 
natives are extremely poor shots, and stick so closely to cover 
that their bullets fly wide of the mark. 

The victory at Pasig, achieved by General Wheaton, was 



CAINTA TAKEN 007 

the greatest o])taiiied by the Americans since the repulse of the 
attack on Maniki, February 5th. 

On the following day, General Wheaton's flying brigade 
continued the advance. The village of Cainta, northwest of 
Pasig, was captured after a desperate fight, by the Twentieth 
Infantry. The village was strongly fortified. The Amer- 
ican troops were under Majoi' Rogers. They first enconiitered 
theFilipino outposts in the dense jungle on the banks of the 
river. The insurgents were dislodged after half an hour's 
fighting. The Americans advanced in splendid (M<ler under 
a heavy fire, until it was necessary to volley the Fili])inos from 
the trenches. The latter had a great advantage and wounded 
a number of the Americans. But the Americans charged 
across the rice fields in the face of a cross fire, making four ad- 
vances on the eiu'uiy, who numbered a thousand iiieii, five 
hundred of whom were intrenched. Our troops, however, 
carried the town after four hours' fighting, and burned the 
buildings on the outskirts, the Filipinos firing from the win- 
dows and keep up a running fire in the streets. The Ameri- 
cans then wdthdrew in order to obtain more annnunition. The 
insurgents lost about one hundred men and our loss was two 
killed and seventeen woundecl. The rebels retreatecl north- 
ward. The insurgents at the outposts and in the trenches be- 
yond Caloocan fired several volleys on the night of March 15th, 
u]ion the INFontana and Kansas volunteers, and a part of the 
l''oiii-tli r(>gulars, desii'ing, it is suppo-^ed, to discovei" whether 
tlu; American line had been thinned by the movenuMit of (Jen- 
eral Wlu^eler's command. The Americans in the trenches 
replied warmly to the fire. 

Some of the rebels expelled from Oainta and the small 
towns in the vicinity of Pasig comltined forces, and on the 
night of ]\rarch 1 .'>th attacked a com])anv of the Wa-^1iinat<^n 
volunteers, a detached jtost at Taguig, alxmt a niih> and a half 
southeast of Pasig. Oeneral AVheaton immediately reinforced 
the AnuM'icans with two companies each of tln^ "\^^a<hingt<ui 
and tlie Orea'on I'egiments. The post held the eneni\' in clieck 



668 IN COMMAND OP LAGUNA DE BAY 

and the fire of the reinforcing companies repulsed them, driv- 
ing them across to an ishmd formed in the estuary. They were 
thus in front of the Twenty-second regulars. On discovering 
that they were entrapped the rebels fought desperately, aided 
materially by the jungle and the darkness; but they were com- 
pletely routed with heavy loss, after two hours' fighting. The 
Americans lost two killed and twenty wounded. 

General Wheaton determined to punish the natives, and 
at daybreak on March lOtli his brigade started in the follow- 
ing order: The Sixth Artillery, holding the extreme right; 
the Oregon volunteers holding the center, the Washington 
regiment keeping to the edge of the lake, and the Twenty- 
second regulars occupying the right of the line, which swept 
the whole country along the lake, in a southeasterly direction, 
toward General Ovenshine's position. The line, thus ex- 
tended over two miles of country, rough and covered with 
thick jungle, advanced eleven miles. The enemy fled, and at 
scarcely any time did the Americans get within 1,200 yards 
of them. The troops returned to Pasig exhausted by the hard 
work under a hot sun. No fewer than 200 Filipinos were 
killed. The American army and navy were now in command 
of Laguna de Bay. 

Many of the Filipino soldiers captured at this time repre- 
sented that the Filipino army was weakening. On Friday, 
March 17th, the armed tugs Lag una de Bay and Oeste shelled 
the town of Marong on the lake, the rebels fleeing without 
making any response to the fire. The Americans landed a 
party, which destroyed a quantity of stores, and all the stone 
buildings except the church. The expedition then proceeded 
to Majayjay where a sugar-mill and sawmill were destroyed. 
On arriving at Santa Cruz, it was found that the enemy was 
strongly intrenched and prepared to defend the position, as- 
sisted by two gunboats and several strong launches. More- 
over, the mouth of the river was blocked with rocks and bam- 
boo. A few shells caused an exodns of the citizens, but not of 
the enemy's troops. The x\mericans did not attempt a landing. 



< E 



r > 
C - 
c - 



X 



a: - 
p: - 




THE OREGON AT MANILA 671 

About tliis time the American army in the island of Luzon 
was reorganiztnl, two divisions of three hri<;a(h's each being 
formed, (iciieral Lawtou assumed command of the First, 
which consisted of the Washington, Xorth Dakota, and Cali- 
fornia volunteers, under (ieiieral King; six troops of the 
Fourth Cavalry, the Fourteeiitli Regulars, the Idaho volun- 
teers, and a battalion ol" tlic Iowa troops, under (ieneral Oven- 
shine; the Third and 'riiirty-seeond regular infantry, and the 
Oregon regiment, under General Wheaton, and Dyer's and 
Hawthorne's light batteries. General Mac Arthur's division 
consisted of two batteries of the Third Artillery, the Kansas 
and ]\rontana volunteers, under (ieneral II. G. Otis; the Colo- 
rado, Nebraska, and S(mtli Dakota regiments, and six com- 
]ianies of the Pennsylvania I'cgiment, nndei' General Ilale; the 
Fourth and Seventeenth regulars, the Minnesota and Wyoming 
volunteers and the Utah Artillery. 

The battleship Oregon arrived at Manila March 19th, hav- 
ing been asked for by Aduiii'al Dewey. She was accompanied 
by the Iris, and made the run from Callao in quick time, leav- 
ing the latter port on January 11th. That gave the Admiral 
three armorclads, the other two being the monitors Monadnock 
and Monierey. The transport Sherman arrived at Manila on 
March 22d, bearing the Third Infantry and a battalion of the 
Seventeenth Infantry, a total of thirty-four oifieers and 1,702 
enlisted men. Colonel J. 11. Page, Tliinl Infantry, eonimand- 
ing. The transport Solace arrived with supplies and several 
hundred seamen for Admiral Dewey's ileet on the same day. 



CHAPTEE LYIII 

STILL ADVANCING UPON THE ENEMY — DAYS OF IIAKD 
FIGHTING — MALABON BURNED AND ABANDONED - 
MALINTA AND OTHER TOWNS CAPTURED— DEATH OF 
COLONEL EGBERT. 

Gen. Otis's Curfew Order — Eagerness of the Volunteers to go Forward 

— Good Work of the Regulars — Weak Charges of the Filipinos — 
Effort to Surround the Enemy — Magnificent Entrenchments Thrown 
up by the Natives — Night before the Encounter — Early Start by our 
Forces — Gen. Mac Arthur's Advance to the Eastward — Filipinos Re- 
treat Stubbornly — Three Fortitied Towns Taken ^ Gen. Wheaton's 
Operations — Heavy Fire on the Oregons — German Consvd Aston- 
ished — Concealed Entrenchments — Gallant Kansas Fighters — Our 
Losses — Battle Renewed on the Following Day — Malinta Carried by 
a Resistless Assault — Malabon Fired — Col. Egbert Killed — Troops 
Exhausted by the Heat — Prince Ludwig von Lowenstein Killed — 
Oregon Troops Ordered Forward — A Volley Fired into the Nipa Ilvits 

— Two Days of Hard Fighting and the Results. 

THE inhabitants of Manila, after that awful night when 
the torches of the insurgents were applied to build- 
ings in the citj, were greatly relieved by the quiet 
secured Ijy the order issued by General Otis requiring every- 
body to be off the streets by seven o'clock in the evening. The 
boldest of the natives did not think of disobeying the order, 
and when the church bells pealed their seven strokes there 
was a general clatter of hurrying feet, slamming of shop doors, 
and rattling of wagons along the rough streets. In a few 
minutes, swarming, buzzing ]\Ianila was changed into a drowsy 
village, and the oidy sounds In the streets were the footfalls of 
the guards as they went their way about the city. Stores, res- 
taurants, and cafes suddenly closed, belated customers being 
compelled to make their exits through rear doors which were 
locked as hurriedly as possible; the provost guard called out 
" Vronto! " or " Hurry along! " as the late goers fled home- 
wards,. not on a run, for that would excite suspicion, but walk- 

( 672) 



ALL QUIET AT MANILA 073 

mg with ]>otli liniids waviii<>' nnd liiion Idonso flying, and with 
that earnest expiH^ssion whicli was meant to say to the guards, 
" Yes, Sefuir, 1 am hurrying hduic as rai)idly as possil)le." 
Thereafter, during the night, the only sound along the Escolta 
was the tramp of heavy army shoes, or the ringing of a rifle 
l)utt lowered to the granite sidewalk. 

This state of things was ratlier severe on the city popula- 
tion, which had been in the habit of taking the air during the 
evening hours, but everybody, Europeans, Filipinos, and 
Americans, took it philosophically, and decided that it was 
Ix'tter to sufl"er the inconveniences of remaining indoors during 
the evening that to have men running about and setting tire 
to the buildings and shooting down those who attempted to 
})ut out the fires. One " night of terror " was quite enough. 

It can be said with trutli that tlic Americans rapidly settled 
down to the life of war and displayed that lack of excitability 
which characterizes steady nerves. Camj) routine was carried 
on among the troops exactly tlu^ same as at a civil encampment 
at home, the evening band concert in the camps outside the city 
giving opportunity for some recreation and diversion that 
tended to relieve the monotony of camp life. 

In the field the American troops had already won the repu- 
tation of ]iossessing indomitable courage and heroic valor. 
Everywhere they showed the greatest eagerness to make every 
shot count and were willing to expose themselves recklessly to 
accomplish it. They showed a zest in fighting that made it 
diflicult to restrain them. This was illustrated by a remark 
made by General King on the evening when the Idaho volun- 
teers had chai-gcil the intreuchments of the oucmy near Santa 
Ana. It was his intention only to advance a short distance, 
but tlie men had been held in leash all night and until the 
middle of the forenoon under a heavy fire, and when told to 
advance they started on a run. witli wild yells, foi- the Filipino 
entrenchments. General King saw that it was useless to call 
them back, and, turning with a smile to his staff, he said : 
" There goes the American soldier, and all hell couldn't stop 



r)74 ZEAL OF UNITED STATES VOLUNTEERS 

him." The result showed that the men knew by instinct and 
h>ng- acquaintance with the Filipino ninch better how to tight 
him than the general did with his military theories, for they 
jumped the insurrxctus out of their entrenchments and killed 
scores of them without losing a man, while if they had made 
the cautious advance intended they would probably have suf- 
fered severely. This eagerness to fight w^as displayed by the 
volunteers more than the regulars, for the reason that the 
volunteers enlisted simply because they wanted to fight, and 
the regulars did not have this as their chief motive. 

It was admitted by officers generally that the volunteers 
in Luzon were thoroughly seasoned troops and equal to the 
regulars for all military purposes. Said a field officer of the 
Seventeenth shortly after the arrival of the transport Grant, 
" I was highly pleased to see the guard duty performed by the 
Oregon regiment yesterday. It was the best I have seen since 
the war begun." The men of the Twentieth regulars looked 
on at the work of the Washington regiment in their attack on 
Pateros, with astonishment, and said, " Just look at those men; 
they don't seem to fear anything." 

The new regular army regiments also did splendid work 
whenever they took part in an engagement. The Twentieth 
and the Twenty-second, after only ten days off ship, were put 
into the flying brigade, and went at once into the battle of 
Guadaloupe, and behaved splendidly. If they lacked the 
dash of the older troops, they did not fail to advance steadily 
and use their rifles to good effect. For half an hour the Twen- 
tieth was under the hottest kind of fire, and poured a steady 
stream of bullets from their exposed position in the open into 
the woods where the enemy was concealed, advancing steadily 
as they did so. The only difference between them and the 
troops that fought in ]irevious battles is that the latter would 
have charged and dislodged the enemy instead of advancing 
gradually. But the work was done. 

The work of the flying brigade consisted in driving the 
insurgents from one defense to another, one example of that 



ADVANCING ON NOVALISCHES <>7o 

kind Ix'iiiii' 'lit' attack liy the Tuciit ictli ii])<iii an claltnratc on- 
trc'iK'linient about two miles noi-tlicast of i'a^iy,', to which the 
bulk of the cucinv drivwi from tlic city the day before liad re- 
tired. In the attack one man was kill(Ml and seventeen 
W(pnn(h'd. The assault was made withmit the aid <d" artiUci'v, 
and could not have been successful if .Vmerican troops had de- 
fended the works. Several times the Filipinos nuide a faint 
and farcical imitation of the American charge, by screeching in 
their shrill ^•oices and rushing out a little distance, always after 
dark, only to retire ]n-ecipitate]y when greeted by a volley. 
Occasionally a few of them woidd steal up near the line or 
some exposed encampment, hcad(|iiarters, or field hospital, 
and from a sheltered position open a bushwhacking fire; but 
they would retreat (juiekly when their position was discovered, 
and they were fired upon. This was simply individual action, 
or the tactical idea of some chief of s(piad or company, and not 
the part of any general offensive i)lan. 

To return to tin? narrative of the campaign, it was decided 
to make an eftort to sui'i-ound the insurgent army to the north- 
ward of Caloocan. To that end General MacArthur, with 
two brigades, commenced an advance on Novalisches, north- 
east of Caloocan, at daylight on the morning of March 25th. 
It Avas i)lanncd to have liim swing to the left and strike north 
of Palo, after reaching Xovalisches. Genci-al AVheaton's 
brigade was to press forward from Caloocan at the proper 
time, Genefal Hale's brigade, on the old line nortli of Pasig, 
making a demonstration west of the Manila reservoirs. It 
was estimated by General Otis that the enemy numbered 12,- 
000 on the line and was strongly entrencdicd. 

During the six weeks that elapsed after the taking of 
Caloocan the insurgents had been making a series of magnifi- 
cent intrenchments, and it was from these that the American 
troops drove them on that March morning. Tliere were three 
lines of trenclics, one l»a<'k (d" the other, and all i>t" them con- 
cealed in the woods and brn-li. with band)oo entanglements 
or almost impassable swamp.s in front of them. It was an ini- 



G76 THE INSURGENTS CONFIDENT 

pregnable position, and the natives were justly confident of 
their ability to hold it. Xo such position as that had ever been 
captured from them b}- the Spaniards. Indeed, they had 
never felt it necessary to construct such strong works for de- 
fense against the Spaniards, who do not indulge in the Amer- 
ican practice of charging earthworks and neglecting to stop 
when fired upon. For six weeks the natives held these lines, 
sharpshooting all day and making almost nightly attacks, and 
more than a score of our men were killed or wounded, and in 
that time they gained the greatest confidence in their fighting 
powers, believing the Americans were afraid to attack them. 
This belief was most rudely shattered. 

There was great enthusiasm in the insurgent lines during 
the night before the battle. It was plain that Aguiualdo or 
some one of the leaders was making a speech, for they fre- 
quently yelled and cheered with much vigor. Their high, 
falsetto yells lacked the power and vigor of the deeper-toned 
American cheer, but no doubt as fully expressed their senti- 
ments. Occasionally their high-keyed bugles would ring out, 
and once was heard the familiar air of " Marching through 
Georgia," which the Filipino bands all learned to play soon 
after the American occupation of Manila. On our side all was 
quiet, save for the rattle of army wagons on the hard rock road 
of Caloocan, bringing up ammunition and supplies, a noise un- 
usual enough to tell the enemy that something new was on foot. 
At last the Filipinos quieted down, and soon the bugles of both 
armies sounded tattoo and taps, and nothing more was heard 
except the calls from trench to trench of the insiirredos, whose 
custom it was to call the numbers of their posts every ten 
minutes. x\t intervals during the night the iiisurrectos 
opened fire upon tlie American intrenchments, at the nearest 
point on the extreme left of the line, where Company L of the 
Oregon regiment was stationed, the distance being less than 
one hundred yards, but no attention was paid to it, and the 
soldiers slept until reveille. 

By three o'clock the darkness was pierced by the lights of 



CAPTrKIXn THE STRONfJIIOLD 070 

many cainpfiros that si)niiig up suddculy and silently within 
the American lines, liefore dawn the troops had hreakfasted 
and the advance began. 'J'lic start was iiia<h' tiom Laloma. 
The advance was led by General AlacArthur's division com- 
posed of General Harrison (J. Otis's i)ri^ade on the left, made 
up of the Third Artillery and the Twentieth Kansas and First 
Montana regiments, and (Jencral Hale's brigade, which in- 
cluded the First Sonth Dakota, Tenth Pennsylvania, and First 
Nebraska regiments. As this force moved forward beyond 
the trenches that had been deserted by the Filipinos, the re- 
serves occnj)i(Ml the trenches, prepared to advance when their 
services would be needed. The reserve force was made np of 
General AVheaton's command, composed of the Second Oregon 
regiment and the I'wenty-second and Third Infantry, and 
General Hall's brigade, which included the Fourth Infantry, 
two battalions of the Seventeenth Infantry and the Thirteenth 
]\Iinnesota and First AVyoming regiments. 

General Mac Arthur's advance to the eastward encountered 
immediate and fierce oj)position from the Filipinos, who were 
massed in considerable force in that direction and poured a 
heavy small-arm fire upon the Americans. General Hale 
quickly extended his front. Otis's artillery i-ushed to the tir- 
ing line two guns of the Utah battery of light artillery under 
Lieutenant Xaylor, two guns of the Sixth Artillery under 
Lieutenant Fleming, and a Colt automatic field gun in coni- 
iiuind of Ensign Davis. While the artillery vigorously 
shelled the village of IMasamboug the infantry charged across 
the level fields in splendid disregard of the terrible volleying 
of the insurgents, and with a loud cheer carried the trenches, 
driving the enemy from them in disorder. The Filipinos gave 
ground stubbornly, but they could not withstand the tempes- 
tuous rushes of the United States troops, who continually 
pressed foi-ward, with the precision ()f machinery, in the face 
of the most galling fire. The relentless sweej) of the Amer- 
icans carried everything before it. 

At last the enemv fell back, and after carrvinu tlu^ 



nSO IRRESISTIBLE CHARGE OF THE OREGONS 

trenches the Americans swung to the iiDi-thward, capturing in 
splendid style the fortilied towns of l^alintanac, Jialza, and 
Cathahan, and finally driving the enemy before them into the 
swamps bordering the Jiiliaha River toward the town of 
Xovalisches. The rongli character of the country, with its 
dense undergrowth and the determined resistance of the 
enemy, prevented further advance in this direction, and the 
line swung to the left along the river. 

General AVheaton began operations from Caloocan. He 
was met by a heavy fire from Malabon, about a mile to the 
west and slightly north of Caloocan, and from the trenches 
in front where the enemy were stationed in large numbers. 
At half-past eight the Twenty-second regulars advanced with 
the idea of forming connection with Colonel Egbert's regi- 
ment on the right, and the Third Artillery, which formed the 
left of General MacArthur's division. The attempt was a 
daring one, and was pluekily maintained under a galling fire; 
but the end was failure, which left a gap of a mile on the ex- 
treme left of the American line. The Oregon regiment ad- 
vanced almost to the confines of the town of Malabon, receiv- 
ing the heaviest fire of any of the United States troops that 
were engaged. When the order came to charge the intrench- 
ments the soldiers as one man leaped over their breastworks 
and rushed forward with cheers, amid a storm of bullets that 
left many of their number on the ground. Before the as- 
tonished enemy fully realized what was happening, the troops 
had cleared the intervening space, broken through the en- 
tanglements, waded waist-deep through the mud and water, 
and clindjcd the face of the first trench, shooting right and left 
and front among the fleeing defenders. From the first trench 
the Filipinos fled to the second, and as the irresistible line 
swept on, they again took refuge in the third, only to abandon 
it in turn and seek safety across the river, which ran in the 
rear of their lines, destroying a s]ian of the bridge. From 
strong defenses on the opposite side, and from trenches across 
the bayou separating the trenches from Malabon, they con- 



FOES IN AMBUSCADE 081 

tiiMicd the fire until ihirk, ;iii(I liasfv iiiti'ciicliiiicnts were 
tlirown up to protect our troops froui this lire. 'J'his charge 
of the Oregon regiment is worthy to rank witii any feat of 
American arms in any war, and if it had been made against 
reguhir troops tlie regiment \\(»ul(l liave been literally cut to 
pieces. As it Avas, it sustained forty-nine casualties in a few 
minutes. The (Jerman Consul, looking over the ground the 
next day, said he would have declared its impossible to take 
such a position without artillery, and expressed his intense 
astonishment, but when told that the work was done by volun- 
teers instead of regulars, he was completely dumfounded. 

The steady advance of the right continued against strong 
opposition, and every regiment ran against concealed intrench- 
ments from which they had to advance and drive the enemy, 
themselves being always in ])lain view, while the insurgents, 
screened by bi-ush and tinibci-, always I'etrcatcd in time to find 
new cover from which to fire upon the advancing line. Oc- 
casionally the white clothing of a Hoeing rebel or the striped 
blue of one of Aguinaldo's regulars would be descried through 
an opening in the brush, and almost invariably the wearer was 
a dead man an instant later. The greater portion of the 
enemy killed were slaughtered in this way, except those caught 
in the rush u]ion the first intrenchments. The Kansas regi- 
ment, which had been moved from in front of the ^lalabon 
trenches the night before, encountered a strong position, which 
it carried with the same gallantry that has marked all its fight- 
ing since the campaign began, and suffered severe losses. The 
same steadiness and courage were dis]ilayed by all regiments; 
all sufi"ored heavy losses, but carried everything before them. 
AVlun <lar.kness came on and the firing ceased, the entire line 
rested on the river, prepared to force a crossing in the morning. 
The American loss in killed and wounded was about 140, that 
of the insurgents at least 200. 

On the following day the battle was renewed, the Amer- 
icans pushing forward to ^falinta, taking that town by an- 
other of those resistless assaults that are the glory of our army 
39 



682 DEATH OF COLONEL EGBERT 

ill the campaign in the Philippines, and cansing the rebels to 
retreat to Polo. The attempt to get around in the rear of the 
insurgents was a failure because of the roughness of the 
country and the stubbornness of the resistance made by the 
enemy, but General Otis's and General Hale's commands were 
about six miles to the east of Polo when the fighting stopped. 
It was expected that our men w^ould meet with resistance at 
Malabon, west of Malinta, and southwest of Polo, but the 
enemy evidently thought it better strategy to concentrate their 
strength in the vicinity of Polo, so they set fire to Malabon at 
daylight and moved up to join their main body. There was, 
therefore, no resistance when a battalion of the Oregon regi- 
ment advanced north to Malabon, and then wheeled to form 
the left flank in an attack on the town of Malinta. Here it 
was found that the main body of the rebels had withdrawn 
from Malinta during the night, leaving only a few of their 
number to annoy the Americans with light firing. The 
Twenty-second infantry approached the place with General 
Wheaton and his staff close behind. When the Americans 
were about 300 yards from the intrenehments, there was a 
sudden and heavy volley from the Filipinos. The Twenty- 
second infantry went up the slope, through the thick grass, 
under the hottest kind of fire, and suffered considerably, but, 
Avith the Oregon volunteers on the left and the Kansas on the 
right, the fighting was kept up for half an hour. General 
Wheaton and his staff were all the time under a rain of bullets. 
Colonel Egbert of the Twenty-second Infantry, who was in 
the thickest of the fight, was shot in the abdomen. He was 
placed upon a stretcher, and an attempt was made to carry him 
to the cars, l)ut he died on the way. It was a most affecting 
scene. General Wheaton, l^aring his head, said, wdth tears 
in his eyes: " Xobly done ! Egbert." Colonel Egbert 
gasped in reply, " Good-bye, General; I'm done. I am too 
old." 

The military career of Colonel Egliert forms an interest- 
ing chapter in the records of the War Department. He was 




I. UKAD INSlRllKMS IX THEIR TRRXCHES AT CIXGALOX. 
DEAD IXSURGENTS IN THEIR TREXCHES ON THE RATTLEKIELDOK CALOOCAX. 

Photographed as found. 



SKIRMISHES AND ENCOUNTERS <i85 

a born soldier, who loved the smell of powder and the thunder 
of battle. Like ninny of the heroes of recent wars, he was 
small in stature, l)ut full of energy, determination, and un- 
daunted courage. Jle was severely wounded on -Inly 1st at 
Santiago, and promoted for gallantry in that action. Colonel 
Egbert ncx-er overlooked an oi)portunity to get to the front in 
time of batth'. Pei-sonally, he was a genial, whole-souled 
man, albeit a stern disciplinarian. 

Xo Filipinos were found in the trenches at Malinta. 
Though their force was a])parently much smaller than that 
of the Americans, they had an immense advantage in position 
and in opportunity to retreat. General MacArthur's advance 
guard, the Third Artillery and the Twentieth Kansas regiment, 
joined General Wheaton's brigade shortly after Malinta was 
taken, apin-oaching along the Xovalisches road westerly. The 
soldiers were much exhausted, and there were several prostra- 
tions from the heat, which was intense. The dead an.d 
wounded were collected in the shade of the trees, and carried 
on stretchers by Chinese across the river to the train. 

After a rest (General MacArthur's division advanced 
toward Polo. The Second Oregon regiment encoinitered a 
thousand Filipinos west of ^lalinta, who were retreating from 
Malabon. The enemy had taken u]i a position behind four 
rows of intrenchment, but was driven out after an hour's heavy 
firing. One Oregonian was killed and five were wounded. 
The Third Artillery, acting as infantry, with two guns of the 
Utah Artillery and the Kansas regiment, had a sharp fight 
east of Malinta. The Americans had but slight loss; five 
Filipinos were found dead and several were taken prisoners. 

The death of Prince Ludwig von Lowenstein-Wertheim 
of Germany occurred during this encounter. lie met his 
death at the hands of the men of tlie Oregon regiment, though 
purely 1)V accident, for which lie alone was to blame. Xo one 
could regret it more than the men of the Oregon regiment 
themselves, for to many of them he had been very kind and 
helpful. During the attack on ^[alabon he spent much of his 



686 DEATH OF A GERMAN PRINCE 

time at the dressing-station at Caloocan, aiding in caring for 
the wounded, and was courtesy and kindliness personified. 
The next morning, when the line advanced across the river and 
halted for a time in order of battle, waiting for the extreme 
right, the sound of whose guns was considerably to the rear, 
to fight its way uj) to the line to which the left had been ad- 
vanced, he again made his appearance and dispensed his cour- 
tesies to the men he passed on the road. When he arrived at 
the advanced line, he came upon Colonel Summers, command- 
ing the Oregons, who advised him and his companion to go no 
farther, as they would get between the lines. He replied that 
he was not afraid, as the Filipinos would not hurt him, as he 
was friendly to both parties, and had several times been within 
the Filipino lines. 

A short time afterwards, the Oregon troops were again 
ordered forward. After going about a mile they were fired on 
and the battle was on again. Steadily the line advanced, fir- 
ing into the brush and woods where the enemy was concealed. 
In front of Company M were a number of native nipa huts, 
and in one of these persons were seen moving about. As these 
huts were the special refuge of sharpshooters, who were con- 
cealed in them, or were hidden in rifle pits beneath them, they 
were always closely watched for this reason, and fired into if 
there was any reason to suspect the presence of the enemy. At 
once a section was ordered to send a volley into the hut, and 
fired several times, stopping as soon as something seemed to be 
wrong. When the hut was reached the prince was found with 
a mortal wound through his body, and his companion with a 
wound in the arm. He was tenderly carried out and taken to 
the rear, but he died almost immediately. As soon as he 
reached the rear, the surgeon gave his body careful attention, 
and also dressed the arm of his wounded companion, and both 
were then conveyed to Manila. The latter fully absolved 
the troops from anv blame in the matter, admitting that it was 
entirely their own fault for recklessly going beyond the lines. 



CHAPll'.R TJX 

FALL OF THE IlEBEL CAPITAL .MALOLOS — VICTORIOUS 
MARCHES OF THE AMERICANS THROUGH THE JUNGLE 

— INSTANCES OF THE HEROISM OF OUR SOLDIERS. 

The Insurgents under the Personal Command of Aguinaldo Routed — 
Notable Feat of the South Dakotas — Retreat toward jMalolos — 
Luna's Manifesto — Getting out of Range of Dewey — DiflicuUy of 
Moving Field Guns — Rebels Beaten by their Officers to Keep them iu 
Line — Aid of the Railroad — Reinforcements for the Insurgents — 
Blockade Runner Caught — A Day's Rest — Bocave Captured — A 
Picture of Desolation — MacArthur's Division Moves Forward to 
Malolos — Filipinos in Retreat — Some Little Resistance on the Way 

— More Fighting in the Jungle — Malolos Entered — The Town Fired 

— Enemy had Slipped Away — Incidents of American Heroism — 
Wounded Sergeant Who Would Return to tiie Fight — Coolness and 
Deliberation under Fire — Scenes at the Hospital — Cheerfulness of 
the Wounded — A South Dakota Hero. 

THE victories of'tlic preceding days were followed up 
by another on ]\Iarcli 28tli, when the main insui'gent 
anny, nnder the personal command of Aguinaldo, 
was routed, after three hours' hard fighting by General !Mac- 
Arthur's division at ]\farilao, which the Filipinos burned 
before deserting. The American advance began at 1 1 o'clock 
in the morning from Meicanayan, where our forces had en- 
camped the night before. Brigadier-General Hale's brigade 
advanced along the right of the railroad, and the brigade of 
Brigadier-General Otis on the left. General AVheaton's 
forces were held in reserve at ^Feicanayan. The Americans 
had not advanced far when the enemy had (ipened a heavy 
fire from the left on the Third Artillery, which was General 
Otis's advance guard. The artillerymen responded heartily 
to the insurgent attack and drove \]\o enemy helter-skelter 
across the Biver ^farilao. TTere the FiH])inos retired within 

theii" trenches, which were only fifty yards iu front of the 

(687) 



088 REBELS RETREAT TO MALOLOS 

advaiicii]g xVmerieans, and made a stand; but the halt proved 
fatal, fo]-, under re])eated volleys from two guns of the Utah 
Battery, under Lieutenant ('ritchon, and the automatic Colt 
guns, under Ensign Davis, they were completely routed, and 
left many dead and wounded on the field. 

In the meantime the men of the First South Dakota had 
performed one of the most notable feats of the campaign. 
CMieering loudly, they fearlessly charged across an open field 
against the main line of the insurgents, who were lying partly 
concealed in a bamboo thicket. It was a daring act, for across 
the level plain the insurgents rained a shower of bullets. Ten 
of the gallant AVesterners were killed and eleven wounded. 
Fearful loss was inflicted on the rebels by this charge. 
Eighty-eight were known to have been killed, and 100, with 
their arms, were captured. The rest fled towards Malolos in 
wild disorder. 

The main body of the insurgents retreated to Malolos, 
Avhere the Filipino Assembly was convened. At every rail- 
road station, circulars were posted, signed l)y the Filipino com- 
mander-in-chief, Antonio Luna, ordering all spies and bearers 
of news to the enemy to be shot without trial, and instructing 
that all looters and ravishers be treated in the same manner. 
All towns abandoned by the Filipino troops were to be burned. 
AVhile deploring the existence of war, the circular maintained 
the undeniable riglit of the Filipinos to defend their homes, 
lives, and lands against '' would-be dominators, who will kill 
them, their wives, and children," adding that this motive 
ought to impel all Filipinos to sacrifice everything. 

At Malolos it was expected that the rebels would make a 
des]ierate resistance, as it was their capital, and the loss of that 
meant more to them than the loss of any other place in the 
i-^land of Luzon. Aguiualdo's tactics had gradually taken him 
beyond the range of Admiral Dewey's guns. Malolos is about 
seven miles back from the bav, although there are shallow 
estuaries which would permit light draught boats to get ^Wthin 
a mile or two. There are many small streams along the line 



A REMARKABLE CAMPAIGN 689 

of the railroad, and the passage of our troops was impeded bj 
the burning- of bridges. The roads were also almost impassa- 
ble for light artillery and ([uick nunuMivers of cavalry. Our 
light lield guns could be moved forward slowly, but it was im- 
possible to manipulate them so as to take advantage of every 
crest and rise of the ground. The only horses available for 
the cavalry and artillery are the small native ponies. It was 
owing to the character of the country and the impassability 
of the roads that the attempts to get a part of our forces in 
the rear of the main l)ody of Aguiualdo's army failed. 

The lighting which began March 25th continued for sev- 
eral successive days. In these long contests the main thing is to 
have all the supplies, stores, etc., kept abreast of the fighting 
force, and this was done in this remarkable campaign. But 
it was thought liest to give our men a rest after three days' 
scrambling in the brush, fording rivers, and charging trenches 
in the blazing sun. The men were tired, but in splendid 
spirits. 1"lie engineers were at work repairing bridges, as the 
rebels failed to destroy the ironwork, and the railroad was kept 
busy hurrying supjilies to the front. The country from 
Mai'ilao to Malolos is level, with occasional stretches of wood, 
but there is no more jungle. The two armies were about 
1,200 yards apart. According to prisoners in the hands of 
the Americans, Aguiualdo's generals, Garcia, Tofreo, and 
Pacheco, were with the Fili])ino army on March 27th, and 
drove their followers into the iirst aggressive demonstration. 
The rebels attempted to charge across the plain east of the rail- 
road, but the Americans charged to meet them and the Fili- 
pinos bolted after a few >liots, leavinu' sevcM-al men killed on 
the field. The Filijuno prisoners declared that the reb(>ls had 
lost all taste for fighting, and that their officers had to keep 
them in line by beating them with swords. 

The fact that the railroad was in operation as far as the 
American lines at Marilao greatly aided the work of forward- 
ing supplies. Sonu' aid was also given by the gnnbiKit- which 
proceeded np the jlnhienn Ki\-ei-. >helliiig the jungle on l)oth 



coo CAPTURE OF A BLOCKADE RUNNER 

sides of the stream. The insurgents around Buhican received 
reinforcements from Malolos. Our men suffered from the 
heat, which was fully 100 degrees in the interior. At this 
time our losses since February 4tli were 157 killed and 8G-± 
w^ounded. 

On March 28th the United States gunboat Yorldowii ar- 
ri^'cd at Manila with the Spanish steamer Mundara, owned 
by the Mondezona C^ompany at Manila, which was attempting 
to run the blockade. The steamer was captured after a stiff 
chase in the gulf in Lingayen, 245 miles north. When she 
was first sighted the Mundara was entering the gulf, but she 
headed seaward. The Yorldoivn fired two shots before the 
steamer was overhauled. 

On ]\rarcli 29tli General ]\racArthur's forces advanced 
from Marilao, after a day's rest, and passed rapidly to Bocave. 
At 5 :15 they reached Guiguinto, three and a half miles from 
Malolos. On the way there was more fierce fighting. The 
American forces met with strong op]:)Osition in the jungle l3e- 
yond Bocave. First one Xebraskan, then one Pennsylvanian, 
and afterwards two of the Montana regiment were killed, and 
thirty-five were wounded, including one officer of the Kansas 
regiment. Bocave was captured at 8 o'clock in the morning, 
and then the second advance to Bigaa was made. Bigaa was 
taken without a shot being fired, the enemy fleeing at the 
approach of the Americans. 

Bodies of dead Filipinos were found stranded in the shal- 
lows of the river, or lying in the jungle wdiere they crawled 
to die or were left in the wake of the hurriedly retreating 
army. The inhabitants who fled from Marilao and Meycaua- 
yan left in such a panic that on the tables our soldiei-s found 
money and valuables, and in the rooms were trunks contain- 
ing property of value. This w^as the case in most of the houses 
deserted. Thev were not molested by our soldiers, but the 
Ohinese, who slipjX'd in between the armies, took possession of 
several houses, over which they raised C^hinese flags, some of 
which were afterwards torn down. 



THE DESOLATION OF WAR G'Ji 

The country between .Marilao and Manila presented a 
]»i('lnre of desolation. Smoke was curling from hundreds of 
ash heaps, and the remains of trees and fences torn by shrapnel 
were to be seen everywhere. The general appearance of the 
country was as if it had been swept by a cyclone. The roads 
were strewn witli furniture and clothing dropped in flight by 
the Filipinos. The only persons remaining behind were a 
few aged persons, too infirm to escape. They camped beside 
the ruins of their former homes and begged passers-by for any 
kind of assistance. The majority of them lived on the gener- 
osity of our soldiers, who gave them portions of their rations. 
Tho dogs of the Filipinos cowered in the bushes, terrified and 
l>arking, Avhile hundreds of pigs were to be seen busily search- 
ing for food. 

From Ouiguinto to Malolos is but a short distance, and on 
the morning of the last day in ]\Iarch General ^facArthur's 
division went forward to the rebel capital. The baggage 
trains had been brought up and the bridges repaired, and the 
scouts reconnoitered the country to wn'thin a mile of Malolos. 
They did not discover the enemy in force, but found scattered 
bodies of Filipino soldiers and about 2,000 natives who were 
retreating to the eastward. 

The i^ebraska. South Dakc^ta, and Pennsylvania volun- 
teers were on the right of the line, and they met ^vith some 
opposition from the enemy who were in the woods, but were 
soon dislodged. The Kansas and Montana volunteei's and 
the Third Artillery had the left of the advance and were not 
on the firing line. Four Xebraskans Avere killed in the early 
skirmish. Ten men of the Dakota regiment were wounded, 
and one of the Pennsylvania was killed. The Americans 
finally di'nve the FiH])inos back. Although there were three 
lines (»f strong intreuchnients along the track, the enemy made 
scarcely any defense there, deneral ^fac Arthur and his staff 
were Avalking on the track, abreast of the line, with everything 
quiet, when suddeidy they received a shower of bidlets from 
sharpshooters in trees and on housetops, but these were speed- 



692 THE OCCUPATION OF MALOLOS 

ily dislodged. The enemy's loss was apparently small, the 
jungle affording them such protection that the Americans 
were unable to see them and in firing were guided only by 
the sound of the Filipinos' shots. 

It was 10:15 a. m. when General Mac Arthur's forces en- 
tered Malolos. The capture of the city was an easy matter. 
The insurgents had slipped away again, preferring to set fire 
to the town and run away rather than lose many of their forces 
in an attempt to defend it. It was Aguinaldo's policy to 
liarrass our army as much as possible but not risk certain and 
final defeat by massing his forces in a determined contest. 
In every instance on the road from Caloocan to Malolos the 
rebels ran away after a more or less prolonged resistance. 
Aguinaldo and his cabinet left Malolos two days before, his 
so-called government being henceforth without a home, and 
the commander-in-chief a wanderer in the jungle. His 
abandonment of the capital greatly weakened his hold upon 
his men and caused great dissatisfaction among his troops. 

There are many stories to be told, showing the bravery 
of our men in this stage of the campaign, that might well be 
given a place here. A few of them will illustrate some of the 
characteristics of the American soldier and the scenes that 
were witnessed during the pursuit of the insurgents. It is 
related by one who saw the incident that as the troops jumped 
over their breastworks and charged against the magnificent 
defenses of Malabon, a sergeant who had become famous in 
his regiment as a chronic growler received a severe wound. 
Two of his comrades stopped to help him, and bound up his 
wound with a first-aid package. The sergeant grieved at be- 
ing hit so soon, and begged the men to hold him up long 
enough to give him just one shot at the enemy, but as they 
were in the rear of our own line this could not be done. So, 
telling him to lie still until the Hospital Corps reached him 
to take him to the rear, they hastened on to overtake the ad- 
vancing line. Fifteen minutes later the hospital men came 
upon him and found his crawling slowly towards tlic front. 



COOLNESS OF THE AMERICAN SOLDIER 095 

(Inii^giiig his gun witli liiiii, (l(t('nniii('<l to get that one shot 
l)of<)i'e his strength gave out. 1 lu v put him on a litter, in 
s|)itc' of his ju'otests, and carried hiui hack to the fiehl hospital, 
and in a few hours he died, still niourniug his failure to do the 
work he had waited so long to do. His company had been on 
special duty until that day, and this was his first fight. 

Coolness and deliberation under fire are as much respon- 
sible for the success of tiie American arms as the resistless im- 
pulse of the charge when the advance is ordered. A small 
party was advancing uj) a road swept by Mauser and Rem- 
ington bullets from half a dozen barricades and short trenches. 
The l)arty was too small to advance further, and so, at 400 
yards range, they continued the fight from the open against 
the protected enemy. Two of the men calmly seated them- 
selves in the road, crossed their legs, and began sharpshooting 
at the scores of heads that constantly appeared above the forti- 
fications as bullets were rained upon them. There they sat, 
discussing with each other the range and the elfect of their 
shots as deliberately as at target practice, and neither of these 
men was hit. 

In front of ]\lalal)on the general field hospital was estab- 
lished in the waiting-room of the Caloocan depot, and, as fast 
as the wounded were attended to or the bodies of the dead 
were brought in, they were placed on the train and sent at 
once to Manila. Tn less than an hour after the battle began 
the first wounded men were being tenderly cared for at the 
general hospital. The scenes at the Caloocan station w-ere 
pitiful and heartrending, and yet they made one feel proud 
of his countrymen. Xot a complaint, and hardly a groan, 
was heard from a man, no matter how badly he was wounded 
or how much ])ain he suffered from the necessary handling, 
and even cutting, of liis wound by the surgeon. On the other 
hand, those not exhausted from loss of blood joked and laughed 
about their hurts, and each was ready cheerfully to tell the 
bystanders how it happened and what he saw of the battle be- 
fore he was hit. Xot a few mingled with their stories praises 



(;96 CHEERFULNESS AND FORTITUDE 

of the work of the Hospital CN)r})s on the tield, and of the 
heroism of tlieir comrades, the roar of whose guns was be- 
coming fainter and fainter as they pushed on in pursuit of the 
retreating insurgents. Some came hobbling up, using a rifle 
for a crutch, others holding one roughly bandaged arm with 
the uninjured other. Some crawled painfully along, shot in 
the leg or body, until they were observed and men went out to 
bring them in, while others were carried in on litters or the 
arms of their comrades, or walked slowly and painfully, their 
arms about tlie necks of those assisting them. Patiently they 
all waited for their turn on the surgeon's table, the more 
slightly wounded refusing to take their turn when others more 
severely injured had been brought in later. One man, who 
had waited a long time in this way, and at last had taken his 
place on the table, all others having been attended to, insisted 
upon getting up again to give place to a badly wounded man 
just theji brought in. A man with a painful but not imme- 
diately disabling wound in the side joked with the surgeon and 
others as the knife and bandage were busy in getting him into 
shape to go to the hospital. When he was ready, ho lowered 
himself painfully to the floor, remarking : " That's a good 
job, Doc. AVhere's my gun ? " 

" What do you want with your gun ? " asked the surgeon. 
" Why, I'm going to the front again and help the boys 
out." 

But this the surgeon refused to permit, and the disap- 
pointed man was soon on his way to the hospital at Manila. 

The cheerfulness and fortitude of the American soldier in 
the hospitals, as well as his bravery under fire, cause astonish- 
ment among the representatives of Germany, England, and 
other countries who saw them in all the phases of the cam- 
paign. Among the Americans who have performed deeds 
which will win for them the coveted medal of honor is Thomas 
Smith, a private of Company E, South Dakota volunteers. 
He was one of a number who was assigned to outpost duty at 
block house Xo. 2, north of Manila, being on duty on a most 



A DASTARDLY ASSAULT 697 

dangerous part in the bamboo thickets. Sliortly after sun- 
down one day, two Filipinos approached and greeted him with 
the customary salutation of '' Good evening, friend." Just 
as thev passed he carelessly glanced over his shoulder. This 
circumstance saved his life, for immediately after passing, one 
of the Filipinos drew a machete, sprang at Smith, and aimed 
a terrific blow at his head. The stroke would have severed 
Smith's head iVoiii his body had he not caught sight of the de- 
scending weapon in time. As it was his left cheek was cut 
open to the bone from the temple to the jaw. With the ])lood 
pouring forth in a stream he sprang to face the natives, who 
instantly fled. Smith shot one of the fleeing miscreants 
through the heart before he had gone twenty feet. From pain 
and loss of blood he fell to his knees, but in that position he re- 
loaded his ritlc and i\vvi\ at the other Filipino, who was just 
disap])earing at the edge of the thicket. His body was found 
next day. Smith was congratulated and (jleneral Otis per- 
sonally commended him for his bravery. 



CHAPTER LX 

UNITED STATES COMMISSIONERS ISSUE A PROCLAMATION 
TO THE FILIPINOS — DISCOVERY OF A MYSTERIOUS 
SECRET ORDER KNOWN AS THE KATAPUNANS. 

President McKinley's Philippine Commissioners — Their Fitness for the 
Work — Arrival at Manila — Proclamation Explaining the Aims and 
Objects of tlie United States — Our Supremacy Must be Enforced — 
Ample Liberty Promised — Civil Rights Protected — Reforms and 
Good Government Guaranteed — Our Position Grossly Misrepresented 
by Filipino Leaders — The Mysterious Secret Organization of the 
Natives — Symbols of the " Ku-Klux-Klan " — Deeds of Murder, 
Robbery, and Arson — Whole Native Population Awed — All Abie- 
Bodied Men Forced to Join — Mystic Symbol Found Everywhere — 
Servants of our Officers Enrolled in the Secret Band — How Aguinaldo 
was Enabled to Collect his Oppressive Taxes to Carry on the War — 
Outrageous Lies Told to the Native Troops. 



THE Board of Commissioners appointed bj President 
McKinley to visit the Philippines and study the situa- 
tion there consisted of President Jacob Gould Scliur- 
man of Cornell University, Admiral Dewey, Major-General 
Otis, ex-Minister Charles Denby, and Professor Dean C. 
Worcester of the University of Michigan. The President's 
choice was universally approved by the people of the nation. 
President Schurman was widely recognized as a man in 
every way abundantly qualified to fill the position of chairman 
of the commission, a man of great learning, sound judgment, 
broad sympathies, and acute perception, and of conservative 
rather than extreme views. Professor Worcester's long resi- 
dence in the Pliili]-»pines made him thoroughly acquainted 
with the inhabitants, and no one better than he appreciated 
the full meaning of the problem which confronted the United 
States in taking into its kindly care these alien races suffering 

from three hundred years of Spanish misrule and oppression. 

(698) 



THE PHILIPPINE COMMISSIONERS 699 

As Professor Worcester probably know the islands hotter than 
any other American, nnd his pnblished writings on the Philip- 
pines are accepted as autliorit.v on the subject, the government 
was extremely fortnnato in hoing able to secure his services. 
Ex-Minister Denl>v had long sci'vico in China, which pcculiaidy 
fitted him to nmk'rstand Kastern problems, and ho also had 
written njion the Pliilii)]nno (piostion in a way to prove his 
capability for performing good service upon snch a commis- 
sion. As to Admiral Dewey and (leneral Otis, it is wholly 
unnecessary to say anything of their fitness for the work. 
They were necessary advisers to the other commissioners, and 
could render them great service^ in every way. As a whole 
the commission was as strong as could possibly have been se- 
lected. 

The civil nunnbors of th(^ commission arrived in Manila 
earlv in March, and at once began a careful study of the situa- 
tion, the islands, rosoui-cos, and possibilities; the people, their 
needs, limitations, and cajiabilities; the insurrection, its origin 
and strength. Early in April they issued a proclamation to 
the Filipinos, assuring them of the cordial good will and fra- 
ternal feeling of the United States and the American people. 
J t then proceeded as follows : 

" The aim and object of tlie American government, apart 
from the fulfillment of the solemn obligations it has assumed 
toward the family of nations by its acce]itance of sovereignty 
over the Pliilippine Islands, is the well hoing, ]U'osperity, and 
ha])])inoss of the Phili]t])ino p{Mt])l(\ and their olovatioii and 
advancement ti> a jiosition among tlio most civilized jH'ojdos 
of the M'orld. 

" The President believes that this felicity and perfection 
of the Pliilippine people is to be brought about by the assur- 
ance of peace and order; by the guarantee ofcivilaiul religious 
liberty; by the establishment of justice; by the cultivation of 
letters, science, and tlie libei-al ancl practical arts; by the en- 
largement of intercourse with foreign nations; by expansion 
of industrial pursuits; by trade and commerce; by multiplica- 



700 PROCLAMATION OF THE COMMISSIONERS 

tioii and improvement of the means of internal commnnica- 
tion; by development with the aid of modern inventions the 
great resources of the archipelago ; and, in a word, bv the un- 
interrupted devotion of the people to the pursuit of useful ob- 
jects and the realization of those noble ideas Avhicli constitute 
the higher civilization of mankind. Unfortunatelv, these 
purposes of the American government and people have been 
misinterpreted to some of the inhabitants of certain islands, 
and as a consequence the friendly American forces have, with- 
out provocation or cause, been openly attacked. And why 
these hostilities ? What do the best Filipinos desire ? Can it 
be more than the United States is ready to give ? They are 
patriots and want liberty. 

" In the meantime the attention of the people of the Phil- 
ippines is invited to certain regulative principles by which the 
United States will lie guided in its relations with them. 
These are deemed to l)e the points of cardinal importance : 

"1. Tlie supremacy of the United States must aud will be enforced 
throughout every part of the archipelago, aud those who resist it can 
accomplish no end other than their own ruin. 

"2. To the Philippine people will be granted the most ample liberty 
and self-government reconcilable with maintenance of a wise, just, stable, 
effective, and economical administration of public affairs, and compatible 
with the sovereign and international rights and obligations of the United 
States. 

" 3. The civil rights of the Philippine people will be guaranteed and 
protected to the fullest extent; religious freedom will be assured, and all 
persons shall be equal and have equal standing in the eyes of the law. 

"4. Honor, justice, and friendship forbid the use of the Philippine 
people or the islands they inhabit as an object or means of exploitation. 
The purpo.se of the American government is the welfare and advancement 
of the Philippine people. 

" 5. There shall be guaranteed to the Philippine people an honest and 
effective civil service, in which, to the fullest extent to which it is practica- 
ble, natives sliall be employed. 

"6. The collection and application of all taxes and other revenues 
will be placed upon a sound, economical basis, and the public funds, raised 
justly and collected honestly, will be applied only to defray the regular 
and proper expenses incurred by the establishment and maintenance of the 
Philippine government and such general improvements as the public in- 
terests may demand. Local funds collected will be used for local purposes, 



PROrLAMATIOX OF THE COMMISSIONERS 701 

and not devoted to otiier ends. Willi such prudent and lionest fiseal ad- 
niinistratioa it is believed tiial the needs of tlie government will, in a short 
time, become compatible with a considerable reduction in taxation. 

"7. A pure, speedy, and effective administration of justice will be 
established, whereby may be eradicated the evils arising from delay, cor- 
ruption, and exploitation. 

"8. The construction of roads, railroads, and similar means of com- 
munication and transportation, and of other public works, manifest ly to 
the advantage of the Philippine people, will be promot<.'d. 

"9. Domestic and foreign trade and commerce, agriculture, and 
other industrial pursuits tending toward the general development of the 
country in the interests of the inhabitants, shall be tlie ojijeets of constant 
solicitude and fostering care. 

"10. Effective provision will be made for the establishment of ele- 
mentary schools, in which the children of the people may be educated, and 
appropriate facilities will be provided for a higher education. 

"11. Reforms in all departments of the government, all branches of 
the public service, and all corporations closely touching the common life of 
the people, will be undertaken without delay, and effected conformably 
with right and justice in a way to satisfy the well-founded demands and 
the highest sentiments and aspirations of the people. 

" Such is the spirit in which the United States comes to the people of 
the islands, and the President has instructed the commission to make this 
publicly known. 

" In obeying his behest, the commissioners desire to join the President 
in expressing their good will toward the Philippine people, and to extend 
to the leading representative men an invitation to meet them for the purpose 
of personal acquaintance and the exchange of .views and opinions. 

" [Signed] J.vcois Gould Schukman, U. S. Commissioner. 

George Dewey, U. S. N. 
Elwell S. Otis, Major- Qeneral U. S. A. 
Charles Den by, U. S. Commissioner. 
Dean C. Worcester, U. S. Commissiomr." 



The proclaiuatioii was officially ])ronnil,i;at('(l at Manila, 
was printed in the newspapers, and was spread throughont the 
islands by the aid of the AnuM-iean forces. It was hojied that 
it would convince the natives oi the good intentions of the 
United States and lead them to accept American sovereignty, 
although it was recognized tliat people who h;id heen o]v 
pressed and deceived as the Filipinos had heen would not too 
readily accept the promises of another power. The memhers 
of the commission rccogni/.ed the fact that \\\v warfai'c which 
40 



702 A DECEIVED AND OPPRESSED PEOPLE 

Aguinaldo and his colleagues had been able to make against 
the United States wonld never have been possible without 
gross misrepresentation and deception, which had convinced 
the natives that the Ignited States would be even more cruel, 
more despotic, and more unjust than Spain ever had been. 
They saw that the insurrection had its origin and strength in 
the Tagal provinces around Manila. The remaining prov- 
inces of north and south Luzon are peopled by different races, 
and the rest of the natives of the archipelago are not natural 
allies of the Tagals, but unfriendly rivals. During the 
months while the treaty of peace was being negotiated at Paris 
Aguinaldo sent detachments of about one hundred armed Ta- 
gals to the towns of the Yisayan group of islands to compel 
the natives to submit to his government. The liberty of the 
])opulations was constrained and supremacy was enforced, 
there being no American troops there to prevent such action. 
Had the treaty been promptly agreed to and ratified without 
delay, there never would have been an armed insurrection of 
any account in the island of Luzon. 

One of the things that came to the knowledge of our com- 
mission seeking information about the true inwardness of 
the situation in the Philippines was the unfortunate and un- 
welcome fact that there existed among the Filipinos a secret 
brotherhood known as the Katapunans, a sort of political or- 
ganization, who!-e symbol was the same as that used by that 
mysterious order in the South after the war, known as the 
Ku-Klux Klan. The mystic symbol was 'Tv. K. K." The 
organization seemed to be confined to the island of Luzon, 
but might have been in existence elsewhere. The members 
of this organization were responsil)le for the extension of the 
war and the persistence with which the insurgents kept at the 
work of maintaining an army long after it became apparent 
to every intelligent Filipino that further resistance was use- 
less, by maintaining a virtual reign of terror among the rebels 
by threatening death to all M'ho refused to fight. Financial 
gain and other considerations prompted the members of this 



THE KATAPUNAN BROTHERHOOD 703 

order to deeds of murder, robbery, and arson. The leaders 
of the insurrection united with this secret order, and for the 
time, at least, succeeded in making it their chief agent and 
means of support. The leaders of the society were so active 
and so powerful that they succeeded in enrolling among its 
members a large number of the young and reckless Filipinos, 
and in making the whole body of the poj)ulation in the island 
of Luzon stand in awe of it and do its bidding. It is said that 
in Manila every able-bodied man was enlisted in the ranks of 
the Katapunans and made to join his strength to the army 
of Aguinaldo, i'xou the servants of white families who were 
attached to their employers because of good treatment re- 
ceived being registered as revolutionary soldiers and cowed 
into accepting the orders of the leaders. The unfortunate 
I'ilipinos who were the personal servants of officers, drove their 
carriages, did their washing, or cooked their meals, were either 
Katapunans themselves or so feared the brotherhood that they 
deserted to a man from their posts of action when the secret 
order came. ]\rany of them were found after the big fight at 
Manila dead in the trenches, the victims in reality of the dread 
power of the Katapunans. 

By means of the terror inspired by this society, Aguinaldo 
was enabled to collect his taxes in every house in Manila. 
The Americans collected their taxes only where their regular 
military authority extended, but Aguinaldo collected his even 
from the body servants of the military governor himself. 
The mystic symbol of the three K's was to be found every- 
where. The strength of this relentless force was tested bV 
Aguinaldo immediately after the faihire of his attack on ]\Ia- 
nila, and when his disastrous defeat at Caloocan proved that 
he could not fight the army of General Otis with any hope 
of winning victories. There was a rumor that Aguinaldo had 
been deposed because he sent emissaries to General Otis to 
consult about peace, and that ^fontenegro had been made 
commander of the army. This proved not to l)e wholly true, 
but it appeared that Montenegro, an ardent revolutionist, 



704 POWER OP THE ORGANIZATION 

bad the Katapimans behind him, and was strong enongb to 
dictate the policy of the President, who had either to go on 
with the war or become a refngee, with the possibility of Kat- 
apunan vengeance seeking him out wherever he might go. 

It was in all probability the Katapunans who organized 
the uprising in Manila on February, and set the fires that 
burned so man}' houses in the Santa Cruz, Tondo, and San 
JSTicholas districts; and it was they who instituted the order 
to burn all towns which the Filipino army was about to evac- 
uate. A reliable corres]iondent, writing under date of April 
0th, said : ''After the battle of Malabon I talked with half a 
dozen wounded Filipinos, and every one of them said he 
either had to fight or be killed. A short distance from 
Malabon twenty-three dead men were found, each with his 
head nearly severed from his body, and natives said they 
had been killed by the Katapunans for refusing to fight. 
Yesterda}"" I was with a scouting party in the direction of 
Santa Maria, a, town occupied by about five hundred insurgent 
soldiers, near the foothills. I had with me several copies of 
the proclamation issued l\y the American commissioners. 
We approached within half a mile of the town, and within 
five hundred yards of an insurgent outpost. All the natives 
fled as we advanced, except one old man, who remained in 
his house. I gave him two of the prqclamations, printed in 
Tagalog and Spanish, and asked him to see that they were 
taken to Santa Maria. He promised, but said the Katapu- 
nans would cut his throat, and that they killed everybody who 
d'id anything to lu-ing about peace. 

"Nevertheless, the insurgent army is disintegrating. 
ISTon combatants are coming through the lines and returning 
to their homes, or to where the cold ashes indicate the loca- 
tion of their former homes, and some of them freely admit 
that they ha^-e been soldiers, but against their will, which lat- 
ter may not have been true in the beginning. Two days ago 
a well-dressed and gentlemanly young mestizo came in. He 
spoke good English, and was a fair representative of the 



A FILIPINO S STATKMKNT 705 

liiii'licr class Kilipiims. He adinilic*! \villi(Hif ]icsif;ili<>ii fliat 
he had been an olliccr in ilic I'llipimi arniv, l>nt sjiid he was 
eonvineed <•!' llic I'^llv of tiuhtina,- the Americans, and that the 
Filipinos wonld be better oil" with the American authority 
over them. He said that if the Filipino soldiers only knew 
the truth, they would desert and go home, but that they were 
told outrageous lies about the crnclty of the Americans, and 
for a long time were made to believe that they were 
whipping us, and that many thousands of our men had been 
killed in battle or perished from exposure to the sun. They 
knew now that they were beaten, but still thought that our 
losses exceeded theirs, and that we could nut stand the climate. 
I asked him why he did not tell them the truth, and he simply 
said, 'Katapunans,' shrugged his shoulders, drew his hand- 
across his throat, and suiile(l suggestively." 



CHAPTER LXI 

FALL OF SANTA CRUZ — LAWTON'S SWEEPING VICTORIES — 
BRILLIANT AND REMARKABLE ACHIEVEMENT OF GEN. 
FUNSTON — DEATH OF COL. STOTZENBERG. 

Brief Respite from Fighting — Pathetic Scenes — An Expedition up 
Laguna de Bay — Gen. Lawton's Fighters — A Picturesque Flotilla — 
Moving on Santa Cruz — Delayed by Shallow Water — Landing in 
Cascoes — Our jVIen Leap into the Water — Across a Bridne in Face of 
a Galling Fire — Lawton in the Palace — More Towns and Some Boats 
Taken — " Rebels Would not Wait to be Killed" — Marching North- 
ward — Natives Retreat Everywhere — Seven Brave North Dakotans 
Killed — San Antonio Entered without Resistance — Copies of the 
Proclamation Distributed — Lawton Recalled — His Expression of 
Disappointment — Objects of the Expedition Achieved — The Rebels 
Gather at Calumpit — An Armored Car at Work — Funston and His 
Heroes — Swimming the Stream — Rafts Floated in the Face of the 
Entrenched Natives — Complete Success of the Assault. 

SEVERAL days elapsed after the taking of Malolos be- 
fore hostilities were resumed. They were days of 
resting", of reconnoissance in various directions to as- 
certain the movements of the rebels; of gathering strength 
for the next assault. Signs that the insurrection was disin- 
tegrating were not wanting, various individuals who reached 
otir lines from those of the enemy declaring that the great 
body of insu]-gents were anxious to give up the sword for the 
ploughsliare; but their officers and the dread Katapunans 
kept them in the ranks. Old men, many of them ill and de- 
crepit; helpless women, with neglected, hungry children, — all 
carrying white flags or some semblance of them, — were seen 
returning to their homes, begging for pity and assistance. 
Pitiful were the scenes our soldiers were compelled to wit- 
ness daily. 

Brigadier General Harrison Gray Otis gave up his com- 
mand, and on April 3d sailed for his home at Los Angeles, 

(706) 



EXPEDITION TO SANTA CRUZ 709 

C'al., confident that the insurrection was in its death throes. 
General A\ lieaton took command of his l)rigade. 

'Jlie first offensive movement of importance in the month 
of April was General Lawton's expedition to Santa Cruz. 
This place is situated on the southeast shore of that big fresh 
Avater sea called Laguna de Bay, connected with Manila hy 
the Pasig River, and is a leading town in a section of the 
island of Luzon which up to this time had not been attacked 
by the American army, the province of Laguna, with a popu- 
lation estimated at over 13,000 persons. The distance from 
]Manila is less than fifty miles, and the place is an opening- 
wedge to the country to the south and east, highways lead- 
ing from it to the important point of Batangas and the })ro- 
vince of Tayabas, whose capital city is located ninety-one miles 
from Manila. 

General Lawton's expedition consisted of about 1,500 
men, including 200 picked sharpshooters, chosen from the 
various regiments; Hawthorne's mountain battery. Gale's 
s([uadron, three ti'oops of the Fourth (^avalry, unmounted; 
Bronck's and Tappen's battalions of the Fourteenth In- 
fantry, Linck's battalion of the First Idaho Infantry, and 
Fraine's battalion of the First Xorth Dakota Infantry. The 
scene as the expedition started was picturesque. Darkness 
was gathering when the men marched to the river, where they 
were to embark on board the boats waiting for them at San 
Pedro !Macati. There were twenty canoes, towed by tugs, 
and the fierce little gunboats Laguna de Bay, Oeste and Napi- 
(Inn, with a steam launch foi' (icncral Lawton and his staff. 
The expedition steamed slowly along the shallow, tortuous 
Pasig Piver, and delays were numerous, as several boats 
grounded. It was nearly dawn when the expedition reached 
the open lake, and it was a severe disappointment to the men, 
as it had been ])lanned to have the attack on the city made at 
daybreak. Cautiously the ex])e(lition ])roceede(l, realizing 
that from the wooded shores at any ])oiiit the fire of the enemy 
might proceed, the Xapidon and Ocsir a niile ahead and the 



710 LANDING UNDER FIRE 

Lag una de Bay guarding the rear. On the hilltops rebel 
signal tires were lighted, giving ^\-arning of the approach of 
the expedition. It was noon before the white church towers 
of the town appeared in the shadow of the great volcanic 
mountain, on a marshy plain, doted here and there with groves 
of palms. 

The sharpshooters were landed in a casco, a flat-bottomed, 
square, bow-and-prow boat, which was run into a shallow inlel 
about five miles south of the city. A few shells were then 
sent toward the intrenchments of the rebels, at the edge of 
the woods, and they fled away at the first shot fired. Then a 
number of Americans leaped into the water, and wading for 
about 100 yards, crept forward and formed in line, covering 
the landing of the remainder, which occupied until about five 
o'clock. The three troops of the Fourth Cavalry were sent 
ashore unmounted, and landed on a dangerous, marshy point, 
directly south of the city, under fire from the trenches of the 
rebels. Xot a sign of life was manifest in the town itself, 
and no attack was made on our forces except the volleys sent 
at our men as they landed. As it was so late, it was decided 
not to attack that night, but on the following morning the 
American line south of the city, and the Fourth Cavalrymen 
on the other side, closed in, pouring volleys upon the trenches. 
The gunboats shelled the woods ahead of the troops and the 
Gatlings did good service. 

General Lawton, with the Fourteenth Infantry battalions, 
approached a narrow iron bridge across a creek on the south 
border of the town, where a company of Filipinos was en- 
trenched behind a stone barricade. The Americans rushed 
ahead in single file, facing a galling fire, tearing down the 
barricade and dislodging the rebels. Once in the town, the 
Filipinos gave no serious diflieulty to the Americans, although 
annoying them a good deal. However, it was not long before 
General Lawton had estal)lished his head(iuartors in the j^alaee 
of the Governor, and the town was orderly under the patrol 
of the American troops. Over ninety Filipinos were killed 



ENTERING SAN ANTONIO 711 

and many wow taken prisoners. Our casualties consisted of 
but a few men wounded, one of whom afterwards died. 

On the following day our army captured Pagsajan, a town 
about five miles east of Santa Cruz, and Lumban, three miles 
further to the northeast. We also captured all the large ves- 
sels used in the lake trade, and a Spanish gunboat. They 
were concealed in a river. 

General Whcaton, with the I'enth Pennsylvania and the 
Second Oregon, drove the rebels ten miles to the eastward 
of the railway line of communication with Malolos. He tele- 
graphed to (ieneral Otis: "The rebels would not wait to be 
killed." The insurgents gave some trouble along the line 
of the I'uili-oad, making one or two night attacks upon our 
forces, damaging the railway tracks, and injuring and killing 
a few of our men. They were invariably driven back to their 
retreat in the jungle, often losing large nund)ers of men. 

After taking Santa Cruz and the two towns mentioned 
above, General Lawton began marching north along the road 
between the lake and the hills, with the little army gunboats 
keeping abreast of his forces. The Filipinos, as usual, beat 
a retreat. Several small t(»wns were foiuid deserted of all 
save dogs and pigs, and various household goods, which had 
been dropped in the hurry of the natives to get away, were 
found scattered along the trails leading to the hills. The 
only serious disaster to our men was the killing of seven North 
Dakota boys by a group of insurgents hidden near the road- 
side in some thick bushes. At sunset the army entered San 
Antoniii without resistance. Twenty unnrmed prisoners, 
bearing copies of the proclamation of the Philippine Commis- 
sion, Avhich they had somehow secured, were afterward re- 
leased and sent outside our lines with bundles of proclamations 
to distribute. The Fourth Cavalry was left to guard Santa 
Cruz. The country which our troops occupied on this expedi- 
tion is thickly po])ulated, and ]irodnces mucli fruit. Not a 
house was liiirncd by our lucii, the ouly articles confiscated 
being pigs and chickens. This consideration for the proix'rty 



713 GENERAL, LAWTON KETURNS TO MANILA 

of the natives did much to convince them of the good inten- 
tions of the Americans. At one phice a woman was found 
hidden in a basket, and a youth was found buried in mud, ex- 
cept as to his head. Both were given food and money, greatly 
to their astonishment. 

When General Lawton started on this expedition to Santa 
Cruz and that vicinity, his men took with them ten days' ra- 
tions. At the expiration of the ten days the expedition was 
back in Manila. Some disappointment over General Law- 
ton's return was expressed in the United States, but his troops 
were needed in the movement to the northward, and enough 
to garrison the places could not be spared. General Lawton 
seemed to have been somewhat disappointed at being recalled, 
for he said : ''With the forces I have there is no doubt I 
could go through the whole island, but if a government is to 
be esral'lished, it will be necessary to garrison all the towns. 
It would take 100,000 men to pacify the islands. I regret 
the necessity of- abandoning the captured territory." 

The general's disappointment was natural, but the main 
objects of his expedition were accomplished, and the 1,500 
men with him were needed elsewhere. One important result 
achieved was the spreading abroad among the natives of our 
government's proclamation, and it was only by such means 
that copies of the proclamation could be put into the hands 
of the people; for the Filipino leaders would not allow copies 
of it to be read by the people, so anxious were they to keep the 
natives in ignorance of the beneficent proposals of this govern- 
ment. Another object achieved was the demonstration of 
the power and effectiveness of American arms to the people 
of that region, and they were not slow in seeing that point. 
If they could not read the American proclamation they could 
at least undei-stand the force of American l)ullets. 

The American loss in this expedition was six killed and 
eleven wounded. Possibly 200 rebels were killed and many 
prisoners were taken. 

While this movement had been in progress, the Filipinos 



THE ADVANCE ON CALUMPIT 713 

had boon g-atlif-rinc: in considerable numbers at Calnmpit, 
about oi^lit miles iiortlnvest of Malolos, on the left bank of the 
Bagbog- Kiver, at its eonlluence with the larger river Rio 
Grande. The place contained something like 2,000 houses, 
■ and had liccn made the center of the insurrection after 
tlie abandonment of Malolos. General Otis attempted an- 
other flank movement here, his purpose being to send General 
^lacArtlnir with a large force from ]\Ialolos along the rail- 
road, and General Lawton, M'ith his flying column, was to go 
toward the northeast as far as Xorzagaray, from wliich point 
he was to move abruptly west toward Calumpit. His aim was 
to get between the retreating rebels and the mountains, shut 
off their escape, and force a decisive battle. General Mac- 
Arthur's forces were divided into two brigades, one under 
General Hale, whicdi went to Pulilan, and moved from there 
toward (^alumpit, and the other, under General Wheaton, co- 
operating with him on the other side of the river. On April 
25th a general advance was made on Calumpit. General 
Wheaton had the Twentieth Kansas and First Montana regi- 
ments, with three guns of the Utah Light Artillery and two 
troops of cavalry, his line extending from the railroad to the 
west bank of the Bagbog River. General Hale's brigade was 
made up of the First Nebraska, the Fifty-first Iowa, and First 
South Dakota. Infantry, and his left flank was practically 
joined with General Wheaton's right across the river. 

The men marched two miles withont encountering the 
enemy, through a flat, unbroken country in which were corn 
and rice fields, and then came across trenches, behind which 
the enemy was located. An armored car, which was being 
employed in the operations, was moved forward, and the 
trenches were shelled from it for nearly half an hour, the 
rebels responding bravely. Then came General Hale's troops 
across the unprotected fields, a galling fire in their eyes, until 
they reached the river banks, where they fought the enemy 
at short range. The lowans were deployed to the right to 
flank the trenches, and when this movement was executed 



714 A SERIOUS SITUATION 

the TvTebraskans and South Dakotans swam the river, drove 
the enemy from their positions, and pursued them for half a 
mile before they were recalled. However, before this was 
accomplished, Major Young, with the guns of the Utah Ar- 
tillery, dashed through a village that had been burned, and 
protected the Xebraskans and South Dakotans as they made 
their way across the river. 

The armored car marked the extreme left of the Ameri- 
can line. Little resistance was met with on the left, as a large 
force of the rebels left their trenches on this part of the line 
and dej^loyed to the right to support their comrades against 
the advance of General Hale's brigade. When General 
Wheaton reached the river he halted. Some of the girders 
of the fifty-foot bridge spanning the stream had been de- 
stroj'cd by the rebels. The situation at that point presented 
great difficulties. The enemy was doubly protected. The 
river was to all appearances impassable. The bridge was 
long, narrow, partly ruined, and protected by the fire of the 
enemy; the stream wide and deep; on the opposite bank, the 
enemy, well fortified, ready to pour a withering fire into the 
ranks of those who would dare attempt to cross. No Spanish 
army would have thought of crossing that stream at that 
point, under these circumstances. Indeed, most armies 
would at least have hesitated and delayed operations until 
some way out of the dilemma presented itself. But the gal- 
lant United States troops know no such word as hesitation or 
delay. The moment the obstacle presented itself, the remedy 
was found. Heroism supplied the need, and the intrepid Funs- 
ton, colonel of the famous Kansas regiment; that daring, ver- 
satile, and unflinching little fighter, whom many love to liken 
to brave "Joe" Wheeler, was the hero who saw the w^ay to 
overcome the obstacle, and bravely led his comrades across 
the stream and against the foe. 

It is hard to find in the records of warfare more heroic 
work than that of the brave Colonel Funston and his com- 
rades before Calumpit. Their achievement, while perhaps 



HEROISM OF TKEMBLEY AND WHITE 715 

less romantic in some respects than the splendid adventure of 
llobson, was, nevertheless, fully as brave, and even more glo- 
rious and important in its results. 

When night came on. Colonel Funston made a daring at- 
tempt to surprise the insurgents. His plan was to lead 120 
men across the river, a mile to the westward, and enfilade the 
insurgents. His purpose was to surprise and rout them. 
Eight companies of Kansas volunteers furnished the detail. 
The march was down the river bank, but it was a quiet moon- 
light night, and the barking of dogs betrayed the activity 
of the Americans. The insurgent artillery opened a heavy 
fire, and the attempt to cross had to be abandoned. 

But the army must be got across that river. Colonel Funs- 
ton thought it could be done by means of rafts. But before 
even that hazardous advance into the face of a strongly en- 
trenched foe could be undertaken, guiding ropes must be 
thrown across the rushing river and secured to the opposite 
l)aiik. AVho would venture for such service? Colonel Funs- 
ton's proposition was immediately accepted by the commander 
of the brigade, and the colonel went to his famous fighting 
regiment and asked for volunteers. Privates AVilliam B. 
Trembley and J. AVhite of the Twentieth Kansas at once ac- 
cepted the call and offered their services. It was a great work 
they were called upon to perform. AVith strong ropes secured 
around their shoulders they plunged into the stream. When 
they started, a particularly heavy fire was begun by our men 
to draM' the attention of the enemy, and slowly and very cau- 
tiously the swimmers moved through the water toward the op- 
posite sh<ir(>. A\'h(ii tliey landed, the apparition of two yelling 
white figures frightened several insurgents from the nearest 
trench. But the work was done, the ropes were fastened, and 
the daring soldiers returned unhurt, though bullets cut the 
Avator all ai'diiiiil tliciii. Shortly afterward a roughlv-l)uilt 
raft was ferried back and forth, and on this Colonel Funston 
and two of his companies crossed the stream amid a terribly hot 
fire from the enemy, who had not for a moment imagined such 



;iG ANOTHER CHARGE OF THE KANSANS 

bravery possible. They got across safely, rushed up the bank 
cheering and yelling, and immediately drove the enemy from 
their trenches in great confusion. This was one of the greatest 
achievements of the war, and General Otis promptly recog- 
nized it in his despatches to Washington. As promptly the 
President promoted Colonel Funston to be brigadier-general, 
a promotion he deserved, not only for his action upon this occa- 
sion, but for his great bravery throughout the campaign. 

The advance of Colonel Funston and his brave Kansans 
was interrupted by a small but deep stream flowing with the 
Rio Grande about 200 yards west of the railway, where the 
heaviest trenches were located, tiere the insurgents, under 
General Luna, attempted to check the Americans, using 
Maxim guns, which obliged Colonel Funston's small force to 
retire. Immediately afterward, however, with Captain Orjig 
and eiglit men, the intrepid Kansan crossed the stream in a 
small boat, charged upon the trenches, and an immense force 
of insurgents, completely terrified, began to break. Colonel 
Funston, yelling and shouting, dashed up to the railway and 
at once began crossing the bridge with General Wheaton, the 
structure no longer being protected by the insurgents' fire. 
The rebels retreated in all directions. An effective fire was 
started by the Kansas and Montana regiments, which caused 
the line of the enemy to crumble. Many retreated to a train 
which was waiting at the next station, and were conveyed to 
the northward. Others surrendered, thirty-seven either being 
captured or taken compliant prisoners. Others fled to the 
woods to the eastward, going to the mountains or a large swamp 
several miles distant. 

As one of the most intrepid yet unassuming officers of our 
land forces, General Funston's career prior to his exploits in 
the Philippines is worthy of a brief notice. He was born in 
1866, in Xew Carlyle, O., and from both parents inherited the 
qualities that go to make up the gallant man of action, the 
blood of soldiers and of pioneers mingling in his veins. After 
being graduated from the High School at Tola, Kansas, to the 




PROMIXi.:x r C.KXKRALS IX Ol-K WAR WITH THE FILIPINOS 



■ GENERAL FUNSTON'S CAREER 710 

^■i(*illity <>{ \\liicli phict' tlie faiuilv rciiiovcd about 1808, ho 
entered the State Tniversitv at Lawrence, but did not com- 
plete the course, as he had an opportunity to g-o to Colorado 
with a Government exploring party, lie had boon much in- 
terested in the study of the Spanish language, and on this trip 
carried his text-books and improved every occasion for using 
the language conversationally. His friends had tried to dis- 
suade him from this study, but he continued it as with the 
foreknowledge of its future usefulness. A second trip t(j 
Colorado was made as guide to a party of prospectors. After 
this he was selected by the government to lead an exploring 
]iarty across Death A'alley, California, where so many have 
perished since Fremont's day. This expedition was a com- 
plete success, and the government next sent him to Alaska to 
report upon the people and resources of that territory. He 
brought back a most valuable report, and was lecturing on 
Alaska to Kansas audiences, when he was sent there again by 
Secretary ^Forton, and returned with a second authoritative 
report and a remarkable collection of native wares and curios. 
In 1895 Funston w^ent to Mexico to investigate the coffee- 
planting industry for a stock company. At this time he was 
writing magazine articles upon Alaska, and had arranged to 
go to Cuba as the representative of a Xew York pajK-r. Before 
starting he secured a commission as captain in the Cuban army 
from T. Estreda Palnui, and on his arrival in Cuba found that 
he iiiueh preferred fighting to writing. He was promoted to 
the rank of Major, then made Colonel and placed in command 
of the Cuban artillei-y. He fought constantly for eighteen 
months; then, his right arm shattered by a shell, his lung 
pierced by a bullet, and his hip crushed liy a fall from a horse, 
his one chance of life was in leaving the island. On his way 
to Havana he was captured and brought before the Spanish 
general, l»y whom he would have been condemned to be shot 
had it not been for his ingenuity in acconuting fcu' himself. 
Iveaching Havana, he was taken in charge by Cicneral Lee, 
who sent him to a hospital in New York, and from there he 



7*20 A DEADLY VOLLEY FROM FILIPINO TRENCHES 

returned to his home in e()nij)ai';itiv(' liealth. The cause of 
Cuban liberty being very dear to liis heart he began lecturing 
in behalf of " Cuba Libre." In May, 1898, he was offered 
the command of the Twentieth Kansas. An appointment on 
General Miles's staff was declined, but he went to Tampa to 
give advice and information; then returned to Kansas and 
went with his regiment to San Francisco, from whence they 
sailed for the Philippines, where he distinguished himself as 
a most courageous and fearless leader. 

Apalit, the next town from Calumpit, was burned, the 
Americans, with the remainder of General AVheaton's and 
General TIale's forces, advancing and occupying the railway 
station. During the engagement the Utah Battery, the Sixth 
Artillery, and the Montana and Kansas regiments' did most 
effective work, and the South Dakota, Nebraska, and Iowa 
volunteers moved across the river and performed excellent 
service. The insurgent loss was heavy; the American small. 
The heat was intense, several of our men being prostrated by it. 

One great loss sustained by our troops in the advance on 
Calumpit was the death of Colonel John M. Stotzenburg of 
the First ISTebraska Infantry. He was killed in a reconnois- 
sance on Ouingua, near Malolos, with three other members of 
his regiment. The natives had a horseshoe trench, about a 
mile long, encircling a rice field on the edge of a wood. 
Captain Bell with forty cavalrymen encountered a strong out- 
post; one of his men was killed and five were wounded by a 
volley. The Americans retired, carrying their wounded under 
fire, and with great difficulty, being closely pursued, the fog 
enabling the enemy to creep up to them. Two men who were 
carrying a comrade were shot in the arms, but they continued 
with their burden. Captain Bell sent for reinforcements to 
rescue the body of the killed cavalryman, and a battalion of 
the jSTebraska regiment, under Major Mufford, arrived and 
advanced unchecked by volleys from the enemy's trenches. 
The Americans lay about 800 yards from the trenches behind 
rice furrows, under fire, for two hours. Several men were 



DEATH OF COLONEL STOTZENBERG 721 

siinstriick, one dying from the effects of the heat, as they lay 
there waiting for the artillery to come up. Finally the Second 
battalion arrived, and then Colonel Stotzenburg, who had 
spent the night with his family at Manila, came upon the field. 
The men immediately recognized him and raised a cheer. 

Colonel Stotzcnbnrg, deciding to charge as the easiest 
way out of the difiiculty, led the attack at the head of his regi- 
ment. He fell with a bullet in his breast, dying instantly, 
about 200 yards from the breastworks. Lieutenant Sisson fell 
with a bullet in his heart, the bullet striking him near the 
picture of a lady suspended by a ribbon from his neck. In the 
meantime the artillery had arrived and shelled the trenches. 
The Filipinos stood until the Xebraska troops were right on the 
trenches, and then they bolted to the second line of intrench- 
ments, a mile back. The Nebraska regiment lost two pri- 
vates killed, and had many wounded, including two lieuten- 
ants. The Iowa regiment had several wounded. The Utah 
regiment had one officer and three men wounded. Thirteen 
dead Filipinos were found in the trench. Their loss was com- 
paratively small on account of their safe shelter. The Amer- 
icans carried the second trench with small loss and obtained 
possession of the town. Colonel Stotzenburg had won a repu- 
tation as one of the bravest fighters in the army. He always 
led his regiment, and had achieved remarkable popularity with 
his men since the war began, although during the first of his 
colonelcy, the volunteers, who were not used to the rigid dis- 
cipline of the regular troops, thought him too exacting. The 
loss of the Xebraska regiment in the campaign was the greatest 
sustaine<l l)y any regiment, and the disaster greatly saddened 
officers and men. 



41 



OHAPTEK LXTI 

THE FILIPINOS SEEK PEACE — ATTEMPTS TO SECURE A 
TRUCE — MORE VICTORIES- AD.AIIRAL DEWEY SAILS FOR 
HOME — THE STORY OF HIS LIFE. 



Failure of Efforts to Surrouud tlie Natives — Emissaries Sent by tlie In- 
surgent Leaders — A Request for a Truce— Gen. Otis Steadily Refuses 
to Recognize the Insurgent Government — Capture of Baliuag — Lieut. 
Gilmore Heard From -The Macabebees Come to the Front — They 
Act in Conjunction with the Americans — Victorious March of Our 
Forces Continued — San Fernando Falls — Insurgents Evidently Badly 
Demoralized — Valuable Supplies Taken by Our Men — Two Divisions 
Clear the Country — Army Gunboats Shelling the River — An Attack 
by Mascardo Repelled — Fresh Troops Off for the Front — Aguinaldo 
Wants all Foreigners to Leave — Old Request for an Armistice Re- 
peated — Gen. Luna Bent on Carrying on the War — Request for 
Armistice again Refused — Admiral Dewey Sails on the Olympia for 
New York — The Story of Plis Life. 

THE hope that our two bodies of troops in the island of 
Lnzon would be able to snrround the insurgents and 
take a large body of them as in a net, capturing many 
prisoners, including Aguinaldo, Luna, and other leaders was 
not fulfilled. The efforts made in that direction failed, mainly 
because of the great difficulties iinposed by the roughness of 
the country and the lack of good roads in the region which the 
eastern column had to traverse, a region abounding in diffi- 
culties which even our persistent armies could not easily over- 
come. The trap was set several times, or rather almost set, 
for the plans of the directors of the movements of the Ameri- 
cans were never fully carried out, but success did not crown 
our efforts. As long as the troops were kept near the railroad, 
rapid progress could be made, but when they went back where 
there was neither railroad nor water transportation, the march 
was delayed until the enemy had beat a retreat which made it 
impossible for our men to surround the rebels. Had this flank- 

(722) 



FILIPINOS ASK FOR A TRUCE 7v*o 

ing movement been aceompHsluHl, the rebellion wonlfl have 
come to a speedy termination. 

Bnt as it was, there were not lacking attempts on the part 
of the rebels to end the war by patching np some kind of peace. 
.Vfter the defeat sustained by the insurgents at Calunipit, 
emissaries were sent to Manila under a flag of truce to ask for 
a cessation of hostilities, but the negotiations failed, siiiii)ly be- 
cause the Tnited States would consent to peace only on condi- 
tion that the insurgents should unconditionally surrender. 
The Filipinos wanted tinu>, claiming that they must consult the 
people and ascertain their wishes, but it was obviously impossi- 
ble for our representatives to recognize in any way the so-called 
Filipino government, and we could treat with the insurgents in 
no other way than as individuals. We were prepared to offer 
universal aumesty and the greatest freedom possible short of 
actual independence, making as generous terms as possible, but 
refusing to recognize the existence of anything like an actual 
government on Philippine soil, other than the government of 
the United States. The Filipino delegates held several con- 
ferences with General Otis and talked the situation over with 
members of the peace commission, bnt the negotiations came 
to naught and fighting was resumed. The first blow stiiick 
after this slight interruption was by General Lawton, who 
captured Baliuag and other villages in its vicinity, scattering 
and pursuing 1,600 troops. This was on ]\Iay 3d, and on 
that same day it was ascertained that Lieutenant Gilmore and a 
party of seven enlisted men from the gunboat Yorliown, with 
six men from the army, were held as prisoners by the insur- 
gents. The disappearance of Lieutenant Gilmore and party 
some time l)efore created much anxiety, and it was impossilde 
to trace them for some time. 

Abnnt this time it was learned that the Macabebees, the 
ancient enemies of the Tagals, who inhabit the north part of 
the island, were anxious to fight in co-operation with the Amer- 
icans against the Tagals under Aguinaldo. General LTale 
started from Calumpit on ]\Liy 'Ad to meet them, and when 



724 SAN FERNANDO CAPTURED 

they saw our forces they welcomed them with great acclaim, 
and later made themselves useful to the Americans, mostly as 
servants in place of the Chinamen who had before that acted 
in that capacity. 

The victorious march of our army continued, carrying 
everything before it. On May -ith. Generals Wheaton and 
Hale of General MacArthur's division found the enemy 
strongly entrenched about four miles south of San Fernando, 
General Luna being in connnand. General AVheaton, leading 
his troops in person, made a brilliant charge, scattering the 
enemy's forces and inflicting heavy losses, while General Hale 
was equally successful. The movable capital of the insur- 
gents, the portable government that made so many retreats, 
was located temporarily at San Fernando, and on May 5th it 
was obliged to move on again, as that place also fell an easy 
prey to our army. The place was found to be very strongly 
fortified, and if the insurgents had had any fight in them they 
could easily have kept our men off for a time at least, and with 
proper direction could have inflicted heavy losses upon the 
Americans. South of the town there was a double line of 
loop-holed trenches, the construction of which showed good 
military knowledge, and there were some Spanish blockhouses 
that could have been utilized for defence, but, strangely 
enough, they were put to no use whatever. A Spanish pris- 
oner, who was formerly a provincial official, and was left be- 
liind when the enemy retreated, said that General Luna was 
wounded in the chest dnring the fighting at San Tomas and the 
troops were completely demoralized. Our troops found that 
most of the houses in San Fernando were intact, most of them 
having their furniture left uninjured in the hurried flight of 
the rebels. In that engagement General Funston was slightly 
wounded in the hand. General Lawton reported the capture 
of 150,000 bushels of rice and 205 tons of sugar. The value 
of the subsistence captured at Baliuag was $1,500,000. 

General INfacArthin- Avith his forces at and beyond San 
Fernando, and General Lawton at Baliuag and Maasin, moved 



REBEL CAPITAL TAKEN 



:-->5 



along further int.. the heart of the enemy's country on sub- 
stantiallv parallel Hues, about iifteen miles apart. Between 
them was the Kio Grande Hiver, which to some extent is ac- 
cessible to our light-drauoht, armed steamers. An attack was 
made on the Americans near San Fernando by a body of Fili- 
pin.x^ under General M^scardo, but they were easily repelled 
bv tlie Kansas and ^lontana regiments, The army gunboats 
■nseended the river, shelling the jungle on either bank and 
carrying jov to the Hacabebees up the stream. Fresh troops 
Avcnt to'lhe front a few days later, two battalions of the Seven- 
teenth Infantry which bad been holding the lines about Manila 
joining General ^lacArthur at San Fernando, and one bat- 
talion of the same regiment joining General Lawton near 
Bacolor. ^Jliese troops wer^ replaced at Manila by the Twenty- 
first Infantry, which arrived from the TJmted States on May 
11th. General Lawton moved on and captured Ilde Fonso 
and San I^Iiguel to t;he north, wi-tlii slight loss, driving a con- 
siderable force of tlie ^iw;my. 

Aguinaldo issued a proclamation ;to the effect that all f or- 

.eigners must leave insurgent territory. He gave them forty- 

, eight hours to go. The object of that move was plain. Agui- 

,nddo believed that by refusing foreigners the a'ights of non- 

.QQufkrtants he could force their governments to reeognize the 

11 belligerency of his so-called government. 

Om .of the most striking and gratifying successes of the 

Luzon c-a«n,paign was the capture of San Isidr.., the capUal of 

the so-calM Filipino government, adopted after its hasty and 

ignominious tiglit from San Fernando. The place lies many 

miles northeast of San Fernand.) and is on the natural line of 

retreat from that place to the mountains, deep in the interior of 

Luzon, and far away from the railroad which runs from Manila 

to i:)agupan. The resistance of the natives to our army, in- 

.st^id of being stronger an<l more f..ruii(lable as the scene of 

. aet^n was shifted to the north and farther away f rom -:^Ianila, 

seom^ to have grown less and less stubborn. This was oon- 

^irar>: to the expectations of our generals, who naturally thought 



72G BRILLIANT SUCCESS OF GENERAL LAWTON 

that the Filipinos, when pressed back into the interior, would 
gather strength from their local resources and be stimulated to 
greater ett'orts, if only by the courage of despair. The rapidity 
of General Lawton's advance was unprecedented in the cam- 
paign, lie drove the enemy from point to point, taking one 
town after another, capturing the last stronghold of the rebels, 
and then pursuing them even to their mountain fastnesses, 
and cut his way through the country with very slight losses in 
killed or wounded. This brilliant feat called forth high 
])raise from all who observed it. General Otis saying in one of 
his brief cable despatches announcing the victory at San Isidro 
that " Lawton, with tact and ability, has covered Bulacan prov- 
ince wdth his column and driven insurgent troops northward." 
It was jDart of the plan of General Otjs to have Lawton keep 
the enemy constantly on the run, to pursue relentlessly, to 
flank the natives at every turn, to terrify them into worse and 
worse disorder, and prevent anything like an orderly re- 
arrangement of their army. This plan is similar to that which 
has been pursued in many an invincible campaign against the 
Indians, and proved a success in Luzon. 

This audacious march not only resulted in the capture of 
many towns, l)ut cleared the country on the right up to the 
mountains which run in general nearly parallel to the seacoast 
and in wdiich the Rio Grande River takes its rise. The par- 
ticular body that advanced upon San Isidro consisted of the 
Thirteenth Minnesota, Second Oregon, First Xortli Dakota, 
and Twenty-second Infantry, under Colonel Summers. It 
started from Beluarte early on the morning of IMarch iTth and 
met the enemy two miles south of San Isidro. Scott's battery 
shelled the natives out of their trenches and they retired to 
the town, Avhere they w^ere flanked by the American troops. 
The insurgents made a brief resistance and then broke aw^ay, 
Colonel Summers pursuing them some distance beyond the 
town. The force of the enemy was estimated at 2,000 men. 
The insurgent loss was five killed and twenty wounded and the 
Americans had but two men slightly wounded. 



HOPEFUL SIGNS OF PEACE 727 

Major Kobbe, with a special command, comprising the 
Seventeenth Infantry, a battalion of the Xinth Infantry, a 
battery of the First Artillery and six mountain guns, accom- 
panied by the tugs Laguna de Bay, Cavadonga, and Oceana 
towing cascoes loaded with supplies, moved from Calumpit up 
the Rio Grande Kiver on the night of ]\[arch IGth. This 
movement was part of a ])lan to cond)ine with Generals Law- 
ton and MacArtluir in a movement to capture a large body of 
the enemy. 

About this time large numbers of Filipinos were seen re- 
turning daily to their homes inside the American lines, and 
many of the richer natives returned to Manila and announced 
their intention of accepting the sovereignty of the United 
States. Laborers resumed work in the rice fields which they 
had abandoned to join the army, and afforded a curious mark 
of their respect for American authority by removing their hats 
to the passing trains. The railroad was being repaired and 
trains sent forward as rapidly as possible. 

On May 18th General Otis cabled to Washington the wel- 
come news that representatives of Aguinaldo and the insurgent 
cabinet were on their way from their mountain retreat twelve 
miles from San Isidro, seeking terms of peace. This news 
w^as most gratifying, as it was the first indication that Agui- 
naldo and the insurgent cabinet had agreed ^'n askinfr peace. 
After the reception which previous embassies got in Manila, 
the insurgent leaders must have known just what terms our 
conmiander-in-chief would be apt to make, and the people of 
the United States rejoiced in the assurance that the end of the 
war in Luzon was at hand. 

Further developments at Manila, however, were disau- 
pointing. The Filipino envoys came from Aguinaldo and the 
so-called Filipino government, but they did not come ])repared 
to negotiate ])eaee, making again the old request, that of an 
armistice pending the session of their congress. It soon be- 
came api^arent that there was a serious division in tlie ranks of 
the Filipinos, one party wishing to end the war on the best 



728 DIVISIONS IN THE REBEL RANKS 

terms that could be obtained, and the other insisting upon 
carrying on the losing game further. General Luna appears 
to have been the chief Filipino officer bent upon further fight- 
ing, and he seems to have been in command of the military end 
of the Filipino government, which enabled him not only to 
bend the army to his wishes, but also to imprison two of the 
peace commissioners selected by Aguinaldo, and to cripple the 
commission further by confining its poAvers to the simple re- 
quest for an armistice. The commissioners who were allowed 
by the despotic Luna to go to Manila were General del Pilar, 
Gracio Gonanza, a member of the Filipino cabinet; Lieutenant- 
Colonel Alberto Barretto, military advocate, and Major Zeal- 
cita, a member of Aguinaldo's personal staff. Florentino 
Torres, Pablo Ocampo, and Thedor Yanco, residents of Manila, 
were also empowered to act with these commissioners. The 
two commissioners, Buencamino and Colonel Aruelles, who 
were detained by General Luna, were said to be outspoken ad- 
vocates of unconditional surrender, and they thus incurred the 
severe displeasure of the commander of the army. 

The commissioners had a conference with General Otis on 
May 20th, but he al)solutcly refused to grant an armistice 
pending the decision of the Filipino congress as to a line of 
policy. x\s tlie commission was not empowered to do any- 
thing further, the interview was fruitless. However, the 
commissioner's were treated with every courtesy, were allowed 
to see their families in Manila, and were escorted about the 
Oregon. 

The Nebraska regiment returned to Manila on May 19lh 
for a thirty days' rest. They were on the firing line constantly 
after February 4tli and participated in twenty-seven engage- 
ments, including skirmishes, and lost 225 in killed and 
wounded. Many of the men were sick and utterly worn out 
by their long participation in battle, much of their time having 
been spent in the trenches. 

It w^as clear at this time that the Filipino people were, as a 
rule, I'eady to end the rebellion. Aguinaldo was evidently 



THE INSURGENTS DEMORALIZED 729 

discouraged; hundreds of natives were seen returning to their 
former homes, saluting our flag and showing white emblems of 
some sort, and reports from the army tokl but one story of 
demoralization and despair. 

Admiral Dewey, who had borne the burden of the naval 
campaign and subsequent negotiations at .Maiiihi for over a 
year, sailed for home on the Olympia on ^lay 20th. lie had 
asked to be allowed to retire from control of the naval forces of 
the United States in order to get needed rest, and Kear Ad- 
niii'al .John C. AVatson was ordered to succeed him at Manila. 
The news that the great naval hero was coming home to the 
people who regard him as their idol naturally caused great in- 
terest throughout the United States, The ISTavy Department 
allowed the admiral to take his choice of routes, and he pre- 
ferred the one by way of the Suez Canal. This would bring 
him to Xew York first, and at once preparations -were made to 
give him a grand welcome. All sorts of schemes were pro- 
posed for doing him honor, and public men and enterprising- 
newspapers came fors\ ard with many plans, some of wdiich 
were more ingenious than sensible. 

America's muster-roll of naval heroes bears many an in- 
spiring name, Paul Jones, Perry, Farragut, Foote, and others 
of rare energy and heroism, men whose lives were unselfishly 
devoted to their country's glory, and whom an admiring people 
will ever delight to honor. Our war with Spain develojied no 
liero more resolute and intrepid than Admiral George Dewey, 
tlie modern king of the sea. Other men, like Sampson, 
Scliley, TTobson, Roosevelt, Funston, and Otis, achieved last- 
ing fame, but none of their achievements equaled tliat of 
Dewey. Xo circumstance was lacking to make his deed and 
that of his gallant sailors most brilliant and historic. It was 
theirs to strike the first decisive blow in the first war ever 
wai-ed for humanity's sake; theirs to test in a fair fight the 
strength and effectiveness of our modern warships and thdW 
armament, and theirs to uphold to the world the power and 
• dignity of tlu' Anicric;iii n;ition. 



730 THE YOUTH OF GEORGE DEWEY 

The record of Admiral Dewey's forty-one years of naval 
service is inspiring. His early youth was spent in the little 
town of Montpelier, Vermont, his people being among the 
most substantial and prominent families of the town. His 
father was a successful physician who would have preferred a 
landsman's life for his son, but the boy, after attending the 
public school in his native place, and a military school at Nor- 
wich, Vt., announced his determination to enter the navy, and 
at his entreaties the father exerted his influence to procure him 
an appointment to the Xaval Academy at Annapolis. He en- 
tered in 1854, being then seventeen years old, an active and 
hardy and generous youth who feared nothing and dared 
everything. He was graduated with distinction in 1858, and 
ordered to the Wabash, the flagship of the Mediterranean sta- 
tion, where he remained for a year. He was then transferred 
to the old frigate Mississippi of the West Gulf Squadron. 

In January, 1861, he attained the rank of Passed Midship- 
man, and in the troubled days of early spring, when many 
Southern officers resigned their commissions, was promoted to 
the grade of Master, a title corresponding to that of Lieuten- 
ant, junior grade. In April he received his commission as 
Lieutenant, thus achieving three grades in four months. 

Kear- Admiral Dewey's Avar record dates from the firing 
on Fort Sumter, in 1861. He did gallant service with the 
West Gulf squadron, and received his first real " baptism of 
fire " in April, 1862, when Farragut ran the gauntlet of the 
forts and forced the surrender of New Orleans. 

Later, after much desultory but efl^ective fighting on the 
river, he took part in the attack on Port Hudson. When he 
stood, unmoved and calm, on the roof of the Olympiads pilot- 
house off C'avite on that memorable first of INlay, his memory 
must have reverted to that splendid service of his eager youth, 
and found a parallel for it in what he was now accomplishing 
in a new field on the other side of the world. For after the 
New Orleans forts had been passed his ship was selected out of 
all assembled as the one best fitted to meet and overcome the 



SERVICE IN THE CIVIL WAR VM 

desperate essay of the Confederate steamer Mcniassds, which 
was rushing, under a full liead of steam, to ram the victorious 
lieet. He was tilled with the ardor of this fight, as he said in 
after vears, and sorely disappointed when the Manassas 
t\irn(>d and ran ashore almost under the muzzles of our guns, 
and was sunk by the rending and smashing broadsides of the 
Mississippi. At i^>rt Hudson, misfortune befell the old 
frigate; for while attempting to run the batteries she grounded, 
heeled to port, and lay with almost useless guns at the mercy 
of the enemy. Her range was quickly gained; and so pitiless 
and sure was the Confederate aim that, all else failing, she was 
set on fire and abandoned, her crew escaping in the small boats, 
the captain and Lieutenant Dewey being the last to leave. 

His next a]ipointment was to the Agawam of the Xorth 
Atlantic blockading station, and he rounded out in her his war 
service by duty on the blockade and in the two memorable at- 
tacks made upon Fort Fisher in December, 1864, and in Jan- 
uary, 1865. In March of the latter year he was promoted to 
the grade of Lieutenant-Commander, thus attaining in less 
than eleven years after entrance a rank which rarely comes to 
even the most > deserving lieutenants until over thirty years' 
service has been done. He carried out of the Civil "VYar. a 
splendid record for gallantry and coolness under fire, for fer- 
tility of resources and cjuickness of apprehension under many 
trying circnmstancos, and for intelligence and a trained zeal, 
which gave him a high rej)utation with his brother officers and 
an excellent standing in the department. Hence he was ap- 
pointed to many important stations, and during the twenty 
succeeding years he saw service in command on the European, 
Home, Pacific, and (liina stations, at the Xaval Academy, in 
the Light-house Establishment, and in the Xavy Department 
as chief of one of the most important adnn'nistrative bureaus. 
For a number of years he made his home in "Washington, and 
here he was as prominent in official and social life as he was 
keen in athletic exercises, in which from boyhood he had been 
most expert and enthusiastic. His wife, who was a daughter 



732 SEAMAN, COMMANDER, AND DIPLOMAT 

'of Governor Cjoodwin of Xew Hampshire, died after a few- 
years of married life, and his affection for their only son was as 
marked as the zeal and energy which caused him to be looked 
upon everywhere as one of the ablest officers of our naval 
service. 

In manner he was ever courteous and considerate to 
strangers, and genial with his friends. He was just in duty to 
his junior officers, and among his intimates and when freed 
from the restraint of discipline, was a cordial yet ever prudent 
companion. This quick thinker and sharp fighter was so 
precise in dress that it said that " the creases of his trousers 
are ever as well defined as his views on naval warfare." 

Furthermore, the admiral proved himself great in diplo- 
macy as well as in action, discreet as well as brave, cautious 
as well as firm. His modesty, his afl^ability, his thorough 
Americanism won for him the respect and hearty esteem of 
those who met him, and the straight course he steered during 
those trying times, when the obtrusive German admiral was 
in ]\ranila Bay, and the S])aniards and the insurgents con- 
stituted sources of serious embarrassment, during the long 
negotiations of the peace commission at Paris, and the longer, 
more trying period when the T'nited States Senate was de- 
ferring action on the peace treaty, amply proved his greatness. 
TEIis victory over the Spanish fleet was an unparalleled feat in 
■:naval history, but the revelations of character disclosed after 
that brilliant achievement did fully as much to endear him to 
tli-e 'hearts of all loval Americans. 



CHAPTER LXIir 

PROPOSED FORM OF GOVERN^IENT REJECTED BY FILIPINO 
LEADERS — THE INSURGENTS AGAIN ACTIVE — AMERI- 
CAN TROOPS CAPTURE ANTIPOLO AND 3IOROXG. 

Optimistic Views of Admiral Dcwej' — Proposed Temporary Plan of Gov- 
ernment — A Perplexing Problem — A Genuine Surprise — Commis- 
sioners meet at Manila — Endurance and Patience of our Soldiers — 
Refugees Within American Lines — Captain Tilly Treacherously Mur 
dered — First Memorial Rites in JManila — Mounds Covered with 
Flowers — Impressive Services — Troops in Motion Again — A Panic 
Among the Insurgents — Arduous .March of Gen. HaU's Column — 
Advancing on Antipolo — Americans Take Possession of an Al-jaudoued 
Town — Skirmishing on the Way to Morong — Driving tiie Insur- 
gents into the ^lountains — Occupation of Las Pinas and Parauaque. — 
A Filipino Trick — Sawing the Stringers of a Bridge almost in twa — 
Gen. Lawton's Bravery — Advancing to the Battle of Zapote. 

TIIE departure of Admiral Dewey from Manila removedl 
one of the five members of the commission which rep- 
resented the United States in all negotiations concern- 
ing the islands. Before leaving the beantiful bay over -\vhichi 
he had stood guard for more than a year the admiral enthusi- 
astically expressed his belief in the progress of the Filipinos, 
under the protection of the United States, and declared his 
strong hope that America's possessions there would be the key- 
to Oriental commerce and civilization. 

With his views the other members of the peace commission 
were in complete accord. As they had the situation well in 
hand and were able to handle it in all its phases, it was not 
deemed necessary to appoint a fifth member in place of the 
admiral. Shoi-tly after liis departure the commission sub- 
mitted to the Filijuno commissioner? at ^fanila a draft of the 
form of government the President was jircparcd to establish in 

the islands. The exact terms of the brief form of proposal 

(733) 



734 TERMS OFFERED THE FILIPINOS 

which the commission submitted, after laying the matter be- 
fore President McKinley, were as follows : 

" While the final decision as to the form of government is in the hands 
of Congress, the President under his military powers, pending the action of 
Congress, stands ready to offer the following form of government : 

"A governor-general to be appointed by the President ; a cabinet to be 
appointed by the governor-general ; all the principal judges to be appointed 
by the President ; the heads of all departments and judges to be either 
Americans or Filipinos, or both, and also a general advisory council, its 
members to be chosen by the people by a form of suffrage to be hereafter 
carefully determined upon. 

" The President earnestly desires that bloodshed cease and that the 
people of the Philippines, at an early date, enjoy the largest measure of 
self-government compatible with peace and order." 

A more difficult proposition in government was never en- 
countered than that which the jjeace commission had before it, 
and the general opinion in the United States was that the prob- 
lem \vas met and answered in the proposal submitted to the 
representatives of the rebels as satisfactorily as could possibly 
have been expected. The Philippine group was composed of 
many islands, peopled by different races whose interests were 
diverse, and of whom some were hostile to the others. The 
intention was to give to these people as large a measure of self- 
government as possible, and to that end it was proposed to 
allow them to elect an advisory council which would present 
the claims of the people to the Governor and cabinet, and thus 
give them a voice in the government. It was also proposed 
to give them a voice in the conduct of the courts by allowing 
them to elect their own minor judges. That was as far as it 
was safe to go at the beginning, but the promise was given 
that more liberal terms wonld be made and the powers of the 
people enlarged as fast as they proved themselves capable of 
assuming more responsibility. At the ontset the government 
would have to be military in character, like that in Cuba, but 
as conditions became more settled, the military element of the 
government would be more and more modified. President 
!McKinley, through the peace commission, notified tlie Fili- 



FAILURE OF NEGOTIATIONS 735 

pinos that it was his iliity to establish a suitable form of gov- 
ernment and let Congress determine the question of the future 
government of the islands, but it was understood that Congress 
would be largely influenced in its action by the advice of those 
who had been on the ground and were thoroughly familiar 
with the existing conditions. 

The Filipinos insisted upon an armistice for the purpose of 
getting the views of the people ou the question, and this our 
representatives would not grant. Consequently the negotia- 
tions were fruitless. 

It was then decided that the three civil members of the 
peace commission should visit various ports in the archipelago 
for the purpose of meeting prominent natives, to whom they 
would explain the friendly intentions of the President, in order 
to be guided in making recommendations to Congress relative 
to the character of the government to be supplied. It was 
believed that through this means something of the ill effect of 
the falsehoods circulated by the emissaries of Aguinaldo might 
be in a measure overcome, and the people be led to demand the 
cessation of the rebellion that was costing them so dearly in 
lives and treasure. 

But the negotiations at Manila were prolonged by the 
Filipino commissioners appointed by Aguinaldo. They pre- 
sented as the desire of the insurgents absolute independence 
under the protection of the United States, but the nature and 
scope of this ])rotcction they could not explain, and the con- 
ference resulted in failure. The Filipino commissioners left 
]\ranila on the 25th of May, being escorted to their lines under 
a flag of truce. 

On May 22d the conditions, as far as the army was con- 
cerned, were as follows : In Bulacan province troops were 
mnintainod at Quinga, Baliuag, and San ^liguel, other places 
that had been captured having been evacuated. General Law- 
ton proceeded down the TJio Grande river from San Isidro and 
drove the army westward fi-oni San Antonio, Cariao, and Ara- 
yat, where he was joined on May 21st by Major Kobbe's col- 



736 HARASSING THE AMERICANS: 

limn, lie then proceeded to Santa Ana and Kadaba. Gen- 
eral MacArtiiiir was at San Fernando, and from that point he 
moved southward and westward. General Luna's force at 
Tarlac was much diminished, a number of his officers desert- 
ing-. In Papmanga and Bulacan the inhabitants were return- 
ing to their homes, expressing no fears save of the treatment 
they would receive from the insurgent forces. South of Ma- 
nila the insurgent troops had been quietly gathering and a 
large force was believed to be there, thus threatening Manila 
from that direction. A battalion of troops was sent to allay 
the excitement of the natives in the southwestern portion of 
!Negros and the west coast of Cebu, wdiere agents of Aguinaldo 
had succeeded in making some trouble. 

About this time General Otis was withdrawing the volun- 
teer regiments as rapidly as possible in order to allow them to 
return to the United States, replacing them wdth regular army 
organizations. On May 25tli the Oregon volunteers on the 
north line, who had done splendid service through the cam- 
paign, returned to Manila. Other regiments follow^ed, leav- 
ing three regiments of regulars to guard the north from Ba- 
liuag to San Fernando. 

The natives were not slow to follow up the advantage they 
hoped for by the approach of midsummer heat and tropical 
storms. It w^as apparently their purpose to give the invaders 
no rest day nor night. Their guerrilla tactics were kept up 
with increasing activity and they managed to make it impos- 
sible for the Americans to leave their positions in the trenches, 
where they slept in their clothes, constantly on the alert 
against sudden, fierce dashes of the barefooted rebels. The 
bands of General Luna and General Mascardo, which re- 
treated toward Tarlic when they feared they would be caught 
between General MacArthur and General Lawton, returned in 
force to their old trenches around San Fernando, and there 
were daily collisions. Opposite our lines on the south, pro- 
tecting Manila, the Fili]uuos hrd erected three rows of 
trenches, and reports that were given by men who were taken 



CAPTAIN TILLEY ASSASSINATED 737 

prisoners or voluntarily snrrendorod tlienisclves to the Amer- 
icans indicated that the natives wei-e i-elying npon the sup- 
posed inability of their opponents to keej) up the fighting much 
longer. Friendly natives continued to throw themselves upon 
the protection of the Americans. They entered our lines by 
land and river routes, coming from that section of the country 
where tlie passage of the two armies had pructieally exhausted 
the food supply, asking for charity and begging to l)e received 
as friends. Old men, women, and children formed the great 
body of these refugees, as most of the men who could woi-k 
and were not in the army were retained by Aguiiialdo for th(! 
purpose of digging trenches. 

Captain George II. Tilk\v, (jf the L^nited States Signal 
Corps, was killed at Escalante, on the east coast of the island 
of jXegros, on the 11th of ^lay. His party was treacher- 
ously attacked by a large body of natives. The cable com- 
pany's vessel that was engaged in placing a cable between Ilo- 
ilo and Cebu went to Escahmte to remove the old cable there, 
and Captain Tilley, with the captain of the vessel and three 
men, visited the town, the natives making a friendly demon- 
stration. AVhile there they wore ambushed by the crafty 
rebels. The captain of the vessel and one man escaped, but 
Captain Tilley and the other two men were not so fortunate. 
Tliey were horribly l)eaten and maltreated. The l)ody of 
( ';i]it;iiii Tilley was afterwards found tloating in tlie river, witli 
marks of violence on the head. I'his led to the sending of a 
small body of American troops to Xegros, where a few insur- 
gent biuids threatened resistance, though not upheld by the 
better class of the people. 

On "Memorial Day, May 30, 1899, the first occasion of the 
kind ever ob-cived in ]\ranila, there were appropriate services 
that were ftf special significance, while all through the United 
States the dav was ol)served with unusual feeling l)ecause of 
the new graves that marked the last resting places of those who 
fell in tlie war with Spain. au<l pravers went uv for those who 
were carrying the United States flag on the bloody battlefields 
42 



738 THE FIRST MEMORIAL DAY IN MANILA 

of the Philippines. It was at Battery Knoll, where Scott's 
guns were planted against the Filipino trenches during the 
first days of the fighting at Manila, that services in honor of 
the soldier dead were held. Nearly 300 soldiers lay buried 
there on a bleak mound surrounded by rice fields, rough 
boards marking the graves, which were ranged in five un- 
broken row^. Beyond these were the Spanish blockhouses 
which were battered by shells from the American lines. All 
the American troops who could be spared from their places in 
the trenches marched to Battery Knoll, carrying a wealth of 
tropical flowers and foliage with which to decorate the graves 
of their comrades. Over each mound fluttered the folds of a 
silken flag. The day was as soft and balmy as a Jime day in 
New England, when just before sunset the soldiers, dusty and 
bronzed, in their l)lue and l)vown uniforms, gathered in a circle 
around Battery Knoll. Interspersed among them were groups 
of x\merican women, and brown-faced natives, from a little 
distance, peered curiously at the unwonted spectacle. The 
guns of the monitor Monadnocl', bombarding Paranaque, 
boomed a significant reminder that war and carnage were still 
at hand, l)ut just as the Sixth Artillery Band began a solemn 
dirge the thunder of the MoiuuIiwcl-\s guns ceased, while 
" taps " sounded from the bugle. Similar services were held 
over the graves of those interred in Paco cemetery. 

On the morning of June 3d the troops under General Law- 
ton's command began a forward movement that caused the 
rebels to take to their heels once more. A column under Gen- 
eral Hall crossed the San Mateo river and about noon en- 
countered and repulsed a large band of insurgents, twelve 
miles east of Manila, between ]\rariquina and Antipole. A 
running fight was in progress all the afternoon, and the insur- 
gents were driven from the hills toward the sea. A Filipino 
outpost first attacked a few American scouts, whereupon the 
Fourth Cavalry formed a skirmish line and easily drove the 
insurgents into the hills. Then the Second Oregon volun- 
teers in extended order moved across a wet, soggy rice field 



ANTIPOLO CAPTURED 739 

toward the hills, where it was believed a large force of the 
enemy had concentrated, ^^'hen the Oregonians were within 
about a mile of the position, the Filipinos opened a heavy fire, 
the Americans replying and pressing forward more rapidly. 
After a few volleys the insurgents were seen scattering over 
the crest of the hills in every direction, and their panic was 
increased when the artillery opened upon tlieiii and the shells 
began to explode all around them. The bonibardiuent by tiic 
batteries and the musketry was maintained for nearly half an 
hour, after which not a Filipino could be seen on the hills and 
not a shot came from tlu^ jiosition. The heat was fearful and 
caused the most intense sutlering among the troops, but they 
continued on the trail taken by the fleeing enemy in the hope 
of driving them toward the lake. 

It had been the original intention to surround the forces 
of General Pio del Pilar so that he would be obliged to retreat 
to the Morong peninsula, where capture would have been in- 
evitable. This plan was not completely successful, because 
General Hall's column found the country full of difficulties 
M'hich greatly prolonged the march. There were several 
streams to be bridged or forded, and the men frequently floun- 
dered through morasses waist-deep in mud, an experience 
which, under the terrific sun, exhausted them completely. 
General Hall's forces completed a circuit of tAventy miles in 
the rough country and drove the enemy before them. They 
swept down the Antipolo Valley, their objective point being 
the rebel town of Antipolo, a place far up in the mountains 
which had cost Spain the lives of three hundred men, and 
which the Spaniards had said the Americans could never caj)- 
ture. They met with sjiirited resistance from Cieneral Pio 
del Pilar's forces, but their heavy skirmish line carried all be- 
fore it. The movement was so rajud that the Filipinos had no 
time to defend the place or to destroy it. The lines were 
thrown around three sides of the tovm and then the final ad- 
vance was made. Tt was found unnecessary to fire a shot. 
Kot an insurgent was to be seen, the place being abandoned. 



740 THE MOVEMENT IN MORONG PROVINCE 

It was believed that the insurgents had a large force on the 
peninsula of Morong, which projects southward into Laguna 
de Bay. Xear the peninsula was the town of Morong, and a 
battery was located on the western shore. Upon this place the 
American troops next advanced, but their progress was greatly 
impeded by the roughness of the country. Transportation 
over it was impossible, and even the Signal Service wagons had 
to be abandoned. This prevented the maintenance of a com- 
plete cordon of soldiers. The heat was terrible, prostrating 
large numbers of the troops, who had to be taken across the 
lake in hospital tugs, one of which was struck by a shot from 
an insurgent cannon. 

The result of the movement in Morong province was to 
drive the insurgents into the mountains. The city of Morong 
was occupied and garrisoned, but the troops from all other 
places were withdrawn. The inhabitants of the provinces 
professed friendship and asked for protection. A large num- 
ber requested permission to enter Manila, but General Otis re- 
fused, as the population of the city was increasing too rapidly. 

A most important movement was begun on the morning of 
Saturday, June 10th, which had for its objective point the 
coast region south of Manila. The town of Paranaque es- 
pecially was regarded as one which it was desirable to capture, 
as it has been used for some time as a base of supplies by the 
insurgents, and a considerable force was gathered there. It 
lies on the coast a short distance south of Manila and in such a 
position that the vessels of the fleet were able to aid the land 
forces in attacking it. 

The brigades commanded In' General Lawton marched 
southeast from San Pedro Macati and then turned toward 
Bacoor, to the south of Paranaque. The insurgents were 
soon found, and at 9 o'clock the Colorado troops had a short 
contest with the enemy, in which ten of the Americans were 
wounded, two of them mortally, while the rebels left forty of 
their dead upon the field. General Wheaton SAvung to the 
northwest between Bacoor and Las Pinas, while General 



LAS PINAS AND PARANAQUE TAKEN 741 

OvGiisliiiio aJvaiK'od to the westward. The insurgent out- 
posts tired when they saw the Americans and then ran, stop- 
ping occasionally to tire again. They made no attempt to 
hold their ground. The main body of the rebels was heavily 
entrenched at Paranaque. The heat was terrific and it was 
utterly impossible for the men to advance rapidly. The 
wounded, the aiuimuiitioii, and llic supplies were carried on 
litters by Chinese coolies. At noon a lialt was called to allow 
the wearied soldiers to rest and sock ihr fi-icndly shade, but in 
an hour they were again on the march, atlvancing slowly to 
the southeast of Las Pinas, General Lawton and his escort at 
the head of the line. A body of Filipinos who were securely 
ensconced behind protecting trenches opened fire on the Amer- 
icans when the latter were about 500 yards distant. The Col- 
orado regiment deployed quickly and returned a fire which, 
with the volley firing of the Xinth Infantry, soon silenced the 
enemy. The Americans advanced along the river fronting 
the trenches, whereupon the rebels ran, circled the American 
left, and tried to attack them in the rear, but were unsuccess- 
ful. There were seven casualties among the Americans. 
Our men were unable to reach the beach of ^lanila Bay before 
nightfall, and they bivouacked in the fields south of Las Pinas. 
Dui-ing the night the rcl)els retreated southward along the 
slioi'c, iiiid llic sound of their bugles could be plainly heard as 
they marclieil away. In the morning the Americans occupied 
Las Pinas and Parana(|U(\ They found plenty of " fri(Mids " 
among the natives, who told them that the insurgents, number- 
ing about 3,000, commanded by General Xoriel, were then at 
Bacoor. Our casualties were about thirty wounded. North 
of Paranaque there were three series of trenches, the outside 
one measuring twenty feet. They anticipated an attack from 
the l)ay side and had constructed a Hfteen-foot trench for nine 
miles to prevent the landing of boats. Heavy defensive 
works encircled the town. Parananue had been re]>eatedly 
fired on by warships and it was found that the chureli had 
been conq)letely riddled by the American tire, over one hun- 



742 ADVANCE UPON BACOOR 

fired shots being counted on this bnilding alone. In entering 
the town the troops found a bamboo bridge that had been 
parti}' destroyed by the rebels. The apparent damage was 
qnickly repaired and an attempt was made to nse it without a 
careful examination. A mule team with a load of ammuni- 
tion started to cross and had gone but a short distance when 
the bridge gave way, precipitating the team and the wagon 
twenty feet into the water below. Then it was found that 
the insurgents had sawed the stringers half through. The 
rebels in their retreat to Bacoor dragged two heavy cannon 
taken from the arsenal at Cavite. The gunboats did excel- 
lent execution along the shore during the movement, but 
many of the insurgents retired in that direction, protected by 
the presence of women and children whom they made to go 
l)efore them. The loss of the enemy was placed by General 
Otis, on a conservative estimate, at about 400. 

One feature of the advance was the plucky work of Gen- 
eral Lawton, who personally led an attack on the trenches of 
the enemy. Tie was a target for their sharpshooters and, 
though he had a narrow escape, he came out of the engage- 
ment unscathed. Three mend^ers of his staif, all of whom 
followed their dashing leader, had their horses shot from under 
them. 

General Lawton's command now occupied Paranaque and 
Las Pinas, and the insurgents had fled to the southward. In- 
formation had reached General. Otis at ^Manila that the rebels 
would abandon both places and would probably take a stand 
on the l)ank of the Zapote river, where their strongest position 
was located, and where, in ISOS, the Pilipinos destroyed a 
Spanish battaliou nunil>oring SOO men. Notwithstanding the 
fact that over 500 of General Lawton's command had dropped 
out from heat exhaustiou on the march from San Pedro Ma- 
cati, he determined to resume the advance upon Bacoor. 



ClIAPTKll LXIV^ 

THK BATTLE OF LAS PINAS - DLSPHHATE FTGHTIXG AT 
ZAPOTE — MANILA TIIIiEATENEI) FROM THE SOUTH — 
ASSASSINATION OF GENERAL LUNA. 

Persistence of the Insurgents — The Rainy Season Their Ally — Americans 
Not to be Daunted — A Fiercely Fought Battle — United States Soldiers 
in a Rain of Bullets — Seven Warships Open Fire--Taking Zapote 
Bridge — Peppered b}- Filipino Sharpshooters — Brave Loaders of the 
Brave — Insurgents IMassiug Their Forces— They Intend to Capture 
Manila — General Otis Thwarts Their Plans — The Trenches Carried — 
Rebels Retreat through Imus — The Town surrendered — Tele- 
graph Wires Cut — Sharp Skirmish at San Fernando — Dissension 
Between Aguinaldo and Luna — A Statement from Agoncillo — 
His Criticism of President Mclvinley and General Otis — Luna's 
Death Reported — Insulted by a Captain of Aguinaldo's Guard — Ramon 
Endeavors to Defend Luna — Luna and Ramon Assassinated. 

TllOUdll tlioroiiglily beaten wherever fotiiid, the Fili- 
pinos were by no means conquered. When driven, as 
they always were, from every point wherever a stand 
was made, often from stron^-ly intrenched positions that had 
required months of patient hibor, they speedily reappeared at 
some other point only to be aptin routed and driven to another 
place. It must be admitted that the task of subduiuii' them 
had be(Mi underestimated. 

From the l^eginninii' of hostilities, Agiu'naldo liiid shrewdly 
ado|)te(l a jilan of guerrilla warfare well calculated to exhaust 
the American troops with the least possible damage to his own 
followers. lie cautiously avoided decisive engagements, 
while keej)ing our troops on the alert night aii<l day to guard 
against sudden attack-^. A\'iili a comparatively insignificant 
force he had succeeded in harassing and evading the army 
under Oeneral Otis for nearly six months. Xow, the ally that 
he had coiitidently counted upon had- afri\c<l. The dreaded 

(743) 



744 FIGHTING IN THE RAINY SEASON 

rainy season had set m, and the American troops had already 
begun to feel its deadly effect. But the Filipinos under- 
estimated the resources, energy, and endurance of the Amer- 
ican soldier. General Otis at once proceeded to destroy the 
tradition in the Philippines that the rainy season is a bar to 
military operations by white troops. In these operations the 
intense heat of the tropics was well-nigh overpowering, but 
our troops pressed forward through jungles and swamps with 
unflinching courage. Some of our famous and successful 
campaigns against American Indians were undertaken in the 
middle of winter when the Indians relied on the intense cold 
and deep snows to protect them, and among the officers and 
men of our forces in the Phili]>pines were many old Indian 
fighters with whom climatic conditions never interfered in 
carrying out their plans. The successful advance of General 
Lawton's command south of Manila and the evident deter- 
mination to push the camjiaign must have convinced Agui- 
Tialdo that aggressive ojierations would go relentlessly on, rain 
or shine. 

One of the most fiercely fought engagements of the war 
took place on Tuesday, June loth, between the forces of Gen- 
eral Lawton and the enemy south of Las Pinas, American field 
guns being engaged in their first duel with a Filipino battery 
which was concealed in the jungle, 'i'he native troops fought 
more desperately than ever before, and it was only by the most 
determined and valorous work on the part of our forces that 
victory was obtained. Companies F and I of the Twenty-first 
Infantry were nearly surrounded by a large body of insurgents, 
but they cut their way out, with heavy loss. General Lawton, 
AVheaton, and Ovensliine showed the utmost personal bravery 
during the day's fighting. 

The engagement was, in a measure, unexpected. During 
the night three cannon shots were fired at the Americans on 
the outskirts of Las Pinas. In the morning, General Lawton 
took a battalion of the Fourteenth regiment and two com- 
panies of the Twenty-first regiment to locate the rebel batt(M'y 



A DESPERATE ENCOUNTER 745 

in its hiding place in tlip juiiglo. When it was found, two 
guns of the JSixth artiUerv and four mountain guns were 
phinted against it at six hundred yards' distance. Ihe Fili- 
pino battery consisted of one large gun, from which they tired 
home-made canister, loaded with nails, and two smaller guns. 

The companies of the Twenty-first regiment, >kirniisliing 
along the beach with guicU^s, enc(inntere(l what was appai'ently 
a handful of rcdxds, who retreated. The r(\<iulars followed 
close, when suddenly the rebels o})ened a terrific fire on them 
from the sides and rear. They withdrew to the water's edge, 
finding what shelter they could, but exposed to a continuous 
fire. 

AVhen th(>ir ammunition was nearly exhausted, the com- 
panies retreated, but (General Lawton dashe(l (l(»wu to them 
and rallied the men. A little group made a desperate stand, 
(leneral Lawton, Major Starr, and Lieutenants Donovan and 
Connolly taking rifles from tlie A\<)unded men and firing at the 
eiHMuy. The general's shots l)ronght down some of the rebel 
sharpshooters from a tree. Finally, with their cartridges all 
gone, the little force was compelled to break through the ene- 
my's flank, carrying the wounded to the main body of the 
troops. 

^leanwhile, hostilities had been in ])rogress on the bay. 
At daylight the rebels at Cavite (b'()])])(Ml two shells from a 
liig smooth-bore gun, mo!mtc<| in fi'ont <d' the chni'ch. into the 
Cavite navy yard. The oidy damage done was to splinter the 
top of the huge shears on the Mole. 

The gunboats Cnllno, Maiilhi, and Zafiro jiroceeded to 
silence and dismount the gun, and then i-an (dose along the 
shore, bf)nd)arding the relxd ])osition. The insurgents replied 
all along the beach to Bacoor with rifle fire and a fusilade fnun 
some small pieces of artillery. So vigorous was the enemy's 
fire that soon after o'clock the gunboat J/clrim joinol the 
small gunboats mentioned, and the Princefon, Moiilcrci/, and 
Mana(hu)rl\ from their ancln^rages, dropjied occasional l»ig 
shells amonc' the rebels. Tlie M mind nock, Ili'lnitt. and /'/- 



74(3 WARSHIPS ASSIST THE TROOPS 

-firo trained their guns on Bacoor and finally set the town on 
fire, but the insurgents put out the flames. 

The fire of the seven warships apparently only served to 
excite the rebels, as they kept up an incessant fire of musketry 
and artillery from near the mouth of the Zapote river, two 
miles north of Bacoor. The fire of all the warships was con- 
centrated on this point soon after noon, as a preliminary to a 
resumption of the land battle. The Monadnock anchored 
close to the shore, and her heavy guns pounded the rebels con- 
tinuously, while the smaller warships, steaming along the 
shore, poured bullets from their rapid-fire guns at the enemy. 
The rebels were eventually forced to abandon their artillery, 
after holding out about four hours. 

The troops began at one o'clock to move forward to resume 
battle after the enemy's land battery had been silenced. The 
roads were narrow, and the small bridges that spanned the 
streams were, as a rule, commanded by almost impregnable 
breastworks twenty feet thick. The American troops moved 
slowly forward, often wading waist-deep in the mud of the salt 
flats. With their steady volleys of musketry they finally drove 
the rebels beyond the Zapote river. The only means of cross- 
ing this deep stream was by a small bridge, which the Filipinos 
commanded Avith trenches, spreading Y-shaped, whence they 
could concentrate their fire upon the bridge. They also were 
concealed l)y the trees and jungle. The only approach to the 
bridge was by a narrow, winding road, where the rebel bullets 
dropped thickly. Tlie short range made it almost impossible 
for the Americans to use artillery, and the mountain guns 
were fired at twenty-five yards. The two armies lay facing 
each other with the river between. The enemy were prac- 
tically out of sight, while the men in blue and khaki lay in the 
mud and bushes, many of them without any shelter for three 
hours, without a moment's cessation in the firing. 

One battalion after anotlier of the reserves was summoned 
by General Lawton from Las Pinas, until only enough troops 
were left in the town to prevent the Filipinos from attacking 



BATTLE OF ZAPOTE BRIDGE 747 

the Americans in the roar, which was feared, as they wore 
creeping around our left through the woods, delivering a Hank- 
ing fire, which put a great strain upon the endurance of the 
Americans floundering in the mud, while the Filipino sharp- 
shooters, hidden in trees, were peppering our men. The Four- 
teenth regiment lay to the right of the bridge. In front of 
them was the Twelfth regiment, wliilc tlic Ninth was on the 
right, and the 1'wenty-first up the road, facing the bridge. 
On the bridge were the bodies of two Americans who had at- 
tempted to rush across. Many wounded men had been carried 
from the open ground before the bridge. The fire of the in- 
surgents was terrific. General Lawton was told by a priest at 
Las Pinas that Zapote was defended by four thousand men, 
who had sworn upon the crucifix never to leave the field alive. 
The report of General Otis was as follows: 

" Makti,a, June 15. 
" Adjutant- General, Washinr/ton : 

" Success of Lawton's troops in Cavite province greater than reported 
yesterday. Enemy, numbering over 4,000, lost in killed, wounded, and 
captured more than one-third ; remainder much scattered. Have retreated 
south to Imus. Their arsenal of tivc pieces of artillery, three cajiturcd. 
Navy aided greatly on shore of bay, landing forces occasionally. Inhab- 
itants in that country rejoiced at deliverance and welcome with enthusiastic 
demonstrations arrival of our troops. Otis." 

General Lawton, although exhausted by the morning's 
fight, rallied by sheer will power, and was the comnianding 
figure in the battle. He went u]) and down tlic lines, direct- 
ing and encouraging the troojis. General Wheaton and Gen- 
eral Ovenshine were equally courageous. In fact, the gener- 
als were among the few men on the battlefield who refused to 
take shelter under hottest fire. After the battle General Law- 
ton remarked that it was more like war than anything he had 
seen in the Philippines. Tie was a conspicuous mark for tlu^ 
enemy, as he was a man of large stature, nml his uniform ;ind 
white helmet could be easily distinguished for a great distance, 
but he went up and down the line unscathed. Our loss was 
ten killed and fortv wounded. 



T4S DRIVEN FROM THE TRENCHES 

The reason for the movement against the insurgents to the 
south of Maniha was to prevent an attack on the city. There 
was good reason to suppose that they intended to try to take the 
city and were massing their troops in the vicinity of Cavite 
with that end in view, but General Otis determined to break 
up their organization before they coukl perfect their plans. 
The policy wliich ('eneral Otis pursued was that of keeping the 
enemy constantly on the move and preventing at all times the 
concentration of the natives at any place where they might be 
able to organize. The Filipinos who were to the south of Ma- 
nihi had been left alone until they became dangerous. Then 
it became necessary to attack and subdue them. 

Before dark on the night of June 13th the Fourteenth In- 
fantry swam the Zapote river, charged and carried the 
trenches, a heavy fusilade of artillery preparing the way and 
covering the crossing. The insurgents broke from the woods 
before the Fourteenth reached them. Almost at the same 
time tlie Xinth and the Twelfth fnfantry crossed a bar of the 
sea and came upon their left flank at a point where a body of 
marines with Maxim guns landed under protection of the 
ships' batteries and fired upon the enemy's left rear with a 
demoralizing effect. The Twenty-first crossed the river by a 
bridge as soon as it could l)e mended. Sixty-five dead Fili- 
pinos were found in the trenches. Several five-inch bore guns 
were cajjtured, with aninmnition marked '' U. S. Xavy Yard." 

After crossing the river the troops were withdrawn with 
the exception of the Xintli and the Twenty-first infantry, these 
regiments being left with four guns to guard the bridge. As 
they were being formed into companies the insurgents com- 
menced to fire volleys from the bamboo jungle 300 yards 
away. The regiments formed into line rapidly, and coolly, 
though under fire, and cheering, rushed to the woods, driving 
the enemy a mile away, the Filipinos disputing every foot. 
The Fourteenth encnrnped across the river, the men caring for 
man>- of the Avounded Filipinos. Eight prisoners were cap- 
tured. 



CAPTURE OF IMUS 7-1:0 

On June ir)tli the town of Innis, wliicli the S]);uiiai'(ls >\Hn\\ 
months in capturing-, was finally surrendered by its mayor to 
the ^Vmericaus. The town occupied a naturally strong posi- 
tion on a deep river with steep banks, which was crossed by a 
single bridge. The church and arsenal were loop-holed for 
riiles. A cartridge factory and powder mill at this place fur- 
nished ammunition to the insurgents, who attempted on the 
liMli to remove the stores from the mills and arsenal, but who 
hastily retreated, as if expecting defeat, leaving quantities of 
shells and powder behind them. A white flag floated from the 
church tower as the Americans entered, and that night the 
town was peacefully garrisoned by two battalions of the Four- 
teenth Infantry. The terrified and poverty-stricken inhabi- 
tants, who fled from the town when the American scouts came 
in, began to return, l)cing reassured by the mayor, who de- 
clared that the Americans were welcome, that the Filipino 
army were a "' band of cutthroats," and that they retired 
in utter confusion on the night of the 13th, carrying with 
them one hundred dead and three hundred wounded, and neg- 
lecting to guard their Spanish prisoners, fourteen of whom 
escaped. General Lawton distributed beef and rice to the 
needy, and the pervading sentiment seemed to be that of 
friendliness. 

San Fernando, captured by our troops in May, was the 
scene of the next skirmish. The telegraph between that place 
and Calumpit failing to work, a signal sergeant and three men 
were sent to make repairs. They found that the line had been 
cut at Apalit, and a section of the railroad torn up. This was 
done to sever communication with INIanila and prevent troops 
being sent to reinforce (Jeiun-al ^lacAi'thur, who was in com- 
mand at San Fernando. The party wei-e fired ujion by sharj)- 
shooters concealed in huts near l)y and they returned for re- 
inforcements, and succeeded in making repairs. 

Early on the morning of the Kith there was a simultaneous 
attack on the American lines encircling the town. An Towa 
regiment held the right of the line, the Kansas regiment the 



750 AGUINALDO ON THE BATTLEFIELD 

left, and the Montana regiment and Seventeenth Regular In- 
fantry the center. The light continued but for a short time, 
the work of the Americans being sharply effective, as they re- 
pulsed the rebels everywhere along the line with heavy loss. 
Nearly five thousand Filipinos took part in the attack, and the 
field was strewn with their dead and dying. The American 
casualties numbered but fourteen wounded, most of them only 
slightly. Preparations for the attack had been in progress for 
several days, and General Otis believed it to have been under 
the personal supervision of Aguinaldo. 

Much having been reported as to serious disagreements be- 
tween Aguinaldo and General Luna, a rupture between the 
leaders, and a breaking up of the insurgents into two or more 
conflicting parties was somewhat expected. Fearing that this 
state of affairs would tend to their discredit, and lessen the sym- 
pathy they had hoped to find in Europe, and even in America, 
Aguinaldo and his chief adviser, Agoncillo, were prompt to 
deny all such reports. A signed dispatch was sent from Paris 
to New York by Agoncillo, which read as follows : 

"The report that there are diflFerences of opinion between President 
Aguinaldo, General Luna, and other subalterns, is entirely false. 

" It is more false that the}^ refuse to have any dealing with the United 
States. 

"Aguinaldo, the supreme chief, is obeyed by all. The only obstacle in 
the way of an amicable arrangement with the Americans is the unyielding 
spirit of General Otis and his inspirer, President McKinley, who refuses to 
fulfill the solemn promise given by the American representatives to the 
Filipino people of independence as soon as triumph should be gained over 
the Spanish forces — a noble act which our country received with gratitude 
and joy. It is utterly false that they have laid plots against their religious 
interests. If it becomes independent the Philippine government will pro- 
claim liberty for all religions. All these reports referred to are but pretexts 
intended to deceive the American people, and invented by the imperialists 
who make a business of politics, which they put above the true interests of 
America and the Philippines." 

This was published on the 10th of June, and a day or two 
later came the report that Luna had been assassinated by mem- 
bers of Aguinaldo's guard. The news was soon confirmed. 



ASSASSINATION OF GEN. LUNA 751 

and it was learned that on Juno 0th General Limn and his ad- 
jutant, Colonel Kanion, visited Aguinaldo's headijuarters at 
( 'abanatnan. their purpose being, it was said, to secure Agui- 
nahlo's authority to imprison all Filipinos suspected of being 
friendly to the United States. General Luna asked the cap- 
tain of the guard if Aguinaldo was at home, to which question 
the captain replied in an insolent manner, " I don't know." 
The general was incensed at the nuuincr of the subordinate 
and berated him for his insolence, wherenijon the captain put 
his hand to his revolver. Luna instantly drew his revolver 
and fired at the captain, who returned the fire. Both marks- 
men missed in their excitement, and Colonel Ramon at once 
interfered, drawing his sword, whereupon a sergeant of the 
guard stabbed him with a bayonet. The entire guard then 
sprang upon Luna and Ixanion with bolos and bayonets, in- 
flicting many wounds and killing them both. 

The conviction was general that the death of Luna was 
connived at by Aguinaldo, There was a difference of opinion 
as to the real j^osition of General Luna, in regard to his attitude 
towards the Americans. The first Fili})ino envoys who 
entered the American lines with a request for the suspension 
of hostilities pending the arrangement of peace came from 
General Luna. Later, when peace commissioners, direct from 
Aguinaldo, started for Manila, they were detained by Lnna, 
who, according to reliable reports, had become an nncompro- 
mising opponent of overtures to the Americans. President 
Schurman of the Philippines Commission reported that Agui- 
naldo was in favor of making peace, bnt was deterred from do- 
ing so by Lnna, who wanted to keep np the resistance to Ameri- 
can authority. Other United States officials, however, be- 
lieved that Luna was in favor of peace, and that he was opposed 
by Aguinaldo in regard to making overtures to General Otis. 
General Luna was, next to Aguinaldo, tlic foremost leader in 
the insurrection. lie was a man of better education than his 
chief, having taken a college course in Europe, and had con- 
siderable force' of character. 



752 INCREASE OF FORCE 

It was (leeifled bv the adiniiiistration at Washington about 
the middle of June to increase the lighting force of the army 
in the Pliilippines to 35,000 men, all regulars, by tJie begint- 
ning of the dry season. This was 5,000 men more than 
General Otis estimated were needed to quell the insurrection. 

An order was issued by the War Department at Washing- 
ton, June 13th, increasing from 112 to 128 the number of men 
in each infantry company then serving in the Philippines or 
under orders to proceed there. General Otis had at that time 
in the Philippines, on the way thither and under orders for 
service in the islands, a total force of 23,400 enlisted soldiers, 
distributed as follows: Infantry, fifteen regiments, 20,160 
men; artillery, seventeen batteries, 2,040 men; cavalry, one 
regiment, 1,204 men. In addition, there was a total of about 
584 men belonging to the non-commissioned staff and bands. 
The assignment of eight companies each of the Twenty-fourth 
and Twenty-fifth Infantry made a further increase of 2,090, 
including the non-commissioned staff and the proposed increase 
of sixteen men in each company. The order of June 13th also 
increased each company of infantry of the fifteen regiments 
by sixteen men, making a further increase of 2,880 men. Al- 
together, the raising of the strength of the infantry companies 
to 128 men, and the assignment of the companies of the Twen- 
ty-fourth and Twenty-fifth Infantry, made a total increase of 
4,979 men. Adding to this 150 men of the engineers gave 
General Otis a complete total of 29,147. 




30 



31 



32 



33 



34 



35 



36 



Pl ■ 







5 < 

X 










T^t 



Cj 



A. D. WortliiBgton & Co.'s New Map oi' Philippine- Islands, Manila Baj, (phiiin, Jai^an, Korea, Etc. 




A. 1). \\'()fthiiig(o2i A- ( 'o.'s New Map ot'tlu" \\nr\i\ i>n Mereator's Project ioi 




m s 



